SAMPAIO, Laura Cristina Ferreira. A exigência religiosa e os limites da ética: considerações acerca da continuidade ou ruptura entre os estágios ético e religioso em Kierkegaard. 2004. 122f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2004. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-05T13:20:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2004-DIS-LCFSAMPAIO.pdf: 354990 bytes, checksum: 8a6ca20652240fe8181fe6a583035009 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-05T14:02:21Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2004-DIS-LCFSAMPAIO.pdf: 354990 bytes, checksum: 8a6ca20652240fe8181fe6a583035009 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-05T14:02:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2004-DIS-LCFSAMPAIO.pdf: 354990 bytes, checksum: 8a6ca20652240fe8181fe6a583035009 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004 / The present study, based on the theory of Kierkegaard´s stages, has as a proposal to expound the ethical and religious existence in Kierkegaard, considering critically the religious exigency and the limits of the ethics. Putting the relation between the ethic and the religious, Kierkegaard with the use of the pseudonyms shows several conceptions. It was searched, then, to identify if and until what point one can think, starting from certain writings of Kierkegaard, on a conciliatory mention, notably, between the ethical and religious stages. To complete this analysis, they were surveyed secondarily the critical and studious authors who could support a confirmation or an information of the antagonism between the referred stages. In other words, it was wanted to clear if there was a total exclusion or if it could be thought about conciliation coming from some essential relation, intrinsic between the ethical and religious spheres. / O presente estudo, fundamentado na teoria dos estágios kierkegaardianos, tem como proposta abordar a existência ética e religiosa em Kierkegaaard, avaliando criticamente a exigência religiosa e os limites da ética. Ao colocar a relação entre o ético e o religioso, Kierkegaard com o uso da pseudonímia apresenta concepções variadas. Buscou-se, então, a identificar se e até que ponto se pode pensar, partindo de certos escritos de Kierkegaard, numa abordagem conciliatória, notadamente, entre os estágios ético e religioso. Para completar essa análise, percorreram-se secundariamente autores críticos e estudiosos do corpus kierkegaardiano que pudessem sustentar uma confirmação ou uma infirmação do antagonismo entre os referidos estágios. Em outras palavras, procurou-se esclarecer se havia uma total exclusão ou se poder-se-ia pensar numa conciliação advinda de alguma relação essencial, intrínseca entre as esferas ética e religiosa.

CASTRO, Franklin Roosevelt Martins de. O problema da linguagem em S. Kierkegaard. 2009. 106f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2009. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-06T12:15:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2009-DIS-FRMCASTRO.pdf: 907530 bytes, checksum: 9c6c407aeffcf8c882768246dfec79fc (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-07T10:52:39Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2009-DIS-FRMCASTRO.pdf: 907530 bytes, checksum: 9c6c407aeffcf8c882768246dfec79fc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-07T10:52:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2009-DIS-FRMCASTRO.pdf: 907530 bytes, checksum: 9c6c407aeffcf8c882768246dfec79fc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / O objetivo desta pesquisa foi investigar a categoria da linguagem no pensamento de Sören Kierkegaard (1813 – 1855). No primeiro momento, analisamos como a relação método e linguagem é uma estratégia de reflexão irônica das categorias dialéticas do pensador dinamarquês. Depois, verificamos que a linguagem é marcada pelo conceito de queda e devir, portanto, está perpassada pela história e pelo paradoxo. Por fim, problematizamos os impasses que a linguagem apresenta ao tentar criar um sistema absoluto e/ou explicar a interioridade subjetiva. Desse modo, a linguagem em Kierkegaard se constitui em uma tensão entre os limites da razão e o conhecimento da diferença absoluta, ou seja, no paradoxo entre o silêncio e a palavra. / L´objectif de ce travail est d´enquêter au sujet de la catégorie de langage dans la pensée de Soren Kierkegaard ( 1813-1855). Dans un premier temps, nous analysons comment la relation entre la méthode et le langage devient une stratégie de réflexion ironique en relation aux catégories didactiques du penseur danois. Ensuite nous vérifions que le langage est empreint des concepts de chute et de devenir, et est ainsi traversé par l´histoire et le paradoxe. Enfin nous réfléchissons au sujet des impasses auxquelles lève le langage quand il essaye de créer un systéme absolu et/ou d´expliquer l´intériorité subjective. De cette manière Kirkegaard construit une tension entre les limites de la raison et la connaissance de la différence absolue, qui peut être le paradoxe entre le silence et la parole.

