Par un arrêt très remarqué rendu le 10 juillet 2007 dont la formule a depuis été réitérée, la Chambre commerciale a énoncé que « si la règle selon laquelle les conventions doivent être exécutées de bonne foi permet au juge de sanctionner l’usage déloyal d’une prérogative contractuelle, elle ne l’autorise pas à porter atteinte à la substance même des droits et obligations légalement convenus entre les parties ». Elle a ainsi opposé la substance de l’obligation à la prérogative. Cette solution novatrice suscite l’interrogation. Cette étude a pour objectif d’insérer le concept de substance de l’obligation dans le régime de droit commun des obligations. Dans un premier temps, il est indispensable de cerner ce concept en le définissant. Saisi comme le cœur intangible du contrat, il doit se comprendre comme l’attente légitime du créancier raisonnable de l’obligation essentielle. Confronté aux notions de cause et de force obligatoire, il montre sa capacité à repenser le droit des obligations. Il met en évidence l’articulation des alinéas premier et troisième de l’article 1134 du Code civil, ainsi que la hiérarchie au sein même de l’alinéa premier de ce même article. Dans un deuxième temps, l’originalité de son régime doit être appréciée. Le concept de substance de l’obligation intervient au stade de la conclusion du contrat, comme au stade de son exécution. Il complète le régime de l’erreur-obstacle, en autorisant la sanction de l’erreur sur la rentabilité économique du contrat. Il simplifie également le régime de la clause lui portant atteinte. Il permet, en outre, de repenser le régime de l’imprévision, en ouvrant la voie à la caducité et à la révision judiciaire du contrat. Les pouvoirs d’interprétation et d’intervention du juge dans le contrat sont affinés. Ce sont finalement les principes directeurs du droit des obligations qui sont repensés. Le concept de substance de l’obligation s’inscrit donc en rupture avec l’autonomie de la volonté. Il remodèle enfin la force obligatoire du contrat. / By the much acclaimed decision of July 10, 2007, since reiterated, the Commercial Chamber stated that “if the rule according to which conventions must be executed in good faith allows the judge to sanction unfair use of a contractual prerogative, it does not allow it to undermine the very substance of the rights and legal obligations agreed between the parties”. It has opposed the substance of the obligation to the prerogative. This innovative solution arouses some questioning. The aim of this study is to incorporate the concept of substance of the obligation under the common law of obligations. Firstly, it is essential to define the concept. Considered as the intangible heart of a contract, it must be understood as the legitimate expectation of the reasonable creditor of the essential obligation. Confronted to notions of cause and compulsory value of a contract, it shows its ability to rethink the law of obligations. It highlights the articulation of the first and third paragraphs of article 1134 of the civil Code, and the hierarchy even within the first paragraph of that article. Secondly, the originality of its regime must be assessed. The concept of substance of the obligation intervenes in the conclusion of the contract, as well as during its execution. It completes the system of error-barrier allowing the sanction of the error on the economic profitability of the contract. It also simplifies the system of the clause relating to its detriment. It allows a rethinking of the system of vagueness, opening the way to futility and judicial review of the contract. Interpretive powers and judicial intervention in the contract are refined. It is ultimately the guiding principles of contract law that are redesigned. The concept of substance of the obligation therefore falls out with the independent willpower. Lastly, it restructures the compulsory value of a contract.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:22:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gabriela Shizue Soares de Araujo.pdf: 1515384 bytes, checksum: 2969fb4184ffe07847ea2cb5a2c4dee2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-10-14 / This dissertation seeks to demonstrate the fragility of human rights, when our highest court forgets the principles and guidelines vectors in constitutional interpretation and hermeneutics application of the Constitution, under pressure of public opinion. We seek the best interpretation of the Supreme Court s exceptional original jurisdiction by prerogative function, making a parallel with the peculiar judgment of the Criminal Action Nº 470/MG. We demonstrate that ordinary citizens that do not hold function´s privileges should have preserved their right to natural justice, due process, and especially the double jurisdiction. At the end, we conclude that the double degree of jurisdiction is a fundamental right that can not be denied even to holders of prerogative function and we highlight the unconstitutionality regarding the latent negative of that right in the trial of Criminal Case Nº 470/MG. Wide literature was searched, manifestations of respected masters and doctors, reviews