The paper analyses the relationship between succession and firm performance. Using a unique panel data set on a sample of roughly 4,000 Austrian family firms we examine empirically the impact of past succession as well as future succession plans on employment growth and investment behaviour. Analysing succession plans, we do not find a 'shadow of succession' effect. No significant difference in employment growth and investment behaviour is found between firms that plan to transfer the firm in the next ten years and those who do not. In contrast, past succession exerts a significant and positive employment growth effect which becomes stronger over time. The impact of past succession on investments is also positive but not significantly different from zero. Thus, our findings provide support for the existence of a positive employment shadow after a transfer, whereas the shadow of succession hypothesis has to be rejected prior to transition. (author's abstract) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

Empresas familiares são o principal tipo de empresa ao redor do mundo. No Brasil são responsáveis por 50% do PIB e geram 85% dos empregos formais. Por possuírem a influência da família no negócio, os mecanismos de controle gerencial adotados por essas empresas tendem a ser informais e baseados em confiança. Estudos na área de contabilidade gerencial em empresas familiares demonstram que a adoção de sistemas de controle gerencial trazem benefícios econômicos e podem auxiliar na implementação de estratégias e facilitar processos de sucessão. No entanto, falta compreensão na academia sobre como ocorre o processo de adoção de sistemas de controle gerencial em empresas familiares e qual a influência da família e dos valores familiares neste processo. Este estudo buscou entender como os valores familiares, a presença da família na gestão e a interação entre os atores organizacionais influenciam o processo de adoção de SCG em empresas familiares. Para atingir este objetivo, foi conduzido um estudo de caso em uma empresa familiar que possui membros da família na gestão e passou por um processo de adoção de sistemas de controle gerencial. Foram realizadas entrevistas com gestores familiares e não familiares e coletados documentos considerados relevantes para o entendimento do fenômeno estudado. A análise foi feita utilizando-se a técnica de análise de conteúdo temática à luz do quadro teórico proposto por ter Bogt e Scapens (2014), baseado na Velha Economia Institucional (Old Institutional Economics). Os resultados evidenciados neste estudo demonstram como o contexto organizacional, os valores familiares no negócio e a racionalidade dos atores organizacionais direcionaram a escolha, o processo de adoção e a institucionalização do sistema de controle gerencial no caso estudado. Este estudo contribui para a literatura demonstrando que o uso do quadro teórico proposto por ter Bogt e Scapens (2014) é apropriado para entender como ocorre o processo de adoção de SCG por empresas familiares e fornecendo explicações para resultados conflitantes (Songini & Gnan, 2015; Speckbacher &Wentges, 2012), sugerindo que além da presença de membros da família na gestão, as instituições internas (como os valores familiares) e externas precisam ser considerados quando se busca entender a adoção de SCG em empresas familiares. / Family firms are the most prevalent type of companies in Brazil and throughout the world, contributing to 50% of the brazilian GDP and 85% of the employment rate. Given that the family is involved in the business, control mechanisms in these firms are more likely to be informal and trust-based. Academic research shows that the use of management control systems can result in better economic performance, promote strategy implementation and support succession processes. Nevertheless, there is a gap on the understanding of how management control systems adoption process happen and what is the influence of the family values on this process. Drawing on a case study carried out on a family firm managed by family members that recently adopted a management control systems this studies aims to shed light on how family values, the presence of family managers and the interaction between organizational actors influences management control systems adoption. Interviews were conducted with family and non-family managers and relevant documents were collected. The collected data was analyzed guided by ter Bogt e Scapens (2014) framework, based on Old Institutional Economics. The results shows how the presence of a family manager e the family values can influence adoption process and the institutionalization of management control systems in family firms. The organizational context, family values and the agency of organizational actors directed management control systems choice and the adoption process on the family firm studied. This study contributions to the academic literature are twofold: Firstly, the use of ter Bogt e Scapens (2014) framework is suitable to understand how MCS adoption processes occurs on family firms. Secondly, providing explanations for conflicting results (Songini & Gnan, 2015; Speckbacher & Wentges, 2012), suggesting that in addition to family managers presence both internal (family values) and external institutions must be accounted for when seeking to understand the adoption of MCS in family firms.

