Traditionally, John Stuart Mill has been described as a transitional thinker who fails to fully understand the values he espouses. Critics contend that he cannot simultaneously espouse both utility maximization and the protection of individual choice-making as a non-trumpable value. Like his moral philosophy, Mill’s political thought is also rejected for interspersing, seemingly at random, elements of utilitarianism with concerns about respecting individual choice-making. More recent attempts to bring Mill’s commitment to utilitarianism into line with his respect for individual choice-making are not wholly successful. In this thesis, I offer an interpretation of Mill’s moral philosophy which reconciles the tension between utility maximization and respect for individual choice-making as a non-trumpable value. In addition, I argue that my interpretation of Mill’s moral philosophy also allows us to interpret his political thought. / Master of Arts

A presente dissertação trata do problema dos direitos culturais sob a ótica do utilitarismo liberal de John Stuart Mill. Objetiva-se a inserção da filosofia política do autor nas discussões que vêm sendo travadas nas últimas décadas por liberais e comunitaristas a partir da colocação do problema filosófico da identidade. Para tanto, busca-se desfazer frequentes equívocos e apresentar uma leitura integrada da filosofia de Mill com base na análise criteriosa de seus escritos, auxiliada por seus mais eminentes intérpretes. Pretende-se demonstrar que é de uma fundamental e prévia compreensão utilitarista, bem como de uma particular posição acerca do modo de acesso à verdade, que decorrem as convicções liberais e a centralidade da autonomia individual em seu pensamento. Estabelecidas essas premissas, verifica-se que o estado milliano, ao dispensar a convicção na neutralidade da esfera pública que decorre do pensamento liberal contratualista usualmente professado, mostra-se compatível em tese com a tarefa de garantir direitos culturais. Ao mesmo tempo em que sua visão ampla acerca dos bens que contribuem para a felicidade é capaz de posicionar a cultura no cálculo hedonístico individual, com reflexos na quantificação da utilidade em vista da felicidade geral, a defesa de Mill da autonomia e da diversidade parece poder justificar uma especial atenção ao contexto social que sirva para a expressão máxima da individualidade. / This dissertation deals with the problem of cultural rights from the viewpoint of the liberal utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. It intends to include the author‘s political philosophy in the debates that have been held in recent decades between liberals and communitarians starting from the approach of the philosophical problem of identity. To this end, we try to undo common misconceptions and provide an integrated reading of Mill's philosophy based on careful analysis of his writings, aided by his most eminent interpreters. We attempt to demonstrate that it is based on a previous fundamental adhesion to utilitarianism, as well as from a particular position regarding the access to the truth, that arise the liberal convictions and the centrality of autonomy in his doctrine. Given these premises, we could find that the Millian state, exempting the assumption on the neutrality of public sphere derived from the liberal contractarian doctrine usually professed, reveals itself theoretically compatible with the task of guaranteeing cultural rights. Whilst Mill‘s broad view regarding goods that contribute to happiness is capable of dragging culture into the hedonistic calculus, which affects the measurement of utility over general happiness, his defense of autonomy and diversity seems to justify a special attention to social context which maximize the expression of individuality.

A presente dissertação trata do problema dos direitos culturais sob a ótica do utilitarismo liberal de John Stuart Mill. Objetiva-se a inserção da filosofia política do autor nas discussões que vêm sendo travadas nas últimas décadas por liberais e comunitaristas a partir da colocação do problema filosófico da identidade. Para tanto, busca-se desfazer frequentes equívocos e apresentar uma leitura integrada da filosofia de Mill com base na análise criteriosa de seus escritos, auxiliada por seus mais eminentes intérpretes. Pretende-se demonstrar que é de uma fundamental e prévia compreensão utilitarista, bem como de uma particular posição acerca do modo de acesso à verdade, que decorrem as convicções liberais e a centralidade da autonomia individual em seu pensamento. Estabelecidas essas premissas, verifica-se que o estado milliano, ao dispensar a convicção na neutralidade da esfera pública que decorre do pensamento liberal contratualista usualmente professado, mostra-se compatível em tese com a tarefa de garantir direitos culturais. Ao mesmo tempo em que sua visão ampla acerca dos bens que contribuem para a felicidade é capaz de posicionar a cultura no cálculo hedonístico individual, com reflexos na quantificação da utilidade em vista da felicidade geral, a defesa de Mill da autonomia e da diversidade parece poder justificar uma especial atenção ao contexto social que sirva para a expressão máxima da individualidade. / This dissertation deals with the problem of cultural rights from the viewpoint of the liberal utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. It intends to include the author‘s political philosophy in the debates that have been held in recent decades between liberals and communitarians starting from the approach of the philosophical problem of identity. To this end, we try to undo common misconceptions and provide an integrated reading of Mill's philosophy based on careful analysis of his writings, aided by his most eminent interpreters. We attempt to demonstrate that it is based on a previous fundamental adhesion to utilitarianism, as well as from a particular position regarding the access to the truth, that arise the liberal convictions and the centrality of autonomy in his doctrine. Given these premises, we could find that the Millian state, exempting the assumption on the neutrality of public sphere derived from the liberal contractarian doctrine usually professed, reveals itself theoretically compatible with the task of guaranteeing cultural rights. Whilst Mill‘s broad view regarding goods that contribute to happiness is capable of dragging culture into the hedonistic calculus, which affects the measurement of utility over general happiness, his defense of autonomy and diversity seems to justify a special attention to social context which maximize the expression of individuality.

