This diploma thesis studies in depth the progress and endings of both Napoleon's reigns in 1814 and 1815. The first chapter deals with belligerent campaigns in the beginning of 1814, with the first Napoleon's abdication and his deportation to Elba. His exile there is examined in the second chapter which shows his living on a small island in the Mediterranean sea. The third chapter takes place on the Continent again and describes Bonaparte's escape and his sequential armament within France including the view on Allies' forces and problems in Naples. The fourth chapter is genuinely military for it examines number of forces on both sides and mentions all three important battles. The last, fifth, chapter looks at the second Napoleon's abdication, at interlude since his departure for the South, entrance of Allies into Francie and return of Louis XVIII until Bonaparte's final embarking on a British vessel and his deportation to the island of Saint Helena. Key words: Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor, abdication, Elba island, The Congress of Vienna, Quatre Bras, Ligny, Waterloo, Gebhard von Blücher, Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, Joseph Fouché, Louis XVIII

Text in Afrikaans / Suid-Afrika het as gevolg van apartheid vir etlike dekades oor 'n gedeeltelik legitieme plaaslike regeringstelsel beskik. Die probleem is dat die land se apartheidsregering afsonderlike stelsels vir blankes en swartes in aparte woongebiede in stand gehou het, welke beleid vir meeste Suid-Afrikaners onaanvaarbaar was. Swart plaaslike owerhede wat swart plaaslike regering moes bedryf, was nog polities nog ekonomies lewensvatbaar. Die rede hiervoor is dat hul enersyds deur die gemeenskap verwerp is en andersyds nie voldoende inkomstebronne gehad het om plaaslike owerheidsdienste finansieel onafhanklik te lewer nie. Stedelike swart gemeenskappe was aan 'n, vir hulle, onaanvaarbare apartheidsgestruktureerde swart plaaslike regeringstelsel onderworpe. Swart plaaslike owerhede was voorts as gevolg van hul ekonomiese nie-lewensvatbaarheid, gekniehalter in die lewering van plaaslike owerheidsdienste asook die daarstelling en instandhouding van kapitale ontwikkelingsprojekte. Stedelike swartes was dus blootgestel aan gebrekkige dienslewering in aparte, onderontwikkelde "slaapdorpe" waar hulle noodgedwonge moes woon. 'n Vraag waarna gevolglik gekyk word, fokus op die kenmerke van 'n ideeeltipiese model van plaaslike regering wat die gedeeltelik legitieme stelsel behoort te vervang. As gevolg van die onaanvaarbaarheid van die swart plaaslike regeringstelsel was swart plaaslike owerhede sedert die vroee tagtigerjare die teikens van aksioniste teen hierdie apartheidsproduk. Aksioniste het nie-gewelddadige aksie (NGA), geskoei op die Gandhiaanse filosofie en metodiek van Satyagraha, aangewend ten einde swart plaaslike owerhede te vernietig. NGA (wat dikwels ook tot gewelddadigheid gelei het), het tot gevolg gehad dat die owerheid later noodgedwonge 'n nuwe plaaslike regeringstelsel vir die totale Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing, met alle deelvennote moes beding. Onderhandelings het vervolgens meegebring dat 'n oorgangsproses na legitieme (demokratiese) plaaslike regering vir alle Suid-Afrikaners ingevolge die Oorgangswet op Plaaslike Regering, 1993 (Wet No. 209 van 1993) geaktiveer is. In hierdie proefskrif is gevolglik vasgestel: (1) welke invloed die politieke bedeling (apartheidsbedeling) op die ontwikkeling van stedelike swart gemeenskappe en die bedryf van swart plaaslike regering gehad het; (2) wat die aard en effek van NGA op die ontwikkeling van swart plaaslike regering was; en (3) hoe geldig die onderhandelde plaaslike regeringstelsel is, vergeleke met die ideeel-tipiese model wat geidentifiseer is. / As a result of apartheid South Africa possessed a partially legitimate local government system for several decades. The problem is that the country's apartheid government maintained separate systems for whites and blacks in separate residential areas, a policy that was unacceptable to the majority of South Africans. Black local authorities who had to maintain black local government were neither politically nor economically viable because they were rejected by the community and lacked sufficient sources of revenue to render financially independent local government services. Urban black communities were subject to what, for them, was an unacceptable apartheid-structured black local government system. Black local authorities were also prevented by