of various segments of society, slowly gathered the personal conviction of the author / Esta dissertação busca demonstrar a fragilidade a que se expõem os direitos fundamentais do homem, ao se permitir que pressões da opinião pública, movidas por interesses políticos e pessoais, levem nossa mais elevada Corte a olvidar os princípios vetores e as diretrizes hermenêuticas constitucionais na interpretação e aplicação da Constituição Federal ao caso concreto. Procuramos a melhor interpretação da excepcional competência originária por prerrogativa de função do Supremo Tribunal Federal para julgar infrações penais, fazendo um paralelo com a condução do tema no julgamento peculiar da Ação Penal n° 470/MG. Demonstramos que os cidadãos comuns não titulares de prerrogativas de função devem ter preservado seu direito ao juiz natural, ao devido processo legal, e principalmente ao duplo grau de jurisdição. Ao final, concluímos que o duplo grau de jurisdição é um direito fundamental que não pode ser negado nem mesmo aos titulares de prerrogativa de função e ressaltamos as inconstitucionalidades latentes quanto à negativa desse direito no julgamento da Ação Penal nº 470/MG. Vasta literatura foi pesquisada, manifestações de respeitáveis mestres e doutores, opiniões de segmentos variados da sociedade, amealhados à convicção pessoal da autora

Il a été longuement discuté de savoir si le système d'arbitrage est applicable pour régler les litiges administratifs qui concernent certains contrats administratifs ou d’autres sans rapport avec le contrat administratif. Dans cette thèse, les trois questions spécifiques sont analysées tour à tour : (1) Est-il possible pour un arbitre ou un tribunal arbitral de trancher des questions relevant du droit administratif? (2) Y a-t-il, ou devrait-il y avoir, des limitations à l'autorité des arbitres et des tribunaux arbitraux? (3) Enfin, après la délivrance d'une sentence arbitrale, quel rôle devrait jouer l'État dans la phase de contrôle judiciaire? La première question concerne l'arbitrabilité et a été discutée dans la première partie (FIRST PART: ARBITRABILITY). La deuxième question a été discutée dans la deuxième partie (SECOND PART: PARTICULAR QUESTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS IN ARBITRATION PROCEDURE). Enfin, sur la dernière question a fait l’objet d’une troisième partie (THIRD PART: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EXECUTION OF ARBITRATION AWARD). Dans cette thèse, nous avons comparé les systèmes de quatre pays (Canada, Chine, France, Taïwan). En conclusion, nous pouvons donc conclure que l’évolution de la conception du contrat administratif implique de nombreux aspects, y compris les aspects juridiques, économiques, politiques et même culturels. Le développement de la fonction de contentieux administratif, comme ‘’subjectivement orienté" ou "objectivement orienté" aura une incidence sur l'acceptation de l'arbitrage en matière administrative. Dans l'ensemble, l'arbitrage sera plus acceptable dans les systèmes dont la fonction est plus ‘’subjectivement orientée" que dans ceux dont la fonction est "objectivement orientée". / While arbitration has traditionally been considered as a means to resolve private disputes, its role in disputes involving administrative contracts is a crucial question in administrative law. In brief, the three specific questions are (1) Can arbitrators or arbitral tribunals decide issues involving administrative law? and (2) Is there, or should there be, any limitation on the authority of arbitrators or arbitral tribunals? (3) Moreover, after the issue of an arbitration award, what role should the State play in the judicial review phase? The first question, the issue of arbitrability, is discussed in part 1 (FIRST PART: ARBITRABILITY). The second question will be discussed in part2 (SECOND PART: PARTICULAR QUESTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS IN ARBITRATION PROCEDURE). Finally, on the question of what happens after the arbitration award, we will discuss judicial review in part 3 (THIRD PART: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EXECUTION OF ARBITRATION AWARD). We compare legal systems between the four countries: in France, in Canada, in China and in Taiwan. We believe that an administrative contract, at least in its function and conception, is gradually becoming different from a private contract. Innovation with respect to administrative contracts will also reflect the concentration and function of the administrative litigation systems in each country. In addition, the “objective” or “subjective” function of administrative litigation will also affect the degree of arbitrability, as well as arbitration procedures. Taken together, arbitration will be more acceptable in systems whose function is more “subjectively oriented” than in those whose function is “objectively oriented". Finally, “the arbitration of administrative matters” traditionally has been an important question in administrative and arbitration law. In the future, we will continue to see it shine in the doctrine and jurisprudence of both the administrative and arbitration law fields.

