Submitted by Setor de Tratamento da Informa??o - BC/PUCRS (tede2@pucrs.br) on 2015-06-02T14:30:55Z No. of bitstreams: 1 469628 Texto Completo.pdf: 931195 bytes, checksum: c7c8e9f4562e06942a014716c371b8d2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-06-02T14:30:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 469628 Texto Completo.pdf: 931195 bytes, checksum: c7c8e9f4562e06942a014716c371b8d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-12 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / This thesis aims to analyze the dichotomy between fact and value. The separation of the merely factual-objective of which is evaluative-subjective is the result of a historical progression based on a number of theories that oppose each other, going back to the clash between Descartes and Hume (rationalism and empiricism). However, this dichotomy is criticized by Hilary Putnam, who defends the existence of an entanglement of facts and values. In this sense, will seek to demonstrate the danger to defend the ideal of a science free of ethical and social values. The second chapter, in order to demonstrate a more tangible way the entanglement between facts and values, is dedicated to an evaluation conducted on the unsustainability of the dichotomy fact - value in the economy. It is proposed to evaluate the work of Amartya Sen, Indian philosopher and economist who has devoted his career to the affirmation of the economy also as a human science that deals with complex ethical factors which can not be reduced simply to numbers and statistics.Sen defends the possibility of a welfare economy and, therefore, proposes a rereading of "classical economics", adding that it would have been an ethical impoverishment due to its overly linked to mathematical reason structure and focus on individual interest. Seeking a solution that would avoid utilitarianism, Sen developed the theory of capabilities, which proposes to consider the interpersonal comparisons of "utility." Thus, we intend to address the issue of the fact-value dichotomy, based on the thought of Putnam and Sen, pointing out the possible consequences that the arguments raised generate for philosophical perception of political science, and notions of reason applicable to normative issues. / A presente disserta??o busca analisar a dicotomia entre fato e valor. A separa??o do que ? meramente f?tico-objetivo do que ? valorativo-subjetivo ? resultado de uma progress?o hist?rica fundada numa s?rie de teorias que se op?em entre si, remontando ao embate entre Descartes e Hume (racionalismo e empirismo). Contudo, esta dicotomia ? criticada por Hilary Putnam, que defende a exist?ncia de um entrela?amento de fatos e valores. Nesse sentido, buscar-se-?, no primeiro cap?tulo do trabalho, demonstrar o perigo de se defender o ideal de uma ci?ncia livre de valores ?ticos e sociais. O cap?tulo seguinte, buscando demonstrar de modo mais tang?vel o entrela?amento entre fato e valor, ? dedicado a uma avalia??o aplicada, relativa ? insustentabilidade da referida dicotomia no campo da economia.Para isso, prop?e-se avaliar alguns aspectos da obra de Amartya Sen, fil?sofo e economista indiano que dedicou sua carreira ? afirma??o da economia tamb?m como ci?ncia humana que lida com fatores ?ticos complexos, que n?o podem ser reduzidos a n?meros e estat?sticas. Sen defende a possibilidade de uma economia de bemestar e, para isso, prop?e uma releitura da ?teoria econ?mica cl?ssica?, aduzindo que ela teria sofrido empobrecimento ?tico decorrente da sua estrutura excessivamente ligada ? raz?o matem?tica e ao foco no interesse individual. Buscando uma solu??o que evitasse o utilitarismo, Sen desenvolveu a teoria das capacidades, na qual se prop?e a considerar as compara??es interpessoais de ?utilidade?. A partir dessas discuss?es, pretendemos abordar o tema da dicotomia fato-valor com base no pensamento de Putnam e Sen, apontando as poss?veis consequ?ncias geradas pelos argumentos levantados ? percep??o filos?fica das ci?ncias pol?ticas, e ?s no??es de raz?o aplic?veis ?s quest?es normativas.