their economic nonviability from delivering local government services effectively and from instituting and maintaining capital development projects. Urban blacks were therefore subjected to poor service delivery in separate, underdeveloped "dormitory towns" where they were forced to live. An issue to be considered in this regard concerns the characteristics of an ideal-typical model of local government that should replace this partially legitimate system. As a result of the unacceptability of the black local government system local authorities became the targets of activists who waged a campaign against this product of apartheid since the early eighties. Activists used non-violent action (NV A), based on the Gandhian principle of Satyagraha, to destroy black local authorities. As a result of NVA (which often led to violence) the central government was eventually forced to negotiate a new local government system for the whole of South African society with all stakeholders. Negotiations led to a process of transition to legitimate (democratic) local government for all South Africans as promulgated in the Local Government Transition Act, 1993 (Act No. 209 of I 993). Consequently the following has been established in this thesis: (1) the influence of the political dispensation (apartheid dispensation) on the development of urban black communities and the maintenance of black local government; (2) the nature and the effect of NV A on the development of black local government; and (3) how valid the negotiated local government system is, compared to the identified ideal-typical model. / Development Studies / D. Litt. et Phil. (Ontwikkelingsadministrasie)

Trois jours avant les élections nationales de 2010 au Royaume-Uni, l’association London Citizens réunit les trois principaux prétendants à la fonction de Premier Ministre. Parmi les 2 200 personnes présentes dans la salle, certaines défilent sur scène et confrontent les candidats à des revendications (portant sur le salaire minimum, les droits des immigrés, les logements abordables et l’accès au crédit), tout en les enjoignant à reconnaître et à promouvoir le rôle de la « société civile » dans la gouvernance londonienne. À la pointe de ce combat, London Citizens représente un très large éventail d’organisations - congrégations religieuses, établissements scolaires, syndicats et autres associations - qui cherchent collectivement à faire entendre leur voix en interpellant les responsables politiques, mais également les acteurs économiques, bousculant ainsi les règles du jeu politique traditionnel. Construite sur le modèle du Broad-Based Community Organizing initié par Saul Alinsky dans les années 1940 à Chicago, London Citizens cherche à mobiliser un très grand nombre de communautés et d’habitants de Londres. Encadrés par des « organisateurs », les différents membres se rencontrent régulièrement et mènent ensemble des actions collectives sur des territoires et des sujets variés. « Démocratique » sous bien des aspects, l’action de London Citizens est aussi ambigüe au regard de sa conception de l’émancipation citoyenne et des changements sociaux visés. C’est une approche pragmatique de la citoyenneté et de la démocratie qui est alors mise en avant. / Three days before the general elections of 2010 in the UK, the organisation called London Citizens brings together the leaders of the three main parties. Among the 2,200 people in the room, some come on stage and confront the candidates with their demands (on the minimum wage, immigrant rights, affordable housing and access to credit), while urging them to recognize and promote the role of "civil society" in the governance of London. At the forefront of this fight, London Citizens represents a very wide range of organizations - religious congregations, schools, trade unions and other associations - which collectively seek to make their voices heard by politicians, but also economic actors, upsetting the traditional rules of politics. Built on the model of broad-based community organizing initiated by Saul Alinsky in the 1940s in Chicago, London Citizens seeks to mobilize a large number of London communities and residents. Supervised by "organizers", the various members meet on a regular basis and conduct collective actions, big and small, on different issues. "Democratic" in many ways, the work of London Citizens is also ambiguous with regard to its conception of citizen empowerment and targeted social changes. In so doing, it promotes a pragmatic approach to citizenship and democracy.