A presente dissertação trata do problema dos direitos culturais sob a ótica do utilitarismo liberal de John Stuart Mill. Objetiva-se a inserção da filosofia política do autor nas discussões que vêm sendo travadas nas últimas décadas por liberais e comunitaristas a partir da colocação do problema filosófico da identidade. Para tanto, busca-se desfazer frequentes equívocos e apresentar uma leitura integrada da filosofia de Mill com base na análise criteriosa de seus escritos, auxiliada por seus mais eminentes intérpretes. Pretende-se demonstrar que é de uma fundamental e prévia compreensão utilitarista, bem como de uma particular posição acerca do modo de acesso à verdade, que decorrem as convicções liberais e a centralidade da autonomia individual em seu pensamento. Estabelecidas essas premissas, verifica-se que o estado milliano, ao dispensar a convicção na neutralidade da esfera pública que decorre do pensamento liberal contratualista usualmente professado, mostra-se compatível em tese com a tarefa de garantir direitos culturais. Ao mesmo tempo em que sua visão ampla acerca dos bens que contribuem para a felicidade é capaz de posicionar a cultura no cálculo hedonístico individual, com reflexos na quantificação da utilidade em vista da felicidade geral, a defesa de Mill da autonomia e da diversidade parece poder justificar uma especial atenção ao contexto social que sirva para a expressão máxima da individualidade. / This dissertation deals with the problem of cultural rights from the viewpoint of the liberal utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. It intends to include the author‘s political philosophy in the debates that have been held in recent decades between liberals and communitarians starting from the approach of the philosophical problem of identity. To this end, we try to undo common misconceptions and provide an integrated reading of Mill's philosophy based on careful analysis of his writings, aided by his most eminent interpreters. We attempt to demonstrate that it is based on a previous fundamental adhesion to utilitarianism, as well as from a particular position regarding the access to the truth, that arise the liberal convictions and the centrality of autonomy in his doctrine. Given these premises, we could find that the Millian state, exempting the assumption on the neutrality of public sphere derived from the liberal contractarian doctrine usually professed, reveals itself theoretically compatible with the task of guaranteeing cultural rights. Whilst Mill‘s broad view regarding goods that contribute to happiness is capable of dragging culture into the hedonistic calculus, which affects the measurement of utility over general happiness, his defense of autonomy and diversity seems to justify a special attention to social context which maximize the expression of individuality.