SANTOS, Maria Deiviane Agostinho dos. Angústia e história um reencontro da liberdade em Kierkegaard. 2014. 129f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2014. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2014-10-20T16:14:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_mdasantos.pdf: 893500 bytes, checksum: a8aa0882a9945cbd1149e027d4bf1af8 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2014-10-20T16:34:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_mdasantos.pdf: 893500 bytes, checksum: a8aa0882a9945cbd1149e027d4bf1af8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-20T16:34:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_mdasantos.pdf: 893500 bytes, checksum: a8aa0882a9945cbd1149e027d4bf1af8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Kierkegaard discusses the fundamental metaphysical categories through human existence. It is not, in this work, only to establish ontological relations, but to discover, if possible, how Kierkegaard puts the interiority to the externality in an earlier conception of the History itself. This effort is the key issue facing the condition of the individual in history, since their absence to their historical and current can overcome. Focused on the implication of the concept of anxiety, of freedom and the history itself. This work aims to establish the foundations of freedom for its reunion, giving through the dialectical conception and, at the same time, the possibility of rupture that the man is able to establish in the history, an answer to the questions that pertain to freedom and anxiety. This work touches finally the question of the ethics of love, as the reconciliation of the man with himself. / Kierkegaard discute categorias metafísicas fundamentais através da existência humana. Não se trata, neste trabalho, de estabelecer apenas relações ontológicas, mas de descobrir, se possível, como o homem passa de sua interioridade para sua exterioridade em uma concepção anterior à própria história. Este esforço, por sua vez, é voltado à questão fundamental da condição do indivíduo na história, desde sua ausência até sua atualidade histórica e possível superação. Voltado à implicação do conceito de angústia, da liberdade e da própria história. Este trabalho tem como objetivo estabelecer as bases da liberdade para seu reencontro, dando, através da concepção dialética e ao mesmo tempo da possibilidade de ruptura que o homem é capaz de estabelecer na história, uma resposta às questões que dizem respeito a liberdade e a angústia. Este trabalho toca, finalmente, a questão de uma ética do amor, como reconciliação do homem consigo mesmo.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2011-10-20Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:34:01Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 aun_fs_me_mar.pdf: 463147 bytes, checksum: 11557c23bc2276776599c3083e1ac47c (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / Esta dissertação procura esclarecer a singularidade da concepção kierkegaardiana do conceito de ironia e a relação estabelecida entre este conceito e a questão da subjetividade. Com essa finalidade priorizamos a análise da obra O conceito de ironia constantemente referido a Sócrates, na qual podemos investigar as distinções que Kierkegaard estabelece entre a ironia socrática, a ironia no romantismo alemão e a concepção hegeliana de ironia. Valorizamos a análise da definição de ironia como “negatividade” e também a noção de “personalidade” apresentada pelo autor. Tendo em vista que, como figura de transição, o lugar ocupado pela ironia na obra de Kierkegaard é configurado sempre no intervalo e na passagem entre várias dualidades, tais como, real e ideal; finito e infinito; interior e exterior; vida e forma ou, ainda, entre uma subjetividade e outra, defendemos ao longo da dissertação que um estudo detido da tese kierkegaardiana sobre a ironia é essencial para compreendermos alguns dos principais aspectos de sua filosofia / This dissertation aims at clarifying the singularity of Kierkegaard´s concept of irony and its relation to the subjectivity. Thus, the priority of this research is the analysis of the work: “The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates”, by Kierkegaard, in which it is possible to examine the distinctions between the Socratic irony, the irony in the German Romanticism and the Hegelian notion of irony. We focus on the analysis of irony as negativity and also on the author´s idea about “personality”. Considering the place of irony in the Kierkegaard´s work as an element of transition, that figures in between several dualisms, such as: Real and ideal; finite and infinite; interior and exterior; life and form; or also between subjectivities; we believe that a careful study of Kierkegaard´s thesis about irony is essential to understand some of the main aspects of his philosophy