Moral realism is the view that there are such things as moral facts. Moral realists have attempted to combat the skeptical problem of relativism, which is that the truth of an ethical value judgment is often, or always, subjective, that is, relative to the parties it involves. This essay presents, discusses, and criticizes Hilary Putnam’s attempt at maintaining moral realism while at the same time maintaining a degree of epistemological relativism. Putnam’s positive account originates in moral epistemology, at the heart of which lies truth, as idealized rational acceptability or truth under ideal conditions. The bridge between moral epistemology and normative ethics stems from Putnam’s disintegration of facts and values. His theory is finalized in the construction of a normative moral theory, in which the central notion is incessant self-criticism in order to maintain rationality. After presenting Putnam’s core thesis, the criticism raised by Richard Rorty, is deliberated upon. Rorty is critical of Putnam’s attempt at holding on to objectivity, because he does not understand how objective knowledge can be both relative to a conceptual scheme, and at the same time objective. The conclusion is that Putnam is unable to maintain his notion of truth as idealized rational acceptability and is forced into epistemological relativism. Putnam’s normative ethics has characteristics in common with virtue ethics, and is of much interest regardless of whether it can be grounded epistemologically or not.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1939. / "Select bibliography": p. [xvii]-xviii.

No figure of fourth-century Christianity seems to be at once so well known and so clouded in mystery as Hilary of Poitiers. His work as an historian provides invaluable knowledge of the mid-fourth century, and he was praised as a theologian throughout late antiquity. Today, however, discussions of his theology are founded upon less solid ground. This is largely due to methodological issues. Modern scholarship has often read Hilary through anachronistic historical and theological categories which have rendered his thought incomprehensible. Recent scholars have sought to overcome this and to reexamine Hilary within his own historical, polemical, and theological context. Much remains to be said, however, in regard to Hilary's actual theological contribution within these contextual parameters. This thesis contends that in all of Hilary's polemical and constructive argumentation in De Trinitate, which is essentially trinitarian, he is inherently and necessarily developing an anthropology. In all he says about the divine, he is saying as much about what it means to be human. This thesis therefore seeks to reenvision Hilary's overall theological project in terms of the continual, and for him necessary, anthropological corollary of trinitarian theology-to reframe it in terms of a 'trinitarian anthropology'. My contention is that the coherence of Hilary's thought depends upon his understanding of divine-human relations. I will demonstrate this through following Hilary's main lines of trinitarian argument, out of which flows his anthropological vision. These main lines of argument, namely, divine generation, divine infinity, divine unity, the divine image, and divine humanity, each unfold into a progressive picture of humanity from potentiality to perfection. This not only provides a new paradigm for understanding Hilary's own thought, but invites us to reexamine our approach to fourth-century theology entirely, as it disavows any reading of the trinitarian controversies in conceptual abstraction. Further, theological and religious anthropology are widely discussed in contemporary scholarship, and Hilary's profound exploration of divine-human relations, and what it means to be a human being as a result, has much to offer both historical and contemporary concerns.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2014. / Submitted by Albânia Cézar de Melo (albania@bce.unb.br) on 2015-01-30T11:50:33Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_AlexandreFreitasMelloJunior.pdf: 990645 bytes, checksum: e32ca247b491414fc6308d333947c403 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ruthléa Nascimento(ruthleanascimento@bce.unb.br) on 2015-02-10T20:02:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_AlexandreFreitasMelloJunior.pdf: 990645 bytes, checksum: e32ca247b491414fc6308d333947c403 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-10T20:02:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_AlexandreFreitasMelloJunior.pdf: 990645 bytes, checksum: e32ca247b491414fc6308d333947c403 (MD5) / A presente dissertação expõe o périplo percorrido por Putnam com o escopo de argumentar que a dicotomia fato/valor está fundamentada em noções errôneas dos conceitos nela envolvidos. A dicotomia, assim constituída, é o sustentáculo de um equívoco segundo o qual enunciados de valor, em especial enunciados éticos, não podem ser objetivos. Postulamos que enunciados éticos podem ser objetivos, mas para isso alguns conceitos centrais devem ser reformulados. Desse modo, é tematizado no primeiro capítulo o que são enunciados cognitivamente relevantes, na perspectiva do positivismo lógico, pois é a partir desse registro filosófico que Putnam reage às conclusões de que enunciados éticos não são objetivos. No segundo capítulo, analisa-se a noção de fato do positivismo lógico inspirada no empirismo britânico, apresentando uma rejeição dessa noção, quando considerada nesses termos. É lançada, também, uma crítica ao realismo da metafísica tradicional, fator esse fundante para o procedimento que Putnam irá realizar favoravelmente ao imbricamento entre as noções de ‘fato’ e ‘valor’. ‘Fato’ e ‘valor’ estão intimamente relacionados, de tal forma que é impossível imaginar uma questão de fato que não contenha uma valoração qualquer e, a fim de demonstrar isso, abordamos a noção de ‘conceitos éticos espessos’. No terceiro capítulo, é apresentada a primeira rodada do debate entre Putnam e Habermas, na qual a posição daquele está em evidência. Putnam faz considerações sobre a distinção habermasiana entre ‘valor’ e ‘norma’. Habermas responde, e dá um panorama da filosofia de Putnam. Este realiza uma tréplica, esclarecendo pontos em que julga que Habermas enganou-se. No quarto e último capítulo, procuramos, por fim, explicar o que é o realismo pragmatista de Putnam, conhecido por realismo interno, dando uma fundamentação teórica a noção de objetividade que é condição necessária para se estabelecer a relevância cognitiva dos enunciados éticos. Para falarmos do realismo pragmatista, invocamos a ‘relatividade conceitual’ e o ‘esquema conceitual’, haja vista serem fulcrais para o seu entendimento. ________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This dissertation presents the journey traveled by Putnam with the scope to argue that the fact/ value dichotomy is based on misconceptions of the concepts involved. The dichotomy, thus constituted, is the basis of a misconception according to which statements of value, particularly ethical statements, cannot be objective. We postulate that ethical statements can be objective, but for that, some core concepts must be reformulated. Thus, the first chapter presents what cognitively relevant statements are, from the perspective of logical positivism, as it is from this philosophical record that Putnam reacts to the conclusions that ethical statements are not objective. The second chapter examines the logical positivism’s notion of fact, actually inspired by British empiricism, to present a rejection of this notion, when considered in these terms. It also launched a critique of the realism of traditional metaphysics, which is a foundational factor for Putnam’s procedure favorably to the entanglement between the notions of 'fact' and 'value'. 'Fact' and 'value' are closely related, so it is impossible to imagine a matter of fact that does not contain a valuation and, in order to demonstrate this, we discuss the notion of ‘thick ethical concepts'. In the third chapter, the first round of debates between Putnam and Habermas is presented, in which Putnam’s position is in focus. Putnam makes consideration of Habermas' distinction between 'value' and 'norm'. Habermas responds, and gives an overview of Putnam’s philosophy. Then, Putnam performs a rejoinder to clarify points in which he believes Habermas was mistaken. In the fourth and final chapter, we finally try to explain what Putnam’s pragmatic realism is, also known as internal realism, by giving a theoretical basis for the notion of objectivity, necessary condition to establish the cognitive relevance of ethical statements. In order to talk about pragmatic realism, we call down the 'conceptual relativity' and the 'conceptual scheme', considering they are central for it to be understood.

