While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to 'what is <i>scientific</i> explanation?', while Railton was focused on a question more similar to 'what is scientific <i>explanation</i>?' In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other. / Master of Arts / While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to ‘what is scientific explanation?’, while Railton was focused on a question more similar to ‘what is scientific explanation?’. In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other.

This thesis is a systematic investigation of whether there might be conceptual room for the idea that the world itself might be vague, independently of how we describe it. This idea – the existence of so-called ontic vagueness – has generally been extremely unpopular in the literature; my thesis thus seeks to evaluate whether this ‘negative press’ is justified. I start by giving a working definition and semantics for ontic vagueness, and then attempt to show that there are no conclusive arguments that rule out vagueness of this kind. I subsequently establish what type of arguments I think would be most effective in establishing ontic vagueness and provide some arguments of this form. I then highlight a potential worry for this type of argument, but argue that it can be circumvented. Finally, I consider the main ways that the opponent of ontic vagueness would be likely resist the arguments I have offered, and argue that these strategies of response are methodologically problematic. I conclude by claiming that ontic vagueness is a perfectly plausible ontological commitment.

No description available.

Ontic structural realism is the view that structure is fundamental. This view is at odds with a long-standing tradition in metaphysics which takes the fundamental structure of reality to consist of individuals. Steven French argues in favour of an eliminativist ontic structural realism which is supposed to eliminate individuals, as well as other objects, from the category of fundamentalia. There have also been more moderate attempts where 'non-individuals' are encompassed in the framework. In this paper, I make two interconnected claims. Firstly, that any moderate version of ontic structural realism is too weak to be included in the ontic structural realism familiy since the view fails to satisfy the motivations for employing any kind of ontic structural realism in the first place. Secondly, that if we want to formulate an ontic structural realist view that delivers on the claim that there are no fundamentalia apart from structure we will not find a satisfying view in French's oeuvre.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / This thesis develops a general theory of patterns on the basis of the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce. The main questions with which this thesis is concerned are: what is the ontological status of patterns? In what does their reality consist in? Why does exhibiting patternhood seem to be a necessary condition for the very possibility of cognition? The development of the theory is motivated by a discussion of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), a theory that has recently been gaining attention in analytic philosophy of science, especially in philosophy of physics. The central claim of OSR is that only patterns (structures) are real; individual objects are not real, or have only a “thin” being in some sense. In this thesis I deal mainly with the version of OSR developed by James Ladyman and Don Ross in their book Every Thing Must Go. I address two criticisms that are commonly levelled against OSR, (1) that it cannot give an adequate account of the difference between physical structure and mathematical structure, and (2) that it cannot give an adequate account of the relationship between the world and our representations of the world. I then show how Peirce’s philosophical framework, as encapsulated in his pragmatism, theory of the categories, Scholastic realism, and theory of the continuum, could provide an answer to these difficulties. OSR will also be used to illuminate an aspect of Peirce’s philosophy which I believe has not been sufficiently emphasized in the literature, namely its structuralist aspect. Specifically, it will be shown that Peirce’s philosophy leads to a worldview very similar to that of OSR, via a path of reasoning that is completely different from those standardly used to argue for OSR. This thesis as a whole is an attempt to throw light on the nature of patternhood through an elucidation and justification of this path of reasoning, which I call the alternative path to OSR.

