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In modern society, there is a generally accepted notion that corporations should be socially responsible, but there is much disagreement over what exactly "social responsibility" means. The primary area of disagreement concerns whether or not firms have a duty to consider non-owner stakeholders in their decision-making process. This paper addresses the need to quantify the benefits of socially responsible activities that provide financial returns to shareholders while still addressing the needs of non-owner stakeholders. It investigates the extent to which the reputational effects of corporate social responsibility lead to increased effectiveness of corporate lobbying expenditures, as measured by effective tax rates. This interactive effect creates a tangible economic benefit for firms, and ultimately their owners, providing an opportunity for firms to address the interests of both non-owners and owners. I expect, and find, that firms that are more socially responsible get a higher return on their lobbying expenditures than firms that are less socially responsible, reflected in lower effective tax rates. This result suggests that the competing viewpoints of the stakeholder and shareholder theories may not be as diametrically opposed as prior literature has suggested. The financial benefits that can be gained from being socially responsible may result in bottom-line profits to the shareholders, while still addressing the needs and desires of non-owner stakeholders. / Ph. D.

Agricultural interest groups play an important role in the formation of agricultural policy. History has shown that agricultural policy has developed gradually over time and major reform is rare. When reform does take place, however, it is not without the support of interest groups. This study describes the manner in which these organizations contribute to the process of policy determination and their effects on the outcome of legislation. This thesis provides an overview and characterization of 80 interest groups that were involved in the 1995 Farm Bill process. Data was collected from testimony, newspaper articles, position papers, personal interviews, and press releases. The information was then organized to summarize the objectives of each organization and provide insight on their strategies, methods of influence, structure, and composition. The study concludes with a discussion about the outcome of the farm bill and an analysis of why some interest groups may enjoy more success than others. / Master of Science

Thesis advisor: Juliet Schor / This study explores the dynamics of legislative conflicts surrounding PFAS (per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances) regulation in Massachusetts, focusing on the strategies employed by industry representatives and pro-regulatory advocates giving testimony at public hearings. Through a qualitative analysis of hearing transcripts and testimonies, the study reveals two primary lobbying strategies: an appeal to a status quo bias by emphasizing economic burdens and a "splitting hairs" tactic that emphasizes scientific nuances to advocate for a risk-based approach to regulation. In contrast, pro-regulatory advocates highlighted the known risks of PFAS exposure and served as foils to industry narratives. The study highlights the strategic communication tactics used by interest groups to influence policymakers and sheds light on the complex landscape of environmental regulatory debates in Massachusetts, emphasizing the role of public interest groups in countering the influence of private interest groups. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2024. / Submitted to: Boston College. Morrissey School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Sociology. / Discipline: Scholar of the College.

Essa dissertação testa a hipótese de que a ação política empresarial organizada faz diferença nas decisões governamentais e, portanto, que grupos de interesse empresariais seriam relevantes para o sucesso político alcançado por setores econômicos no contexto estudado. A análise avalia deliberações decorrentes do Plano Brasil Maior que afetaram 19 setores organizados entre 2011 e 2014. Dez setores são selecionados para a amostra, contrapondo-se os mais bem sucedidos e os menos bem sucedidos, sendo o sucesso a variável dependente. Como variáveis independentes, elencou-se uma série de possíveis causas que podem ter levado ao resultado de sucesso, sendo metade delas relacionadas a aspectos estruturais dos setores (geração de empregos, faturamento, balança comercial e tipo de setor), e a outra metade relacionada à atividade de lobbying (número de associações representativas do setor, estrutura das associações, número de reuniões realizadas com o governo, ação política através da associação). A análise é realizada através da metodologia de Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), que aponta as variáveis determinantes para o sucesso dos grupos no período mencionado. Os resultados da pesquisa condizem com a hipótese levantada e com parte da literatura sobre grupos de interesse, ao constatar que as variáveis estrutura das associações e ação política através da associação são necessárias para o resultado. Isso quer dizer que variáveis ligadas ao lobbying são essenciais para o sucesso do setor, e que a atividade de ação política empresarial faz diferença. / The dissertation tests the hypothesis that the business political action makes a difference in government decisions - and therefore that the business interest groups would be relevant for the political success achieved by the economic sectors in the context. The analysis assesses deliberations arising from the Plano Brasil Maior that affected 19 organized sectors between 2011 and 2014. 10 sectors are selected for the sample, oposing \"most successful\" and \"less successful\" sectors, as \"success\" is the dependent variable. As independent variables, we list a few possible causes that may have led to the successful outcome, half of which are related to structural aspects of the sectors (job generation, income, trade balance and industry type), and the other half is related to the lobbying activity (number of associations representing the sector, the structure of associations, number of meetings with the government, political action through the association). The analysis uses the Qualitative Comparative Analysis method (QCA), which points out variables which were crucial to the groups success in the mentioned period. The results are consistent with the hypothesis and with the interest groups literature, since variables \"structure of associations\" and \"political through the association\" are necessary for the result. This means that variables related to lobbying are essential to the group success, and that business political action activity makes a difference.

