My DPhil submission consists of a series of papers on related topics on the moral philosophy of scarce benefit distribution. It focuses on two types of scarce benefit distribution case. The first type occurs when which all potential beneficiaries of a good each have an equally strong moral claim on an equal benefit from the resource but scarcity or indivisibility prevents us from benefiting all potential beneficiaries. Call these cases equal conflict cases. In 'Anti-Majoritarianism', I argue against the view defended by both utilitarians and non-utilitarians that in equal conflict cases you always ought to give the benefit to as many people as possible. I argue that doing so is neither morally right nor fair. In 'Weighing Up Weighted Lotteries', I argue that the philosophical debate between unweighted and weighted lottery benefit distribution procedures has been misconceived and that fairness requires us to use a new kind of weighted lottery that I call the exclusive composition-sensitive lottery. In 'Can't Get No Satisfaction', I defend a new view that I call the dual-structure view about how lotteries satisfy potential beneficiaries' claims in equal conflict cases and highlight the implications of that view for the distribution of donor corneas to those who have suffered corneal degeneration. The second type of this distributional problem occurs when we can either benefit a very large number of potential beneficiaries with a very small benefit (call these the many) or a very small number of potential beneficiaries with a very major benefit (call these the few). In "Valuing the Few Over the Many" I argue that there are cases where not only ought we to benefit the few over the many no matter how numerous the many are, but it is also better to do so. However, this conclusion can be shown to conflict with a number of widely held tenets of value theory. I evaluate different ways of accommodating these intuitions and argue that in some contexts, benefits are not of finite value. The view I defend in 'Valuing the Few Over the Many', combined with some intuitively plausible axiological claims, is inconsistent with the transitivity of the 'better than' relation. In 'Making Betterness Behave' I argue that for what I call the conditional non-coextensive thesis: if 'better than' is not transitive, one ought to take the position that 'more reason to bring about rather than' is transitive. I argue that one can generate a transitive 'more reason to bring about rather than' deontic ordering from a non-transitive axiological ordering in a principled way. This deontic ordering avoids the major practical objections (money pumps, moral dilemmas and threats to practical reasoning) to non-transitivity of the 'better than' relation.

This thesis examines the role appearances play, with notable continuity, in the psychology and ethics of Plato's Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic. Common to these dialogues is the claim that evaluative appearances are almost invariably false: what appears to be good or bad is typically not in fact so and what is good or bad typically does not appear so. I argue that this disparity between apparent and real value forms the basis of Plato's diagnoses of a wide range of practical errors: psychological phenomena like akrasia, mistaken conceptions of the good like hedonism, and the influence of cultural sources of corruption like oratory, sophistry, and poetry. It also, relatedly, forms the basis of his account of lower passions like appetite, anger, or fear. Such passions are especially prone to lead us astray because their objects -- appetitive pleasures like food, drink, or sex, for example -- present especially deceptive appearances. One of the principal aims of this thesis is to show that this presents a significant point of agreement between the psychologies of the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic. In all three dialogues, I argue, motivational errors result from a specific kind of cognitive error: the uncritical acceptance of appearances. Plato's early and middle psychologies differ in their account of the subject of this error -- in the Protagoras and Gorgias, the whole person; in the Republic, the appetitive or spirited part of a person's soul -- but not in their basic theory of how our passions arise or, crucially, why they are liable to motivate us towards harmful ends.

This thesis presents a comprehensive theory of evildoing as an attack on morality, grounded in objective morality. It introduces evildoing as a distinct category of immorality, arguing that it is the relationship of evil acts to the core of morality that distinguishes them from ordinary wrongdoing. Two projects are undertaken: to provide an account of morality that can ground a theory of evildoing that is both objective and capable of systematically accommodating the diverse phenomena and definitions of evil acts, and to articulate and defend the attack on morality theory of evildoing. The challenge of the first project is met by a minimalist account of morality, structured by what I call the fundamentals of morality. The thesis defends a particular substantive account of these fundamentals, underpinned by the idea of conatus as the end of morality. Ultimately, it is conatus as the striving to persist in existence and prosper inherent in human beings that justifies the objectivity of the fundamentals of morality and with it the objectivity of the theory of evildoing, for it is these fundamentals that are attacked when we speak of an ‘attack on morality.’ Specifying and defending the conditions necessary for such an attack is the task of the second part of the thesis. An act constitutes evildoing, or an attack on morality, when it is wrong, results in serious harm to others, originates in an intention based on the correct belief that the act will cause or risk such harm, and where the perpetrator’s mental states and/or the act’s consequences are antagonistic to the realization of morality via one or more of its fundamentals.

Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary bioethics. In this thesis, I aim to provide a rationalist account of personal autonomy that avoids the philosophical flaws present in theories of autonomy that are often invoked in bioethics, and that can be usefully applied to contemporary bioethical issues. I claim that we can understand the concept of autonomy to incorporate two dimensions, which I term the 'reflective' and 'practical' dimensions of autonomy. I suggest that the reflective dimension pertains to the critical reflection that agents must carry out on their motivating desires, in order to be autonomous with respect to them. I begin by rejecting prominent desire-based and historical accounts of this dimension of autonomy, before going on to defend an account based upon a Parfitian analysis of rational desires. Following this analysis of the reflective dimension of autonomy, I argue that autonomy can also be understood to incorporate a practical dimension, pertaining to the agent's ability to act effectively in pursuit of their ends. I claim that recognising this dimension of autonomy more comprehensively reflects the way in which we use the concept of autonomy in bioethics, and makes salient the fact that agents carry out their rational deliberations in the light of their beliefs about what they are able to do. I go on to argue that this latter point means that my account of autonomy can offer a deeper explanation of why coercion undermines autonomy than other prominent accounts. Having considered the prudential value of autonomy in the light of this theoretical analysis, in the latter half of the thesis I apply my rationalist account of autonomy to a number of contemporary bioethical issues, including the use of human enhancement technologies, the nature of informed consent, and the doctor-patient relationship.

This essay presents the result of a quantitative study made among contemporary pagans in Sweden. The study, which is based on an Internet survey, examines which types of pagan practices that are most common and what kind of troubles pagan faith could cause in the practitioners daily life. The study also examines whether the historical tradition and the archaeological facts behind a contemporary pagan movement serves as a pattern or an inspiration for the practitioners way of leading their lives or performing rituals. It also examines the correlation between the participants sex and their pagan tradition. The study shows that a vast majority of the 132 participants claimed to belong to an Old Norse tradition, but also believed in different beings of nature and nature religion. A majority of the participants viewed historical and archaeological facts with a connection to their faith more as an inspiration to their religious practices than actual religious rules.

Sverige blev först i världen 1981 med att officiellt erkänna teckenspråket som dövas första språk. Det görs en uppdelning av döva teckenspråkiga personer i äldre och yngre döva, eftersom deras språkliga situation i hem och i skola är olika. Uppdelningen går mellan dem som gick i skolan på 1960-talet och tidigare och dem som började skolan vid 1980-talets början och fram till nu. Under 1970-talet användes en svenskanpassad undervisningsform där teckenspråket mer och mer började accepteras, men där döva hamnade mellan två stolar. Uppsatsen tar sin utgångspunkt från en representant från gruppen äldre döva och hans berättelse. Syftet är att undersöka teckenspråkskommunikationen i förskola och skola för barn i gruppen yngre döva. Genom en kvalitativ intervjustudie är syftet att belysa pedagogernas teckenspråkskommunikation vid bemötandet av barnens eventuella frågor om död. För att besvara uppsatsens frågeställning har åtta pedagoger verksamma i förskola och skola, för döva och hörselskadade barn, intervjuats enskilt. Alla åtta pedagoger är hörande och har talad svenska som sitt första språk. Tidigare forskning gällande barns tankar om döden, teckenspråkskommunikation och livsfrågor har studerats. Resultatet visar att pedagogernas livserfarenhet har gett dem öppenhet att kommunicera livsfrågor, men det råder stor kunskapsbrist i teckenspråk för att möjliggöra detta. Det finns ett stort samverkansbehov hos pedagogerna för att ge barnen tillgång till ett meningstolkande sammanhang.