This thesis investigates the formation of power structures in a revolutionary setting. It takes as a case study the central Siberian city of Krasnoiarsk, in which a powerful Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies emerged during the period March-October 1917. The Krasnoiarsk Soviet was an elective council established during the overthrow of Tsarist authorities. Throughout 1917, it became a vital component of an emerging local and regional power structure, assuming growing responsibility for a number of core state tasks. As well as providing a new empirical case study to English-language literature on 1917, the thesis employs a nuanced analytical approach which challenges existing conceptualisations of state power in revolution and the role played by local soviets. State power in revolutionary Russia has often been viewed as something to be contested between different political groupings and organisations seeking to assert their own outright control. This view is captured neatly by the formulation of “dual power”, in which soviets and Provisional Government organisations constructed alternative power bases in an attempt to wield outright control. Accordingly, the soviets’ growing political strength indicated an ability to marginalise other groups and organisations seeking to wield power. By contrast, this thesis does not seek to explain how power in revolutionary Krasnoiarsk was “captured” or otherwise controlled by the Soviet alone. Instead, it applies a critical interpretation of state power proposed by Bob Jessop and other theorists, who view the state as a site of interaction and negotiation between multiple autonomous organisations and social actors, all of which have a stake in the way it operates in practice. It focuses on the emergence of a “soviet power” writ small, in which the Krasnoiarsk Soviet became an authoritative organisation within a broader constellation of revolutionary actors. Without denying the Soviet’s centrality within this power structure, the thesis does not explain its role simply as the monopolisation of authority over other would-be contenders. Rather, it sees the Soviet’s importance in its ability to establish itself as a focal point for interactions between multiple actors which, collectively, shaped state power at a local and regional level. It considers how the forms and practices of revolutionary power developed through these interactions and how these interactions in turn transformed the roles of actors and organisations engaging them. In order to unpick the complex and dynamic processes of revolutionary power, the thesis employs three core methodological concepts: institutions, mobilisation, and ideology. It makes several important and original arguments. Firstly, it emphasises the autonomy of social actors which supported the Soviet and engaged in its politics, demonstrating the extent to which they were able to shape its political functions and structures according to their own concerns. Secondly, it reveals the importance of skilled administrative personnel to Soviet work, highlighting the invaluable practical roles they played in the regulation of provisions and their ability to influence Soviet policy measures on this issue. Thirdly, it demonstrates the close cooperation between the Soviet and other local governmental and administrative bodies, including the city Duma and provisions regulatory organisations, which remained vital to fulfilling state functions throughout 1917. Finally, it discusses how the Soviet and socialist activists challenged established power relationships between Krasnoiarsk, as a locality, and all-Russian state authorities, revealing the growing importance they attached to securing greater local autonomy in revolution and the changing ways local actors viewed their role in wider all-Russian politics.

Denna studie är en fallstudie av Equmeniakyrkans kampanj Klimatfastan, där de under 40 dagar uppmanade medarbetare och medlemmar att se över sitt klimatavtryck och göra beteendeförändringar utifrån detta. Tidigare forskning visar att religiösa miljöaktioner skiljer sig från sekulära miljöaktioner gällande metoder, fokus och budskap. Studien ämnaratt undersöka hur Klimatfastan genomfördes, vilka effekter kampanjen hade påmedlemmars miljömedvetna beteende samt vilka svårigheter och framgångsfaktorer som kunde identifieras. För attkunna dra slutsatser utifrån ett bredare perspektiv, undersöktes den nationella organisationen och en lokal församling i Equmeniakyrkan. Materialet som användes för att besvara studiens frågeställningar bestod av tre intervjuer med Equmeniakyrkans personal, en enkät riktad till en lokal församling och ett internt dokument. Resultatet visar att Equmeniakyrkansanvändning av resurser förstärktes genom användning av vad Bomberg och Hague (2018) definierar som andliga resursergenom hela processen. Detta identifierades som en framgångsfaktor för kampanjen. En skillnad mellan den nationella organisationen och den lokala församlingen var möjligheten att förutse och hantera hinder för medlemmarnas deltagande i kampanjen. / This is acase study that examines the UnitingChurch in Sweden ́s (UCS) campaign “Klimatfastan” (Climate Fasting), during which members were encouraged to examine their carbon footprints and make lifestyle changes accordingly for40 days. Previous research shows that religious environmental groups differ from secular groups when it comes to methods, focus areas and messages. The aim of this study was to examine how the Climate Fastingwas implemented, which effects the campaign had on members’ pro-environmental behaviour,and which strengths and weaknesses the campaign had. To be able to draw conclusions based on a wider perspective, the campaign was examined through the lens of the national organisation and a local congregation. The material used to answer the study’s research questions consisted of three interviews with staff at UCS, a survey answered bymembers of a local congregation,and an internal document. The results show that UCS ́s use of resources was enhanced by the use of what Bomberg and Hague (2018) define asspiritual resourcesthroughout the campaign. This was identified as a strength. A difference between the national organisation and the local congregation was the ability to identify and counteract barriers for members’ participation in the campaign.

