The Axiom in the studies of military science is that implementing combined arms will result in atactical victory, in maneuver warfare. But there have been historical examples of when that has not been the case, and we in this profession must learn from these defeats. The intention of this study is to examine if Robert Leonhard’s theory of combined arms can explain the tactical defeats of the German forces during the battle of Alam el Halfa and Operation Citadel.  The conclusion of this study is that the German forces implemented combined arms warfare, but still lost. The German struggled during both cases to fully implement the dilemma principle and the alcyoneus principle. The implication of this result leads to the discussion that even if combined arms warfare is implemented, the enemy doesn’t necessarily suffer the effect as explained by Leonhard in the dilemma principle and the alcyoneus principle.

Different prerequisites for war exists and varies due to the terrain. Cities, mountains and covered terrain all creates their special conditions for the battle. The biggest difference in methods is found between the urban warfare and all the other ways of fighting in war. Combined arms constitutes the fundamentals of fighting a war, and organizing armed forces. But if the environment of the war is changing, the different prerequisites of combined arms need to change. The purpose of this study is to survey the distinguishing differences and prerequisites between the two kinds of environments, described in the invasion and fight in Rumaila oil field (2003) and Operation Phantom Fury (2004). By analyzing these cases, the purpose of this theory consuming case study is to explore and examine the use of combined arms in different environments during the Iraqi war in between 2003 and 2004. The analytical results reveal that the prerequisites before Operation Phantom Fury that made the operation successful was premonition to all the civilians in the city of Fallujah, the aggressive and massive use of indirect fire support, the reorganization of the divisions backbone, infantry, and finally the knowledge from earlier operations in Fallujah.

A trend in modern warfare is to conduct war both conventionally and unconventionally. This modern era sets high demands on conventional forces to face the contemporary threat. Most of the modern conventional forces conduct war through maneuver warfare and uses the practice of combined arms to organize and fight, but is the method of combined arms still a valid method? This study examines Robert Leonhard’s theory of combined arms in the Yom Kippur war 1973 and during the American Thunder Runs in Baghdad 2003. The research question that this study is trying to answer is how the combined arms theory can explain the tactical success in the two cases. Previous studies about the theory explains how it could be understood, not how it is used. The theory encompasses three principles which is applied to the two cases to allow a structured analysis. The results show that both the Israelis and the Americans use the combined arms theory to achieve tactical success. What the analysis also shows is that the theory is not the only element that achieved success, but also technical advantage, moral and experience made an impact on the outcome of the cases.

Sweden is a country that has identified the need to increase its military capabilities due to the ongoing decrease of stability in northern Europe. Russia is being more aggressive, and reports say that the latest military exercises in Russia has been focused on minimizing the time to mobilize large units. This development has led to a political will to expand the number of Swedish brigades that could be used to defend the country. Sweden has a long tradition of maneuver warfare. In the armed force´s handbooks and doctrines, you can find lots of evidence of an ambition to inflict damage on a potential enemy through the principle of combined arms. But are the Swedish armed forces organized in a proper way to do so?    The purpose of this essay is to investigate how the current organization could be complemented with a new type of infantry brigades. In doing so this essay is a comparative text analysis of doctrines and handbooks connected to two types of infantry battalions, one old organization from the cold war era and one modern. The results found in this is that the organizations are quite similar. Small differences lead to the conclusion that the modern style battalion organization is preferable, mainly to its organizational focus on delaying operations.

This thesis examines how the use of combined arms according to Robert Leonhards theory can explain the military success on the tactical level of war in two historical cases. Previous studies focus mainly on how combined arms shall be understood and how it shall be used and not how combined arms has contributed to military success. This thesis uses a theory testing case study to examine how combined arms contributed to the military success of the Israeli forces in the Yom Kippur-war and to that of American forces in  Operation Desert Storm.   The analysis is based on Robert Leonhards three principles of combined arms. The result of the analysis shows that both the Israeli forces and the American forces used the different principles of combined arms. The analysis also showed that the use of combined arms created military success at the tactical level of the different wars, but combined arms cannot by itself explain the military success as the technical advantages, moral and educational level also had a significant impact on the outcome.

Recent aggressions and geopolitical insecurities in the Baltic region have made it necessary for the Swedish armed forces to change their focus from an international defense policy to a territorial defense strategy. This change focuses mainly on strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Swedish armed Forces by reshaping the brigade structures with a focus on combined arms warfare in conjunction to maneuver warfare. Current doctrine and manuals show a lack in combined arms concerning its contribution to tactical success as well as its origin. As such a question whether tactical success can be explained with combined arms has been raised. This thesis aims to examine if Robert R Leonhard’s theory on combined arms can explain success at a tactical level during Operation Desert Storm and the Yom Kippur war and the analysis focuses on Robert Leonhards three principles of combined arms. The result of the study shows that the theory can partly explain success at a tactical level in both cases. But further studies must be conducted on the subject in order to increase the theories explanatory power.

