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Do bailouts make banks “too interconnected to fail”?: the effects of TARP on the interbank market and bank risk-takingWang, Weichao 09 May 2018 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2018-05-09 / I investigate how the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) affected the stressed interbank money market trading during the recent financial crisis via a difference-in-difference (DiD) design. I find that the TARP capital injection significantly enlarged the interbank exposure for the TARP recipients relative to others, particularly for banks in smaller size, with lower level of interbank trading and located in relatively poor economic conditions. I further test whether the distorted interbank liquidity position of the TARP recipients stimulated their credit risk appetite. I find that TARP recipient banks with larger interbank exposure also significantly shifted to riskier credit portfolios than others after the TARP implementation, suggested by estimates on forward- and backward-looking risk measures. Results are robust to the instrumental variable analysis, the sample self-selection model, the propensity score matching analysis, various placebo experiments and alternative econometric models. My results are most consistent with the “capital spillover” hypothesis that banks used the TARP capital to develop more interconnected interbank relationships, and the moral hazard effect that higher future bailout expectation and increased systemic relevance jointly construct a “new government safety net” for the TARP beneficiaries to take excessive credit risks under the implicitly perceived “too interconnected to fail” protection.
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Risco Moral no Mercado de SaÃde Suplementar e Efeitos da CoparticipaÃÃo na Demanda por Consultas e Exames / Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Market Effects and the Demand for co-participation in consultations and examinationsArianny Mary Moura Chaves 21 July 2009 (has links)
nÃo hà / O objetivo deste trabalho à avaliar a ocorrÃncia de risco moral na demanda por consultas mÃdicas e serviÃos de apÃio ao diagnÃstico e tratamento (exames) no sistema de saÃde suplementar brasileiro. Especificamente, visamos à comparaÃÃo quantitativa da utilizaÃÃo desses serviÃos de saÃde entre dois tipos de planos: com e sem coparticipaÃÃo. Para isso, utilizamos dois mÃtodos de matching baseado no propensity score, onde os estimadores sÃo calculados a partir de grupos ou estratos (Stratification Matching) e a partir de uma funÃÃo densidade (Kernel Matching). No modelo de estratos o efeito estimado da coparticipaÃÃo em consultas mÃdicas ficou entre -0,358 e -0,979 per capita por ano. No modelo a partir de uma funÃÃo Kernel, o efeito da coparticipaÃÃo foi de -0,286 a -1,031 per capita por ano. No caso dos exames, o efeito da coparticipaÃÃo ficou entre -2,965 e -4,652 (Stratification Matching) e -2,621 e -5,057 (Kernel Matching). Em ambos os modelos a regiÃo Nordeste apresentou o maior efeito de coparticipaÃÃo, tanto para consultas quanto para exames, enquanto a regiÃo Sul teve o menor efeito. Os resultados alcanÃados com o trabalho evidenciam a ocorrÃncia de risco moral, ou seja, a utilizaÃÃo de serviÃos de saÃde à sensÃvel à imposiÃÃo de mecanismos de regulaÃÃo, onde indivÃduos com coparticipaÃÃo demandam consultas mÃdicas e exames em quantidade inferior aqueles sem coparticipaÃÃo. / The objective of this study is to evaluate the occurrence of moral hazard in the demand for medical and support services for diagnosis and treatment (tests) in the Brazilian supplementary health system. Specifically, we aim at the quantitative comparison of the use of health services between two types of plans: with and without coparticipaÃÃo. For this, we use two methods of matching based on propensity score, where the estimators are derived from groups or strata (Stratification Matching) and from a density function (Kernel Matching). In the model of strata the estimated effect of coparticipaÃÃo medical appointments was between -0.358 and -0.979 per capita per year. In the model from a kernel function, the effect of coparcenary was -0.286 to -1.031 per capita per year. In the case of examinations, the effect of coparcenary was between -2.965 and -4.652 (Stratification Matching) and -2.621 and -5.057 (Kernel Matching). In both models the Northeast had the highest effect coparcenary, both for consultations and for examinations, while the South had the smallest effect. The results achieved through the study show the occurrence of moral hazard, ie the use of health services is sensitive to the imposition of regulatory mechanisms where individuals coparticipaÃÃo require medical examinations and in quantities not exceeding those without coparcenary