Neste trabalho examinamos os efeitos do controle e governança familiar nas decisões de fusões e aquisições (M&A). Analisamos 420 empresas não-financeiras listadas na BM&FBovespa entre 1997 e 2007 e encontramos que empresas controladas por famílias empresarias por meio de excesso de direitos de voto são mais propensas a se engajar em atividades de M&A. Encontramos também que empresas cujo presidente do conselho de administração é um membro da família controladora, a probabilidade de crescimento via M&A diminui. Finalmente, encontramos que as atividades de M&A em empresas controladas por famílias prejudicam o desempenho operacional de longo prazo. Em conjunto, mecanismos de excesso de controle parecem atenuar a restrição de recursos financeiros das famílias para perseguir o crescimento via M&A, entretanto, esta estratégia de crescimento gera resultados operacionais inferiores. Estes resultados têm importantes implicações para a literatura de governança e para a prática empresarial em países emergentes como o Brasil. / We examine the effect of family control and governance on merge and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. We analyze 420 Brazilian non-financial firms from 1997 to 2007 and found that family-controlled firms with excess of control rights are more likely to engage in M&A transactions. We unravel that family chairman reduces the likelihood of family firms to grow through M&As. We also find that M&A activities in family controlled firms are detrimental to their operational performance in the long-run. Overall, family control enhancing mechanism seems to attenuate family limited resources to expand through M&A, where institutions are weak and the capital market is not developed, but this growth strategy leads to poor operational performance. Altogether, these results have important implications for corporate governance research and practice in emerging economies like Brazil.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-11-13T12:29:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Gabriel Medaglia Voelcker_.pdf: 3571636 bytes, checksum: ea74b544f2ed9803ebd4afdd918f566b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-13T12:29:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gabriel Medaglia Voelcker_.pdf: 3571636 bytes, checksum: ea74b544f2ed9803ebd4afdd918f566b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-08-20 / Nenhuma / O presente trabalho aborda a relação estatística entre firmas familiares e tomada de risco. Procura-se contribuir para a crescente literatura em firmas familiares ao realizar uma revisão da literatura das características que as distinguem de firmas não familiares, buscando inovar ao pesquisar um construto pouco trabalhado com este tipo de firma: a tomada de risco. Revisa-se a literatura sobre ambos construtos, utilizando pressuposto teórico e trabalhos empíricos para formular-se a hipótese de pesquisa: firmas familiares são mais avessas à tomada de riscos do que firmas não familiares. Esta hipótese é testada empiricamente através procedimentos econométricos em uma amostra de 1188 observações. Utiliza-se uma amostra com particularidades relevantes, contemplando as firmas listadas na bolsa de valores do Brasil, que compõem um dos maiores mercados mundiais com concentração acionária. Realiza-se dois testes para diferença de médias entre firmas familiares e firmas não familiares, os testes T e Mann-Whitney. Após verificada que a diferença estatística nas variáveis entre os dois tipos de firma existe, busca-se testar a hipótese utilizando um teste de Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários. Para robustez, são utilizados testes de dados em painel com efeitos aleatórios. Em todas as regressões rodadas observa-se um efeito negativo da presença familiar na tomada de risco das firmas. Conclui-se que os resultados corroboram a hipótese de que firmas familiares seriam mais avessas à tomada de riscos que firmas não familiares. / The present work analyses the relationship between family firms and risk-taking. It seeks to contribute to the growing literature on family firms by reviewing the literature on the characteristics that distinguish them from non-family firms, aiming to innovate by approaching a less-used construct for this type of firm: risk-taking. The literature on both constructs is reviewed, using theoretical and empirical works to develop the research hypothesis: family firms are more averse to risk-taking than non-family firms. This hypothesis is tested empirically through econometrics procedures in a sample with 1188 observations. A sample with relevant particularities is used, consisting in the firms listed in the Brazilian stock market, which is one of the biggest markets in the world with shareholder concentration. Two testes are performed to test if the average of the variables behave differently between family and non-family firms: T and Mann-Whitney. After verifying that there is a statistical difference between the two types of firm, it is tested the hypothesis using a Ordinary Least Squares test. For robustness, random effects tests with panel data are performed. In all regressions the presence of family firms negatively affect risk-taking. Thus, it can be concluded that family firms seem to be less prone to risk-taking than non-family firms