La théorie des prérogatives de contrat administratif transplantée du droit administratif français a invoqué un débat de longue période dans la communauté judiciaire qu’une législation nationale unifiée a toujours été absente même aujourd’hui. En fait, dans le droit administratif français lié qui se compose principalement par la jurisprudence dans ce domaine, il y a non seulement une série de conditions préalables pour réaliser chaque prérogative, mais aussi un mécanisme de protection qui maintient un équilibre financier du contrat pour la justice finale. Or, sur la base d’une préférence pour les pouvoirs publics enracinée dans les traditions juridiques et le régime politique de la Chine, combinés certaines situations actuelles contemporaines, les chercheurs chinois ont partiellement mis en évidence la première, mais ignoré la seconde, conduisant à l’échec de cette transplantation juridique. En fait, comme une sorte de pouvoir administratif, la prérogative ne doit pas être considérée dans le propre système de contrat qui se compose par les droits et obligations consensuels, mais se réfère à la compétence légale de l’administration qui doit être contrôlée par la responsabilité légale. De plus, cela peut s’interpréter aussi comme la rupture de contrat, de sorte que l’administrateur doive prendre la responsabilité contractuelle fondée sur la théorie de la responsabilité sans faute, la relativité de contrat et la force de contrat, au lieu de la Légalité au sens étroit; la responsabilité administrative dans ce domaine devrait par conséquent être attribuée à la rupture de contrat, à l’endommagement et à l’illégalité. Peu importe quel modèle serait suivi par la législation à l’avenir, un système judiciaire indépendant et influant dans la pratique sociale sera la protection ultime de tous les systèmes juridiques incluant le contrat administratif en Chine. / The theory of prerogatives of administrative contract transplanted from the French administrative law has triggered such a longtime debate in the judicial community that a unified national legislation has been absent even today. Actually, in the French administrative law, composed mainly by Case Law in this domain, there is not only a series of conditions to enforce each prerogative, but also a protective mechanism to keep a financial balance of contract for the final justice. However, based on a preference to the Power rooted from the legal traditions and the political regime of China, combined with certain contemporary facts, Chinese researchers have partially highlighted the former but ignored the latter, leading to the failure of this legal transplant. Actually, as a type of administrative power, the prerogative should not be considered into the proper system of contract composed by the conventional rights and obligations, but refers to the legal authority of administration that should be controlled by the legal responsibility. In addition, it could be considered as the breach of contract too, so that the administrator should take the contractual responsibility based on the Theory of no-fault, on the Relativity of contract and on the Force effect of contract; thus the administrative responsibility hereof could be assumed for the breach of contract, for the quasi-tort out of contract and for the illegality. No matter which pattern would be followed by the future legislation in China, an independent and influential judicial system should be the final protection of all legal systems including the administrative contract.