Au carrefour de la sociologie de la culture et de la sociologie de la déviance, ce travail porte sur les dimensions festives et oppositionnelles du monde des free parties, qui s’articule autour de manifestations techno clandestines et marginales. A partir d’une enquête ethnographique, il s’agit d’examiner une pratique culturelle et musicale mais aussi de saisir la variété des expressions oppositionnelles que les jeunes engagés dans ce monde y déploient. A la suite d’un travail de clarification théorique, cette recherche s’inspire de la notion de contre-culture, dans laquelle l’idée de conflictualité est centrale. Cet outil conceptuel permet d’explorer diverses facettes de l’univers free, controversé et encore largement méconnu, et notamment sa composante « contre ». On peut ainsi montrer que, si le monde free est loin d’être réductible à ses dimensions oppositionnelles, celles-ci peuvent donner un relief particulier à la fête – et réciproquement. La pertinence du croisement entre l’objet « free parties » et l’outil conceptuel « contre-cultures » est due en partie à la double déviance, sociale et légale, qui caractérise les fêtes techno étudiées. Les différents aspects oppositionnels mis en évidence dans ce monde juvénile, ainsi que la distinction entre non-conformité et contestation qui en émane, permettent d’analyser le rapport entre déviance, illégalité, conflictualité/illégalité à la lumière du cas des free parties. / At the crossroads of the sociology of culture and the sociology of deviance, this work focuses on the festive and oppositional dimensions of the free party world, which revolves around clandestine and marginal techno events. Based on an ethnographic research, this study aims to examine a cultural and musical practice but also to grasp the various oppositional expressions unfolding within this youth culture. After providing a theoretical clarification, I draw on the notion of counterculture, in which the idea of conflict is central. This conceptual tool enables me to explore various facets of the free party universe, controversial and still largely misunderstood, and in particular its antagonistic elements. Thus I show that, while the free party world does not amount to its oppositional dimensions, the latter can enhance the festive experience – and vice versa. The double deviance – both social and legal – characteristic of the studied techno parties makes it all the more relevant to bring together this object of study and the concept of counterculture. The various oppositional aspects of this youth culture I highlight, as well as the resulting distinction between nonconformity and contention, enable me to analyze the relationship between deviance, illegality, and conflict/counterculture in the light of the case of free parties.

En 2012, en pleine crise économique, le gouvernement autonome de la Catalogne convoque des élections anticipées et demande, pour la première fois depuis le retour de l’Espagne à la démocratie suivant la mort du dictateur Francisco Franco, une forte majorité afin de pouvoir mener la région vers la sécession. Plus ou moins en même temps, le groupe armé sécessionniste basque, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, annonce la fin de sa campagne meurtrière qu’elle mène depuis des décennies et qui fait plus de 800 victimes. Si l’on accusait depuis longtemps les Basques d’être plus séparatistes que les Catalans, ces nouveaux faits suggèrent un renversement des rôles de leurs mouvements sécessionnistes. En s’appuyant sur les littératures sur les mouvements sociaux et la sécession, l’objectif de cette étude est d’expliquer ce phénomène. Nous montrerons d’abord en quoi les structures économiques et institutionnelles encadrant les régions et leurs relations avec l’État central font en sorte que la crise économique espagnole (2008-2014) offre une structure d’opportunité politique pour la réussite du sécessionnisme catalan alors que cela n’a pas été le cas au Pays basque. Ensuite, nous démontrerons que le manque de synchronisme entre les processus basque et catalan de pacification des clivages de la violence politique joue un rôle déterminant sur la capacité de coopération entre nationalistes sur la question nationale durant la crise, ce qui affecte le potentiel de mobilisation sécessionniste. Enfin, nous verrons que grâce aux structures présentées tout au long de cet ouvrage, les cadres sécessionnistes mobilisés par les revendicateurs stratégiques et les fervents champions de la sécession sont plus crédibles et pertinents en Catalogne qu’au Pays basque, ce qui explique les niveaux opposés de résonance transversale du discours sécessionniste. / In 2012, in the midst of an economic crisis, the autonomous government of Catalonia called snap elections, seeking for the first time since Spain’s return to democracy following the death of the dictator Francisco Franco, a strong majority in order to lead the region towards secession. At roughly the same time, the Basque secessionist armed