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2012-11-19Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:13:30Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 martins_wm_me_mar.pdf: 608229 bytes, checksum: a365622e0381361ee617673beb9eecea (MD5) / Investigamos no presente trabalho o pensamento estético e filosófico do pensador húngaro György Lukács (1885-1971), especificamente na obra A teoria do romance, de 1916, com vistas a analisar e compreender os aspectos e elementos que o referido filósofo desenvolve nessa importante obra do, assim denominado, período de juventude; é importante para nosso trabalho destacar e salientar a significação que a filosofia da existência formulada pelo danês Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) adquiriu para o jovem Lukács nessa sua obra de 1916. Para tanto analisamos, inicialmente, o ensaio de Lukács dedicado a Kierkegaard, presente no livro A alma e as formas, de 1911; destacamos os contornos de A teoria do romance; elaboramos a conceituação de Kierkegaard dos conceitos de demoníaco, desespero e ironia; e, por fim, analisamos as ressonâncias kierkegaardianas em A teoria do romance. Os dois pensadores analisados adquiriram importância capital no desenvolvimento do debate filosófico durante todo o século XX, o presente trabalho justifica-se, portanto, nas próprias afirmações de Lukács em sua maturidade onde ele mesmo destaca entre suas influências juvenis a constante presença das ideias de Kierkegaard, entre outros, para seu percurso intelectual, por ele chamado de seu “caminho para Marx” / We investigate in this work the aesthetic and philosophical thought of the Hungarian thinker György Lukács (1885-1971), specifically in the work The theory of novel, of 1916, in order to analyze and understand the aspects and elements that this philosopher develops in this important work, named as, period of youth, it is important for our work to highlight and emphasize the significance that the philosophy of existence formulated by the Danish Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) acquired for the young Lukács in his work of 1916. For this, we analyze, initially, Lukács' essay devoted to Kierkegaard, in present in the book The soul and forms, of 1911; highlighting the outlines of The theory of novel; we elaborated the Kierkegaard's concepts of demoniacal, despair and irony, and finally, we analyze the kierkegaardian resonances in The theory of novel. The two thinkers analyzed acquired importance in the development of philosophical debate throughout the twentieth century, this work justified, therefore, in Lukacs' own statements in his maturity where he stands among his juveniles influences the constant presence of Kierkegaard ideas, and others, for his intellectual journey, called by him as road to Marx”

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3042.pdf: 1304916 bytes, checksum: ca23a9815be2800168dbcd1cc6af4a93 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-04-07 / Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais / The present study, based on the Kierkegaard s existential dialectics, intends to deal with ethical and religious existence in Kierkegaard, critically assessing the demands of religion and the limits of ethics. Upon establishing the relationship between the ethical and the religious, Kierkegaard using pseudonyms presents varied conceptions. In Fear and Trembling(1843) under the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio, he highlights the rupture between the ethical and the religious, showing that Abraham s story (Gn.22) holds a suspension of ethics; and under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis, in the introduction to Concept of Anxiety (1844), he inserts, into his understanding of ethics, another distinction: between a first ethics , which encompasses Greek ethics as well as Hegel's speculative thinking, and a second ethics , established upon the Christian message, the concept of love to one s neighbor, demanded by a divine commandment, and the principle of ethical life. This second ethics is described a work titled Works of love , authored by way of his own name. In other words, it was attempted to clarify if there was a thorough exclusion or if it would be possible to think of an intrinsic reconciliation, due to some essential relationship between religious existence and ethical existence. / A presente pesquisa, fundamentada na dialética existencial de Kierkegaard, pretende abordar a existência ética e religiosa, avaliando criticamente a exigência religiosa e os