La prise en compte de l’intérêt du cocontractant, ayant une particularité conceptuelle suffisante, n’agit pas au service principal de l’intérêt égoïste ou de l’intérêt commun. Dynamique relationnelle, altruisme, et altérité de base des intérêts, en caractérisent donc une théorie pure. Quant à sa réalité théorique en droit contractuel, elle est fondée sur un principe de fraternité. Il constitue d’abord son support conceptuel, à l’exclusion de la solidarité dont il se distingue, son contenu correspondant à la triple dynamique délimitant la théorie pure de la notion. Il est ensuite son fondement réel, permettant de dépasser les limites de ses fondements concurrents – la bonne foi ou le solidarisme contractuel –, et le principe-axiome rendant compte de celle-ci. Quant à sa réalité matérielle le constat est qu’une partie de l’évolution de la théorie classique des obligations et contrats se matérialise par telle prise en compte. Cette dernière se manifeste d’une part, comme tempérament au principe de liberté contractuelle, tantôt comme norme positive de comportement – dans la bonne foi relationnelle, et l’obligation d’information renforcée –, tantôt comme limite à une prérogative contractuelle – dans le contrôle de l’abus et potentiellement, l’obligation de minimiser le dommage. Elle se manifeste d’autre part, comme aménagement du principe de la force obligatoire, opérant lors de la survenance d’une difficulté d’exécution étrangère au partenaire – dans l’obligation de renégociation du contrat, et potentiellement la théorie de l’imprévision –, ou d’une difficulté inhérente à celui-ci – dans les mesures de grâce, et la législation d’aménagement du surendettement des particuliers. / A sufficient particular concept of “taking into consideration the other party’s interest” cannot intervene principally at the service of the selfish or common interest. Its pure theory is therefore characterized by “relational dynamism”, altruism and a basic distinction between interests. Concerning its theoretical reality in contractual law, it is based on a fraternity principle. Such principle constitutes firstly its conceptual support, to the exclusion of solidarity from which it is distinguished, since its content corresponds to the triple dynamic that characterizes the notion’s pure theory. Secondly, it constitutes its real basis, since it allows overcoming the limits of its concurrent basis – the good faith and the contractual solidarism – and is the principal-axiom where it finds its source. As to its material reality, a part of the evolution of the classical theory of obligations and contracts is materialized by such taking into consideration. It is manifested on the one hand as a temperament to the contractual freedom principle, sometimes as a positive standard of behavior – in the relational good faith and the reinforced obligation of information – and sometimes as a limit to a contractual prerogative – in the control of abuse and potentially the obligation to mitigate damages. It is manifested on the other hand, as an adjustment of the binding effect principle, when occurs a difficulty of execution that is exterior to the other party – in the duty to renegotiate the contract and potentially the “unforseeability” theory –, or inherent to this party – in the grace measures and the legislation on the adjustment of private individuals excessive indebtedness.

This thesis seeks to place drama of the Caroline commercial theatre in its contemporary political and legal context; particularly, it addresses the ways in which the struggle for supremacy between the royal prerogative, common law and local custom is constructed and negotiated in plays of the period. It argues that as the reign of Charles I progresses, the divine right and absolute power of the monarchy on stage begins to lose its authority, as playwrights, particularly Massinger and Brome, present a decline from divinity into the presentation of an arbitrary man who seeks to impose and increase his authority by enforcing obedience to selfish and wilful actions and demands. This decline from divinity, I argue, allows for the rise of a competing legitimate legal authority in the form of common law. Engaging with the contemporary discourse of custom, reason and law which pervades legal tracts of the period such as Coke’s Institutes and Reports and Davies’ ‘Preface Dedicatory’ to Le Primer Report des Cases & Matters en Ley resolues & adiudges en les Courts del Roy en Ireland, drama by Brome, Jonson, Massinger and Shirley presents arbitrary absolutism as madness, and adherence to customary common law as reason which restores order. In this climate, the drama suggests, royal manipulation of the law for personal ends, of which Charles I was often accused, destabilises law and legal authority. This destabilisation of legal authority is examined in a broader context in plays set in areas outwith London, geographically distant from central authority. The thesis places these plays in the context of Charles I’s attempts to centralise local law enforcement through such publications as the Book of Orders. When maintaining order in the provinces came into conflict with central legislation, the local officials exercised what Keith Wrightson describes as ‘two concepts of order’, turning a blind eye to certain activities when strict enforcement of law would create rather than dissolve local tensions. In both attempting to insist on unity between the centre and the provinces through tighter control of local officials, and dividing the centre from the provinces in the dissolution of Parliament, Charles’s government was, the plays suggest, in danger not only of destabilising and decentralising legal authority but of fragmenting it. This thesis argues that drama provides a medium whereby the politico-legal debates of the period may be presented to, and debated by, a wider audience than the more technical contemporary legal arguments, and, during Charles I’s personal rule, the theatre became a public forum for debate when Parliament was unavailable.