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Funding social sector activity in Brazil: a case study analysis of agency risk incidence and mitigationDragon, Katharina Agnes 03 August 2012 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2012-08-03 / Empresas e organizações sociais têm um papel cada vez mais importante no mercado brasileiro. Essas organizações - sejam elas com ou sem fins lucrativos –têm como objetivocausar um profundo e positivo impacto social.Ambas enfrentamtambém o mesmo desafio: financiar as suas operações. Recentemente, dois modelos inovadores de financiamento, o fundo de venture capitalVox Capital e o fundo de empréstimo social SITAWI, entraram no mercado brasileiro para solucionar esse desafio. Este estudo analisa ambos os fundos,associando o problema do financiamento de empresas e organizações sociais às teorias tradicionais de negócio. Mais especificamente, por meio de um estudo de caso,é avaliado se o risco de agência (agency risk) explica as práticas e o designcontratual utilizados pelos fundos. A pesquisa é baseada num estudo de Alemany e Scarlata (2010) sobre a estruturação dos negócios de fundos filantrópicos de capital empreendedor (PhVC, na sigla em inglês) na América do Norte e na Europa. Uma definição chave desse estudo é que organizações sem fins lucrativos, ao contrário daquelas com fins lucrativos, estão sujeitas a uma restrição de distribuição de lucros. Embora Alemany e Scarlata (2010) tivessem descobertoque parceria (stewardship), mais do que o problema de agência (agency problem), explica a estrutura dos negócios dos fundos PhVC, as implicações do presente estudo de caso para o Brasil são diferentes. Os resultados sugerem que o problema de agência,mais do que a parceria,descreve adequadamente os contratos analisados de financiamento. Detectou-seque cláusulas contratuais não foram apenas usadas para mitigar o risco de agênciaresultanteda ausência de uma restrição de distribuição de lucros, mas também para reger as estruturas cooperativas com organizações sem fins lucrativos. No caso de SITAWI, a restrição dos destinatários de fundos de distribuir lucros provou-se uma ferramenta efetiva para alinhar os interesses entre os financiadores e os destinatários dos fundos. Apesar daimplicação da presença de parceria, os contratos do fundo social contiveram cláusulas geralmente usadas para reduzir o risco de agência. No caso de Vox Capital, os destinatários dos fundos eram empresas com fins lucrativos, portanto não sujeitas à restrição de distribuição de lucros. O modelo de negócio de Vox Capital é organizado para impedir qualquer incidência potencial do problema de agência. Ambos os fundos, independentemente da estrutura jurídica dos beneficiários destes fundos, evidenciaram o intuito de garantir a aplicação de práticas de negócio utilizadas pelas empresas tradicionais do setor corporativo em vez daquelas utilizadas no setor social.
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Governança corporativa no Brasil: análise do custo de capital próprio em um ambiente com assimetria de informaçãoLombardi Junior, Guilherme 23 August 2012 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2012-08-23 / The stock exchange called BM&FBOVESPA created special stock listing segments in December of year 2000, which impose stricter rules than the legal framework, regarding the disclosure of financial information and the improvement of corporate ownership structure. The purpose of BM&FBOVESPA was to reduce the information asymmetry and, therefore, reduce the company’s cost of capital (equity). We sought to verify for the Brazilian stock market if there are statistically relevant differences in the cost of capital (equity), differentiating companies based on the levels of corporate governance while controlling the migration effect. We could confirm in this paper that the migration to the special stock listing segments yields better and statistically significant returns to the shareholders. However, we got some negative and statistically significant results for the stocks returns for companies listed in the special stock listing segments, when compared to the Basic Market. This result contradicts the initial intuition that good corporate governance reduces the cost of capital (equity) for the firm. / A BM&FBOVESPA criou os segmentos especiais de listagem de ações em dezembro de 2000, que estabelecem regras mais rígidas do que o arcabouço legal, atuando tanto no aumento da transparência na divulgação das informações ao mercado, quanto na melhoria da estrutura societária. O objetivo da bolsa foi diminuir a assimetria de informação e, por consequência, reduzir o custo de captação para as empresas. Propusemos verificar, no mercado brasileiro, se há diferenças estatisticamente significativas no custo de financiamento das empresas através de capital próprio (ações), diferenciando as empresas com base nos níveis de governança corporativa e controlando o efeito das migrações entre os segmentos de listagem. A partir da análise dos dados obtivemos resultados positivos e significativos quando analisamos as migrações de listagem, mas resultados negativos e significativos para os retornos das ações listadas nos segmentos diferenciados da bolsa, quando comparados com os retornos das ações listadas no Mercado Básico. Este último resultado contraria a intuição inicial de que boas práticas de governança diminuem o custo de capital (próprio) da firma.