limites da ética. Ao colocar a relação entre o ético e o religioso, Kierkegaard com o uso da pseudonímia apresenta concepções variadas. Em Temor e Tremor (1843) sob o pseudônimo Johannes de Silentio, destaca a ruptura entre o ético e o religioso, onde a história de Abraão (Gn. 22) comporta uma suspensão da ética; e sob o pseudônimo de Vigilius Haufniensis, na introdução ao Conceito de Angústia (1844), insere, em sua compreensão de ética, uma outra distinção: entre uma primeira ética , que compreende tanto a ética grega, como o pensamento especulativo de Hegel, e uma segunda ética , estabelecida sobre a mensagem cristã - o conceito de amor ao próximo, ordenado pelo mandamento divino, e princípio de vida ética. Esta segunda ética é descrita em uma obra veronímica intitulada As Obras do Amor . Em outras palavras, procurou-se esclarecer se havia uma total exclusão ou se poder-se-ia pensar numa conciliação advinda de alguma relação essencial, intrínseca entre a existência ética e religiosa.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Psicologia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia Clínica e Cultura, 2013. / Submitted by Luiza Silva Almeida (luizaalmeida@bce.unb.br) on 2013-07-30T19:51:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_MatildesPazLandimBezerraFilha.pdf: 684054 bytes, checksum: 8d278547e6be2a179d814ded970e1c67 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2013-08-02T12:24:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_MatildesPazLandimBezerraFilha.pdf: 684054 bytes, checksum: 8d278547e6be2a179d814ded970e1c67 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-02T12:24:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_MatildesPazLandimBezerraFilha.pdf: 684054 bytes, checksum: 8d278547e6be2a179d814ded970e1c67 (MD5) / Este trabalho tem por intuito principal um aprofundamento no entendimento acerca da ironia tendo por foco sua relação com a negação. Tal intuito é buscado por meio da investigação das obras de Kierkegaard e Freud. Em Kierkegaard a ironia é tomada (por meio de sua expressão em textos platônicos), a partir de seu papel histórico transformador, como vinculada ao surgimento da noção de subjetividade encaminhando para a noção de autorreflexividade e responsabilização. No contexto, a ironia socrática nos serve de exemplo para o entendimento da correlação entre ironia (considerada a partir de dois sentidos possíveis: figura de linguagem e vivência) e negação/negatividade no cerne da possibilidade de virada histórica e pessoal. Da obra freudiana, alguns aspectos concernentes aos entendimentos dos “Der Witz” conduzem à compreensão do papel dos processos psíquicos constitutivos tanto da produção irônica quanto de sua assimilação pelo interlocutor, levando ao entendimento de que a efetivação de tais processos na constituição de uma ironia fina (Witz) exige a participação de todo o psiquismo. Pela coadunação de conhecimentos propostos pelos dois autores, a negação (em relação a que a ironia se opõe) é abordada como no bojo do desenvolvimento da capacidade de julgamento, a partir de sua vinculação com o “fantasiar” e o “pensar. Enquanto instrumentalidade clínica (de negação da negação), a ironia conduz para a possibilidade de uma visão mais bem humorada (cômica) dos próprios infortúnios (trágicos) e possibilidades destinais. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This writing intends to detail irony understanding concerning its link to negation, and Sigmund Freud and Soren Kierkegaard works are the main theoretical references used here. Kierkegaard seems to consider irony (according to its standing in platonic texts) starting from its historical change role and tied to the appearing of subjectivity notion going to self- reflexivity and self-implication meanings and issues. Socratic irony serves as an useful example to realize the correlation between irony (in two possible respects: figures of speech and experience) and negation/negativity in the drama of historical and personal turnings. Inside Freud’s teachings, in turn, there are some aspects concerning “Der Witz” that lead to an understanding of the constitutive psychic processes role regarding irony production and its assimilation by speakers and listeners, since they imply that is necessary full psychic participation to construct fine irony (Witz). By means of combination of both authors’ arguments, negation (to which irony is opposed to) is approached as part of ethical and moral development, arising from its link to imagination and thinking. Irony, if used as a clinical instrument (being a negation of another negation), may be fit to construct a happier (comical) experience of someone’s own troubles (tragic) and possible fates.

