La question de l’effectivité de la sanction pénale fait régulièrement débat. La sanction pénale serait, bien souvent, partiellement effective. Il faut dire que selon une acception classiquement répandue, l’effectivité de la sanction pénale correspondrait au taux d’application de la sanction prononcée et au rapport de conformité entre la sanction prononcée et la sanction exécutée. Tout écart entre ces deux pôles serait la manifestation d’une situation d’ineffectivité. Cette approche de l’effectivité est réductrice, elle ne permet pas d’appréhender cette notion dans sa globalité. Considérant comme effectif « ce qui produit un effet », l’étude de l’effectivité de la sanction pénale ne peut se limiter à une simple vérification de la correspondance entre la sanction prononcée et la sanction exécutée, elle s’étend à l’appréciation des effets produits par la sanction. L’effectivité, qui est un état, ne peut se confondre avec l’exécution qui correspond à l’ensemble du processus permettant d’y parvenir. Au cœur de la recherche de production des effets de la sanction, l’exécution est alors source de l’effectivité recherchée. Selon toute probabilité, la sanction exécutée produira des effets. Pourtant, sauf à vider de son sens la notion d’effectivité, il n’est pas possible de considérer que tous les effets que la sanction est susceptible de produire relèvent de son effectivité. Seuls les effets conformes à la finalité qui lui est assignée intègrent cette notion. Tout en distinguant l’effectivité de l’efficacité, l’effectivité de la sanction s’appréciera à l’aune des effets qui contribuent au maintien de la paix sociale. / The question of the effectiveness of criminal sanction is the cause of great debate. The criminal sanction would be, so often, partially effective. It must be said that according to common thinking, the effectiveness of criminal sanction corresponds to the rate of application of the pronounced sanction and to the relation of conformity between the pronounced sanction and the executed sanction. Any difference between these two poles could be seen as the demonstration of a situation of ineffectiveness. This approach of the effectiveness is simplistic, it does not make it possible to apprehend this notion in its entirety. Considering as effective “what produces an effect”, the study of the effectiveness of criminal sanction cannot be limited to simply checking the correspondence between the pronounced sanction and the executed sanction, it extends to the evaluation of the effects produced by the sanction. The effectiveness, which is a state, cannot nevertheless be confused with the execution which corresponds to the whole of the process making it possible to reach that point. At the core of the search for the production of the sanction’s effects, the execution is then the source of the required effectiveness. In all probability, the executed sanction will produce effects. However, unless we empty the notion of effectiveness of its meaning, it is not possible to consider that all of the effects which the sanction is likely to produce concern its effectiveness. Only the effects in conformity with the finality which is assigned to it integrate this notion. While distinguishing the effectiveness from the efficacy, the effectiveness of the sanction will be assessed in light of the effects which contribute to the maintenance of social peace.

L’énergie nucléaire a toujours suscité la polémique. Alors que certains considèrent qu’une énergie nucléaire « sûre » pourrait contribuer à assurer à la fois une meilleure sécurité des approvisionnements énergétiques et une réduction des émissions mondiales de gaz à effet de serre, d’autres lui reprochent plusieurs types de risques et particulièrement les accidents nucléaires, la gestion des déchets nucléaires, la non-prolifération et les attaques terroristes ou même militaires contre les installations nucléaires civiles. En réalité, le retour d’expérience des accidents nucléaires les plus catastrophique de l’histoire, Three Mile Island (États-Unis) en 1979, Tchernobyl (ancienne URSS) en 1986 et Fukushima Daiichi (Japon) en 2011, a montré que des accidents nucléaires graves peuvent avoir des effets divers d’une portée potentiellement considérable, (très souvent transfrontières), à la fois pour les personnes, les biens et pour l’environnement. L’accident de Fukushima a confirmé une fois de plus la nécessité d’améliorer les règles existantes du droit international de l’énergie nucléaire, de manière à mettre en place un régime mondial de responsabilité civile du fait nucléaire, répondant aux préoccupations de tous les États qui pourraient être touchés par ce type d’accident. Le défit aujourd’hui est, donc, degarantir une réparation efficace, équitable et harmonisée des différents types de dommages issus d’un accident survenant dans une installation nucléaire. / Nuclear energy always caused the polemic. Whereas some consider that a “sure” nuclear energy could contribute to ensure at the same time a better safety of the energy supplies and a reduction of the greenhouses gas emissions, others reproach its several types of risks, particularly, the nuclear accidents, the nuclear waste control, the non-proliferation and the terrorist attacks or even armed against civil nuclear installations. Actually, return of the experience of the most catastrophic nuclear accidents in history (Three Mile Island (the United States) in 1979, Tchernobyl (former USSR) in 1986 and FukushimaDaiichi (Japan) in 2011), showed that serious nuclear accidents can have a variety of potentially far-reaching effects (very often transboundary) for people, property and the environment. The Fukushima accident confirmed once again the need to improve the existing rules of international nuclear energy law to put in place a global nuclear liability regime that addresses all of the states that may be affected by a nuclear accident. Today’s challenge is, therefore, to guarantee an efficient, fair and harmonized repair of the different types of damage resulting from an accident occurring in a nuclear installation.

