Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:19:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 68070200633.pdf: 1686127 bytes, checksum: e2da52c9e68b9e8d28bf968e3ef9dd42 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-12-01T00:00:00Z / Propõe-se com a presente dissertação conduzir estudo exploratório sobre a razoabilidade de um método de apoio à tomada de decisão para ordenar os controles internos contábeis, utilizando critérios estabelecidos pelo regulador do mercado de capitais dos Estados Unidos, quantificados por meio de uma escala baseada em operadores da lógica fuzzy. O método foi elaborado com base em pesquisa bibliográfica sobre o controle interno contábil e sua relação com os controles internos em geral; a exigência de constituição, avaliação e divulgação da avaliação dos controles internos contábeis pela legislação do mercado de capitais americano ao longo das últimas três décadas; o conceito de matriz de risco; os métodos de apoio à decisão; e os fundamentos da lógica fuzzy. A metodologia proposta foi adaptada à realidade da entidade objeto do estudo de caso e aplicada sobre 2,4 mil controles. Uma amostra de aproximadamente 14% desse universo foi analisada e permitiu concluir pela razoabilidade do método proposto, que será utilizado pela entidade estudada como parte de seu processo de avaliação dos controles internos contábeis.

The master's thesis analyses the contemporary corporate governance standards and their legal framework. The paper describes the development of different corporate governance principles and the key legal pieces that regulate the corporate governance area (eg. Sarbanes-Oxley, Basel II, EC regulation). The core of the paper focuses on corporate governance failures that led to the current financial crisis, analyses their link to the corporate governance principles and describes the trends for development in the corporate governance regulation.

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This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and corporate governance changes on the firm’s performance. The first paper utilizes a cost minimization stochastic frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of director total compensation. Our findings suggest that board members are over compensated. We show that, on average, the director actual compensation level is above the efficient compensation level by around 63%. Our results suggest that an increase in director excess compensation decreases the likelihood of CEO turnover, reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity, and increases managerial entrenchment. Thus, the surplus in director compensation is directly associated with managerial job security and entrenchment. Furthermore, although director excess compensation is not significantly inversely related to the firm’s future performance, it has an indirect negative effect on future performance through its impact on the entrenchment-performance relationship. Therefore, this essay proposes that the overcompensation of directors is directly associated with a board culture predicated by mutual back-scratching and collusion between the CEO and the board members. The second essay tests the effect of an exogenous shock, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, on the structure of corporate boards and their efficiency as a monitoring mechanism. The results suggest an increase in the participation of independent directors at the expense of insiders. Consequently, we investigate the implications of board composition changes on CEO turnover and firm value. We document a noticeable reduction in CEO turnover in the post-SOX period. We also demonstrate that, after SOX, a board dominated by independent directors is less likely to remove a CEO due to poor performance. Finally, we highlight a negative association between the change in board composition and firm value. We propose that our findings are predicated on an off equilibrium result whereby firms were forced to modify iv their endogenously chosen board composition. Therefore, contrary to the legislators’ objectives, we suggest that the change in board structure brought about inefficient monitoring and promoted an unfavorable tradeoff between independent directors and insiders. The third essay examines the relationship between the firm’s governance structure and its value during different economic conditions. We show that both relative industry turnover and CEO entrenchment increase during economic downturns. We also find that relative industry turnover and managerial entrenchment have opposite impacts on the value of the firm throughout the recessionary period. While industry turnover leads to an appreciation in firm value, managerial entrenchment reduces shareholders’ wealth. The negative impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value, however, outweighs the positive impact of industry turnover. Accordingly, we propose that a recession provides managers with a good opportunity to camouflage their behavior and extract more private benefits and, thus, blame the poor performance on bad economic conditions.

No description available.

