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Henry of Ghent and theological education for womenBall, Frances A., January 1974 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1974. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.
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William James Ghent, reformer and historianSmith, Harold Sherburn, January 1957 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1957. / Typescript. Abstracted in Dissertation abstracts, v. 17 (1957) no. 10, p. 2256. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 526-547).
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Sense and spirituality : seeing Jan van Eyck's Ghent altarpieceAdams, Merchant Stewart, 1972- 03 September 2009 (has links)
This thesis emphasizes the senses of the audience in reception of Jan van Eyck’s heroic Ghent Altarpiece. This pivotal work may have demanded the viewer engage in a hierarchy of devotion ranging from intimate and private to public and liturgical. Jan van Eyck engages in a strategy of representation that focus and specify various aspects of vision to create a multivalent devotional experiences for the viewer. This thesis compares some of the visual uses of frames in miniatures and how they relate to altarpiece formats and hierarchies of vision. Reception of the Ghent Altarpiece is also discussed in relation to Augustine of Hippo’s theory of tri-partite vision as well as his theory of cross-modal uses of the sense in dialogues of spiritual truth. Sound is also a vital component of the devotional experience of the Ghent Altarpiece. Issues of music and speech acts are discussed to underscore the multivalent devotional uses of the Ghent Altarpiece. / text
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O conhecimento abstrativo em Henrique de Gand (a. 1240-1293) / Henry of Ghent (a. 1240-1293) on abstractive knowledgePaiva, Gustavo Barreto Vilhena de 28 September 2017 (has links)
Henrique de Gand pode ser considerado um dos mais importantes mestres em atividade na Universidade de Paris do último quarto do século XIII. Em sua volumosa obra composta, principalmente, por sua Suma de questões ordinárias e por 15 conjuntos de Questões quodlibetais , Henrique disserta frequentemente acerca do conhecimento humano. Em particular, ele dedica amplo espaço em seus textos [1] à caracterização do homem como ser capaz de obter conhecimento e [2] à discussão sobre o modo como, uma vez afetado pelos objetos de conhecimento, o homem age (por suas potências cognoscitivas) para produzir tal conhecimento. Esse conhecimento simples, obtido por abstração dos sentidos, será a base para o conhecimento proposicional posterior. Entretanto, é patente uma fundamental dificuldade na filosofia de Henrique: tanto [1] a potência humana para o conhecimento como [2] a atividade humana para tal conhecimento são insuficientes para a produção de um conhecimento estritamente verdadeiro. Sendo assim, a doutrina da intelecção de Henrique, muito embora admita a ocorrência de um conhecimento intelectual por abstração a partir dos sentidos, igualmente aponta para a necessidade de uma ação divina, para além da abstração e da própria alma humana, que permita um conhecimento estritamente verdadeiro. O presente trabalho se concentra na descrição da noção de conhecimento abstrativo em Henrique de Gand para, ao final, apontar a problemática necessidade, sublinhada por nosso autor, de um ultrapassamento desse conhecimento proveniente dos sentidos. / Henry of Ghent can be considered as one of the most important masters at the University of Paris in the last quarter of the 13th century. In his voluminous work composed mainly by his Summa of Ordinary Questions and 15 sets of Quodlibetal Questions , Henry often discusses human knowledge. Specially, he gives ample room in his texts [1] to the caracterization of man as a being capable of acquiring knowledge and [2] to the discussion about the way in which man acts (through his cognitive potencies) to produce such knowledge once affected by the objects of knowledge. This simple knowledge, acquired through abstraction from the senses, will be the basis for the posterior propositional knowledge. Nevertheless, a fundamental difficulty is clear in Henrys philosophy: both [1] human potency for knowledge and [2] human activity toward knowledge are insufficient for the production of strictly true knowledge. Thus, although Henrys doctrine of knowledge accepts the occurrence of intellectual knowledge through abstraction from the senses, it also points to the necessity of some divine action beyond abstraction and the human soul itself which allows for strictly true knowledge. The present study concentrates on the description of Henry of Ghents conception of abstractive knowledge pointing at the end to the problematic necessity highlighted by our author of surpassing this knowledge acquired through senses.