This dissertation examines the way the Pythagorean conception of the incommensurable structures the assertions of subjective agency in Blaise Pascal’s Pensées (1670), Søren Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), and Alain Badiou’s Being and Event (1988). The Pythagoreans coined the term “incommensurable,” alogos, to describe magnitudes that cannot emerge within a specific system of signification. Across three chapters, I extend the Pythagorean understanding of the incommensurable into the areas of philosophy, religious studies, and mathematics in order to posit the fundamental instability at the core of subjective agency. Moving from Thomas S. Kuhn’s failure to define the incommensurable logically in his Structures of Scientific Revolutions, I argue that such a conception of the incommensurable must be understood as fundamentally faith-based. Given the fact that the incommensurable cannot emerge into signification, its existence must be posited on faith. Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Badiou each move from a faith-based assertion of the incommensurable to offer a conception of subjective agency within a specific system of signification. Thus, against the work of Bonaventura Cavalieri and Evangelista Torricelli, Pascal refigures the incommensurably infinite to establish a heterodox subjective agency within Augustinian faith-by-grace; Kierkegaard manages to navigate the incommensurability of direct communication and personal faith by effacing his pseudonym Johannes Climacus; and Alain Badiou relies on the incommensurable “event” to imagine the possibility the subject’s calling into being of the new. In each of these three texts, the incommensurable functions to guarantee the possibility of subject agency within a specific system of signification.

Die tema van hierdie verhandeling is 'n vergelykende studie van die kategorie enkeling by Soren Kierkegaard en Max Stirner met die doel om punte van ooreenkoms en basiese verskille uit te wys. Daar word gepoog om deur 'n analise van begrippe wat binne die kategorie van die enkeling val, nuwe lig te werp op die twee denkers se filosofie. Hierdie probleemstelling bring mee dat daar gedurig vergelykend gewerk word, maar dat die uiteensetting ook beperk word tot daardie basiese begrippe wat die vergelyking duidelik na vore bring. So word in hoofsaak dan die volgende behandel: Die probleem van denke en syn soos dit by die twee denkers voorkom, word ondersoek. Beide Kierkegaard en Stirner stel die eksisterende enkeling as die sentrale begrip in die soeke na 'n relasie tussen denke en syn. Belangrike verwante eksistensiebegrippe kom voorts onder bespreking; die stel van die self en selfkeuse, selfbewussyn, moontlikheid en wording, eksistensie, essensie, reele en ideele syn. By die ontleding van hierdie begrippe word duidelik aangedui hoe verskillend die antwoorde was wat Kierkegaard en Stirner gegee het in die lig van die filosofiese probleme van hulle tyd. Wanneer Kierkegaard die enkeling stel as eindig-oneindig word die moontlikheid meteen gestel vir 'n relasie van die enkeling tot God, terwyl Stirner die enkeling slegs as oneindig sien. Die begrippe "sprong" en "oomblik" gee die sleutel tot die verstaan van Kierkegaard se filosofie en stel meteen ook die moontlikheid dat 'tiie enkeling voor God" kan staan. Stirner en Kierkegaard se beskouing van "gees" is wyd ui teenlopend en illustreer duidelik Stirner se negatiewe denke en Kierkegaard se positiewe siening. Kierkegaard stel die begrip subjektiwiteit as antwoord op die vraag na die waarheid, terwyl Stirner ook van hierdie prinsipe uitgaan, maar 'n heel ander resultaat bereik. Kierkegaard stel die moontlikheid van 'n etiese lewe waarin die enkeling hoër as die universele is. Be ide Stirner en Kierkegaard trek te velde teen die moraliteit van hulle tyd, maar op heel verskillende wyse - dit blyk veral uit die inhoud wat hul gee aan begrippe soos "vryheid" en "massa". Kortliks word aangedui hoe Kierkegaard se filosofie uitloop op die finale stadium van religieusiteit deur die stel van begrippe soos sonde, skuld, angs ens. Stirner verwerp alle vorme van godsdiens as blote verbeeldingsvlugte. Die resultaat van die studie is dat hoewel daar enkele ernstige besware ingebring kan word teen Kierkegaard se siening van die "enkeling", hy nogtans 'n baie belangrike bydrae tot die filosofie lewer. Die positiewe van sy siening lê juis daarin dat die "enkeling" oop is vir 'n relasie tot die jy en veral die U. Stirner se beskouing loop uit op 'n volslae skeptisisme en is volledig onvrugbaar. Stirner en Kierkegaard se uiteindelike siening van die "enkeling" is wyd uiteenlopend en die basiese verskil kan reeds aangetoon word in die gebruik van die terme "Einzige" en "Einzelne"; Kierkegaard se "enkeling" is uniek en enig op 'n heel ander wyse dan Stirner se "enkeling". / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 1971. / gm2014 / Anthropology and Archaeology / unrestricted

Die doel van hierdie studie is om te probeer vasstel wat bedoel word met die etiese en die religieuse stadiums in die werke van Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Wat is die verband tussen hierdie twee stadiums? Hoe vind die oorgang van die een na die ander plaas? Op 'n krities-analitiese wyse word die verskillende synstrukture, kategoriee, begrippe en terme ondersoek soos dit in die denke van Kierkegaard voorkom. Die ondersoek en interpretasie van Kierkegaard se werk word deur verskillende faktore bemoeilik. Dit word in hierdie werkstuk kortliks genoem. Kierkegaard hou aan die leser sekere moontlike vorms van lewe voor. Hierdie vorms van lewe kan binne die etiese en religieuse dimensies val. Die belangrikste begrippe ten opsigte van hoe die enkeling die etiese en die religieuse ken, word voorts bespreek onder drie afdelings : die kategorie, die bestemming en die begrip. Kierkegaard stel dit dat die mens die vermoe het om sekere logiese tipes of reekse van tipes te kan onderskei. Die volgende tipes word bespreek : die verstaanskategorie en die eksistensiekategorie. Laasgenoemde sluit die kategorie van moontlikheid en die kategorie van herhaling in. By die bestemming gaan dit om die korrekte of verkeerde aanwending van die kategoriee. Hierdie beginsel word ondersoek in die etiese en die religieuse stadiums. Die probleem van tese-antitese-sintese word gestel in die lig van die Hegeliaanse beskouing van rnediasie. Die korrelasie wat Kierkegaard stel tussen denke en syn word aangetoon. Die probleem objek-subjek word bespreek en die onderskeid wat deur Kierkegaard gemaak word tussen kwantitatiewe en kwalitatiewe dialektiek. In die volgende hoofstuk word die eksistensiele beweging by die etiese en die religieuse stadiums aangedui. Vir Kierkegaard is die stel van die self en selfkeuse belangrik. Die selfbewussyn is die plek.waar denke en syn mekaar ontmoet. Die sleutelbegrippe moontlikheid, wording en essensie word geanaliseer. Die korrekte verstaan van ideele en reele syn is verbind met genoemde begrippe. Kierkegaard stel dit dat eksistensie 'n sintese van die oneindige en die eindige is en die eksisterende enkeling is sowel oneindig as eindig. Hierdie uitspraak word voorts ondersoek. Die rrsprong" is 'n sentrale begrip in sy filosofie. Hoe die sprong (in subjektiwiteit) verband hou met verskillende ander begrippe, word aangedui. Verskillende moontlike of gerealiseerde vorms van lewe word aan die leser voorgehou. Die "oomblik" is 'n begrip wat gebruik word in korrelasie met ander begrippe, bv. die tydsbegrip. Wanneer Kierkegaard die relasie van die enkeling stel met wat hy noem "die enkeling voor God'', probeer hy 'n antwoord gee op die sentrale probleem wat hy vir homself stel, nl. hoe om 'n Christen te word. Die verskil tussen Religieusiteit A en Religieusiteit B word oak aangedui. Die volgende hoofstuk handel oor die eksistensiele ervaring by die