In the years following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, corporations have heightened their efforts to comprehensively manage all aspect of business risk that could jeopardize their operations or potentially lead to business failure. This increase in efforts have motivated firms to adopt additional preventative measures to internally manage their unique portfolios of impeding enterprise risk. Due to legislative efforts by the U.S. Congress, both the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) were broadly developed to improve corporate governance while increasing transparency within financial reporting. Specifically, Dodd-Frank mandates that large financial firms with $50 billion in assets establish special committees dedicated to assessing their financial risks. Meanwhile, SOX requires all public firms to establish rigorous internal control systems to ensure the adequacy of financial reporting. However, these laws mainly target financial firms and fall short of requiring nonfinancial firms to establish a separate committee to manage corporate risk even though it would be in these companies own interest to enhance their safeguarding efforts against ambiguous financial uncertainties, reputation downshifts, and other inherent risk. This dissertation seeks to understand whether a separate voluntary risk management committee at the board level is related to the financial stability and creditworthiness of nonfinancial firms. Firstly, we investigated whether the existence of a separate risk management committee is associated with the firm’s leverage, solvency, financial health, and organizational soundness. Secondly, we examined whether the existence of a separate risk management committee is associated with the firm’s short- and long-term credit ratings. Using secondary data from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), we analyzed data from a wide range of financial ratios and credit ratings from companies listed on the S&P 1500 index to evaluate if these committees have an association with the firm’s ability to manage its risk effectively. Regression analysis was utilized to explore this relationship. Although the direction of the relationship cannot be determined, the results suggest that the establishment of a separate voluntary risk management committee was minimally related to the financial soundness of the firm and was not related to the firm's leverage, solvency, or overall organizational soundness. Inferences or causality cannot be made. Additionally, we found that firms with better short-term credit ratings were more likely to establish a voluntary risk management committee, while long-term credit ratings did not show a correlation with the presence of a voluntary risk management committee. Interestingly, the study also found that the presence of more men on the board and a larger board size increased the likelihood of firms adopting a risk management committee, but over time, the interest in forming these committees has declined within the timeframe reviewed, particularly in the healthcare, communication, and utilities sectors. The results of this study suggest that relying on traditional financial/accounting ratios might not be the most effective method for assessing a firm's risk. Further, these results underscore the need for a more comprehensive approach that includes both quantitative and qualitative risk assessments and approaches. This dissertation contributes to the benefits of establishing a voluntary risk management committee in nonfinancial firms, which is a topic that has not been extensively researched. The aim is to offer a deeper insight into the benefits of such committees and encourage more firms to improve their risk management practices where positive correlations were identified. / Business Administration/Interdisciplinary

Visselblåsarbegreppet har blivit ett allt mer frekvent förekommande inslag inom den unionsrättsliga lagstiftningen, och vikten av att beskydda arbetstagare som bistår myndigheter med information som kan stoppa överträdelser har på senare år uppmärksammats och betonats världen över. I samband med en modernisering och uppdatering av den finansmarknadsrättsliga lagstiftningen, inte minst till följd av den tekniska utvecklingen inom området, valde EU:s lagstiftande organ att göra en markering mot fysiska och juridiska personer som ägnar sig åt överträdelser som kan vilseleda aktörerna på de finansiella marknaderna. Bland annat infördes, genom ett antal nya rättsakter, enhetliga sanktioner samt minimibestämmelser för kriminalisering av vissa ageranden. Vid framtagandet av lagstiftningen diskuterades även på EU-nivå huruvida ett potentiellt införande av ekonomiska incitament för visselblåsare som bidrar med värdefull information i fråga om marknadsmissbruk borde utgöra en del av det sociala skyddet för nämnda individer. Medlemsstaterna hade redan i samband med tidigare unionsöverskridande lagstiftning ålagts att vidta särskilda åtgärder för att säkerställa att visselblåsare erhåller