A dissertação trata da responsabilidade especial prevista no art. 40 da Lei 6.024/74 para os administradores de instituições financeiras frente aos credores sociais na hipótese da quebra da instituição. É discutida a natureza dessa responsabilidade, se objetiva ou subjetiva, buscando seu exato conteúdo. O tratamento adotado é interdisciplinar, envolvendo diversas áreas do direito e da economia. O direito constitucional fornece a tábua de valores para o sistema, impondo limites, e a teoria geral do direito contribui com a análise do conteúdo e a finalidade das normas de responsabilidade, com o regramento prudencial do Banco Central servindo para o detalhamento das condutas. São então utilizadas as ferramentas de análise econômica do direito, particularmente a teoria dos jogos para a modelagem de um regime de responsabilidade subjetiva, e outro de responsabilidade objetiva, como jogos estratégicos, na forma normal e na extensiva, identificando os pontos de equilíbrio e de eficiência, O resultado aponta para uma ineficiência do modelo de responsabilidade objetiva para o administrador. O modelo de responsabilidade subjetiva revela-se mais eficiente, apontando como desejáveis as ferramentas de delação premiada e inversão do ônus de prova, para mitigar problemas de assimetria de informação entre depositante e instituição financeira. A dissertação conclui que a responsabilização objetiva do administrador seria inconstitucional e ineficiente, e que o regime jurídico atual é de responsabilidade subjetiva, mas que pode ser aprimorado, especialmente tornando mais claras as regras aplicáveis. / The dissertation analyzes financial institutions\' managers\' special liability to creditors in the event of bankruptcy, as established by Brazilian Law 6.204/74 article 40. Its discussed the nature of such a liability, whether a negligence standard or strict liability rule, seeking to clarify its full extent. The approach is interdisciplinary, using many fields of both law and economics. Constitutional Law provides the goals and values for the system, and General Theory of Law contributes to analyzing the content and purpose of liability rules, with the Central Bank\'s prudential supervision rules detailing actions. The tools of economic analysis of law are then used, particularly game theory to model a system based on a negligence standard, and another based in a strict liability standard, as strategic games in both normal form and extensive form, identifying the points of equilibrium and efficiency. The result points to an inefficient model of strict liability for the administrator. The model based on a negligence standard is shown to be more efficient, pointing as desirable tools that grant immunity to whistleblowers and reverse the burden of proof, to mitigate problems of asymmetric information between depositors and financial institutions. The dissertation concludes that the strict liability of the manager would be unconstitutional and inefficient, and that the current legal regime is that of negligence standard liability, but it can be improved, particularly by clarifying the rules.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Renzo Gama Soares.pdf: 711346 bytes, checksum: facf3483b7543905f15fd5e5726fd4db (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-24 / Strict liability, the one that doesn t need a negligent act to impose the damage doer the obligation to pay the victim for the damages caused, is getting more and more important in the judiciary system, since the end of he 19th century. Especially after the Civil Code of 2002, the analysis of this kind of torts became even more relevant for the Brazilian Law system because of the several cases in which it is applied, including especially the adoption of this system as a general clause statement. Because of this necessity, the present work intends to study the strict liability, especially concerning its axiological foundations, that for long are beyond the original idea of risk, and some microsystems where this kind of liability is applied. To accomplish this result, the paper was divided in two parts: the first one is used to study the fundaments of torts, since the private vengeance until the strict liability as we know nowadays; the second part is about some of the Microsystems that are not based on a negligent act to impose the damage doer the obligation to pay the victim for the damages caused in the Brazilian legal system. The study is done, as much as possible, in a comparative form with other foreign legislation. Some of them influenced the Brazilian legislator on the text of the 2002 Civil Code, but others just have a similar regulation on the matter, even if there is not any influence on Brazilian Civil Code. These comparative studies are done, as much as possible, based on foreign books that study local statutes, so we tried to avoid an interpretation of foreign legislation out of the country s cultural and social context / A responsabilidade civil objetiva, aquela que prescinde da culpa para sua análise e conseqüente imputação de obrigação de indenizar ao causador do dano, vem ganhando cada vez mais espaço no mundo jurídico, desde o final do século XIX. Especialmente com o advento do Código Civil de 2002, a análise desta espécie de responsabilidade passou a ser ainda mais relevante para o Direito brasileiro, em razão das inúmeras previsões deste tipo de responsabilização neste corpo legislativo, inclusive