The rights may be required when they were violated or infringed. The rights are provided for in national laws and international standards such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the covenants on human rights in 1966, among others, to demand them, can use both national justice system as international. This chargeability occurs both in the political sphere (through social mobilization and action by public authorities), as in the legal field (national judiciary and international courts). In the latter case, it is when he is called justiciability. The Universal human rights system established access to justice as a guarantee of social rights. This means ensuring effective judicial protection for the duties of States. Our research of the idea that to understand organizational phenomena of society, which are correlated to the right, a method is necessary in this case, the comparative legal method The current problems that have the realization of the fundamental right to education (restricted and almost privileged access at all levels, uncertain and conditional adaptability, etc.) are dormant. The issue of justiciability of the right to education is dealt with in a right perspective compared between Brazil and Colombia, and is understood as the power of the holders of this fundamental right to require states to respect and protection, making it effective; in other words: it is the obligation of States to provide judicial remedies for such purposes. The justiciability is a way to enforce the rights before the courts, both at the national, regional and international levels, and analyzed in our thesis / Os direitos podem ser exigidos quando foram violados ou infringidos. Como os direitos estão previstos nas leis nacionais e normas internacionais, como a Declaração Universal dos direitos humanos e os pactos sobre direitos humanos de 1966, entre outros, para exigi-los, pode usar tanto sistema de justiça nacional como o internacional. Esta exigibilidade ocorre tanto na esfera política (através de mobilização social e ação pelas autoridades públicas), como no campo jurídico (poder judiciário nacional e tribunais internacionais). Neste último caso, é quando ele é chamado de justiciabilidade. O Sistema Universal de direitos humanos estabeleceu o acesso à justiça como garantia dos direitos sociais. Isso significa a garantia de tutela jurisdicional efetiva para o cumprimento dos deveres dos Estados. A nossa investigação parte da ideia de que para compreender fenômenos organizacionais da sociedade, que estão correlacionados com o direito, é necessário um método, neste caso, o método juridico comparativo Os atuais problemas que têm a efetivação do direito fundamental à educação (acesso restrito e quase privilegiado em todos os níveis, incerta e condicional adaptabilidade, etc) são latentes. A questão da justiciabilidade do direito à educação é tratado dentro de uma perspectiva de direito comparado entre Brasil e Colômbia, e é entendida como o poder dos titulares deste direito fundamental para exigir aos Estados o respeito e proteção, tornando-o efetivo; em outras palavras: é a obrigação dos Estados para fornecer recursos judiciais para tais fins. A justiciabilidade é uma maneira de fazer valer os direitos diante dos tribunais, tanto em nível nacional, regional e internacional, sendo analisada na nossa dissertação.

The thesis offers new paradigms for advancing socio-economic rights in Africa. Many States Parties to human rights instruments have failed to promote the common welfare of their citizens partly because of the justiciability debate, which continues to complicate intellectual and practical efforts at advancing socio-economic rights. The debate also prevents the normative development of these rights through adjudication. Furthermore, traditional human rights theory and practice have been state-centric, with non-state actors largely ignored in the identification, formulation, and implementation of human rights norms. Yet, the involvement of non-state entities in international arena has limited states' autonomies considerably, with serious implications for human rights. Transnational Corporations (TNCs) have capacities to foster economic well-being, development, tenchnological improvement, and wealth, but they also often cause deleterious human rights impacts through thei employment practices, environmental policies, relationships with suppliers and consumers, interactions with governments, and other activities. The thesis argues that socio-economic rights are normative and justiciable. It argues that traditional approaches are no longer sufficient to secure human rights and calls for a dismantatling of some structures erected by doctrinal systems; for realignment of relationships among social institutions; and for integrated bundles of fundamental interests that harness benefits of human rights norms and widen the landscape to commit both formal and informal regimes. Fashioning out a new paradigm for advancement of socio-economic rights requires addressing state capacity. It requires an integrative and global interpretive framework. It requires, finally, a new paradigm to commit non-state actors in Africa. The illustrative chapter uses the rights to work and to social security as templates for some prescriptions towards reaslising socio-economic rights in Africa. / Jurisprudence / LL.D.

