近年來企業或個人，透過移轉計價與關係人進行非常規交易之案例時 有所聞。或許其非常規交易之動機，並非為了規避稅負，而政府為了維護 自身管轄權之行使，或基於公平理念保障少數股權股東及債權人之權益， 勢必對藉由移轉計價進行非常規交易者有所規範。 目前國內對於關係 人間移轉計價問題之研究文獻，大多著重於關係人以非常規交易規避稅負 之型態剖析，及國內外涉及非常規交易調整方法之法令介紹。而關於移轉 計價之理論基礎與關係人之定義二項課題，皆未予以詳盡探討。而國外之 研究文獻，對於廠商間之移轉計價行為是否符合效率？往往多所爭議、並 無定論。此外部份文獻認為，廠商係在政府所允許之常規範圍內，來決定 其移轉價格之數額。但政府如何訂定常規價格？似乎並無文獻論及。故本 文擬由理論、實務及法令三方面，來探討關係人移轉計價之問題。

本研究探討關係人交易、公司治理與銀行利率之關聯性。根據我國財務會計準則公報第六號規定所揭露之相關關係人交易項目，以多元迴歸模型來解釋銀行在進行授信決策時，如何解讀企業財務報表中之關係人交易，以測試利益衝突假說。同時，為探求關係人交易與公司治理之關聯，將考量公司治理因素加入授信決策後，以多元迴歸模型解釋銀行對原關係人交易解讀是否產生改變。樣本取自於上市櫃公司，實證結果顯示關係人交易與銀行授信利率有顯著關係，且利益衝突假說成立。進一步探討後發現，當迴歸模型加入公司治理變數後，實證結果顯示公司治理變數對銀行授信利率有著非常顯著之影響，而關係人交易對銀行授信利率變成不顯著。 / This study investigates the relationship between the related party transaction and loan interest rate before/after the consideration of corporate governance mechanism. We also explain the effect of related party transaction on interest rate based on the conflict of interest hypothesis. The sample consists of firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC firms. The result shows that the related party transaction has significant effect on loan interest rate. However, this effect disappears after considering the corporate governance.

本研究探討台灣於 2013 年接軌國際會計準則（IFRS）後，上市公司對於關係人交易揭露情形之改變。整體而言，財務報表附註之關係人交易段落中揭露的文字大幅減少，透過檢視公報規範及 2013 年實務上之揭露情形，可發現揭露方式的改變是導致關係人資訊驟減的主要原因，大部分上市公司不再提供個別重要關係人之交易資訊。 另外，本文實證研究發現，股權的偏離、負債比率及公司的規模，會讓揭露字數衰減的幅度更為嚴重，但是獨立董事比例愈高的公司，衰減的幅度會被減緩。進一步迴歸分析則指出，就交易事項而言，造成揭露字數下降最關鍵的因素是關係人銷貨和關係人應收（付）帳款票據。具體言之，國內採行 IFRS 並未提升關係人交易揭露品質，且公司各層面的因素對其品質有所影響，主管機關應該加強上市櫃公司關係人交易之審查以及個別重要關係人資訊之揭露。

本文主要探討權益薪酬對審計委員會監督關係人交易效果之影響。本研究從美國證券交易所公開資訊EDGAR資料庫以手動蒐集關係人交易資訊，以2010年至2013年間之中小企業為樣本進行實證分析。實證結果發現關係人交易與權益薪酬交乘項與企業價值呈現顯著負相關，意即發放權益薪酬使得審計委員會極大化個人利益而過度注重短期財務績效，選擇默許管理階層不當之關係人交易安排，進而造成企業價值不利之影響。額外分析亦指出審計委員會之權益薪酬對其監督關係人交易效果有負面影響，但未發現證據指出審計委員會之現金薪酬與其監督關係人交易效果有關聯性。 / This study investigates whether equity-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with the effectiveness of their supervision on related party transactions. We hand collect the data of related party transactions for small and medium-size firms from EDGAR database for the period 2010-2013. We find that the interaction effect between related party transactions and stock compensation for audit committee members is negatively associated with firm value. It suggests that in order to maximize short-term benefits, audit committee members with stock compensation are inclined to be more tolerable to earnings management through related party transactions that are unfavorable to shareholders. Additionally, we do not find any evidence indicating that cash compensation is associated with the effectiveness of audit committee’s oversight on related party transactions.