Ce mémoire vise à évaluer les réformes consistant à encadrer le pouvoir de nomination que confère la prérogative royale au premier ministre. Notre étude s’inspire largement de l’institutionnalisme historique en science politique et des analyses en termes de « path dependency ». Selon cette approche, lorsque les décideurs amorcent une trajectoire de politique publique, leurs décisions subséquentes auront tendance à suivre la même direction. À partir des documents gouvernementaux et des transcriptions de comités parlementaires, ainsi que de l’exemple de la Grande-Bretagne, ce travail cherche à évaluer si les réformes visant à contraindre le pouvoir de nomination du premier ministre canadien ont suivi une trajectoire « path dependent ». Nos conclusions nous amènent plutôt à constater qu’en ce qui concerne les nominations, le Canada est plus monarchique que la Grande-Bretagne. Pour le Canada, l’impression générale qui se dégage à la fin de ce mémoire n’en est pas une de « path dependence » mais plutôt d’incrémentalisme disjoint. / This paper aims to assess the reforms that regulate the appointment power conferred by the Royal Prerogative to the Prime minister. Our study is largely based on historical institutionalism in political science and analysis in terms of “path dependency”. This theory argues that once policymakers begin a course of public policy, their subsequent decisions will follow the same direction. Based on governmental documents, transcripts of parliamentary committees and the example of Great Britain, this work seeks to assess whether the reforms to constrain the appointment power of the Prime Minister of Canada validates the “path dependence” approach. Our findings leads us rather to see that with regard to appointments, Canada is more monarchical than Great Britain. Our general conclusion is that the Canadian approach is not “path dependent” but can be better described as “disjointed incrementalism”.

Le droit traite principalement l’abstention sous l’angle de la faute d’abstention, mais éprouve des difficultés à appréhender l’abstention du titulaire d’une prérogative qui nécessite une nouvelle approche. Refus temporaire, et non exprimé, de jouir immédiatement des effets de sa prérogative pour les retenir jusqu’au moment le plus opportun, l’abstention crée une situation équivoque. N’ayant ni la clarté d’un exercice actif, ni celle d’une renonciation, elle génère en effet imprévisibilité et insécurité juridique. Cette dernière est d’ailleurs exacerbée par les interprétations erronées dont l’abstention fait l’objet et par l’aggravation dans le temps des conséquences qui touchent celui qui la subit. Ainsi, à défaut de statut légalement défini de l’abstention, il est impératif de se saisir de la problématique d’imprévisibilité de l’abstention du titulaire d’une prérogative pour tenter de l’atténuer, tout en mettant en relief sa légitimité. L’encadrement du comportement de celui qui s’abstient dans le temps est la solution qui s’impose. Ainsi, à compter de la fin d’un délai raisonnable, laps de temps préservant sa liberté au sein du délai imparti, il doit respecter le standard de l’agent raisonnable. À défaut, sa responsabilité pourrait être engagée sans que cela n’exclue la responsabilisation de celui qui subit l’abstention. / French law is usually understanding the abstention as the abstention fault. However, the abstention of the holder of a prerogative can not be analyzed this way and requires a new juridical approach. Abstention creates an equivocal situation by being a refusal, silent and temporary, to immediately enjoy the effects of a prerogative in order to retain them until the most appropriate moment. By being unclear unlike an active exercise or a real renunciation, it generates indeed unpredictability and a lack of legal safety. This insecurity is, moreover, exacerbated by erroneous interpretations of abstention and by the aggravation of the consequences affecting the one who suffers from it with the passing time. As a result, due to the absence of a legal status of abstention, it is imperative to take up the unpredictability problem of the abstention of the holder of a prerogative in order to attempt to mitigate it, while highlighting its legitimacy. The appearing necessary solution finds its way in the regulation of the behavior of the one abstaining in time. Consequently, from the end of a reasonable period, preserving his liberty within the time limit, he has to respect the standard of a reasonable agent. Failing that, his liability could be incurred. This would not exclude the accountability of the person who suffers from abstention.