The paper analyses Hilary Mantel’s novel Bring Up the Bodies in terms of how it might correlate with the notion of Russian patriotism. The origin for the research lies in the official list of literature recommended for patriotic education in Russia that was compiled in late 2015 and is thus immediately connected with the surge of state-driven patriotism in the country following the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Bring Up the Bodies is among very few contemporary historical novels by non-Russian authors included in the list. The conducted analysis reveals certain features in the novel’s protagonist and his behaviour that might correspond with the understanding of patriotism and citizenship in Russians. Moreover, the paper argues that legal pragmatism practiced by the protagonist, as well as the very style of historical representation in the novel, that re-evaluates the historical figure of Cromwell and undermines subjectivity of the historical past, may be seen as legitimising contemporary politics in Russia by way of establishing a “tradition.”

The aim of this study is to study the construction of literary values. I have been looking at how literature awarded with sponsored literary prizes has been reviewed in four major English and American newspapers. I have been studying the reception of literature by Ian McEwan, Hilary Mantel, Colm Tóibín and Zadie Smith between 2000 and 2012. The prizes in focus are the Man Booker Prize, the Orange prize for fiction and the Costa Awards. There seems to be an increasing number of articles related to each author after they have been awarded a prize, however with little change in the content of the reviews. The non critical articles seems to move towards a more personal angle. I have also found that critics tend to position the authors’ works in comparision to canonised authorships rather than discussing the literature as awarded.