關係人交易向為我國上市公司常見之交易型態，關係人交易雖具內部交易利益，但交易對象存在特殊關係有助於「利益輸送」或「盈餘操縱」之操作，故有論者認為關係人交易乃控制股東侵佔其他股東財富之重要工具。而台灣獨特的家族型企業結構及其所衍生的不健全公司治理架構，可能是近年來我國資本市場關係人交易弊案頻傳的主因。 台灣證券交易所於2002年2月22日起，要求首次申請上市公司至少須設置二席獨立董事及一席獨立監察人，企望藉此改善上市公司之內部治理架構。儘管過去研究顯示，董事會獨立性是董事會功能能否發揮之重要因素，然各界對此制度仍有所疑慮。因此，本研究以多元迴歸分析及單變量檢定，探討獨立董監制度及關係人交易之關係，分析獨立董監制度對上市公司之實質效益。實證結論如下： 1.相較於未引進獨立董監制度公司，引進獨立董監制度公司在關係人進貨、關係人應付融資及關係人其他支出等可能具有內部利益之關係人交易型態，關係人交易比率較高，而這可能也是獨立董監制度積極監督之正面效應。 2.相對於未引進獨立董監制度公司，自願及非自願引進公司之關係人應收融資比率較高，代表獨立董事、獨立監察人對內部利益明顯的關係人應付融資交易，能扮演著積極推動並消弭歧見的角色。 3.相較於非自願引進獨立董監制度公司，自願引進公司具有較低之關係人背書保證比率。顯示自願引進公司藉獨立董監之監督，能有效減少不利公司績效之關係人背書保證交易。 4.適用獨立董監條款之新上市公司上市後第二年度關係人銷貨及關係人應收融資顯著低於上市前第二年度之水準，代表獨立董監制度的實質監督效果可能須經兩年以上時間才得以顯現。 基於上述結論，本研究對我國獨立董監制度提出下列建議：一、擴大獨立董監制度之適用範圍；二、考慮獨立董監實質效益之顯現時程，對其任期加以規範；三、積極建構完善的市場機制，迫使控制股東自發地強化公司治理機制。 / The related-party transaction is the general transaction mode in Taiwan. Although the related-party transaction brings internal transaction profit, the clients with special relationship could help earnings management or the interest conveyance so the related-party transaction is considered as the significant tool to keep the shareholders from invading other’s fortune. Besides, the malady of the related-party transaction happened frequently in the capital market in Taiwan, and this condition could be refer to the unique structure and the unsound governmence of the companies run by the family members. Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation(TSEC) claimed the qualification for the first time to apply to be the listed company that from Feb. 22, 2002, there should be at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor. By this way, TSEC hope to make an improvement on the governmance of the listed companies. The former research shows that the characteristic of independent directorate is the leading factor to decide if the directorate could be into full play, but we still doubt for this system. Therefore, this research adopts the Multiple Regression Analysis, T-test and Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test to illustrate the relations between the system of independent directors and supervisors and the related-party transaction, and to analyze the real effect which the system of independent directors and supervisors makes on the listed companies. The results are as follows, 1. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies with the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of related-party transaction because the related- party have the internal transaction profit on merchandise, payables and other expenses. This condition could express that the system makes the positive effect on supervising. 2. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily or involuntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of the payables. This situation means that the independent directors and independent supervisors play the significant role on promoting the transactions and eliminating the diversities when the related-parties make payables transaction. 3. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess the lower ratio of the assurance of related- party. This condition illustrates that the system of independent directors and supervisors could reduce the adverse transaction of assurance. 4. The second year of the IPO companies which adopt the system of independent directors and supervisors have lower related-party sales and payables than before being listed companies in their second year. This fact tells us the real effect might take more than two years to carry out. In conclusion, this research offers the suggestions of the systems of independent directors and supervisors in Taiwan as below. First, the qualification of the system of independent directors and supervisors should be broadened. Second, the terms of the directors and supervisors should be made the reasonable consideration because the real effect might take time to carry out. Finally, the market mechanism should be more complete to force the blockholder to enhance the governmace of the company.

本研究將中國的上市企業區分為國有企業與民營企業，藉以檢視中國證監會對上市企業的行政處罰是否存有選擇性執法的現象。調查結果顯示，國有企業較不容易因其關聯方交易之揭露不實而遭受證監會的行政處罰。這個結果代表證監會對民營企業之行政處罰有較低的重大性門檻。且進一步的調查發現，國有企業因關聯方交易揭露不實所面臨的處罰金額不一定高於民營企業因關聯方交易揭露不實所面臨的處罰金額。因此，本研究結果支持中國證監會的行政處罰存在選擇性執法的可能性。 / This study examines the relationship between the enforcement actions on misrepresentation of related party transactions by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the state-owned enterprises. In order to test empirical evidence of selective enforcement, we divided our samples into state-owned enterprises and the private enterprises. The major findings are as follows:(1)the state-owned enterprises are not prone to be punished for misrepresentation of related party transactions by CSRC. (2) the state-owned enterprises fines on misrepresentation of related party transactions are not higher than the private enterprises. The analysis and conclusions of this study prove the consequences of selective enforcement by CSRC.

