<p>In this dissertation, I advance a new interpretation of the meaning and political implications of Isaiah Berlin's theory of value pluralism. My argument focuses on two puzzles within the literature on value pluralism: first, value pluralist political theorists advance a variety of differing political views on an ostensibly value pluralist basis; second, and more deeply, their writings betray significant ambiguity on what value pluralism means in the first place. I identify two central sources of these problems. First, two distinct sets of ideas in Berlin's work, which I label the "moral-practical" and "societal groupings" versions of value pluralism, are persistently conflated by both Berlin and more recent value pluralist theorists. Second, attempts to justify a political view on the basis of value pluralism run aground on a "priority problem" stemming from the central value pluralist concept of incommensurability. In my approach, I maintain the distinction between the moral-practical and societal groupings theories, focusing on the moral-practical version as a more original and less well-understood contribution of Berlin's thought. I also develop a strategy, which I call "giving incommensurability its due," that avoids the priority problem by focusing on metaethical (or second-order), epistemic, and procedural considerations. This strategy supports two major sets of political implications: a liberal-constitutional framework of basic rights and liberties, and a robust, vibrant form of participatory and deliberative democratic politics. This turn to democracy constitutes an important shift vis-à-vis the current literature, which has, up to now, been preoccupied with value pluralism's relationship to liberalism.</p> / Dissertation

A key theoretical debate underlying the now defunct Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation known as the Fairness Doctrine is conflict over what constitutes the right to freedom of speech: a positive or negative conception. Similarly, since repeal of the Doctrine, other FCC measures to uphold the “public-interest” standard in broadcasting have relied on a positive conception of speech. This thesis demonstrates the history of this debate through court cases, news reports, scholarly articles and historical documents. It then is argued that the positive-right nature of these regulations is problematic philosophically, constitutionally and practically. The positive-right conception lends itself to an uncomfortable level of paternalism on the part of government regulators, a constitutional abridgement of negative-right speech and a tedious involvement of government in regulation that can lead to a chilling effect on speech. The conclusion then suggests further areas of research related to the topics covered in the thesis.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3306.pdf: 980283 bytes, checksum: 095ba8f1b64bc57fe7a515773ded36ec (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-09-24 / This work presents the fundamental differences between Isaiah Berlin&#8223;s positive and negative freedom. It also adds the analysis of other philosophers on the subject. The analysis evaluates the state-of-art on freedom of Berlin&#8223;s work (Two concepts of freedom), seeking its relationship with democracy. In particular, it explores Berlin&#8223;s work in relation to Karl Popper&#8223;s work (The open society and its enemies), where it is noticed that both writers fear totalitarianism, but propose different ways to avoid it. Democracy and the electoral process in Brazil are explained in order to introduce the issue of freedom in which this process occurs, showing that, opposing to what liberal theories say, the Brazilian electoral process occurs inside a fake idea of negative freedom. In practice, this is an exercise of extreme positive freedom. / Este trabalho apresenta as diferenças fundamentais entre liberdade positiva e negativa em Isaiah Berlin. Também acrescenta a análise de outros filósofos acerca deste tema. A análise avalia o estado da arte da liberdade no trabalho de Berlin (Dois conceitos de Liberdade), buscando sua relação com a democracia. De modo particular, este trabalho explora o trabalho de Berlin em relação ao trabalho de Karl Popper (A sociedade aberta e seus inimigos), onde se percebe que ambos os autores temem o totalitarismo, mas propõem diferentes caminhos para evitá-lo. Democracia e o processo eleitoral no Brasil são explicados de modo a introduzir a questão da liberdade em que este processo ocorre, mostrando que, contrariando o que as teorias liberais dizem, o processo eleitoral brasileiro ocorre dentro de uma falsa idéia de liberdade negativa. Na prática, este é um exercício de liberdade positiva extrema.