Submitted by Franciele Moreira (francielemoreyra@gmail.com) on 2018-04-18T12:27:09Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Rafel Manoel de Oliveira - 2018.pdf: 1757956 bytes, checksum: 464aaa8d736398dec87202c9df822548 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2018-04-18T15:24:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Rafel Manoel de Oliveira - 2018.pdf: 1757956 bytes, checksum: 464aaa8d736398dec87202c9df822548 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-18T15:24:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Rafel Manoel de Oliveira - 2018.pdf: 1757956 bytes, checksum: 464aaa8d736398dec87202c9df822548 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-27 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq / This study aimed to verify if the acquisitions made by family companies generate better performance than those performed by non-family companies, and if there is a difference between the post-acquisition compensation of executives of family companies and executives from non- family companies of Brazilian companies listed in B3 in the period from 2009 to 2016. The research is supported mainly in the agency relations and the alignment of interests between the principal and the agent, studied by the Agency Theory. Data were collected through Thomson Reuters Ikon and the company reference form. Enterprises were classified as familiar or unfamiliar through the involvement and essential approaches. To achieve the objectives, three multiple regressions were estimated: two related to the performance of acquisitions, with data stacked and a sample of 244 acquisitions (86 companies), and one referring to executive compensation, with a sample of 96 companies with panel data not balanced. The results indicated that: i) Brazilian family firms tend to perform better with corporate acquisitions events compared to non-family acquisitions; and (ii) corporate acquisitions have a greater positive impact on the total remuneration of non-family business executives than on family firms. The results are consistent with the Agency Theory, which says that the gap between ownership and control creates agency conflicts and offers greater opportunities for expropriation by managers. / Este estudo buscou verificar se as aquisições realizadas por empresas familiares geram melhor desempenho do que aquelas realizadas por empresas não familiares, e se existe diferença entre a remuneração pós-aquisição de executivos de empresas familiares e de executivos de empresas não familiares de companhias brasileiras listadas na B3, no período de 2009 a 2016. A pesquisa se suporta principalmente nas relações de agência e no alinhamento de interesses entre o principal e o agente, estudados pela Teoria da Agência. Os dados foram coletados por meio da Thomson Reuters Ikon e pelo formulário de referência das empresas. As empresas foram classificadas como familiares ou não familiares por meio das abordagens de componente de envolvimento e abordagem essencial. Para cumprir os objetivos, foram estimadas três regressões múltiplas: duas referentes ao desempenho de aquisições, com dados empilhados e amostra de 244 aquisições (86 empresas), e uma referente à remuneração dos executivos, com uma amostra de 96 empresas, com dados em painel não balanceado. Os resultados indicaram que: i) as empresas brasileiras familiares tendem a ter desempenho superior com eventos de aquisições corporativas em relação às não familiares; e ii) as aquisições corporativas têm um maior impacto positivo na remuneração total dos executivos de empresas não familiares do que na de empresas familiares. Os resultados são consistentes com a Teoria da Agência, que diz que distanciamento entre a propriedade e o controle gera conflitos de agência e oferece maiores oportunidades de expropriação por parte dos gestores.

Syftet med denna studie är att ta reda på huruvida det föreligger en skillnad i företagsprestation mellan familjeföretag och icke-familjeföretag. För att göra detta har en kvantitativ metod tillämpats. Undersökningsåren är 2003-2011 och företagen som har undersökts har varit små och medelstora företag på den svenska marknaden. Slutsatsen är att det inte föreligger någon prestationsskillnad mellan familjeföretag och icke-familjeföretag. / The purpose with this study is to find out whether there is a difference in firm performance between family firms and non-family firms. In order to fulfill the purpose we have used a quantitative method. The examined period was 2003-2011 and the investigated firms have been small and medium sized firms on the Swedish market. The conclusion drawn is that there is no significant difference in the firm performance between family firms and non-family firms.