Denna text tar sin utgångspunkt i frågan om moralisk pluralism i dagens Sverige är möjlig. Forskning visar på att en grupp präglad av mångfald kan drabbas av samarbetssvårigheter, men det motsatta är inte garant för ett gott resultat. Enligt Fredrik Gregorius anpassar sig religiösa minoriteter ofta till det omgivande samhällets ide om etik och moral. Denna text undersöker om det finns något som skulle kunna benämnas hednisk etik i Samfundet Forn Seds egen tidning. Källmaterialet består av ett flertal artiklar från #20 respektive #35-36. De teoretiska begrepp som använts är antropocentrism samt universalism, vilka härrör från judisk och kristen etisk idétradition. Materialet har studerats med en metod för argumentationsanalys framtagen av Stephen Toulmin, vilken lämpar sig väl för att lyfta fram implicita antaganden om exempelvis människan. Det huvudsakliga resultatet pekar på att det finns minst två olika typer av hednisk etik en värdeontologisk och en dygdetisk. Båda antas ha sin grund i en föreställning om förnuft och därmed betraktas som universella värden/dygder. Naturen antas dock ha värde och rättigheter oberoende av människan i och med sin helighet, vilket innebär att exempelvis värden som frihet begränsas av naturens existensberättigande. Antropocentrismen är således inte lika framträdande som inom kristendomen och judendomen, men det finns andra beröringspunkter såsom en föreställning om en naturlig lag och att etiken är förnuftsbaserad, dessa likheter sammanfaller dock inte med samtliga judiska/kristna traditioner. / This paper starts with the question whether moral pluralism is possible in Sweden or not. Research shows that a group characterized by diversity is subjected to difficulties in cooperation, but the opposite is not a guarantee for a good result. According to Fredrick Gregorius, religious minorities often adapt to the surrounding societies' idea of ethics and moral. This text investigates if there is something that can be called pagan ethics in the community Forn Seds own newspaper. The source material consists of several articles from #20 and #35-36. The theoretical concepts that have been used are anthropocentrism and universalism, which is derived from Jewish and Christian ethical traditions. The material has been studied with a method of analysis of argumentation formed by Stephan Toulmin, which is suitable for highlighting implicit assumptions. The main result shows that there are at least two different types of pagan ethics, a value ontological and a virtuous theory. Both are assumed to have their foundation in the notion of reason and thus are regarded as universal values/virtues. However, nature is believed to have values and rights independent of humans because of nature's sanctity, which means that values for example, such as freedom, is limited because of the rights of nature to exist. Anthropocentrism is not as prominent as in Christianity and Judaism, but there are points of reference such as a notion of a natural law and that ethics is based on reason, these similarities, however, do not coincide with all Jewish/Christian traditions. Keywords

Uppsatsarbetet syftar till en förförståelse för hur studie- och yrkesvägledare arbetar och reflektera kring vägledningssamtal med elever i migration. Ett annat syfte är att lyfta fram elevernas migraionsberättelser som en del i vägledningssamtalet.

Abstract Purpose: In this essay a limited and specific selection of poems by the Swedish poet Nils Ferlin, has been analyzed in order to find various images of Christ. By using these images of Christ, a possible Christology within the poems by Ferlin, will then be elucidated, a so called Ferlinian Christology. The theoretical perspective used in the analysis is one of high versus low Christology i.e. whether the emphasis is focused on Christ as divine, or Christ as human. Method: The used method is hermeneutic, and the chosen poems have been ascribed autonomy in order to verify their message, rather than the message of the author. The poems have been read and analyzed with a text oriented focus. Result: The result of this study is that a various number of images of Christ can be found within the selected poems by Ferlin. In some poems the image of Christ is described by the views of others; persons in the immediate surroundings of Jesus, or first-hand witnesses to the events of the Gospels. Some images show Christ as an explored tool in the hands of dogmatic structures, where the death of atonement on the Cross is problematized, along with people’s misuse of the death of atonement as a free pass to heaven, instead of taking responsibility of their own sins. Other images of Christ in the poems are more positive; showing Jesus as an inspiration, a beacon and a compass of morality. The most striking image, however, is the one of Christ as someone who places mercy above all. Conclusion: A Ferlinian Christology can be seen primarily as low Christology since it is putting the emphasis on the humanity of Christ, and partly problematizing the divinity of Christ. A Ferlinian Christology emphasize the living Christ and the Christ one finds in the Gospels. The Christ found in the dogmas is not showing the truth. The Christ living and acting in the interest of the weak and marginalized people, is the one who ought to be seen upon with respect and as a beacon of morality and truth. Key words: poetry, Christology, Christ, hermeneutics, Ferlin

We live in a so-called late-modern age where religion and various world-views are something one must relate to in society, no matter what one thinks of that and wherever one lives in the world. This statement applies not least if we are to be able to live in consensus with each other and if we want a world with fewer conflicts, which I, without any evidence, claim that the majority of the world´s population wants.     The fact that people with different truth claims, religions an world-views live side by side as today, is not a new phomenon globally and historically, but the Christian conformity that was formerly the practice in the West has today been replaced by a multitude of world-views through increased immigration and through increased secularization.     The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and describe the mission of religious philosophy in a late-modern, multi-religious, pluralistic world. And in the first place to find out what the three religious philosophers Kevin Schilbrack from USA, Mikael Stenmark from Sweden and Nick Trakakis from Australia say about this. By comparing their perceptions with each other, I want to point out similarities and differences and see why I mean that the discipline should be developed for one or the other direction.     I advocate that religion of philosophy continues to work with the methods by which one seeks to understand, describe and explain different religions ans world-views, as well as critically review, assess or evaluate them. This is because the philosophy of religion is to be taken seriously in order for philosophy of religion to take society seriously. Religion of philosophy should also study lived religion as a complement to the textculture.     Moving the starting point to the religion you are studying can also be of benefit to the study of religious philosophy in order to get a more accurate picture of foreign religions. The advantage of what I advocate here is that in the future we can get a philosophy of religion that is not normative, defined that it has the starting point in theism, that the confessional is the norm, or relativistic.