group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, announced the end of its decades-long murderous campaign, which had claimed over 800 lives. If the Basques have long been accused of being more separatist than the Catalans, these new developments suggested a role reversal for both secessionist movements. By drawing from the literature on social movements and secession, the aim of this study is to explain this phenomenon. We will firstly show that the economic and institutional structures framing for the regions and their relations with the central state made it that the Spanish economic crisis (2008-2014) offered a political opportunity structure for the success of Catalan secessionism, whereas this was not the case in the Basque Country. Secondly, we will demonstrate that the lack of synchronicity between both regions’ processes of pacifying their political violence cleavages played a decisive role in determining the capacity for nationalists to cooperation on the national questions, thereby affecting the potential for secessionist mobilization. Finally, we will see that, due to the structures presented throughout this work, the secessionist frames used by the strategic claimants and the consistent champions of secession were more relevant and credible in Catalonia than in the Basque Country, which explains the opposite levels of transversal resonance of the secessionist discourse. / En 2012, en plena crisis económica, el gobierno autónomo de Cataluña convoca elecciones anticipadas y, por primera vez desde el restablecimiento de la democracia española tras la muerte del dictador Francisco Franco, exige una mayoría amplia para llevar a la región hacia la secesión. Más o menos al mismo tiempo, el grupo armado secesionista vasco, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, anuncia el fin de su campaña mortífera de décadas, que ha cobrado más de 800 víctimas. Si los vascos han sido acusados durante mucho tiempo de ser más separatistas que los catalanes, estos nuevos acontecimientos sugieren una inversión de roles de sus movimientos secesionistas. Apoyándonos en la literatura sobre los movimientos sociales y la secesión, el objetivo de este estudio es explicar este fenómeno. En primer lugar, mostraremos que las estructuras económicas e institucionales que enmarcan las regiones y sus relaciones con el Estado central aseguraron que la crisis económica española (2008-2014) proporcionara una estructura de oportunidad política para el éxito del secesionismo catalán, mientras que no fue el caso en el País Vasco. A continuación, demostraremos que la falta de sincronía entre los procesos vasco y catalán de pacificación de los clivajes de la violencia política juega un papel decisivo en determinar la capacidad de cooperación entre nacionalistas sobre la cuestión nacional durante la crisis, lo que afecta al potencial de movilización secesionista. Por último, veremos que, gracias a las estructuras presentadas a lo largo de esta encuesta, los marcos secesionistas movilizados por los reclamantes estratégicos y los fervientes defensores de la secesión han sido más creíbles y relevantes en Cataluña que en el País Vasco, lo que explica los niveles opuestos de resonancia transversal del discurso secesionista. / Al 2012, en plena crisi econòmica, el govern autònom de Catalunya convoca eleccions anticipades, demanant per primera vegada des del retorn d’Espanya a la democràcia després de la mort del dictador Francisco Franco, una majoria àmplia per dirigir la regió cap a la secessió. Més o menys alhora, el grup armat secessionista basc, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, anuncia la fi de la seva campanya mortífera de dècades, que va fer més de 800 víctimes. Si els bascos han estat acusats des de fa temps de ser més separatistes que els catalans, aquests esdeveniments suggereixen una reversió dels papers dels seus moviments secessionistes. Recolzant-nos en les literatures sobre els moviments socials i la secessió, l’objectiu d’aquest estudi és d’explicar aquest fenomen. Primer, mostrarem que les estructures econòmiques i institucionals que emmarquen les regions i les seves relacions amb l’Estat central van assegurar que la crisi econòmica espanyola (2008-2014) proporcionés una estructura d’oportunitat política per a l’èxit del secessionisme català, mentre que això no va ser el cas al País Basc. En segon lloc, demostrarem que la manca de sincronia entre els processos basc i català de pacificació dels clivatges de la violència política juga un paper decisiu en determinar la capacitat de col·laboració entre nacionalistes sobre la qüestió nacional durant la crisi, el que afecta el potencial de mobilització secessionista. Finalment, veurem que, gràcies a les estructures presentades al llarg d’aquest estudi, els marcs secessionistes mobilitzats pels reclamants estratègics i els fervents defensors de la secessió han estat més creïbles i rellevants a Catalunya que al País Basc, el que explica els nivells oposats de ressonància transversal del discurs secessionista.