Thesis (DSc (Sociology and Social Anthropology. Centre for Research on Science and Technology))—University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this study the fundamental question about the technical relationship is investigated. The term ‘technology’ was found to be misused out of contexts by various disciplinary authors. Some authors used it for the notion that could better be described as artefacts. Consequently what was called ‘technology transfer’ was little more than artefactual transfer. Others concentrated on production and design that could better be described by techno-practice. Still others confused so-called ‘technological knowledge’ with what could be described as techno-knowledge and techno-literacy. A survey of notions of the authors in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), especially those that focussed on technology was done and it was found that the following elements were identifiable: Techno-practice for the ‘practice’ of the making, forming, designing and maintaining of artefacts. For this was required Technoknowledge, for the know-how and experience in making, and maintaining these artefacts. Furthermore the element of Techno-science for the technical science that was recording knowledge from different sciences like mathematics, physics and electronics etc. to help in the solutions of techno-practice was identified. Lastly technoliteracy was distinguished from techno-knowledge, indicating the capability to use artefacts without necessarily having the knowledge to fix them. Driving a car but not being able to fix it sounds like a good example. The result of techno-practice is normally an artefact. What was interesting, is that many saw the result of technology as technology. Many associate an artefact with the process of techno-practice under the term ‘technology’. An amazing paradigmparalysis was found that could not distinguish the technical from the technological and cannot be better illustrated than by the biased statement: “Clearly computers are technology…” where-as clearly computers are artefacts, the result of a technical design and production process. Lastly the transcendental empirical method was used to consider the ontic (transcendental) conditions required for this technical relationship and it was described in an ontological, anthropological and societal framework. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die studie is die grondvraag na die tegniese verwantskap ondersoek. Daar is gevind dat die term ‘tegnologie’ buite konteks misbruik word deur verskeie vakwetenskaplike outeurs. Sommige gebruik dit vir wat beter aangedui kan word met die term artefakt. Gevolglik is wat genoem was ‘tegnologie-oordrag’ eintlik beter beskryf met die terme artefakt oordrag. Ander het konsentreer op produksie en ontwerp wat eintlik beter beskryf kan word met die term tegno-praktyk. Sogenaamde ‘tegnologiese kennis’ is verder verwar met wat eintlik beter beskryf kan word as tegniese kennis en tegniese geletterdheid. ‘n Oorsig van terme en gebruike van outeurs in die veld van wetenskap en tegnologie studies (STS) veral diegene wat op ‘tegnologie’ gekonsentreer het, het die volgende elemente ge-identifiseer. Tegno-praktyk vir die praktyk van vervaardiging, ontwerp en instandhouding van artefakte. Tegniese kennis (tegno-kennis) vir die ondervinding van vorming en instandhouding van die artefakte. Tegniese wetenskap (tegno-wetenskap) vir die wetenskap wat kennis aangaande die tegniese proses byeenbring uit ander wetenskappe soos wiskunde, fisika en elektronika, byvoorbeeld om tegniese probleme op te los en moontlikhede te skep. Laastens was tegniese geletterdheid onderskei van tegniese kennis soos om ‘n motor te kan bestuur sonder om dit noodwendig te kan herstel. Die gevolg van tegno-praktyk is gewoonlik ‘n artefakt. Wat interessant was is die feit dat verskeie die resultaat van ‘tegnologie’ as ‘tegnologie’ beskou het. Baie gevalle van waar ‘n artefakt gelykgestel was aan die proses van tegno-praktyk was opgemerk natuurlik onder die term ‘tegnologie’. ‘n Verbasende paradigma versteendheid was gevind waar outeurs nie die onderskeid tussen die tegniese en tegnologiese kon onderskei nie. In ‘n sekere sin kan dit nie beter geïllustreer word as die volgende bevooroordeelde stelling dat dit tog ‘…duidelik is dat rekenaars tegnologie is…’ terwyl dit ewe-eens duidelik is dat rekenaars eintlik artefakte is, die resultaat van ‘n ontwerp en vervaardigingsproses. Laastens is die transendentaal empiriese metode gebruik om die onties (transendentale) struktuurvoorwaardes vir die tegniese verwantskap in ag te neem en daarna is dit beskryf in ‘n ontologiese, (wysgerig) antropologiese en samelewingsraamwerk.

本論文旨在比較分析朱子與李退溪之政治思想。論文內容共分五章十三節，茲簡述各章之重點如下： 第一章為導論：敘述研究動機與目的、研究範圍與方法。 第二章朱子的政治思想：探討重格物致知，以「大學體系」為本，主張重視民生問題、反和議以及天理實踐的哲人政治。 第三章退溪的政治思想：探討重倫理道德，以「聖學十圖體系」為本，主張重視人民之生命、和平睦鄰以及仁體實踐的仁者政治。 第四章比較朱子退溪政治思想的異同：特別著重在時代環境、文化背景等因素對二者政治思想所產生的影響。 第五章為結論：綜合探討和提出個人的研究心得。