Stridsvagnsminans utveckling i helhet har under de senaste 20 åren mer eller mindre stått still. I försvarsberedningens slutrapport Värnkraft beskrivs fördröjande fältarbeten med minor som ett av de prioriterade områdena för Försvarsmaktens ingenjörförband. Med denna prioritering finns ett syfte att undersöka hur vidare minor fortsatt kommer att påverka den mekaniserade striden i framtiden.  För att studera minors påverkan på den mekaniserade striden har den här studien använt Totalförsvarets forskningsinstituts simuleringsverktyg Suss-mek. Minvapnet finns sedan tidigare inte implementerat i programmet. Därför undersöks också vilka nyckelegenskaper som bör ingå i simulering med minor i strid.  Resultatet visar att effekten av framtidens minor på den mekaniserade striden kommer i grunden vara densamma som idag. Däremot kommer teknologin för framtidens minor göra att minan i sig kommer att bli effektivare med högre sannolikhet att nedkämpa motståndaren. Studien kommer också fram till flera relevanta nyckelegenskaper, till exempel front, djup, densitet och fasta beteenden vid sammanstötminering. Det är egenskaper som måste tas hänsyn till vid modellering av minor i ett simuleringsverktyg. / The development of the antitank mine has more or less stood still for the past 20 years. In the Defense Committee's final report Värnkraft, counter-mobility operations with landmines is described as one of the priority areas for the Swedish Armed Forces' combat engineer units. With this priority, there is a purpose to investigate how mines will continue to affect the mechanized battle in the future.  To study the impact of antitank mines on the mechanized battle, this study has used the Swedish Defense Research Agency's simulation tool Suss-mek. The mine weapon has not previously been implemented in the program. Therefore, it is also investigated which key characteristics that should be included in simulation with mines in battle.  The results show that the impact of future antitank- mines in mechanized battle will basically be the same as today. On the other hand, the technology of the future mines will make the mine itself more efficient with a higher probability to kill. The study also shows several relevant key characteristics for example: front, depth, density and fixed behaviours during entering minefield. They are characteristics that must be considered when modelling mines in a simulation tool.

Stridsvagnsminan har varit ett vapen sedan 1916 och därefter har minan tillfört ytterligare en dimension till striden. Minorna har utvecklats under åren och blivit mer avancerade och fler system har möjlighet att placera ut minor. Understödsbehov och framtida bekämpningskoncept, en rapport från Artilleriets stridsskola, visade att avståndslagda minor är ett vapensystem som kan användas i striden för att bekämpa fordon. Försvarsmakten planerar att införskaffa ett system som har kapacitet till avståndslagd minering. Syftet med studien var att beskriva hur användningen av fordonsåverkande avståndslagda minor kan påverkas då de används i strid i olika svenska terrängtyper. Fem officerare från olika delar av Sverige intervjuades där de fick beskriva hur avståndslaga minor kunde användas i strid. Därefter analyserades svaren utifrån två scenarion, Skåne respektive Norrland, som representerar öppen terräng respektive betäckt terräng i syfte att se hur avståndslagda minors användning påverkar teorin om kombinerade vapen med en mekaniserad skyttebataljon. Analysen av de två scenariona visade att det blev svårare att uppnå kombinerade vapen i öppen terräng jämfört med betäckt terräng på grund av god framkomlighet och brist på kanaliserad terräng. Vilket skulle innebära att fler avståndslagda minorna skulle behövas för att påverka en motståndare i öppen terräng.

Den ökade tekniska utvecklingen och användandet av obemannade system ställer krav på en förståelse för dess inverkan på krigföringen. Urban miljö är ofta oundviklig vid markstrid och medför utmaningar som korta stridsavstånd, ökad risk för vådabekämpning och snabba stridsförlopp. Ett system som patrullrobot kan bidra till förbandens förmågor genom spaning, verkan och möjlighet till flexibel manövrering. Arbetet besvarar frågeställningen ”Hur kan patrullrobotsystem medföra militär nytta vid ett markförbands anfall i bebyggelse?” med utgångspunkt i den teoretiska referensramen militär nytta. Analysverktygen utgörs av SWOT-analyser och teorins dimensioner för militär effektivitet, militär lämplighet samt överkomlig kostnad. Syftet med arbetet är att utforska hur patrullrobotsystem kan medföra militär nytta vid anfall mot hastigt uppkomna mål. Resultatet visade att patrullrobotsystem kan anses ha flera möjligheter till att medföra militär nytta. Anledningen är främst de karaktäristiska egenskaperna gällande dess sensorer och en inbyggd verkansdel som bidrar till möjlighet för spaning och precisionsbekämpning. Det tekniska systemet har således en god övergripande förmåga att utföra uppdrag i urban miljö genom exempelvis ökad underrättelseinhämtning och reducerad risk för sidoskador. Patrullrobotsystemet tyder även ha en god förmåga att kunna interageras med andra system och bidra till en synergieffekt. Vidare är den ekonomiska faktorn oftast lägre i jämförelse med andra vapensystem som har liknande precision vid långa avstånd. Likt andra militära system är det dock av vikt att användandet övervägs och är i enlighet med de lagar, förordningar och etiska principer som är fastställda. Tydliga målsättningar underlättar ett optimerat användande av systemet. / The increased technological development and the use of unmanned systems are requiring an understanding of their impact on warfare. Urban environments are often unavoidable in ground combat and bring challenges such as short combat distances, increased risk of friendly fire and rapid combat progress. A system such as a loitering munition can contribute to the unit's abilities through reconnaissance, damage and the possibility of flexible maneuvering. This thesis report answers the question "How can loitering munition systems entail military utility in the context of a ground unit's attack in urban warfare?" based on the theoretical frame of military utility. The analysis tools consist of SWOT analysis and the theory's dimensions of military effectiveness, military suitability and affordability. The purpose is to explore how loitering munition systems can entail military utility in attacks against rapidly emerging targets. The result showed that loitering munition systems can be considered to have several opportunities to entail military utility. The reason is mainly the characteristic features regarding its sensors and a built-in warhead that contributes to the possibility of reconnaissance and precision strike. Thus, the technical system has a comprehensive ability to carry out missions in an urban environment through, for instance, increased intelligence and reduced risk of collateral damage. The loitering munition system also indicates a great ability to interact with other systems and contributes to a synergy effect. Furthermore, the economic factor is usually lower in comparison to other weapon systems with equivalent precision throughout long distances. Nonetheless, as for other military systems, it is important that the use is considered and is in accordance with the laws, regulations and ethical principles that have been established. Clear objectives make it easier to optimize the use of the system.