skydd gentemot arbetsgivare avseende hämndaktioner, men här, tydligt inspirerade av den amerikanska lagstiftningen i motsvarande område, öppnade EU för första gången för att låta unionsmedlemmarna erbjuda monetära utbetalningar till visselblåsare. I förevarande uppsats presenteras den aktuella EU-lagstiftningen samt den inhemska lagstiftning som bestämmelserna genererat i Sverige. Nämnda inslag sätts i relation till den amerikanska visselblåsarlagstiftningen. En redogörelse för lagstiftningens mottagande och effekt – kombinerat med teoretiska såväl som statistiska studier avseende ekonomiska incitament kopplat till visselblåsning – används för att besvara frågan huruvida ett införande av nämnda incitament skulle kunna utgöra ett ändamålsenligt inslag inom den svenska lagstiftningen. Min argumentation, vilken presenteras i analysdelen, utmynnar i ståndpunkten att ekonomiska incitament mycket väl skulle kunna utgöra en funktionell beståndsdel av visselblåsarskyddet, men att lagstiftningens utformning och det praktiska utförandet skulle kunna optimeras jämfört med dess amerikanska motsvarighet. Vidare vill jag i analysavsnittet betona vikten av ett skifte i inställning och attityd inom europeisk rättskultur gentemot visselblåsare.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:40:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Magali Aparecida Camazano.pdf: 740899 bytes, checksum: a0beef09f1c292595d15bc89e031aaca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-14 / Deregulation and globalization of financial services allied with the sophisticated technology used to perform financial operations have increased the complexity of banking activities resulting in the subsequent exposure of financial corporations to operational risk. Several cases of huge losses related to operational risk have been reported in the last 10 years as the bankruptcy of the traditional Barings Bank in England. Therefore, the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), published by the Basel Committee in 2004, established that internationally active banks are required to allocate capital to cope with operational risk (just as required for credit and market risks). The Brazilian Central Bank, following the demands as established by the Basel II Accord has also determined that Brazilian financial corporations are required to allocate regulatory capital to face operational risk as well as implement an operational risk management framework. At the same time, losses related to operational risk occurred in different segments of the economy where American corporations as Enron and WorldCom perpetrated huge accounting frauds resulting in their subsequent bankruptcy in 2001 and 2002 respectively. These events led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. On account of the importance of operational risk management for the soundness of the financial market and the close relation existing between such risk and the requirements mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, such as the enhancement of accounting internal controls and corporate governance attributes, this paper intends to study the influence as set forth by the American Act over the operational risk management within the Brazilian financial corporations that are required to comply with this Act such as Bradesco, Itaú and Unibanco. Thus, a comparison was made between the framework established by the Basel Committee for the banking operational risk management and the mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This study disclosed that both, either the Basel Committee framework as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act focus on the same purposes, that is, control and mitigate the events likely to result in operational risk. Sarbanes-Oxley enables the enhancement of both, accounting internal controls and corporate governance practices, as it will serve as an additional tool for the management of operational risk, cooperating with and supplementing the Basel Committee framework. Therefore, Sarbanes-Oxley allows the Brazilian financial corporations to lower the capital allocation for operational risk due to their decreasing exposure to related risk / A desregulamentação e a globalização dos serviços financeiros associadas à sofisticação das tecnologias financeiras têm aumentado a complexidade das atividades bancárias e a conseqüente exposição dos bancos ao risco operacional. Casos diversos de perdas catastróficas relacionadas ao risco operacional se fizeram presentes nos últimos 10 anos, a exemplo da quebra do tradicional Barings Bank, na Inglaterra. Por decorrência, o Novo Acordo de Capital da Basiléia (Basiléia II), divulgado pelo Comitê da Basiléia em 2004, introduziu a necessidade de alocação de capital para risco operacional (tal qual para os riscos de crédito e de mercado) pelos bancos internacionalmente ativos. O Banco Central do Brasil, à luz do Acordo Basiléia II, igualmente instituiu a necessidade de alocação de capital regulatório para o risco operacional por