Le but de cette recherche doctorale est de mettre au jour une conception spécifique du libéralisme au XIXè siècle qui rendait possible la cohabitation des exigences libérales de respect de l’individu et de ses droits ainsi que des exigences nationales de vie en communauté et d’identité. Partant du principe que de nombreux auteurs ne considéraient pas que le concept de nationalité entrait en contradiction avec les valeurs libérales à cette époque, nous estimons qu’Alexis de Tocqueville, ainsi que John Stuart Mill, proposent la forme la plus cohérente et aboutie de réflexion en la matière, et ce à travers un libéralisme dit « d’esprit » que nous extrairons de leur pensée commune. En effet, alors qu’ils cherchent à contrecarrer les effets néfastes du matérialisme qui aurait comme principale conséquence d’abaisser l’âme des individus et de les priver de liberté, ils mettent au point une approche qui empêche la matérialisation ou la cristallisation complète des références proposées comme point de repère aux citoyens. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Thesis (DPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study involves a critically evaluation of evidence-based patient choice as partnership model in clinical decision making. It pays attention to the emergence of the concept of autonomy in modern moral philosophy and in particular to the pivotal contributions of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill in this regard. Against this background, it elaborates on the ethical principle of respect for autonomy, informed consent as paradigm for patient autonomy in clinical decision making, the conflicts that arise between the ethical concepts of autonomy and beneficence, the dominance of paternalism in clinical decision making, the challenges posed to the dominance of paternalism, the resulting emergence of the concept of partnership in clinical decision making and evidence-based patient choice as partnership model in clinical decision making. Moreover, it provides an exposition of the context, nature and practice of evidence-based patient choice and of the four key decision making skills required from health care professionals to involve patients in clinical decision making, namely shared decision making, risk communication, decision analysis, and the use of decision aids. Against this background, it critically evaluates the effectiveness of evidence-based patient choice as partnership model in clinical decision making by judging it in terms of the ethical concept of patient autonomy as reflected in the informed consent elements of competence, disclosure, understanding and voluntariness and indicates that none of the key skills of evidence-based patient choice can be regarded as completely adequate in honouring the principle of respect for autonomy in clinical decision making and that consequently each of these four key skills leave evidence-based patient choice with a challenge that needs to be addressed from another angle in order to establish and maintain the ethical principle of respect for autonomy. In response to these challenges, the study makes three recommendations for the transformation of evidence-based patient choice to a therapeutic alliance health care, namely to review and further develop the philosophical foundations of evidence-based patient choice, to consider the continental philosophical perspectives of Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jürgen Habermas on the evidence-based patient choice challenges of the separate worlds of doctor and patient, the constitution of meaning in illness and the dangers of abstractions and informational manipulation in health care and to transform the practice of evidence-based patient choice to a therapeutic alliance in health care by individualising the provision of information by embedding it in the human processes of sense making, knowledge creation and decision making through which information is transformed into insight, knowledge and action. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die studie behels 'n kritiese evaluering van evidence-based patient choice as vennootskapsmodel in kliniese besluitneming. Dit verwys na die opkoms van moderne morele filosofie en in die besonder na die deurslaggewende bydraes van Immanuel Kant en John Stuart Mill in hierdie verband. Teen hierdie agtergrond bespreek dit die etiese beginsel van respek vir outonomie, ingeligte toestemming as paradigma vir pasiënt outonomie in kliniese bsluitneming, die moontlike konflikte tussen die etiese konsepte van outonomie en weldadigheid, die dominansie van paternalisme in kliniese besluitneming en die uitdagings wat dit ontlok het, die gevolglike ontstaan van die konsep van vennootskappe in kliniese besluitneming, asook evidence-based patient choice as vennootskapsmodel in kliniese besluitneming. Voorts verskaf die studie 'n uiteensetting van die konteks, wese en praktyk van evidence-based patient choice, asook van die vier sleutelvaardighede wat van medici vereis word ten einde pasiënte in kliniese besluitneming te betrek, naamlik gedeelde besluitneming, die kommunikasie van risikos, die analise van besluitneming en die gebruik van besluitnemingshulpmiddels. Teen hierdie agtergrond onderneem die studie 'n kritiese evaluering van die effektiwiteit van evidence-based patient choice deur dit te meet aan die ingeligte toestemming elemente van kompetensie, blootlegging, verstaan en vrywilligheid en toon aan dat geeneen van hierdie sleutelvaardighede as volledig toereikend in die nastreef van die beginsel van respek vir outonomie in kliniese besluitneming beskou kan word nie en evidence-based patient choice daarom met uitdagings laat wat vanuit 'n ander hoek bearbei moet word ten einde die beginsel in die praktyk te vestig en te onderhou. In reaksie hierop maak die studie drie aanbevelings met die oog op die transformering van evidence-based patient choice na 'n terapeutiese alliansie in gesondheidsorg, naamlik om die filosofiese grondslae van evidence-based patient choice in oënskou te neem en verder te ontwikkel, om oorweging te skenk aan die kontinentaal filosofiese perspektiewe van Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty en Jürgen Habermas met betrekking tot die evidence-based patient choice uitdagings van die verskillende wêrelde van dokter en pasiënt, die konstituering van betekenis in siekte en die gevare verbonde aan die abstrahering en manipulering van inligting in gesondheidsorg en om op grond hiervan die praktyk van evidence-based patient choice te transformer. Dit sal gedoen word deur die verskaffing van inligting aan pasiënte te individualiseer deur dit in te bed in the menslike prosesse van sinmaking, kennis generering en besluitneming waardeur inligting getransformeer word tot insig, kennis en aksie.