Die vorliegende Arbeit zielt darauf ab, zwei Forschungslücken in der Literatur über Bürgerkriege zu schließen. Erstens, die Analyse der Strukturen nicht-staatlicher bewaffneter Gruppen. Zweitens, die Untersuchung der Politik von Milizen, als Form nicht-staatlicher Gruppen, denen in gegenwärtigen Bürgerkriegen eine zunehmende Bedeutung zukommt. Diese beiden Bereiche werden mit Hilfe einer historisch vergleichenden Analyse am Beispiel von zwei Milizen, die im sudanesischen und libanesischen Bürgerkrieg kämpften, untersucht. Die "Popular Defense Forces", 1989 von der Regierung des Sudan mobilisiert, wurden zum Sammelbecken für undisziplinierte und teilautonome militärische Einheiten, die schwerste Kriegsverbrechen begingen. Die "Lebanese Forces", eine maronitisch-nationalistische Miliz, wurde von einer Koalition konservativer christlicher Parteien gegründet. Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Staates 1975-6 wurde diese Miliz zu einer autonomen politischen Einheit mit einem territorial abgegrenzten Kanton im Osten von Beirut. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Prozesse und Strategien, die diesen Milizen die Etablierung von Herrschaft ermöglichte. Die beiden Gruppen entwickelten sich zu Organisationen, die die zu verteidigenden Gebiete beherrschten und mit staatlichen Geldgebern verbündet waren, aber auch in Konkurrenz zu ihnen standen. Diese Arbeit identifiziert drei Mechanismen, die die Entwicklungen von Milizen im Laufe ihrer Zeit bestimmen. Der Erste erklärt die Formierung von Milizen als ein Bricolage von politischen und nicht-politischen Antworten auf Unsicherheit. Der Zweite erklärt, wie sich Milizen in hybride Organisationen, von zentraler Mobilisierungseinheit und lokal eingebettete Organisationen, entwickeln. Der Dritte führt die Kontrolle des Zentrums über die lokalen Organisationen auf die Macht über Ressourcen zurück. Die Arbeit schließt mit dem Entwurf eines alternativen analytischen Modells für die Untersuchung von Bürgerkriegen. / This thesis provides an analysis of the organizational politics of state supporting armed groups, and demonstrates how group cohesion and institutionalization impact on the patterns of violence witnessed within civil wars. Using an historical comparative method, strategies of leadership control are examined in the processes of organizational evolution of the Popular Defence Forces, an Islamist Nationalist militia, and the allied Lebanese Forces, a Christian Nationalist militia. The first group was a centrally coordinated network of irregular forces which fielded ill-disciplined and semi-autonomous military units, and was responsible for severe war crimes. Equally responsible for war crimes, such as the Sabra and Shatila massacre of Shi''a and Palestinian civilians in 1982, the second group, nonetheless, became an autonomous military formation with an established territorial canton with a high degree of control over military units. After first analysing the political and institutional context of formation of these two groups, detailed case study analysis illustrates how political-military leaderships consolidated internal authority over combat units. At first, this authority relied on a bricolage of norms, motivations and institutions, as highly diverse, loosely coordinated actors mobilised in response to insecurity. As key leadership figures emerged, these groups evolved into hybrid organisations, divided between central organisations and locally embedded units operating according to localised security arenas decoupled from central military or political strategy. Central authority was then consolidated through a process of progressive institutionalisation and expansion, as centralised control was established, often violently, over resources, recruitment and discipline. This thesis shows, how militias, formed in allegiance with the state evolved into organizations rivalling state sovereignty and exploiting the communities which they claimed to defend.