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Modelo de incentivos para solução dos problemas de clientes nas agências bancáriasSarti, Fábio Dutra 13 December 2012 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2012-12-13 / Os bancos possuem dificuldade em solucionar os problemas dos clientes. Mais especificamente nas agências, onde a maior parte das metas dos gerentes está relacionada à comercialização de novos produtos e prospecção de novos clientes, interromper esta dinâmica para tratar de problemas de produtos já vendidos ou outros tipos de solicitação representa custo adicional e baixo potencial de receitas para o gerente. Como a agência é um dos principais canais de atendimento dos bancos e estas instituições continuamente pregam a qualidade nos serviços como pilar estratégico, é fundamental que os gerentes sejam tempestivos na resolução de problemas. A dificuldade em se fazer um monitoramento adequado, principalmente nos grandes bancos, pode implicar no surgimento de moral hazard. Ou seja, os gerentes podem optar por direcionar seus esforços àquilo que lhes trazem uma recompensa maior (vendas), preterindo a solução de problemas, ou priorizando apenas aquelas que podem aumentar a sua remuneração. Este trabalho discute o modelo de contrato de incentivos dos gerentes de agência em um banco de varejo brasileiro e, através de análises quantitativas da base de manifestações, procura identificar os gaps existentes que permitem a ocorrência de moral hazard a fim de propiciar mudanças no formato de contrato. O escopo do estudo está limitado a dois dos segmentos de correntistas. Espera-se poder contribuir com a prática administrativa a fim de permitir que os gestores consigam desenhar contratos de incentivos mais robustos, que os clientes usufruam de um serviço bancário com mais qualidade e que o banco analisado possa aumentar a fidelização de clientes.
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Policies for development aidSraieb, Mohamed Mounir 19 March 2015 (has links)
My dissertation is an advocacy of the idea that if aid proved to be ineffective, it is partly because of the donor and not only the recipient as it is usually argued. The thesis contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on aid effectiveness and explores the ability of aid to achieve its goals in the presence of both incentives and informational problems. <p>The thesis consists of three essays dealing with a particular aspect of donor policies that may impact the effectiveness of aid: i) the drivers of aid allocation among recipient countries, ii) ex-post conditionality and the role of reputation in inducing compliance with aid contracts; iii) and finally, the optimal choice of aid modalities.<p>The first chapter investigates the drivers of U.S. aid policy. <p><p>I find considerable evidence that the pattern of aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs and merit of the recipients. Most importantly, inertia seems to impact heavily the aid allocation process. Any of these motivations, when excessive, would lead to a time inconsistency situation where the donor is not credible in his conditionality. With such an impact on aid allocation, the question arises on the effectiveness of conditioning aid provision on political, social, or economic reforms. This is precisely the scope of chapter 2.<p><p>The second chapter investigates the conditions under which reputation can serve as commitment device in order to induce donors of development aid to enforce aid contracts and recipients to comply with such contracts. The idea is that the success of conditionality rests solely on the availability of a commitment technology that ties the hands of the donor. Reputation concerns could create the required incentives and overcome the altruism effect on the donor side.<p><p>Notwithstanding that incentive creation must not be driven by the volume of aid only, but also by the way it is channelled, i.e. aid modality. This is particularly relevant for recipients with certain characteristics. Depending on the preference alignment of the donor and the recipient, the information structure in place, the optimal aid modality can change. The characteristics of the optimal aid package are investigated in chapter 3. Optimality imposes a mix of fixed project and financial transfer to recipient countries. The transfer can be negative for countries exhibiting a high willingness or ability to redistribute to the poor. This is interpreted as a contribution to the financing of the infrastructure project. The extent of the project (large or small size) is determined by the interest of government for the poor in the recipient country.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Vliv problému pána a správce na vznik finanční krize / The impact of the principal-agent problem on the genesis of the global financial crisisMach, Milan January 2013 (has links)
The core focus of this thesis is the principal-agent problem and its role in the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis. Analysis of key elements of the problem like moral hazard and adverse selection lays foundations for identifying situations, in which conflict of interests led to negative impacts on the economic performance before and during the financial crisis. This work also studies the influence of factors that are often overlooked by theoretical economists but are still tightly connected to the principal-agent problem, like exogenous incentives based on the mechanism of trust. The author also evaluates mechanisms that have been put into place after the financial crisis and which could help lower agency costs. He also sketches out possible venues of future research in this area.