Le but de l’étude est de mettre en question la capture de régulation par les intérêts concentrés de la finance dans les débats sur les mesures à prendre après la crise du crédit partie des États-Unis en 2008. Les décideurs publics de ce pays et de l’Union européenne ont entrepris des efforts de réforme ambitieux pour mieux protéger les consommateurs de services financiers. Les débats au Congrès des États-Unis et au Parlement européen se sont achevés sur des décisions importantes concernant la réglementation du crédit. Fortement politisés, ils avaient suscité un lobbying intense des groupes d’intérêt de la finance et de la société civile, où normalement ces derniers auraient été tenus pour beaucoup plus faibles que leurs adversaires. Paradoxalement, une coalition de la société civile aux moyens modestes a réussi à convaincre les décideurs de la nécessité du changement et à contrecarrer les efforts du lobby financier pour l’empêcher. Qu’est-ce qui explique que des acteurs faibles et périphériques l’ont emporté sur des acteurs riches et puissants ? / The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2008. Policymakers in the EU and the US set ambitious reform efforts in motion to better protect consumers of financial services. Decisions to reform credit regulations marked the end of highly politicized reform debates in the US Congress as well as in the European Parliament, involving lobbying from business associations and civil society groups, in which proponents of reforms would normally have been considered to be much weaker than their opponents. Paradoxically, a poorly-resourced civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-makers and countered industry attempts to prevent regulatory change. What, then, explains that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors?

Cette thèse présente une contribution théorique et empirique à la recherche sur la représentation politique des groupes d’intérêt. Plus précisément, son objectif est de développer une analyse de la question la plus importante dans ce domaine, notamment celle de l’influence de groupes d’intérêt sur les politiques de la Commission Européenne. La nature multiforme de l’influence a été présentée dans le premier chapitre, avec un appui sur le rôle des fonctionnaires publics, le contexte politique et les caractéristiques des groupes d’intérêt. Le succès du lobbying a été comparé à travers de différents DGs de la Commission mais aussi à travers des différents contextes politiques avec des différents degrés de saillance et conflit. Les résultats de recherche confirment le rôle primordial des fonctionnaires publics dans les changements des politiques publiques au niveau de la Commission Européenne. Les recherches sur l’influence des groupes d’intérêt doivent prendre en compte le chevauchement de préférences exprimées par les décideurs politiques et les groupes d’intérêt pour mieux comprendre le succès de leur lobbying. En plus, les groups de business ont plus d’influence politique auprès des fonctionnaires qui travaillent dans les directions qui s’appuient sur les politiques économiques. Les résultats soulignent aussi l’importance des variables institutionnelles qui définissent le contexte dans lequel l’influence est exercée. Autrement dit, si certains groupes d’intérêt sont influents dépend du cadre institutionnel, et plus généralement du contexte politique dans lequel l’influence est utilisé. / This study is an account of interest group representation and lobbying success in the European Union. The questions I address are when and why interest groups succeed (or fail) to obtain their preferred policy outcome in the European Commission decision-making process. Lobbying success cannot be exclusively perceived as a function of the political resource exchanges between interest group coalitions and EU institutions. Instead, I argue that policy influence is a complex process that is under the control of policymakers. While multiple actors can effectively influence policy, public officials have a central-veto player-role in the process. They can also accommodate or reject interest group demands for other reasons than information exchange, such as their own ideological preferences, institutional embeddedness or the policy context. I argue that lobbying success can be better explained by a convergence between policymaker preferences, interest group preferences, and the policy context in which their preferences emerge. Thus, I focus on the role of policymakers as the predominant actors with formal agency capacities to change policy. Interest group scholars rely on methodological diversity, combining process tracing and survey designs, to establish the policy preferences of relevant political actors. By using such an approach, the results presented here paint a more refined picture of lobbying success, which depends much more on policymaker preferences than previous studies have considered. This conclusion should encourage scholars in the field to pay more attention to strong and weak ties within policy elite networks in an effort to better understand lobbying success.