This thesis traces versions of the theory of individualism by three major theorists, John Locke, John Stuart Mill and John Dewey, as they criticize existing social, cultural, economic, legal and military conditions of their times. I argue that each theorist modifies the theory of individualism to best suit their understanding of human nature, adapting it where they can and outright removing aspects where they cannot. Based upon each thinker's conception of human nature, their corresponding theory of individualism does justice to that nature. With their view of individualism, each thinker criticizes the activities of their day for its lack of justice to human nature for the bulk of humanity. I examine each thinker's concrete conditions, their theory of human nature, theory of justice and their corresponding theory of individualism. In the first three chapters, I examine first Locke's, then Mill's then Dewey's theory of human nature, justice and individualism. In my final chapter, I critically examine each thinker's theory of individualism and find that John Dewey's is most adequate for our current social conditions. Locke's individualism was a criticism of the absolute rule of aristocratic Land-owners and was an attempt to undermine the conceptual basis for their continued power. John Stuart Mill's individualism was a criticism of John Locke's individualism insofar as majoritarianism had taken root in England and resulted in the "Tyranny of the Majority." Therefore Mill gave high value to the sanctity of the individual even in disagreement with the overwhelming majority. Dewey's theory of individualism largely was a criticism of widespread poverty and abuse of political power in America during the Great Depression. laissez faire economics, combined with cut-throat competitiveness and atomistic individualism had resulted in pervasive injustice and Dewey recommended recognition of our inter-connectedness and continuity rather than our separateness. While I believe Dewey's theory of individualism to be most fit for our current social setting, even his theory suffers from problems yet to be worked out. I lay out these problems in the final chapter and conclude with remarks on what needs yet to be done.

What kind of agent does liberal political thought presuppose? Who is the subject inhabiting modern, liberal conceptions of political order? This dissertation is a study of liberal character-formation, of the kinds of persons, subjects and citizens underlying seminal works in the liberal tradition. More specifically, it explores the forms of character and agency sustaining Immanuel Kant’s and John Stuart Mill’s moral and political philosophies, as well as problems of exclusion and marginalization faced by agents who are, either naturally or circumstantially, unable to develop a properly liberal character. The project is guided by three central aims. The first is expository: the dissertation draws to light the substantial attention that Kant and Mill both devoted to the moral psychology of progressive, liberal agency, and to the conditions, processes and mechanisms forming a liberal character. The second aim is critical, examining the ways in which these ideals of liberal character stand to constrain the inclusiveness and equality at the centre of liberal moral and political doctrines. The final aim is evaluative, reflecting on how we might situate problems of exclusion, both within the broader architectures of Kant’s and Mill’s respective philosophical systems, and in relation to the liberalisms that we inherit from them.

What kind of agent does liberal political thought presuppose? Who is the subject inhabiting modern, liberal conceptions of political order? This dissertation is a study of liberal character-formation, of the kinds of persons, subjects and citizens underlying seminal works in the liberal tradition. More specifically, it explores the forms of character and agency sustaining Immanuel Kant’s and John Stuart Mill’s moral and political philosophies, as well as problems of exclusion and marginalization faced by agents who are, either naturally or circumstantially, unable to develop a properly liberal character. The project is guided by three central aims. The first is expository: the dissertation draws to light the substantial attention that Kant and Mill both devoted to the moral psychology of progressive, liberal agency, and to the conditions, processes and mechanisms forming a liberal character. The second aim is critical, examining the ways in which these ideals of liberal character stand to constrain the inclusiveness and equality at the centre of liberal moral and political doctrines. The final aim is evaluative, reflecting on how we might situate problems of exclusion, both within the broader architectures of Kant’s and Mill’s respective philosophical systems, and in relation to the liberalisms that we inherit from them.

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