e especialmente com a adoção deste sistema por meio de uma cláusula geral. Em razão desta necessidade, o presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a responsabilidade civil objetiva, especialmente no tocante aos seus fundamentos axiológicos, que ultrapassam a originária hipótese de risco, e alguns microssistemas jurídicos em que tal espécie de responsabilidade é aplicada. Para tanto o trabalho foi dividido em duas partes: a primeira cuida da análise dos fundamentos da responsabilidade civil, desde a vingança privada até a responsabilidade objetiva dos tempos atuais; a segunda parte diz respeito especificamente a alguns microssistemas jurídicos que dispensam a culpa para a imputação civil dos danos no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro. A análise, sempre que possível, é feita de forma comparativa com outros ordenamentos jurídicos que influenciaram o legislador de 2002, ou apenas possuem regramento parecido, mesmo que não haja uma relação de influência na legislação brasileira. Tais análises comparadas são feitas, sempre que possível, com base em doutrinas estrangeiras que analisam os textos legais dos respectivos países, de forma a se evitar interpretação do texto legal estrangeiro fora do contexto cultural e social daquele país

Cette thèse a pour sujet les effets que l’information a sur les incitations. Les trois articles fournissent et explorent des résultats lorsque l’information est la principale variable d’intérêt, est endogène, pas homogène entre les acteurs et évolue dans le temps d’une manière qui n’est pas nécessairement rationnelle. Le premier article étudie les problèmes de hold-up dans les hiérarchies verticales avec la sélection adverse montrant qu’alors que le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs augmente, les distorsions provenant de l’asymétrie d’information disparaissent. En outre, il étudie l’effet de la scolarité et du degré d’hétérogénéité de la population de travailleurs sur la répartition du pouvoir de négociation dans les marchés réglementés. Le deuxième article assouplit l’hypothèse des croyances homogènes dans les relations principal-agent avec sélection adverse. Dans un apprentissage évolutif qui est imitatif, les principaux peuvent avoir des croyances différentes sur la répartition des types d’agents dans la population. La convergence à une croyance uniforme dépend de la taille relative de la polarisation dans les croyances. En outre, le modèle est une version d’un cobweb stable. Notre approche offre des explications pour l’alternance des périodes avec quantité oscillante et relativement stable. Le troisième article étudie la fac¸on dont le contenu informatif des politiques juridiques, comme la responsabilité stricte et négligence, en cas de soucis morales, influence la conception optimale des régimes de responsabilité. Plusieurs cas récents ont montré qu’un individu ayant causé un dommage s’expose non seulement a une sanction légale — par exemple, une amende — mais aussi a un boycott social, la désapprobation ou la stigmatisation. L’article montre que le choix d’une stratégie dépend de façon complexe de l’importance du dommage et du “coût moral”. / This thesis focuses on the effects that information has on incentives. The three papers provide and explore some results when the information is the main variable of interest, it is made endogenous, not homogeneous between actors and evolving over time in a way that is not necessarily rational. The first paper studies hold-up problems in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection showing that as the bargaining power of the worker increases, distortions coming from asymmetric information vanish. Moreover, it studies the effect of schooling and degree of heterogeneity in the workforce on the allocation of bargaining power in regulating markets. The second paper relaxes the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about the distribution of agents’ types in the population. Convergence to a uniform belief depends on the relative size of the bias in beliefs. In addition, the set-up is a version of a stable cobweb model. Our approach offers explanations for alternating periods of oscillating and relatively steady quantity. The third paper studies how the informative content of legal policies as strict-liability and fault-based, in case of moral concerns, influences the optimal design of liability regimes. Many recent cases show that an individual found to have caused harm faces not only the possibility of a legal sanction — e.g., the damages he must pay — but also social boycott, disapproval or stigma. The paper shows that the choice of a policy depends in a complex way on the magnitude of the harm and the “moral cost”.Keywords: Bargaining, Adverse Selection, Hold-up, Evolutionary Game Theory, Heterogeneous Beliefs, Bifurcation Theory, Boycott, Law Enforcement, Strict Liability, Negligence.

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本文我們探討平面圖形的嚴格d維矩形表示法。我們證明了四連通三角平面圖有嚴格的二維矩形表示法，而且我們推廣到每一個平面圖都有嚴格的三維矩形表示法。我們的目標是希望能在平面圖矩形表示法的現今地位上，提供新的洞悉,並給未來學習者一個方向。 / We study strict d-box representations of planar graphs. We prove that a 4-connected planar triangulation graph G has a strict 2-box representation. We extend this result to that every planar graph has a strict 3-box representation. Our goal is to provide some fresh insights into the current status of research in the area while suggesting directions for the future.