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<p>Goodwill har under en längre tid varit ett av redovisningens stora problemområden. Debatten om redovisning av detta komplexa begrepp har pågått länge. Frågan om tidsperioden för avskrivningar eller om koncernmässig goodwill överhuvudtaget skall skrivas av har varit en av de mest omstridda redovisningsfrågorna.</p><p>International Accounting Standards Board är ett oberoende organ vars åtaganden är att fastställa standarder inom redovisning och finansiell rapportering. IFRS är det regelverk som ges ut av IASB. Utvecklandet av IFRS sker genom en internationell process där</p><p>alla intressenter (nationella normgivare, utgivare och användare av finansiella rapporter, revisorer mm) som berörs är beviljade att delge sin uppfattning. IASB publicerade under 2004 en ny standard rörande företagsförvärv. IFRS 3 Business Combinations, innehåller stora förändringar som bland annat innebär att Goodwill inte längre skall skrivas av utan vid behov skrivas ned. Under december 2002 utgav IASB ”Exposure Draft 3, Business Combinations” där nämnden bjöd in aktörer till att svara på och kommentera de olika frågorna som ingick i utkastet till IFRS 3.</p><p>Syftet med denna uppsats är att försöka öka förståelsen av hur lobbying av denna typ fungerar genom att studera svarsbreven IASB erhållit ifrån de olika aktörerna till fråga 8 i utkastet.</p><p>Studien har utgått ifrån ett hermeneutiskt förhållningssätt med en abduktiv ansats. Det empiriska materialet är uppdelat efter hur aktörerna ställt sig till frågan och därefter klassificerat efter vilken grupp intressenterna tillhör. Analysen har genomförts för varje aktörsgrupp separat. Syftet med detta är att försöka urskilja hur varje grupp argumenterat för sin sak för att sedan se om vi kan hitta någonting gemensamt i själva resonemangen som knyter gruppen till en viss ställning. Även argumenten i sig är klassificerade efter syntaktiska, pragmatiska och semantiska resonemang.</p><p>Störst i antalet insända svar var producenter av finansiell information. Då nya regler får en direkt påverkan på producenter av finansiell information kan det relativa intresset från denna grupp förklaras med att aktörer söker påverka mot en position som gynnar</p><p>den egna verksamheten. Den minsta gruppen utgjordes av statliga institutioner, detta kan förklaras med att utkastet inte medförde eventuella skatteeffekter, då standarden behandlar koncernredovisning.</p><p>Innhållet i argumenten var den samma för de flesta aktörer. Samtliga intressenter hade på liknande sätt utgått ifrån IASBs ställningstagande när dessa argumenterade mot utkastet. Aktörerna som var för hade inte sökt stärka sin position i vidare mening. Pragmatiska och semantiska argument var de som förekom mest, syntaktiska argument användes i betydligt lägre utsträckning.</p> / <p>Goodwill has under a significant time been a major dilemma in accounting. The controversy regarding how to recognize this complex concept has been going on for a long period of time. The issue concerning amortisation over the useful life or amortisation of goodwill in general is one of the most disputed accounting subjects.</p><p>International Accounting Standards Board is a self governing organizational body whose assignment is to promulgate accounting and financial standards. IFRS is a set of accounting standards that are issued by IASB. The development of IFRS occurs through a process where all interested parties(standard-setter, auditors, publisher and</p><p>users of financial reports) whose affected are advised to inform their opinion. In 2004 IASB published a new standard concerning business combinations. IFRS 3 contained amendments proposing that goodwill should not be amortised systematically over its useful life and that goodwill instead should be impaired on indication. During</p><p>December 2002 IASB published ”Exposure Draft 3, Business Combinations” where they invited participants to respond and comment on the subject that was included in the exposure draft.</p><p>The purpose of this paper to gain understanding and perception of how lobbying of this nature functions by studying and analyzing the comment letters that IASB received on question 8 in the exposure draft.</p><p>In This paper we assume a hermeneutic abductiv approach. The empirical data is divided after how the interested has positioned themselves in the question and accordingly to suited groups. The analysis has been executed for every interest group separately. The purpose in doing this is to try to identify how the each group has argued for his matter and afterwards seek to find something general in the groups reasoning for it’s position. The arguments that each respondent group applies are also assorted in three classifications, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic.</p><p>Considerable amount of the comment letters were in the group, producers of financial information. When new standards have a direct effect on producers of financial reports, we observed that the interest from this group can be explained by stating that they seek to influence against a position that benefits their financial activities. The minor group constituted of governmental institutions, this can be clarified by noticing that the</p><p>exposure draft did not result in any potential tax effects, since the standard only concerned business combinations.</p><p>The content of the arguments was similar for the majority of the interested parties. They had all in an equivalent way assumed from the same standing point as IASB, when arguing against the exposure draft. The interest that was for the proposal did not attempt to strengthen their position in an extended meaning. The arguments that aroused mostly were pragmatic and semantic, syntactic arguments were applied in a lower extent.</p>

Does foreign lobbying affect foreign aid? In this dissertation I provide compelling evidence the answer is yes. Prior scholarship has almost unequivocally focused on international bargaining as an exchange of public goods such as military, economic, or political concessions. Foreign lobbying represents a fundamentally different form of international bargaining. It is the exchange of a private good for an international policy concession. I develop a theory of foreign lobbying and foreign policy that views foreign policy formation as a function of political actors weighing public goods alongside the benefits they receive from foreign lobbyist contributions. I utilize a Heckman selection model to test this theory and find compelling evidence that foreign lobbying influences U.S. foreign aid allocations.