Notre étude qualitative s’est intéressée aux effets des microcrédits sur l’Empowerment économique et social des femmes. Nous avons procédé à l’étude de cas de l’Union des Mutuelles-Partenariat pour la Mobilisation de l’Épargne et le Crédit au Sénégal (UM-PAMECAS), un organisme de microcrédit dont les activités ont débuté au milieu des années 1990. Plusieurs sources de données ont pu être construites à partir d’entrevues, de l’observation participante et de sources documentaires. Nous avons ainsi interrogé 40 femmes bénéficiaires de microcrédits de l’UM-PAMECAS, 13 employés de l’organisme. La perspective de l’approche globale adoptée dans cette recherche, nous a permis, tout à la fois, d’analyser, de comprendre les caractéristiques, le fonctionnement, les effets économiques et sociaux de la diffusion du microcrédit comme mécanisme ou modalité de développement chez les femmes. Pour mesurer les effets de la microfinance sur les bénéficiaires, nous nous sommes reférés à l’Empowerment des femmes. Partant des différentes définitions de ce concept central d’Empowerment et de ses indicateurs, nous avons élaboré notre modèle d’analyse de l’Empowerment économique et social des femmes bénéficiaires de microcrédits de l’UM-PAMECAS. Les résultats révèlent que l’accès des femmes aux microcrédits a favorisé l’Empowerment économique des femmes, avec le renforcement de leurs activités professionnelles et l’autonomie financière. Toutefois, cet Empowerment économique est fragilisé, tant par des facteurs structurels qu’idéologiques. Quant aux effets des microcrédits sur l’Empowerment social et politique, ils sont plutôt faibles, en raison notamment de la permanence du mode traditionnel de régulation des rapports sociaux de sexes. Mots-clés : Microfinance, femme, développement, Empowerment, Sénégal, UM-PAMECAS. / This qualitative study deals with the effects of microcredits on the economical and social Empowerment of women. Therefore, we conducted the case study of l’Union des Mutuelles-Partenariat pour la Mobilisation de l’Épargne et le Crédit au Sénégal (UM-PAMECAS), a microcredit organization which started its operations in the mid 1990s. Several sources of data were constructed from interviews, participant observation and documentary sources. Thus, we interviewed 40 women and UM-PAMECAS microcredit beneficiaries, 13 of them being employees of the organization. The perspective of the global approach was adopted in this research. It has allowed us to analyze and understand the characteristics, operation, and economic and social impact of the spread of microcredit as a mechanism or mode of development in women. In order to measure the effects of microfinance on beneficiaries, we used a central concept, namely the emancipation of women. Based on the different definitions of the concept of Empowerment and its indicators, we developed our model for analyzing the economic and social Empowerment of women who are beneficiaries of UM-PAMECAS microcredit. The results indicate that women’s access to microcredit has fostered economic Empowerment of women with the strengthening of their professional activities and financial autonomy. However, this economic Empowerment is undermined by both ideological and structural factors. As far as the effects of microcredit on the social and political Empowerment are concerned, they are rather weak mainly due to the permanence of the traditional way of regulating social relations between the sexes. Keywords: Microfinance, women, development, Empowerment, Senegal, UM-PAMECAS.

The cases of the Kurds in Iraq and the Abkhaz in Georgia were chosen to illustrate how ethnic entrepreneurs play a crucial role in the ethnic mobilisation process. The study argues that in both cases a combination of variables was at work. These cases seem unlikely comparisons at first. The primary challenge appeared to be dealing with cases that involve different contexts and identities. However, in both cases entrepreneurs exploited an appropriate domestic environment to start the process and they perceived the opportunities provided by external intervention and the state’s policy towards their groups as incentives. Choosing the intermediate variables depends on the understanding that each one provides part of the explanation. Political opportunity structure directs the attention to the cost-benefit analyses of ethnic entrepreneurs and their perceptions of the available opportunity. Ethnic identity politicisation illustrates the role of ethnic entrepreneurs in choosing and activating identities. Finally, resource mobilisation is essential in conflict as any conflict requires resources that are consumed throughout its various stages. These resources are also used by ethnic entrepreneurs to reward their followers and guarantee loyalty, or sometimes to provide material incentives to reassure those unconvinced of the movement's potential success against the central authorities.