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:26:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alexandre David Malfatti.pdf: 999778 bytes, checksum: 5c0e86e20a74e2f7c5a0491f5ce8c3ac (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-30 / The "consumer's protection" wakes up a great interest in the society and in the organs of state power and it portrays the confluence of two movements on behalf of the citizens: the) the consumer's and b) the cash access to the Justice. Brazil should not flee to the world rule of the necessary protection of the consumer-senior. The Federal Constitution of 1.988 disposed expressly about the obligation of the State to defend the consumer (goods 5o, interruption XXXII and 170, V) and of the senior's protection for the family, for the society and for the State (art. 230). The actions of public politics of the Executive Power, of edition of norms for the Legislative Power, of judgments of the Judiciary Power and, finally, of the sphere toilet they cannot act against the consumer's legitimate interests. The law no. 8.078/90 (Code of Defense of the Consumer - CDC) and the Law n. 10.741/2003 (Statute of the Senior - EI) they took care of the regulation of the consumption relationship and of the senior, respectively. It is possible to establish a connection among those laws, in way to fasten parameters of the protection of the consumersenior. Several measures can facilitate the defense in judgment of the consumer-senior: the) creation of specialized judiciary organs, b) mechanisms that guarantee juridical attendance, c) inversion of the obligation of the proof and other internal providences of the process, d) forum prerogative. The prerogative of forum of the consumersenior appears, then, as fundamental instrument for the cash access to the Justice. It is forecast of CDC and of EI that should be applied in benefit of him consumer-senior, so much in the individual actions, as in the collective actions. The interpretation of the competence norms should be made in harmony with that prerogative, always in way to an useful result for the protection of the consumer-senior / A proteção do consumidor desperta um grande interesse tanto na sociedade como nos órgãos de poder estatal e retrata a confluência de dois movimentos em prol dos cidadãos: a) o consumerismo e b) o efetivo acesso à Justiça. O Brasil não deve fugir à regra mundial da necessária proteção do consumidor-idoso. A Constituição Federal de 1.988 dispôs expressamente sobre a obrigação do Estado defender o consumidor (artigos 5o, inciso XXXII e 170, V) e da tutela do idoso pela família, pela sociedade e pelo Estado (art. 230). Os atos de política pública do Poder Executivo, de edição de normas pelo Poder Legislativo, de julgamentos do Poder Judiciário e, por fim, da esfera privada não poderão atuar contra os legítimos interesses do consumidor. A lei no. 8.078/90 (Código de Defesa do Consumidor - CDC) e a Lei n. 10.741/2003 (Estatuto do Idoso EI) cuidaram da regulamentação da relação de consumo e do idoso, respectivamente. É possível estabelecer uma conexão entre aquelas leis, de modo a fixar parâmetros da tutela do consumidor-idoso. Várias medidas podem facilitar a defesa em Juízo do consumidor-idoso: a) criação de órgãos judiciários especializados, b) mecanismos que garantam assistência jurídica, c) inversão do ônus da prova e outras providências internas do processo, d) prerrogativa de foro. A prerrogativa de foro do consumidor-idoso surge, então, como instrumento fundamental para o efetivo acesso à Justiça. Trata-se de previsão do CDC e do EI que deve ser aplicada em benefício dele consumidor-idoso, tanto nas ações individuais, como nas ações coletivas. A interpretação das normas de competência deve ser feita em harmonia com aquela prerrogativa, sempre de maneira a um resultado útil para a tutela do consumidor-idoso

Ce mémoire vise à évaluer les réformes consistant à encadrer le pouvoir de nomination que confère la prérogative royale au premier ministre. Notre étude s’inspire largement de l’institutionnalisme historique en science politique et des analyses en termes de « path dependency ». Selon cette approche, lorsque les décideurs amorcent une trajectoire de politique publique, leurs décisions subséquentes auront tendance à suivre la même direction. À partir des documents gouvernementaux et des transcriptions de comités parlementaires, ainsi que de l’exemple de la Grande-Bretagne, ce travail cherche à évaluer si les réformes visant à contraindre le pouvoir de nomination du premier ministre canadien ont suivi une trajectoire « path dependent ». Nos conclusions nous amènent plutôt à constater qu’en ce qui concerne les nominations, le Canada est plus monarchique que la Grande-Bretagne. Pour le Canada, l’impression générale qui se dégage à la fin de ce mémoire n’en est pas une de « path dependence » mais plutôt d’incrémentalisme disjoint. / This paper aims to assess the reforms that regulate the appointment power conferred by the Royal Prerogative to the Prime minister. Our study is largely based on historical institutionalism in political science and analysis in terms of “path dependency”. This theory argues that once policymakers begin a course of public policy, their subsequent decisions will follow the same direction. Based on governmental documents, transcripts of parliamentary committees and the example of Great Britain, this work seeks to assess whether the reforms to constrain the appointment power of the Prime Minister of Canada validates the “path dependence” approach. Our findings leads us rather to see that with regard to appointments, Canada is more monarchical than Great Britain. Our general conclusion is that the Canadian approach is not “path dependent” but can be better described as “disjointed incrementalism”.