Omniprésente dans le discours juridique, la question de « l’application » ou de la« concrétisation » du droit n’est que rarement considérée comme un objet d’étude à partentière. C’est pourtant peu dire qu’elle recouvre un phénomène multiforme, sinon confus.Cette thèse vise à l’étudier en lui-même et pour lui-même, du point de vue du rapport deconcrétisation entre actes juridiques. Mais, tout en s’inscrivant dans son sillage, l’étudeentendra dépasser la représentation classique de ce rapport livrée par l’École normativiste, àtravers la célèbre théorie de la formation du droit par degrés et de la concrétisationcroissante des normes. Elle se propose de démontrer que le rapport de concrétisation entreactes juridiques, loin de la banalité à laquelle il est généralement associé, relève en réalitéd’une opération juridique bien plus complexe qu’il n’y parait. Cela se vérifie d’abord parl’identification de ce rapport : en soi, concrétiser un acte juridique ne signifie rien pour unautre acte juridique. Tout dépend du point de vue à partir duquel le problème est envisagé.Sous un angle conceptuel, il existe en effet plusieurs figures du rapport de concrétisationentre actes juridiques, tandis qu’appréhendé par le juge, ce même rapport fait l’objet d’untraitement contentieux. Cela se vérifie ensuite par l’analyse de la pratique du rapport deconcrétisation par les acteurs juridiques. Non seulement celle-ci n’a rien de neutre, mais elles’avère pour le moins déstabilisatrice, si ce n’est subversive, à l’égard de la hiérarchie desnormes et des organes. Alors même que sa raison d’être est de rendre compte de larationalité globale de notre système juridique, le rapport de concrétisation entre actesjuridiques aboutit ainsi à la mettre en cause. / Omnipresent in legal discourse, the issue of “application” or “concretization” of law is rarelyseen as an object of study in itself. Yet it is an understatement to say that it covers amultifaceted phenomenon, if not a confused one. This thesis aims to study it in itself and foritself, from the perspective of the relationship of concretization between legal acts. But, whileremaining in its wake, the study will go beyond the classic representation of this relationshipdelivered by the Normativist school, through the famous theory of the gradual construction ofthe law and the increasing realization of norms. It aims to demonstrate that the relationship ofconcretization between legal acts, far from the banality to which it is usually associated, isreally one of a much more complex legal transaction than it looks. This checks out first by theidentification of this relationship : in itself, concretizing a legal act means nothing to anotherlegal act. It all depends on the perspective from which the problem is considered. Under aconceptual perspective, indeed there are several cases in the relationship between legalacts. Examined by the judge, this same relationship is the subject of a contentious treatment.Subsequently it is confirmed by analysis of concretizational practice between the relationshipof legal representatives. Not only is the latter nothing neutral, but it proves to be at leastdisruptive, if not subversive, with regard to the hierarchy of norms and organs. Even thoughits purpose is to report on the overall rationality of our legal system, the relationship ofconcretization between legal acts puts it into question.

Par l’arrêt Pla et Puncernau contre Andorre du 13 juillet 2004, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a fait une entrée remarquée dans le contrôle de l’interprétation des actes juridiques privés. Tenante d’une conception réaliste du droit, elle a élaboré des Principes européens d’interprétation qui sont autant d’obligations qui pèsent sur le juge national. La CJUE partage en grande partie ces principes, mais possède ses particularités et hésite encore à s’aligner sur le contrôle du juge de Strasbourg. Le juge français est quant à lui confronté à des directives d’interprétation qui sont de simples conseils, tandis que la Cour de cassation se refuse à opérer un autre contrôle que celui de la dénaturation. Dès lors, elle n’est pas en mesure de redresser les fautes commises par les juges du fond notamment, et encourt le risque d’engager la responsabilité de l’Etat français devant la Cour EDH. Si la Cour de cassation a entamé une réflexion sur la façon de rendre la justice en coordination avec les cours européennes, la modification du système herméneutique français se heurte à de nombreux obstacles révélateurs de la conception traditionnelle du droit français des obligations. / With the case of Pla and Puncernau versus Andorra on 13 July 2004, the European Court of Human Rights has made a dramatic entrance in the supervision of the interpretation of private contracts. Defending a realist conception of law, it developed European Principles of interpretation, which are obligations for national courts. The CJEU largely shares these principles, but has its particularities and it is still reluctant to align with the Strasbourg Court’s supervision. The French judge is itself faced with interpretive guidelines that are simple advice, while the Court of Cassation refused to operate another supervision than the denaturation. Therefore, it is not able to correct the errors committed by the trial judges in particular, and takes the risk to commit a violation of the European law. If the Supreme Court considers by now how to deliver justice in coordination with the European courts, changing the French hermeneutic system faces many obstacles revealing the traditional conception of French law of obligations.