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O conhecimento abstrativo em Henrique de Gand (a. 1240-1293) / Henry of Ghent (a. 1240-1293) on abstractive knowledgeGustavo Barreto Vilhena de Paiva 28 September 2017 (has links)
Henrique de Gand pode ser considerado um dos mais importantes mestres em atividade na Universidade de Paris do último quarto do século XIII. Em sua volumosa obra composta, principalmente, por sua Suma de questões ordinárias e por 15 conjuntos de Questões quodlibetais , Henrique disserta frequentemente acerca do conhecimento humano. Em particular, ele dedica amplo espaço em seus textos [1] à caracterização do homem como ser capaz de obter conhecimento e [2] à discussão sobre o modo como, uma vez afetado pelos objetos de conhecimento, o homem age (por suas potências cognoscitivas) para produzir tal conhecimento. Esse conhecimento simples, obtido por abstração dos sentidos, será a base para o conhecimento proposicional posterior. Entretanto, é patente uma fundamental dificuldade na filosofia de Henrique: tanto [1] a potência humana para o conhecimento como [2] a atividade humana para tal conhecimento são insuficientes para a produção de um conhecimento estritamente verdadeiro. Sendo assim, a doutrina da intelecção de Henrique, muito embora admita a ocorrência de um conhecimento intelectual por abstração a partir dos sentidos, igualmente aponta para a necessidade de uma ação divina, para além da abstração e da própria alma humana, que permita um conhecimento estritamente verdadeiro. O presente trabalho se concentra na descrição da noção de conhecimento abstrativo em Henrique de Gand para, ao final, apontar a problemática necessidade, sublinhada por nosso autor, de um ultrapassamento desse conhecimento proveniente dos sentidos. / Henry of Ghent can be considered as one of the most important masters at the University of Paris in the last quarter of the 13th century. In his voluminous work composed mainly by his Summa of Ordinary Questions and 15 sets of Quodlibetal Questions , Henry often discusses human knowledge. Specially, he gives ample room in his texts [1] to the caracterization of man as a being capable of acquiring knowledge and [2] to the discussion about the way in which man acts (through his cognitive potencies) to produce such knowledge once affected by the objects of knowledge. This simple knowledge, acquired through abstraction from the senses, will be the basis for the posterior propositional knowledge. Nevertheless, a fundamental difficulty is clear in Henrys philosophy: both [1] human potency for knowledge and [2] human activity toward knowledge are insufficient for the production of strictly true knowledge. Thus, although Henrys doctrine of knowledge accepts the occurrence of intellectual knowledge through abstraction from the senses, it also points to the necessity of some divine action beyond abstraction and the human soul itself which allows for strictly true knowledge. The present study concentrates on the description of Henry of Ghents conception of abstractive knowledge pointing at the end to the problematic necessity highlighted by our author of surpassing this knowledge acquired through senses.
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Promoting Sustainable Mobility In Visby's Inner City : A Case Study Inspired By Ghent's Mobility PlanClift, Summer January 2024 (has links)
This paper examines how selected measures from Ghent's mobility plan can be achievable in Visby's inner city. Gotland has the highest car density and the shortest driving distance in Sweden per person per year (Energicentrum, n.d). Most of the short journeys occur in Visby's inner city (Telia, 2023). This is a problem as short car journeys are often more polluting as carbon dioxide emissions are higher in the first 5km (Energicentrum, n.d). This is a case study with data collected from a document analysis and an interview with an official at Region Gotland to enhance scientific knowledge and understand the limitations and potential for selected measures in Visby. The selected measures that are evaluated are a Low Emissions Zone, Push and Pull parking strategies and increasing pedestrian and bike mobility through Living Streets and bike parking. These three measures from Ghent were found to be achievable in Visby’s inner city. These measures could be achieved by a long planning process and changed to scale and adapt to Visby's unique inner city. Support from politicians to increase acceptance and allow for better conditions for the implementation would also be beneficial in achieving the measures. Additionally, introducing the measures to Visby could help Gotland reach its 2040 regional development goals and increase sustainable mobility in the inner city.
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A masterpiece of diplomacy: Anglo-American negotiations at Ghent, (August-December, 1814)Wood, James Cleveland, 1941- January 1966 (has links)
No description available.
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Pieter van Reijsschoot (1738-1795) et les siens: une famille de peintres gantois du XVIIIe siècleFredericq-Lilar, Marie January 1985 (has links)
Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Le mode d'être des objets intentionnels : une étude du rôle constituant de l'intellect chez Thierry de Freiberg / On the mode of being of intentional objects : the constitutive function of the intellect by Dietrich of Freiberg (1250-1310)Decaix, Véronique 18 March 2013 (has links)
Cette thèse traite de la doctrine catégorielle, de l’ontologie et de la théorie de la connaissance de Dietrich de Freiberg dans le De origine rerum praedicamentalium. L’enjeu principal est d’étudier la fonction constitutive que l’intellect opère sur catégories et sur l’étant en tant que tel. La première partie replace le traité dans le contexte historique des débats à l’université de Paris à la fin du XIIIe siècle touchant au statut des catégories et à la manière d’ordonner les genres réels de l’étant. Elle confronte la dérivation essentielle des prédicaments chez Dietrich aux modèles de systématisation élaborées par ses prédécesseurs, tels qu’Albert le Grand, Thomas d’Aquin, Henri de Gand. La deuxième partie s’attache aux objets constitués par l’intellect : l’Un comme principe du nombre et de la division, la relation et le temps. La dernière partie enquête la modalité sur laquelle l’intellect opère cette activité sur l’étant et montre en définitive que le sujet de la métaphysique, l’être quiditatif des étants, se situe à la croisée de la logique et du réel / This thesis deals with Dietrich of Freiberg’s doctrine of categories, ontology and theory of knowledge, as present in the treatise De origine rerum praedicamentalium. The primary aim is to examine the constitutive function the intellect exercises on the categories and being as being. The first part of this thesis replaces the treatise in the historical background of the late 13th century debates from the University of Paris regarding the nature of categories and the manner of organizing the real genera of being. It compares Dietrich’s deduction of the categories with the systematization of some of his predecessors such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. The second part of the thesis deals with the objects caused by the intellect: the One as principle of number and division, relation and time. The last part investigates the manner in which the intellect exercises its constitutive power on being and demonstrates in the final analysis that the subject of metaphysics, the quiditative being of things, is placed at the intersection of logic and reality
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