Liberalism is often criticized as too moralistic and removed from the realities of politics; and too complacently accepting of injustices. Such criticisms, familiar among contemporary political theorists, were expressed far more forcefully in the earlier twentieth century. Liberalism then came under attack from anti-liberals who wholly rejected the institutional and ethical limits on the political deployment of violence and fear insisted upon by liberals. Such anti-liberals advanced arguments for political ruthlessness on behalf of a truer morality - either the morality of pursuing morally imperative political goals; or the morality of "realistically" responding to threats to public order. Liberals found themselves faced with a dilemma: to adhere to their principles at the price of hampering their ability to combat both existing injustices, and the threat posed by ruthless anti-liberal movements; or to abandon their scruples in seeking to defend, or transform, liberal society. The criticisms and challenges confronting liberalism between the end of World War I, and the end of the Cold War, thus centered on opposing responses to problems of political ethics. They were also shaped by opposed ideals of political ethos - the "spirit", dispositions of character, sensibility and patterns of perception and response, which characterize the way in which actors pursue their values and goals in practice. In this dissertation I reconstruct these debates, and explicate the ethical claims and questions involved, presenting accounts of the opposed - yet often convergent - positions of moral purism, end-maximalism, and realism. I offer accounts of the ethical arguments and ethos of such anti-liberals as Lenin, Trotsky, and Lukacs; and explore the ambivalent commitments and ambiguous arguments of Max Weber, who influenced both critics and defenders of liberalism. Finally, and primarily, I reconstruct the ethical arguments and ethos of "tempered liberalism" - a strain of liberalism, represented by Reinhold Niebuhr, Isaiah Berlin, and Adam Michnik, which sought to re-imagine liberalism as an ethos which rejected both the innocence and complacency of some earlier liberalisms, and the ruthlessness of anti-liberalism, and steered a "moderate" ethical path between hard-headed, skeptical realism, and values of individual integrity and idealism. / Government

No description available.

In his defense of negative freedom, Isaiah Berlin&rsquo / s main target is the political voluntarism of enlightenment rationalism which has paved way to totalitarian and authoritarian political regimes of the 20th century which brought the sacrifice of individual freedom. For Berlin, in contrast to Platonic realism of enlightenment rationalism in which there is a substantial belief in reason&rsquo / s capacity for giving us the knowledge of the supreme good, the nominalist foundations of negative freedom can provide us a secure grounding in the justification of the rights over the goods. By declaring the inviolable rights and relying on the principle of neutrality, negative freedom eliminates the risk of political voluntarism stemming from enlightenment rationalism or scientism. Since the 1980s, in Turkey, political and social oppositions to Rousseauian enlightenment of the Turkish state have deployed the epistemic and political tools of negative freedom. This appeal has aimed to open a legitimate space for the language of freedom as non-intervention under which each individual chooses his personal values without the fear of state intervention. In contrast to the interventionist claims of state, negative freedom, it has been believed that, has provided a secure grounding for the rights of individuals. Besides, the meta-ethical thesis of the incommensurability of human goods has also been employed for delegitimizing the substantial belief in the monism of the republican regime which relied on the assumption presenting the republican way of life as the supreme good. This missionary zeal for the re-construction of the republic on the premises of negative freedom has not, however, gone unchallenged. Against such identification of democracy with free-market and value pluralism, the republican front defends the restoration of the foundational ideals of the republic by returning to the substantial understanding of national sovereignty under the formulation of &lsquo / militant democracy&rsquo / . In this study, even though I agree with the nominalist epistemology of negative freedom which manifests a skeptic and agnostic attitude toward the power of reason and the insistence of negative freedom on the necessity of the priority of right, I have demonstrated the reasons behind the failure of negative freedom in justifying the priority of the right over the goods. Actually, my analysis has already displayed that concerning the radical consequences of the thesis of incommensurability, it is doubtful whether negative freedom can provide political conditions even for the cause of peace without the presence of absolute sovereign as suggested in Hobbes&rsquo / s political theory. At this point, I have argued that we should take into consideration the achievements of the ideal of autonomy in grounding the priority of the right over the good. Contrary to Berlin&rsquo / s distorted representation of autonomy, I believe that the critical rationalism of autonomy and its understanding of law will protect us not only from the metaphysics of enlightenment rationalism and scientism, but also from the metaphysics of historicism envisaged by Berlin&rsquo / s version of negative freedom.