Moral vagueness is encountered when the alethic value of some moral statement containing a moral predicate is deemed to be vague. One such statement could be “abortion in week 22 is permissible”. Given the metaethical framework of moral realism, there are three standard approaches to understanding the ontology of such vagueness. The semantic approach states that the vagueness is due to our language not being able to adequately refer to the moral reality. The ontic approach states that the vagueness is an intrinsic feature of the moral reality, and as such it will always persist. The epistemic approach states that the vagueness is due to subjects not being able to know the moral reality. In effect, there are things about morality we cannot know, because of our epistemic disposition. In this thesis, I investigate arguments in favor of all three approaches and find that of the three, the epistemic approach – here named moral epistemicism – has the best chances of succeeding. / Moralisk vaghet uppstår när sanningsvärdet av ett moraliskt uttalande, innehållandes ett moraliskt predikat, anses vara vagt. Ett sådant uttalande kan vara "abort i vecka 22 är tillåtet". Givet moralisk realism som metaetiskt ramverk finns det tre vedertagna tillvägagångssätt för att förstå ontologin hos en sådan vaghet. Det semantiska tillvägagångssättet hävdar att vagheten beror på att vårat språk inte kan referera till den moraliska verkligheten på ett adekvat sätt. Det ontiska tillvägagångssättet hävdar att vagheten är en inneboende egenskap hos den moraliska verkligheten, det är verkligheten själv som är vag. Det epistemiska tillvägagångssättet hävdar att vagheten beror på att vi som subjekt inte kan veta allt om den moraliska verkligheten. Det finns moraliska sanningar som vi inte kan veta på grund av vår epistemiska disposition. I denna avhandling undersöker jag argument till förmån för alla tre tillvägagångssätt och finner att det epistemiska tillvägagångssättet – här benämnd moralisk epistemicism – har störst chans att lyckas.

Empirical educational research enjoys a methodological and theoretical debate that is characterized by a number of unresolved and lively debated controversies. This compilation thesis is an attempt to contribute to this debate using the toolbox of philosophy of science. The thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four essays. In the introductory chapter I identify three methodological and theoretical controversies that are discussed within the field of educational research. These are: 1) the controversy concerning the scientific status of educational research; 2) the controversy between cognitive and sociocultural theories of learning; and, 3) the controversy between realist and constructionist interpretations of theories of learning. I provide in the essays a critical assessment of the claims behind each of these controversies, and argue for an alternative reconstruction of these issues. In Essay I, I criticize a view about the interpretation of human action, labeled in the text as interpretivism. This view posits a sharp separation between the natural and social sciences, to the effect that the methods of the latter cannot be applied to the former. The first controversy seems to rest on this position. As I argue, the arguments in support of interpretivism are contradicted by actual research practice. I conclude that the interpretivistic claims lack support and that the general separation claim appears as problematic. A further debate has fueled the first controversy, that is, the supposed distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods. In Essay II, I argue against this distinction. More specifically, I discuss the concept of empirical support in the context of qualitative methods (for short, qualitative support). I provide arguments that although there are two specific and non-trivial properties of qualitative support, there is no methodological separation between quantitative and qualitative methods concerning empirical support. Considered together, the first two essays indicate two points of methodological continuity between educational research and other scientific practices (such as the natural sciences). I therefore conclude that the controversy concerning the scientific status of educational research rests in large part on unjustified claims. Essay III focuses on the second controversy. In this article I argue that Suárez’ inferential approach to the concept of scientific representation can be used as an account of scientific representation in learning, regardless of whether learning is understood as a cognitive or social phenomenon. The third controversy is discussed in Essay IV. Here, I discuss some ontological aspects of the framework of the actor-network theory. Reflecting on the use of this framework in the research field of Networked Learning, I argue that the assumption of an ontology of relations provides the solution for two puzzles about the ontology of networks. The relevance of my argument for the third controversy is that it suggests a point of connection between constructionist and realist interpretations of the ontology of learning. The last two essays suggest two points of continuities between theoretical frameworks that have been and still are argued to be incompatible. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following paper was unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Manuscript.</p>

The thesis aims to interpret the philosophy of negative Platonism, which Jan Patočka developed during the 1950s. In the first part, negative Platonism, whose preliminary notion is derived from the interpretation of the eponymous programme essay, is studied in the context of contemporary philosophical discussion and Patočka's subjectivist humanistic conception he developed in the latter half of the 1940s as well as his lectures on classical philosophy. The second part contains author's own systematic interpretation of negative Platonism, including the reconstruction of the textual corpus of Patočka's programme. Finally, the third part, which considers first the inspirational sources of the observed project, reviews negative Platonism and outlines a concept, with which Patočka replaced negative Platonism in the late 1950s. The thesis aims to outline the philosophy of negative Platonism as an important stage in Patočka's philosophical development as well as a significant part of the modern history of European thinking.