parte das instituições financeiras brasileiras, bem como a implementação de estrutura de gerenciamento do risco operacional. Paralelamente, prejuízos relacionados ao risco operacional ocorreram em outros segmentos da economia, destacando-se os escândalos contábeis e falências das empresas americanas Enron e WorldCom em 2001 e 2002, respectivamente, culminando na promulgação do Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002. Face à importância do gerenciamento do risco operacional para a solvência do mercado financeiro e à estreita relação existente entre tal risco e os requerimentos impostos pelo Sarbanes-Oxley, tais como o aprimoramento de controles internos contábeis e de aspectos de governança corporativa, este trabalho teve por objetivo estudar a influência das exigências da Lei americana sobre o gerenciamento do risco operacional das instituições financeiras brasileiras sujeitas à sua observância, a saber: Bradesco, Itaú e Unibanco. Para tanto foi adotado o método de procedimento comparativo, tendo sido realizado cotejo entre o marco regulatório do Comitê da Basiléia para o gerenciamento do risco operacional bancário e as exigências do Sarbanes-Oxley Act, cujo resultado revelou a existência de convergência entre ambos, pois possuem a mesma base conceitual de propósitos, qual seja, controlar os fatores de consubstanciação do risco operacional. O Sarbanes-Oxley proporciona o aperfeiçoamento dos controles internos contábeis e das práticas de governança corporativa, caracterizando-se como um instrumento adicional ao gerenciamento do risco operacional, contribuindo e complementando o marco regulatório do Comitê da Basiléia. Outrossim, o Sarbanes-Oxley propicia a redução de alocação de capital para risco operacional, pelas instituições financeiras brasileiras, haja vista seu potencial de redução à exposição ao referido risco

La divulgation d’informations sur les risques est une problématique centrale de la communication des entreprises cotées. De nombreuses dispositions réglementaires ont été mises en œuvre aux Etats-Unis et en Europe pour promouvoir la transparence sur les risques et les dispositifs de contrôle mis en place pour leur gestion. Les exigences de certification de l’efficacité de ces dispositifs conduit à la question de savoir si ou comment les entreprises non-financières françaises, ayant une double cotation aux Etats-Unis et en France, sont conformes à ces règlementations. Dans ce contexte, il est soutenu que la mise en évidence des différents niveaux de formalisation des dispositifs de contrôle des risques, à travers la communication des entreprises, permet de dégager des typologies originales de mise en conformité et de gouvernance des organisations. La démarche de recherche adoptée est basée sur l’étude de cas longitudinale qui permet de suivre les entreprises du lancement des projets de mise en conformité, à la stabilisation des processus de production de la certification des procédures de contrôle des risques. Les données recueillies (entretiens, rapports annuels) font l’objet d’une analyse de contenu à travers le COSO2. Une seconde étape est leur traitement statistique pour discriminer les réponses stratégiques dans le temps et entre entreprises. Les observations empiriques mettent en exergue différentes réponses stratégiques en fonction de deux périodes et des préoccupations économiques et stratégiques des entreprises. / Risk oriented disclosure is a central issue of listed companies communication. Many Risk-based regulations have been implemented in the US and Europe to promote transparency about risks and controls mechanisms. Under the requirements of the SOX, executives must certify the public company’s financial results (section 302) and have to issue a report on the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls over financial reporting (section 404). The increase of mandatory risk reporting leads to the question of whether or how the French non-financial companies cross-listed in the US and France are compliant with these regulations. In this context and across corporate communication, it is argued that different levels of risk control’s formalization can highlight original typology of compliance and corporate governance. This research uses a longitudinal case study in order to explore the implementation of risk control measures and the risk narrative disclosure strategies to enhance organizational legitimacy. The collected data (interviews, risk disclosures within annual reports) are subject to a content analysis through COSO2. A second step is a statistical analysis to discriminate strategic responses over the time and between companies. Empirical observations point to different strategic responses to institutional processes based on two periods as well as economic and strategic business concerns. The first phase shows that risk control process is structured in order to build the auditability of organization. While, in the second phase companies develop different strategic responses more consistent with their concerns.