近期許多針對中國大陸的研究顯示，關聯交易除了是一個重要的盈餘管理工具外，也同樣是控制股東挹注與挪用公司資源的主要手段，此外中國與關聯方有關的資訊披露規定在近年來也有非常明顯的變化。基於前述兩項原因，本文首先整理相關法規的延革，接著引用一家上市企業的年度報告做為個案分析。此項個案分析的結果顯示上市公司很可能因控制股東的安排，而將資源輸往與控制股東有關的關聯方或形式上獨立的非關聯方。換言之，控制股東可藉隱匿關聯交易資訊或關聯交易隱形化的方式進行對上市企業的掏空行為。 / Recently, many studies have shown that related party transaction in China is an important tool of earnings management, and it also has been approved to be a primary mean for controlling shareholders propping up or tunneling the company. Therefore, because of the two reasons given above, the thesis studies and systematizes changes of related party disclosure requirements in China, and does analysis on a selected listed company’s annual report as an example of related party transaction disclousure. The analysis finds that, through related party transactions, controlling shareholder may tunnel the listed company and benefit the selected parties which are directly or indirectly controlled by controlling shareholder. That is, controlling shareholder can tunnel through invisible related party transactions or through concealment of transaction information from stakeholders.

Durant la décennie écoulée, une série de scandales financiers impliquant des firmes d’envergure internationale (Enron, Tyco, Parmalat, etc.) a secoué les places boursières en déclenchant une crise de la confiance chez les investisseurs. L’analyse des cas précités a révélé un recours massif à la fraude et aux manipulations comptables ce qui a relancé le débat autour de la question de la Qualité du Reporting Financier et de l’efficience des mécanismes de gouvernance.En effet, de récents constats révèlent que des problèmes d’agence générés par une structure de propriété complexe caractérisée par la concentration de la propriété familiale et le recours accru aux mécanismes de renforcement du contrôle vont favoriser l’extraction des bénéfices privés par les actionnaires de contrôle au détriment des minoritaires et par conséquent accroître leur l’incitation à la manipulation de l’information comptable et financière offerte et ce pour dissimuler leurs agissements opportunistes.Dans ce cadre, la présente thèse se propose d’étudier dans quelle mesure la structure de propriété complexe peut entrainer des conflits d’agence aggravant les problèmes d’incitation chez l’actionnaire contrôlant en favorisant l’extraction des bénéfices privés via les transactions avec les parties liées et d’analyser l’effet de cette expropriation sur la Qualité du Reporting Financier de l’entreprise.Nous poursuivons trois principaux objectifs. Le premier est de savoir comment les attributs de la structure de propriété complexe vont impacter la consommation des bénéfices privés faite via les transactions avec les parties liées. Le second est d’analyser comment la dissimulation de la consommation des bénéfices privés va impacter la qualité du reporting financier mesurée par la gestion des résultats comptable et réelle et le conservatisme conditionnel et inconditionnel tout en prenant en considération l’interaction entre la gestion des résultats et le conservatisme. Le troisième objectif est de tester, dans le cadre du conflit principal-principal, l’efficience du rôle du conseil d’administration dans la discipline des actionnaires contrôlants à travers la réduction des bénéfices privés ainsi que dans la garantie d’un reporting financier de qualité en s’opposant à la manipulation de l’information.C’est ainsi que sur un échantillon d’entreprises françaises cotées sur l’indice SBF 250 observées sur la période 2001 à 2009 notre étude a révélé que l’excès du contrôle de l’actionnaire ultime est associée à une plus grande consommation des bénéfices privés. Nous relevons également une relation en U inversé entre la concentration de la propriété de l’actionnaire ultime et les bénéfices privés. La présence de plusieurs détenteurs de blocs de contrôle entrainant une contestabilité du contrôle s’oppose à la consommation des bénéfices privés. Nous avons pu valider l’hypothèse de la dissimulation en confirmant l’effet médiateur des bénéfices privés du contrôle dans la relation entre la concentration de la propriété de l’actionnaire ultime et la concentration de la propriété institutionnelle d’une part et la gestion réelle des résultats de l’autre. Nos résultats empiriques confirment l’efficience de l’indépendance du conseil d’administration dans la réduction des bénéfices privés et la gestion des résultats.Mots clé : Bénéfices privés du contrôle, transactions avec les parties liées, structure de propriété complexe, conseil d’administration, gestion des résultats et conservatisme. / During the past decade, a series of financial scandals involving firms of international scope (Enron, Tyco, Parmalat, etc.) has shaken the stock exchanges in triggering a crisis of confidence among investors. The analysis of the aforementioned cases revealed a massive use of fraud and accounting manipulations which has relaunched the debate on the financial reporting quality and the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms.Recent findings reveal that of agency problems generated by a structure of complex ownership structure characterized by the concentration of the family ownership and the increased use of control-enhancing mechanisms will promote the extraction of private profits by the controlling shareholders to the detriment of the minority and therefore increase their incentives to the manipulation of earnings in order to conceal their opportunistic behavior.In this framework, this thesis proposes to study to what extent the structure of complex ownership may cause conflicts of agency aggravating the problems of incitement in the controlling shareholder in favoring the extraction of private profits via the conclusion of related party transactions and to analyze the effect of this expropriation on the financial reporting quality of the firm.We are pursuing three main objectives. The first is to understand how the attributes of the complex ownership structure can affect the private benefits consumption via the conclusion of related party transactions. The second objective is to analyze how the concealment of the consumption of private benefits will impact the financial reporting quality as proxied by the accounting and real earnings management and the conditional and unconditional conservatism. while taking into account the interaction between earnings management and the conservatism. The third objective is to test, in the context of the principal-principal agency conflict, the efficiency of the role of the board of directors in the discipline of the controlling shareholders through the reduction of private profit as well as in the guarantee of the financial reporting of quality.Our study focuses on a sample of 81 French companies listed on the SBF 250 index observed on the period 2001 to 2009. Our results reveal that the excess of the control of the ultimate shareholder is associated with greater private benefits consumption. We also note an inverted U-shaped relationship between the ultimate ownership concentration and private benefits. The presence of multiple large shareholders causing a contestability of control reduces the private benefits extraction. We validate the private benefits dissimulation hypothesis by confirming the mediating effect of the private benefits of control in the relationship between the ultimate shareholder ownership and the institutional ownership the real earnings management. Our empirical results confirm the efficiency of the independence of the board of directors in the reduction of private benefits and the earnings management. Against all expectation, we note a week effect of the Audit Committee on of financial reporting qualityKey words: Private benefits of control, related party transactions, ownership structure, board of directors, earnings management, conservatism.