「歷史決定論」(Historicism)最初並非是歷史學範疇當中的概念，而是源於哲學範疇中的學說。哲學範疇中的「決定論」(determinism)。決定論的思想內容，有「因果性」、「必然性」、「規律性」等可以清楚指稱的特徵，並且也有著認識與指導的作用存在。隨著各個時代裏的思想家對其內涵詮釋的轉換，才逐漸演變成處理社會歷史發展的歷史學問題。 經由馬克思（Karl Max, 1818-1883）的發揚光大，「歷史決定論」從歷史學中理論性的問題，又擴展到了政治哲學中關於政治實踐與行動的問題。「歷史決定論」與政治實踐與行動的結合，對於人類的歷史發展產生了重大的影響，卡爾‧波柏（Karl R. Popper, 1902-1994）與以賽亞‧伯林（Isaiah Berlin, 1909-1997）兩位二十世紀的著名思想家，注意到了其重大的影響當中之於人類的惡毒影響與嚴重的歷史後果。對於「歷史決定論」，波柏從「歷史決定論不符合科學方法的知識論層面切入，反駁歷史決定論試圖預測歷史是不可能的；伯林從「歷史決定論」是一種幻覺，預設一個烏托邦的美好未來卻造成二十世紀人類的極大災難，反駁歷史決定論將人類對於價值與生活目標的追求歸結為一的可怕後果。 波柏與伯林對於「歷史決定論」的批判引起了主張歷史決定論者之批評，波柏被批判為只從理論而非從實踐的角度，並且誤解了科學方法；伯林被批判為是一種虛無飄渺的相對主義。 儘管主張「歷史決定論」之批判從理據上言之亦有理，然而波柏與伯林對於「歷史決定論」的批判仍然足以引發世人對於「歷史決定論」與政治實踐與行動相結合之可能惡毒影響與嚴重的歷史後果。 對於波柏與伯林之於「歷史決定論」之討論，除了使人對於「歷史決定論」進行反思之外，亦可見「歷史決定論」之於兩位思想家之政治思想體系之重要性。