Cette thèse a pour objectif principal d’apporter une contribution à la littérature concernant la structure et l’efficacité du conseil d’administration (CA). Elle s’articule autour de quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre est une revue de la littérature, tandis que les trois autres portent sur des questions de recherche distinctes. La première étude présentée dans le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier les déterminants de la taille du CA, de l'indépendance de ses membres et de la dualité des fonctions de direction et de présidence du CA. Les principaux apports de cette étude peuvent être résumés comme suit : tout d'abord, nos résultats sont fondés sur l'analyse d'un des plus grands échantillons utilisés dans ce domaine, avec à peu près 16000 observations (entreprises-années) pour près de 2300 entreprises américaines observées de 1997 à 2010. De plus, sur le plan méthodologique, une batterie de tests statistiques a été réalisée afin de vérifier la robustesse de nos résultats, notamment des tests tenant compte des biais d'hétérogénéité et de simultanéité. Enfin, cette étude est probablement la première à démontrer que le passage de la loi SOX a limité la capacité des dirigeants à influencer la composition du CA. La deuxième étude s’attache à analyser les deux principales fonctions du CA, qui sont le conseil au chef d'entreprise et le contrôle de ses activités. Ainsi, comprendre la capacité du CA à remplir ces fonctions est une question fondamentale que nous nous proposons d’approfondir. Cette étude vient enrichir la littérature émergente sur la fonction consultative du CA en fournissant de nouveaux éléments de preuves sur l'importance de cette fonction dans la création de valeur de l'entreprise. Ces résultats apportent également des éclairages sur le conflit potentiel existant entre les deux principales fonctions du CA. Enfin, cette étude s'inscrit dans le courant de pensée qui cherche à évaluer l'impact des caractéristiques des entreprises sur l'efficacité de leurs structures de gouvernance. Le principal objectif de la troisième étude présentée dans le dernier chapitre de cette thèse est de déterminer si la rémunération à base d’actions des administrateurs peut affecter les décisions futures en matière d'acquisition, et le cas échéant, comment. Les résultats de cette étude apportent un nouvel éclairage concernant la rémunération des administrateurs. Cette étude met en exergue l'importance des pratiques de rémunération incitative sous forme d’actions et d’options pour les membres du CA. Par ailleurs, bien que de nombreuses études aient été réalisées afin d'analyser la relation existante entre les mesures incitatives à destination des administrateurs et la performance de l'entreprise, notre étude est l'une des premières à explorer les mécanismes à travers lesquels ces mesures peuvent influencer la valeur de l'entreprise. / This thesis aims at providing contributions to the existing literature on the structure and effectiveness of corporate boards. It comprises three essays that address distinct research questions. The first study examines the trends and determinants of corporate board structure using a panel data sample. This study extends the existing literature on the determinants of board structure in three important ways. First, our results are based on one of the largest samples used in this area, with almost 16,000 firm-year observations for nearly 2,300 firms observed from 1997 to 2010. Second, in terms of methodology, a set of statistical tests was performed in order to check the robustness of our findings, including tests that account for heterogeneity and simultaneity. Finally, this is probably the first study to show that the enactment of SOX has reduced the ability of CEOs in influencing board composition. Specifically, while SOX does not fundamentally alter the economic determinants of board structure, our results show that the documented negative impact of well performing CEOs on board independence in the pre-SOX era is no longer significant post-SOX. In the second study, the principal objective is to investigate the effects of advisory directors' presence on the board and monitoring intensity on the board's overall effectiveness in value creation. This study makes some significant contributions to the literature. First, it complements and extends the growing literature on the board's advisory function by providing strong new evidence on the importance of this board function in value creation. Second, it also provides some evidence on the potential conflict between the two primary functions of corporate boards. Finally, this study adds to the literature that attempts to assess the impact of firm and industry characteristics on the effectiveness of specific governance structures. The last study has as main objective to examine the relation between director compensation structure and shareholder interests in the context of acquisitions. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the recent but burgeoning literature that deals with the determinants of director compensation. Guided by theoretical work in this area, we show that director compensation is mainly consistent with firm's needs for monitoring and advising. Second, we extend the body of research that highlights the importance of equity-based compensation by providing evidence that the use of incentive-based compensation schemes to reward directors also matters. Finally, although many studies have examined the relation between directors' incentives and firm performance, this work is one of the first to examine the channels through which directors' equity-based pay affects shareholders' value.