我國關係人交易普遍且具重要性，而過去研究顯示關係人交易會對公司產生負面效果，且關係人交易之查核具有困難度，因此本研究以關係人交易較多且查核風險較高之高科技公司為研究對象，將關係人交易分為關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易、關係人應收款與關係人應付款等四項類別，探討關係人交易與審計品質的關係。進一步探討當關係人交易分為發行公司與關係人皆受相同會計師查核與受不同會計師查核兩類型，對發行公司財務報表審計品質的影響。實證結果發現：關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易與審計品質呈負向關係；關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易與關係人應收款兩造受不同會計師查核者，對其發行公司財務報表審計品質之負面影響較兩造受相同會計師查核者強。 / Related party transactions are common and important in Taiwan, and empirical studies in Taiwan show that related party transactions have negative impact on earnings management and company performance. Based on auditing standards and literature, related party transactions are difficult to audit, and high technology firms have more related party transactions which may result in higher audit risk than other industry. Therefore, we investigate the association between related party transactions (including sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and payable to related parties) and audit quality (proxied by accrual quality) in high technology firms, and find that sales to related parties and purchases from related parties have negative impact on audit quality. Next, we investigate the impact of related party transactions audited by the same auditor or different auditors. Empirical results show that sales to related parties, purchases from related parties and accounts receivable from related parties audited by different auditors show stronger negative impacts on audit quality than those audited by same auditors.

本研究係探討關係人交易雙方是否委任相同會計師進行查核，對企業負債資金成本之效果。本文以企業利息費用除以平均帶息負債衡量企業之負債資金成本，企業之關係人交易部分則分成關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易、關係人應收款、關係人應付款等四類型交易，來討論關係人交易與企業負債資金成本之關聯，接著將各類型關係人交易再細分成由相同會計師查核關係人交易雙方與由不同會計師查核關係人交易雙方兩類，以檢驗相同會計師查核對於企業負債資金成本之影響。 研究結果發現關係人交易與企業負債資金成本之關聯並無統計上之顯著性。然將關係人交易進一步拆分為是否由相同會計師查核關係人交易雙方後，關係人進貨交易與關係人銷貨交易等兩類型交易若由相同會計師查核交易雙方，其相較於不同會計師查核能夠有效減緩企業負債資金成本增加之情形。 / This study examines the effect of same auditor auditing both sides of related party transactions (RPTs) on cost of debt. In this study, cost of debt is measured using interest expenses divided by average interest bearing debt and we hand collect from annual reports the data of the four common types of RPTs: sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and accounts payable to related parties. For the four types, we further split RPTs into RPTs whose involved sides are audited by the same auditor and RPTs whose involved sides are audited by different auditors. We do not find any evidence that RPTs are associated with cost of debt. However, we find that for sales to related parties and purchases from related parties, RPTs whose involved sides are audited by the same auditor are associated with cost of debt less strongly than RPTs whose involved sides are audited by different auditors. Our results suggest that same auditor auditing can mitigated the detrimental effect of RPTs on cost of debt.