The thesis offers new paradigms for advancing socio-economic rights in Africa. Many States Parties to human rights instruments have failed to promote the common welfare of their citizens partly because of the justiciability debate, which continues to complicate intellectual and practical efforts at advancing socio-economic rights. The debate also prevents the normative development of these rights through adjudication. Furthermore, traditional human rights theory and practice have been state-centric, with non-state actors largely ignored in the identification, formulation, and implementation of human rights norms. Yet, the involvement of non-state entities in international arena has limited states' autonomies considerably, with serious implications for human rights. Transnational Corporations (TNCs) have capacities to foster economic well-being, development, tenchnological improvement, and wealth, but they also often cause deleterious human rights impacts through thei employment practices, environmental policies, relationships with suppliers and consumers, interactions with governments, and other activities. The thesis argues that socio-economic rights are normative and justiciable. It argues that traditional approaches are no longer sufficient to secure human rights and calls for a dismantatling of some structures erected by doctrinal systems; for realignment of relationships among social institutions; and for integrated bundles of fundamental interests that harness benefits of human rights norms and widen the landscape to commit both formal and informal regimes. Fashioning out a new paradigm for advancement of socio-economic rights requires addressing state capacity. It requires an integrative and global interpretive framework. It requires, finally, a new paradigm to commit non-state actors in Africa. The illustrative chapter uses the rights to work and to social security as templates for some prescriptions towards reaslising socio-economic rights in Africa. / Jurisprudence / LL.D.

The central hypothesis of this thesis is that the universal fundamental right to adequate housing must be equally enforced by all states irrespective of its non-entrenchment as a constitutional, legislative and/or policy entitlement. Despite being a minority, poor Canadians still face the same sordid living conditions that the majority are experiencing in South Africa and India. If a developed country such as Canada, despite its available resources and housing policies, and, similar to South Africa and India as third world countries, fails to improve the poor’s standard of living, the right to adequate housing will remain a distant dream for many. Any housing implementation strategy must be able to reduce housing backlogs, eradicate homelessness and slums and in general improve the poor’s standard of living. The thesis considers the diverse implementation strategies of the right to adequate housing as adopted by South Africa, Canada and India and reveals how each country has experienced systemic challenges. Against the background of international and regional human rights obligations, key issues are investigated to determine how to properly implement, enforce and monitor the right, include the role of a constitutionally entrenched right, the adoption of a housing legislative and/or policy measures, the role of the judiciary, (in)action on the part of government and the part played by national human rights commissions. While each of these three countries approaches the issue in their own unique way, and each country makes its own contribution, what is required is a coordinated and multi-faceted housing implementation system. Although the point of departure was to determine what South Africa could learn from Canada and India, the conclusion is that both Canada and India can draw inspiration from South Africa. Nevertheless, the main conclusions are that South Africa must urgently conduct a comprehensive review of its regressive 20 year housing implementation strategy and India’s 61 years five year plans. The Canadian judiciary should be looking at ways to enforce the right within the Canadian Charter as well as its domestic legislation to include ‘social condition’ as a discrimination ground. While both Canada and India must review their housing policies their judiciaries should be evaluating the history of homelessness and the reasonableness of their adopted housing policies. / Private Law / LLD

The central hypothesis of this thesis is that the universal fundamental right to adequate housing must be equally enforced by all states irrespective of its non-entrenchment as a constitutional, legislative and/or policy entitlement. Despite being a minority, poor Canadians still face the same sordid living conditions that the majority are experiencing in South Africa and India. If a developed country such as Canada, despite its available resources and housing policies, and, similar to South Africa and India as third world countries, fails to improve the poor’s standard of living, the right to adequate housing will remain a distant dream for many. Any housing implementation strategy must be able to reduce housing backlogs, eradicate homelessness and slums and in general improve the poor’s standard of living. The thesis considers the diverse implementation strategies of the right to adequate housing as adopted by South Africa, Canada and India and reveals how each country has experienced systemic challenges. Against the background of international and regional human rights obligations, key issues are investigated to determine how to properly implement, enforce and monitor the right, include the role of a constitutionally entrenched right, the adoption of a housing legislative and/or policy measures, the role of the judiciary, (in)action on the part of government and the part played by national human rights commissions. While each of these three countries approaches the issue in their own unique way, and each country makes its own contribution, what is required is a coordinated and multi-faceted housing implementation system. Although the point of departure was to determine what South Africa could learn from Canada and India, the conclusion is that both Canada and India can draw inspiration from South Africa. Nevertheless, the main conclusions are that South Africa must urgently conduct a comprehensive review of its regressive 20 year housing implementation strategy and India’s 61 years five year plans. The Canadian judiciary should be looking at ways to enforce the right within the Canadian Charter as well as its domestic legislation to include ‘social condition’ as a discrimination ground. While both Canada and India must review their housing policies their judiciaries should be evaluating the history of homelessness and the reasonableness of their adopted housing policies. / Private Law / LLD