Dans cette thèse, je propose une lecture renouvelée de l’itinéraire philosophique d’Hilary Putnam concernant la problématique du réalisme. Mon propos consiste essentiellement à défendre l’idée selon laquelle il y aurait beaucoup plus de continuité, voir une certaine permanence, dans la manière dont Putnam a envisagé la question du réalisme tout au long de sa carrière. Pour arriver à une telle interprétation de son oeuvre, j’ai essentiellement suivi deux filons. D’abord, dans un ouvrage du début des années 2000, Ethics without Ontology (2004), Putnam établit un parallèle entre sa conception de l’objectivité en philosophie des mathématiques et en éthique. Le deuxième filon vient d’une remarque qu’il fait, dans l’introduction du premier volume de ses Philosophical Papers (1975), affirmant que la forme de réalisme qu’il présupposait dans ses travaux des années 1960-1970 était la même que celle qu’il défendait en philosophie des mathématiques et qu’il souhaitait défendre ultérieurement en éthique. En suivant le premier filon, il est possible de mieux cerner la conception générale que se fait Putnam de l’objectivité, mais pour comprendre en quel sens une telle conception de l’objectivité n’est pas propre aux mathématiques, mais constitue en réalité une conception générale de l’objectivité, il faut suivre le second filon, selon lequel Putnam aurait endossé, durant les années 1960-1970, le même type de réalisme en philosophie des sciences et en éthique qu’en philosophie des mathématiques. Suivant cette voie, on se rend compte qu’il existe une similarité structurelle très forte entre le premier réalisme de Putnam et son réalisme interne. Après avoir établi la parenté entre le premier et le second réalisme de Putnam, je montre, en m’inspirant de commentaires du philosophe ainsi qu’en comparant le discours du réalisme interne au discours de son réalisme actuel (le réalisme naturel du commun des mortels), que, contrairement à l’interprétation répandue, il existe une grande unité au sein de sa conception du réalisme depuis les années 1960 à nos jours. Je termine la thèse en montrant comment mon interprétation renouvelée de l’itinéraire philosophique de Putnam permet de jeter un certain éclairage sur la forme de réalisme que Putnam souhaite défendre en éthique. / In this dissertation I propose a new reading of the philosophical itinerary of Hilary Putnam on the matter of realism. In essence, my purpose is to argue that there is much more continuity than is normally understood, and even a degree of permanence, in the way in which Putnam has viewed the question of realism throughout his career. To arrive at this interpretation of Putnam I essentially followed two veins in his work. First, in a volume published in the early 2000s entitled Ethics without Ontology (2004), Putnam establishes a parallel between his conception of objectivity in the philosophy of mathematics and in ethics. The second vein comes from a comment he made in the introduction to the first volume of his Philosophical Papers (1975) to the effect that the kind of realism he presupposed in his work of the 1960s and 70s was the same that he upheld in the philosophy of mathematics and wished to argue for at a later date in ethics. Following the first vein makes it possible to better grasp Putnam’s general conception of objectivity, but in order to understand how such a conception of objectivity is not unique to mathematics but is instead a general conception of objectivity one must follow the second vein. There, in the 1960s and 70s, Putnam adopted the same kind of realism in the philosophy of science and in ethics as he had in the philosophy of mathematics. Following this path, one realises that there exists a very strong structural similarity between Putnam’s first realism and his internal realism. After establishing this connection between Putnam’s first and second realism, I draw on Putnam’s remarks and compare the internal realism discourse to his current realism (the natural realism of ordinary people) to demonstrate, contrary to the prevalent interpretation, that there has been a great deal of consistency in his conception of realism from the 1960s to the present day. I conclude the dissertation by demonstrating how my new interpretation of Putnam’s philosophical itinerary makes it possible to shed light on the kind of realism he wishes to champion in ethics.

The main purpose of this dissertation is to answer the question of how one can understand the fact that we mean very different things when we say that God exists and when we say that chairs, mountains and trees exist, and that it is still a matter of existence. On the one hand it seems that we talk about the same thing when we say that something exists, irrespective of what it is, on the other hand it seems to be a question of very different things depending on what it is we are talking about as existing. This dissertation seeks to give an understanding of the relation between the concept of truth and the concept of reality. The conclusion is not only that we presuppose these concepts in everything we do, say, believe and think, but that we presuppose a specific understanding of these concepts, namely a concept of objective truth and a concept of an external and mind independent reality. In this dissertation it is also argued that our use of these concepts and that we use them in everything we do – that they are as basic as they are – says something about how it is, about reality. The use of these concepts does not only say something of what we conceptually presuppose but it also says something about what we assume in relation to reality. The conceptual aspect, in this way, has consequences ontologi.

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