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Rola morálneho hazardu vo finančnej kríze / The role of moral hazard in the financial crisisDemčík, Matej January 2012 (has links)
The financial crisis in the USA is due to its great consequences still considered to be current topic. Its causes were discussed and analyzed by many researchers, but mostly from the financial point of view. This thesis takes different approach and identifies the role of the moral hazard in the pre-crisis period. Moral hazard is very often underestimated and for many people uninteresting factor. Therefor, the thesis is divided into four parts, which present the theoretical background of moral hazard and bring up the importance and constant presence of it in today's world. The main part of this work is last chapter, which analyzes moral hazard in the causes of the financial crisis. Moral hazard played key role in the pre-crisis period when it was present at all possible levels deforming the behavior of market players and causing the market failure. The deformation had mostly form of excessive risk-taking, unfavourable financial products and abuse of the information asymmetry. Very specific and dangerous kind of moral hazard is associated with the government interventions such as Greenspan doctrine or Too big to fail policy. It is because of its systematic character, when opposed to the moral hazard in the private sector is not required the presence of information asymmetry.
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Morální hazard na příkladu finanční krize / Moral hazards in terms of the financial crisisJagošová, Petra January 2012 (has links)
This diploma thesis focuses on the moral hazard aspects in the financial crisis on the USA market in the years 2007-2009, that later became known as a global crisis of real economic. The thesis aim is to prove a role of moral hazard in the financial crisis origins, role that can be detected in the activities and behavior of the market participants. There is a survey of the individual causes of the crisis and interpretation in the terms of moral hazard. First part of the thesis focuses on the theoretical basics of moral hazard that is being represented by the Principal-Agent Problem. This theory is further applied on the financial market theories. Second part of the thesis describes the origin and development of the financial crisis. It represents the introduction of the crisis without exploring the causes. The third part of the thesis is the core part, there is presented the role of moral hazard in the financial crisis due to the synthesis of the two previous parts. Item by item there are introduced the activities on the crisis market, where the principle of these activities is presented in terms of moral hazard. This part also includes moral hazard in the society that influences also the financial market. The last part focuses on the regulation of the financial markets in connection with the possibilities of moral hazard elimination.
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Systémově významné bankovní instituce v kontextu finanční stability / Systemically Important Banks in the Context of Financial StabilityBuchta, Martin January 2012 (has links)
A failure of systemically important bank was up to the present time in most cases avoided through providing financial support by government because there were concerns about destroying the financial stability followed by decline in economic activity because of size, interconnectedness and limited substitutability of the failing bank. However, the implicit governmental guarantees for systemically important banks create many distortions in an economy which are desirable to eliminate. Considering restriction of moral hazard, no increase in systemic risk and preservation of social benefits of G-SIBs the parallel implementation of higher capital requirements and recovery and resolution policy seems to be the most effective measure from proposed regulatory measures for systemically important banks. The future benefits and costs of these measures will be dependent in a high degree on the form and way in which the new rules will be incorporated by governments to their national regulatory frameworks.
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