etiese en religieuse stadiums. Kierkegaard probeer 'n antwoord gee op die God-mens-verhouding. Hy gebruik die voorbeeld van Abraham in die Ou Testament om die beginsel van die teleologiese suspensie van die etiese te demonstreer. Hierdie grootse stuk filosofie van Kierkegaard word krities ondersoek. Kierkegaard se fundering van die etiese en die religieuse word bespreek naas die sieninge van bv. Kant en Hegel. Begrippe soos oneindige oorgawe, versoeking, "Anfechtung", absolute paradoks, skuld en onskuld kern aan die orde. Kategoriee soos wanhoop, angs, onkunde, onskuld, vryheid, ens. word gestel. Daar word aangetoon hoe van hierdie kategoriee by Karl Jaspers, J.P. Sartre en Martin Heidegger in gewysigde vorm voorkom. Die begrippe genie, fatum en passie word ontleed. Kierkegaard se siening van liggaam en gees hou verband met die self en sy moontlikhede; dit verskil by die etiese en religieuse stadiums. Die begrip erfsonde het nie die tradisionele inhoud nie en by die begrip sonde word twee tipes onderskei, die van die enkeling en die van die geslag. By die kategorie sonde word waarheid, onwaarheid, skuld en sondebewussyn gestel. Berou word die hoogste etiese uitdrukking van die enkeling. Die volgende stappe is versoening en "die enkeling.voor God". Die uiteenlopende siening random Kierkegaard se begrip van geloof word ondersoek. Hier le die "hart" van Kierkegaard se eksistensiefilosofie. Geloof is vir hom 'n persoonlike, unieke aangeleentheid van die eksisterende enkeling : dit is 'n wyse van lewe, 'n demonstrasie, streng persoonlik en subjektief. Die relasie tussen Religieusiteit A en Religieusiteit B word verder uitgewerk in die lig van die algemene kategorie van die humor. Die dialektiese verhouding tussen Religieusiteit A en Religieusiteit B word uiteengesit. Verskillende kritiese vrae random hierdie onderskeid word gestel. Met die kategorie lyding ('n uitsluitlik religieuse kategorie) wil Kierkegaard iets heel besonders se. Vir 'n duidelike uiteensetting van die verhouding tussen die etiese en die religieuse stadiums is die kategorie van die enkeling van groot belang. Ons leer die mens ken as enkeling, individu, unieke, enkele, ens. binne die etiese en die religieuse stadiums. Negatiewe kritiek random hierdie kategorie word bespreek en die vraag word gevra of Kierkegaard se enkeling nie totaal vereensaam en geisoleer raak nie? Wat is die enkeling se relasie tot die massa? By Gabriel Marcel, bv. word die "openheid" van die enkeling meer beklemtoon. Max Stirner en Karl Jaspers vind by Kierkegaard se begrip van die enkeling aansluiting. Naas Niezsche plaas Kierkegaard die mens weer sentraal in die filosofie. Kierkegaard was by ·uitstek die filosoof wat erns gemaak het met die Christendom. Hy ontmasker die Christendom van sy tyd met die doel om positiewe resultate te lewer. Hy worstel met die probleem van subjektiwiteit - die vertrekpunt en die eindpunt van sy filosofie. Daar is geen plek vir 'n rasionele etiek nie. 'n Etiese sisteem is nie moontlik nie. Die enkeling, elke handeling en elke situasie is uniek. Kierkegaard stel aan die een kant 'n duidelike onderskeid tussen die etiese en die religieuse stadiums, maar aan die ander kant bring hy die tw~e stadiums bymekaar deur sekere kategoriee te stel. Die relasie tussen die twee stadiums ontglip die leser, juis omdat dit 'n geloofsaksie is. Geloofsuitsprake is van 'n ander aard as etiese uitsprake. Die oorgang van rede tot geloof is met 'n sprang. Kierkegaard oorbeklemtoon nie een van die stadiums nie en verskraal ook nie die religie tot 'n mistiese gevoel of ondervinding nie. Moontlike vorrns van lewe word aan die leser voorgehou met 'n duidelike uitnodiging aan die leser om deel te neem. Kierkegaard plaas die mens as ·enkeling terug in die filosofie. Die hoogste wat die mens kan bereik is om "voor God" te wees. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 1977. / gm2014 / Anthropology and Archaeology / unrestricted