Då asylsökande åberopar sexuell läggning eller könsidentitet som asylskäl, är den egna berättelsen inte sällan den enda bevisning som finns att tillgå. Detta innebär att trovärdigheten i den asylsökandes framförande av sin berättelse tillmäts stor vikt. Tidigare forskning har funnit att trovärdighetsbedömningen i västerländska länders asylprövning påverkas av vilken handläggare som hanterar ärendet, och dennas stereotyper av sexuell läggning och könsidentitet. Förekomsten av stereotyper har härletts till kompetens- eller rutinbrist. Exempelvis har det anförts att asylprövande myndigheter och domstolar lider brist på normkritik och nyanserad kunskap i hbtq+-personers olika omständigheter och leverne. Denna studie erbjuder en annan hypotes, med utgångspunkt i etablerad politisk teori och samtida statsvetenskaplig forskning: Att ideologin romantisk liberalism präglar västerländska länders asylprövning. Det finns empiriskt stöd för att människor i västvärlden i allt större utsträckning värdesätter individuell frihet. Tidigare forskning har antagit att detta värdesättande leder till ökad tolerans och välkomnande av ökad mångfald. Ett sådant positivt förhållande ifrågasätts emellertid av flera statsvetare, däribland den svenska statsvetaren Gina Gustavsson. I en avhandling från 2014 presenterar Gustavsson en beskrivning av en romantisk gren inom liberalismen. Denna ideologi framhåller ett obevekligt, provokativt och kreativt uttryck för individens originalitet: både vad avser beskrivningar av vad människan är, och värderande utsagor om hur människan bör vara. En sådan syn, menar Gustavsson, är en förrädisk förståelse för frihet som kan urarta i intolerans, trots att den utges för det motsatta. Med ideologianalys prövas rätts- och myndighetsmaterial från ett urval västerländska länders asylprövning mot en idealtyp av den romantiska liberalismen. Resultatet är att den romantiska liberalismens frihetsideal i flera avseenden kommer till uttryck i urvalet västerländska länders asylprövning. Slutsatsen är att beslutsfattare och utredares upptagenhet av särskilda uttryck för den asylsökandes identitet, kan förstås som en manifestation av den romantiska liberalismens frihetsideal. Detta snarare än som uttryck främst för kompetens- och rutinbrist, såsom tidigare forskning konstaterat. Vidare förs en diskussion kring betydande spänningar mellan den romantiska liberalismen och mänskliga rättigheters universella anspråk. Detta särskilt avseende asylsökandes begränsade möjlighet eller avsikt att leva upp till romantiskt liberala frihetsideal. / As asylum seekers invoke sexual orientation or gender identity as a reason for asylum, their own story is often the only evidence available. This means that the credibility of asylum seeker's presentation of their story, often is given great importance. Previous research shows that credibility assessments in Western countries can differ depending on the sexual orientation and gender identity stereotypes of the case officer who is handling the case. The existence of stereotypes has been related to lack of skills or routine. For example, it is in previous research stated that asylum reviewing authorities and courts suffer from a lack of norm criticism and nuanced knowledge of lgbtq+-persons' different circumstances and living. This study offers another hypothesis, based on established political theory and contemporary political science research: That the ideology romantic liberalism characterizes the asylum procedure in Western countries. There is empirical support for the fact that people in the Western world increasingly value individual freedom. Previous research has assumed that such values leads to increased tolerance and a welcoming of diversity. However, such a positive relationship is questioned by the Swedish political scientist Gina Gustavsson. In Gustavssons’ dissertation from 2014, a description of a romantic branch of liberalism is presented, which elevates a relentless, creative and provocative expression of the individual's originality: both in terms of descriptions of what an individual is, and evaluative statements about what an individual should be. Such a view, Gustavsson says, is a treacherous understanding of freedom that can degenerate into intolerance, even though it is issued to stand for the contrary. With ideology analysis, judicial and governmental material from a sample of Western countries' asylum procedures is tested against an ideal type of romantic liberalism. The results of the analysis show that the ideal of freedom of romanticism, in several respects, can be found in the asylum procedure in a sample of Western countries. The conclusion is that decision makers and investigators' preoccupation with specific expressions of the identity of the asylum seeker can be understood as a manifestation of the freedom ideals in the romantic liberalism. This rather than a lack of skills and routine, as previous research has found. Furthermore, a discussion is held regarding that there is considerable tension between romantic liberalism and the universal claims of human rights. This particularly regarding the asylum seekers' limited ability or intention to live up to the freedom ideals of the romantic liberalism.

What happens to social democracy when the working class declines? The aim of this study is to examine ideological changes in The Swedish Social Democratic Party, in particular the party’s ideological changes regarding liberty. The material consists of 300 government bills equally divided over the parliamentary sessions of 1974, 1990/91 and 2005/06, in all of which The Social Democratic Party held office. Using the theoretical framework Two Concepts of Liberty, I found that an increasingly amount of bills draws on the idea of negative freedom. However, the result also shows that bills that draws on negative freedom subsequently decreases in favour of bills that draws on positive freedom, suggesting that the ideological changes regarding liberty in The Swedish Social Democracy Party are nonlinear rather than moving straightforward.

The thesis presents Charles Taylor's conception of liberalism where the negative concept of liberty is rooted in a positive moral ideal of authenticity. First of all, both the main motivations which led liberals to defend the pure negative concept of liberty and Taylor's claim that these motivations all depend on the atomistic ontology is examined. Later, this atomistic basis is refuted and Taylor's holistic approach is offered which relies mainly on concepts of the personal identity and of the so called strong evaluation. Following this, concept of authenticity is presented as the implicit ideal of modern identity. Authenticity is interpreted as a pluralistic moral ideal appreciating uniqueness although containing some general moral demands. The thesis also shows that such a concept of authenticity presupposes negative liberty. Finally, some political consequences of such a liberal theory are provided.