La première partie de l’étude est consacrée à l’invocation, intra et extra muros, du droit à un procès équitable. Sont analysés ainsi, dans un premier temps, l’applicabilité directe de l’article 6 et la subsidiarité de la Convention par rapport au droit national et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme par rapport aux juridictions nationales. Le droit à un procès équitable étant un droit jurisprudentiel, l’étude se focalise, dans un second temps, sur l’invocabilité des arrêts de la Cour Européenne et plus précisément sur l’invocabilité directe de l’arrêt qui constate une violation du droit à un procès équitable dans une affaire mettant en cause l’Etat et l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme à l’arrêt qui interprète l’article 6 dans une affaire mettant en cause un Etat tiers. L’introduction dans l’ordre juridique français et hellénique de la possibilité de réexamen de la décision pénale définitive rendue en violation de la Convention a fait naitre un nouveau droit d’accès à la Cour de cassation lequel trouve son terrain de prédilection aux violations de l’article 6 et constitue peut-être le pas le plus important pour le respect du droit à un procès équitable après l’acceptation (par la France et la Grèce) du droit de recours individuel. Quant au faible fondement de l’autorité de la chose interprétée par la Cour Européenne, qui est d’ailleurs un concept d’origine communautaire, cela explique pourquoi un dialogue indirect entre la Cour Européenne et la Cour de cassation est possible sans pour autant changer en rien l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme et le fait que l’existence d’un précédent oblige la Cour de cassation à motiver l’interprétation divergente qu’elle a adoptée.La seconde partie de l’étude, qui est plus volumineuse, est consacrée aux garanties de bonne administration de la justice (article 6§1), à la présomption d’innocence (article 6§2), aux droits qui trouvent leur fondement conventionnel dans l’article 6§1 mais leur fondement logique dans la présomption d’innocence et aux droits de la défense (article 6§3). Sont ainsi analysés le droit à un tribunal indépendant, impartial et établi par la loi, le délai raisonnable, le principe de l’égalité des armes, le droit à une procédure contradictoire, le droit de la défense d’avoir la parole en dernier, la publicité de l’audience et du prononcé des jugements et arrêts, l’obligation de motivation des décisions, la présomption d’innocence, dans sa dimension procédurale et personnelle, le « droit au mensonge », le droit de l’accusé de se taire et de ne pas contribuer à son auto-incrimination, son droit d’être informé de la nature et de la cause de l’accusation et de la requalification envisagée des faits, son droit au temps et aux facilités nécessaires à la préparation de la défense, y compris notamment la confidentialité de ses communications avec son avocat et le droit d’accès au dossier, son droit de comparaître en personne au procès, le droit de la défense avec ou sans l’assistance d’un avocat, le droit de l’accusé d’être représenté en son absence par son avocat, le droit à l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat lorsque la situation économique de l’accusé ne permet pas le recours à l’assistance d’un avocat mais les intérêts de la justice l’exigent, le droit d’interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et d’obtenir la convocation et l’interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge et le droit à l’interprétation et à la traduction des pièces essentielles du dossier. L’analyse est basée sur la jurisprudence strasbourgeoise et centrée sur la position qu’adoptent la Cour de cassation française et l’Aréopage. / The first party of the study is dedicated to the invocation of the right to a fair trial intra and extra muros and, on this basis, it focuses on the direct applicability of Article 6 and the subsidiarity of the Convention and of the European Court of Human Rights. Because of the fact that the right to a fair trial is a ‘‘judge-made law’’, the study also focuses on the invocability of the judgments of the European Court and more precisely on the direct invocability of the European Court’s judgment finding that there has been a violation of the Convention and on the request for an interpretation in accordance with the European Court’s decisions. The possibility of reviewing the criminal judgment made in violation of the Convention has generated a new right of access to the Court of cassation which particularly concerns the violations of the right to a fair trial and is probably the most important step for the respect of the right to a fair trial after enabling the right of individual petition. As for the weak conventional basis of the authority of res interpretata (“autorité de la chose interprétée”), this fact explains why an indirect dialogue between the ECHR and the Court of cassation is possible but doesn’t affect the applicant’s right to request an interpretation in accordance with the Court’s decisions and the duty of the Court of cassation to explain why it has decided to depart from the (non-binding) precedent.The second party of the study is bigger than the first one and is dedicated to the guarantees of the proper administration of justice (Article 6§1), the presumption of innocence (Article 6§2), the rights which find their conventional basis on the Article 6§1 but their logical explanation to the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence (Article 6§3). More precisely, the second party of the study is analyzing the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, the principle of equality of arms, the right to adversarial proceedings, the right of the defence to the last word, the right to a public hearing and a public pronouncement of the judgement, the judge’s duty to state the reasons for his decision, the presumption of innocence, in both its procedural and personal dimensions, the accused’s right to lie, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation and the potential re-characterisation of the facts, his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, including in particular the access to the case-file and the free and confidential communication with his lawyer, his right to appear in person at the trial, his right to defend either in person or through legal assistance, his right to be represented by his counsel, his right to free legal aid if he hasn’t sufficient means to pay for legal assistance but the interests of justice so require, his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him and his right to the free assistance of an interpreter and to the translation of the key documents. The analysis is based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and focuses on the position taken by the French and the Greek Court of Cassation (Areopagus) on each one of the above mentioned rights.