Forskningen om familjeföretag är relativt omfattande. Men det finns fortfarande många frågor som är obesvarade. En viktig fråga som berör familjeföretags utveckling är viljan att ta in extern kompetens inom ekonomiområdet. Det kan röra sig om tjänster såsom ekonomichef, controller eller redovisningekonom. I detta arbete har vi försökt besvara frågan om varför ledningen i familjeföretag väljer att ta in extern kompetens inom ekonomi. Teorin för fram att familjeföretag i det längsta drar sig för att ta in extern kompetens till förmån för den egna familjens medlemmar. Slutsatserna man kan dra efter att ha utvärderat svar från åtta familjeföretags VD:ar samt externt tillsatt personal inom ekonomi är att de till största delen ser mycket positivt på tillsättandet av extern personal inom ekonomi. De flesta för fram åsikten om att utan att tillsätta extern personal hade bolagen i fråga inte kunnat utvecklas så framgångsrikt som de har gjort. De ser extern personal inom ekonomiområdet som en styrka med avseende på de nya kunskaper, erfarenheter och kompetenser som kommer företagen till del. Det många pekar på i intervjerna är att man får in en person som kan komma med andra lösningar på problemen än de konventionella, men även en mindre känslosam attityd till familjeföretagets affärer, vilket kan vara en klar fördel. Nya synpunkter och kunskaper kommer företaget till godo. Dock är den personliga dynamiken med den externa kompetensen av stor vikt för företagen i undersökningen, man bör passa in i företagsandan samt vara lätt att ha att göra med, men ända ha integritet. Nackdelar som man har pekat på är till exempel om den externt tillsatte experten eventuellt slutar sin tjänst eller manipulerar bokföringen. Med tanke på alla de lagar och regelverk som styr företagens vardag krävs en hel del specialistkunskap inom ekonomiområdet, särskilt inom koncernredovisning, beskattning, bokslut och årsredovisning. Dessa kunskaper kan i ett fåtal fall tillgodoses av familjemedlemmar, men i de allra flesta företag är det kompetens man måste få in i företaget utifrån. Vi anser att vår undersökning har gett oss svar på de frågor som vi hade ställt upp angående familjeföretags syn på att anlita extern kompetens inom ekonomi. Nämligen att familjeföretag som vill utvecklas vinner mycket på att anlita extern kompetens inom ekonomi. Inte bara ekonomiskt utan även på många andra områden. Nyckelord: Familjeföretag, Extern ekonomisk kompetens, Bolagsstyrning, Familjeföretags komplexitet, Successionsplanering. / Research on family business is quite extensive. But there are still many questions that remain unanswered. An important issue relating to family business development is the desire to bring in external expertise in the finance area. It may involve services such as finance manager, controller or accountant. In this work the authors have attempted to answer the question of why the management of family businesses chooses to bring in external expertise in economics. The theory implies that the family business as long reluctant to bring in external expertise for the benefit of their own family members. The conclusions to be drawn after evaluating responses from eight family business CEOs and externally added staff in finance is that they are mostly very much welcoming the appointment of external staff in finance. Most of the view implies that without the addition of external staff, the companies would not develop as successfully as they have done. They see external staff within the finance area as strength for the new knowledge, experience and skills that businesses will benefit from. Many CEO: s advocates that you get in a person who can come up with other solutions to the problems than the conventional ones, but also a less emotional approach to family business affairs, which may be a distinct advantage. New ideas and knowledge will benefit the company. However, the personal dynamics of the external competence are of great importance to companies in the survey, it should fit into the entrepreneurial spirit and be easy to deal with, but still have privacy. Disadvantages as some have pointed out are for example, if the externally appointed expert may terminate their service or manipulate the records. Given all the laws and regulations that govern todays businesses requires a lot of expertise in economics, especially in the consolidated financial statements, taxation, financial statement and annual reports. This knowledge can in a few cases be met by family members, but in the vast majority of companies, you need to get the skills into the company from outside. We believe that our study has given us answers to the questions we had put up on the family company's approach to the use of external expertise in economics. Namely, those family businesses that want to develop win a lot of hiring external expertise in economics. Not just economically but also in many other areas. Keywords: Family firm, External financial competence, Corporate governance, Complexity of family firms, Succession planning.

為強化公司治理，我國強制上市(櫃)公司須於2011年底前設置薪酬委員會，本研究首先探討公司自願在2011年底前設置薪酬委員會之因素。因為法令還未強制設置薪酬委員會前，我國已自願設置薪酬委員會之公司約2%，無法使用差異中之差異法(Difference-in-difference)，故本研究以我國家族企業為研究對象，探討相較於非家族企業，薪酬委員會設置對家族企業之公司價值的影響。 本研究結果顯示產業龍頭公司有設置薪酬委員會、公司規模、股東權益報酬率及董事會之獨立性與自願設置薪酬委員會呈現正相關。另外，家族企業相較於非家族企業而言公司價值較低，設置薪酬委員會後公司價值差距變小，但是未達統計上的顯著，亦即，設置薪酬委員會對家族企業的效益及非家族企業的效益沒有顯著差異。 / In order to enhance corporate governance, the R.O.C. Securities and Exchange Act was amended in 2010 to force listed companies to establish a Compensation Committee by the end of 2011. First, this study is to investigate which determinants may encourage companies to voluntarily establish the compensation committee. Then, we investigate whether setting compensation committee or not can increase firm value in family firms more than non-family firms. Because of few volunteers, we can’t use difference-in-difference. The results implicate that voluntary formation of compensation committee is associated with leading enterprise in industry which establishes compensation committee, greater size of the firms, higher return on equity and higher independence of the board of directors. In addition, on comparing Compensation Committees established or not, there appears to be no significant correlation with firm value between family firms and non-family firms.

本文之主要目的係探討家族企業與避稅之關聯性、企業策略是否影響家族企業之租稅規避行為及不同企業策略下家族企業與非家族企業避稅程度是否有異。本文以當期有效稅率、財稅差異以及剩餘財稅差異衡量企業之租稅規避，而企業策略係參照Miles and Snow (1978, 2003)所提出之策略類型進行分類，計算企業之策略分數並將企業分類為防禦者、分析者及前瞻者。研究對象為2002至2013之上市櫃公司，並排除產業性質特殊之金融業公司。實證結果發現家族企業之租稅規避程度高於非家族企業，前瞻者之企業策略會使家族企業之租稅規避程度上升，前瞻者中之家族企業避稅程度方高於非家族企業，防禦者之家族企業則無，顯示前瞻者擁有較多租稅規避機會及承擔風險之特性對於家族企業租稅規避行為有所影響。 / The main purpose of this study is to examine the association between family firms and tax avoidance, to investigate whether business strategies influence the tax avoidance activities of family firms, and to find out whether the level of tax avoidance is different between family firms and non-family firms in different business strategies. Current effective tax rates, book-tax differences, and residual book-tax differences are employed to capture tax avoidance activities. This study uses Miles and Snow’s 1978 and 2003 organizational strategy typology to proxy business strategies; compute strategy score; and classify firms to Defenders, Analyzers, and Prospectors. The research samples consist domestic listed firms for the period 2002 - 2013, and the firms in the financial industry are excluded due to theirs characteristics. The empirical results show that family firms avoid more taxes than their non-family counterparts, the strategic type of Prospectors rises the level of tax avoidance of family firms significantly, the family firms in Prospectors avoid more taxes than non-family firms in Prospectors and the family firms in Defenders don’t avoid more taxes than non-family firms in Defenders. The empirical results represent that the tax avoidance of family firms is influenced by Prospectors’ characteristic of having tax-planning opportunities and embracing risk.

Cette thèse a pour objectif d'analyser la structure du capital et la performance des entreprises familiales Françaises qui s'introduisent en Bourse. A partir d'un échantillon de 90 entreprises familiales appartenant à l'indice CAC All-Tradable de 2010 à 2013, nous constatons que la structure du capital des entreprises familiales est caractérisée par un faible niveau d'endettement avec une préférence pour l'endettement à court terme par rapport au long terme. De plus, la structure de capital des entreprises familiales vérifie les théories classiques du financement, l'hypothèse de ‘market timing', la théorie du ratio d'endettement optimal et de la théorie du financement hiérarchique. Ensuite, nous analysons les performances à court terme et à long terme des entreprises familiales françaises qui s'introduisent en Bourse. Les résultats montrent les différentes techniques d'expropriation employées par les propriétaires des entreprises familiales. A la date de l'introduction en bourse, la majorité des propriétaires des entreprises familiales sont à la fois les directeurs généraux et les présidents des conseils d'administration. Après l'introduction en bourse, les propriétaires des entreprises familiales détiennent environ 80% des droits des flux de trésorerie et nous constatons que la différence entre leurs droits aux flux de trésorerie et leurs droits de vote a augmenté. La sous-évaluation au premier jour est voisine de 2%, ce qui révèle que les entreprises familiales sont correctement évaluées lors de l'émission. Les entreprises familiales surperforment l'indice de marché dans les trois premiers mois de l'émission et après la troisième année. Nous trouvons aussi que le changement des droits de propriété et de contrôle avant et après l'introduction en Bourse explique les performances à court et à long terme contrairement aux mécanismes de gouvernance. / This thesis aims to analyze the capital structure and performance of French family firms going public. From a sample of 90 family firms belonging to CAC All-Tradable from 2010 to 2013, we find that the capital structure of family firms is characterized by a low level of debt with a preference for short-term debt relative to long-term debt. Moreover, the capital structure of family firms is in line with the classical theories of financing, the hypothesis of market timing, the theory of optimal debt ratio and the pecking order theory. Then we analyze the short-term and long-term performance of French family firms going public through Initial Public Offerings. The results show the different expropriation techniques employed by the family firms' owners. On the initial public offering date, the majority of family firms' owners are simultaneously CEOs and Chairmen of boards of directors. After going public, the family firms' owners hold around 80% of the firms' cash flow rights and we observe that the difference between their cash flow rights and their voting rights has increased. First-day underpricing is around 2% which shows that family firms are almost fairly priced upon issuance. The family firms outperform the market index in the first three months of issuance and after the third year. We also find that the ownership and control rights change from pre- to post-IPO date explains the short-term and long-term performance unlike governance mechanisms.