Bien que ni le crime de piraterie maritime ni sa répression ne soient récents, la résurgence de cette forme de criminalité séculaire mais renouvelée la présente sous des aspects inédits, nécessitant la réadaptation de l’arsenal juridique la régissant à sa réalité nouvelle. Son régime traditionnel dérogatoire aux règles classiques du droit de la mer et aux règles de compétence et de juridiction, a pu ainsi s’étoffer par de nouvelles règles intégrant et reflétant les modes contemporains de production normative de la société internationale, ainsi que l’action des structures et acteurs non-étatiques. N’étant cependant pas un problème juridique stricto sensu mais aussi bien le reflet d’une situation présentant des problématiques structurelles plus générales, il demeure évident que la lutte plus durable contre la piraterie nécessite l’adoption d’une approche « globale » ou « holistique », associant à court et à moyen termes un point de vue sécuritaire et judiciaire mais visant également et surtout, une sortie de crise pérenne allant au-delà de l’endiguement de cette menace transnationale. / Neither the crime of piracy nor its repression are recent. The upsurge of this ancient form of criminality underlines new aspects which call the readaptation of the legal rules governing its repression. In addition to its traditional regime, new rules were consequently developped, reflecting contemporary modes of normative production and incorporating the action of non-State structures and actors. Because piracy is not exclusively a legal issue but rather encompasses several broader structural problematics, the fight against piracy requires on the other hand a global and comprehensive approach. This approach associates short-term security and judicial aspects, as well as long-term strategies going beyong simply containing piracy as a transnational threat to maritime security to ensure further stability.

<p>The purpose of this study has been to investigate the prospects for identifying and prosecuting individuals suspected of war crimes, within the process of exclusion from refugee status under article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and using subsequent mechanisms for extradition or prosecution in international criminal law. A number of principles within human rights law and public international law have been advocated by the UNCHR and several human rights NGOs as necessary for a thorough application of the exclusion clauses; one that takes individual responsibility into account and upholds the aims and purposes of the exclusion clauses. There is a discussion as to whether specialised or accelerated exclusion procedures are justified for reasons of security and efficiency, or if they put the rights of the individual at risk and limit the opportunities for gathering information to support investigation and prosecution of the crime in question. Apart from the instruments of asylum law and procedure that have emerged within the EU harmonisation process, there are no general, binding rules on the procedural aspects of the exclusion clauses. One principle that regulates the consequences for the individual of exclusion from refugee status and decisions on extradition is, however, the principle of <em>non-refoulement</em>. Although partly contested in state practice, there is widespread consensus in international jurisprudence and doctrine that the principle, following its status as a <em>jus cogens</em> rule, prohibits every state from returning any individual to a territory where he or she may face torture or other cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment, irrespective of any security risks that the individual may pose to the custodial state.</p><p>Extradition or prosecution of individuals suspected of crimes under article 1F(a), based on universal jurisdiction and the principle of <em>aut dedere aut judicare</em>, has gained increased support from international conventions, such as the 1948 Convention on Genocide and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The principles are widely upheld by human rights NGOs, and tendencies in practice and policy among the member states of the EU and the parties to the Rome Statute point towards the development of a customary rule of universal jurisdiction among these states. Continuing resistance to the Rome Statute and to universal jurisdiction among influential states such as the USA, Russia, China and India nevertheless serves to exclude these states from being bound by such an emerging customary rule of universal jurisdiction. There are compelling arguments as to why breaches of <em>jus cogens</em>-rules should include or give rise to <em>erga omnes</em> rights or obligations for all states to exercise universal jurisdiction over such breaches. Without the support of major states it is, however, difficult to establish the existence of the general state acceptance of universal jurisdiction as is required for the principle to attain <em>jus cogens</em>-status and become universally applicable, regardless of state consent. Future prospects for adequate and efficient identification and prosecution of suspected war criminals depend on the correct and thorough application of the exclusion clauses, in combination with the development of existing rules of universal jurisdiction, and not least on the willingness and ability of states to overcome the political, economic and institutional obstacles that presently may prevent many states from extraditing or prosecuting individuals who fall within the scope of article 1F(a) of the exclusion clauses.</p>

Le droit pénal génère des distinctions entre étrangers et nationaux, les premiers faisant, dans certaines situations, l’objet d’une pénalisation spécifique. Pourtant, la pertinence de cette pénalisation peut être questionnée au regard d’un balancement, opéré par le droit pénal, entre distinction et assimilation.Dans un premier temps, l’étude démontre que les différentes distinctions en droit pénal peuvent être contestées. D’une part, la pénalisation dont fait l’objet l’ensemble des étrangers ne semble pas opportune car elle apparaît tant superflue – lorsque le droit pénal se superpose à un dispositif extra-pénal suffisant – qu’illégitime – lorsque le droit pénal utilise l’apparence d’extranéité comme critère d’application. D’autre part, la pénalisation spécifique dont font l’objet les étrangers en situation irrégulière apparaît inadéquate puisque, dépendante de l’évolution des règles administratives et européennes, elle revêt un caractère instable et parce qu’elle ne présente qu’un intérêt relatif pour lutter contre l’immigration illégale.Dans un second temps, l’analyse montre, à travers un mouvement d’assimilation progressive de l’étranger au national, que le droit pénal sait aussi se désintéresser de l’extranéité. D’une part, cette assimilation répond à un impératif d’égalité qu’il est possible d’observer dans le cadre du procès pénal, mais également à l’aune de la création d’immunités pénales au profit de certains étrangers. D’autre part, cette assimilation est fondée sur la lutte contre l’impunité des auteurs d’infractions puisqu’elle est commandée par les impératifs de la coopération pénale internationale et consacrée par le mécanisme de la compétence universelle. / Criminal law gives rise to distinctions between aliens and nationals, the former being subjected to specific criminalization. But the relevance of this criminalization may be questioned, considering the balance sought by criminal law between distinction and assimilation.First, the study demonstrates that the different distinctions provided by criminal law may be challenged. On one hand, criminalization that applies to every alien is not convenient since it appears non-essential – when criminal law overlaps already sufficient extra-criminal rules – and illegitimate – when criminal law uses foreign origin as selection criterion. On the other hand, specific criminalization applied to illegal aliens appears to be inadequate since, depending on the evolution of national administrative rules and European rules, it has no legal certainty and relative interest to restrict illegal immigration.Then, the analysis shows, through a movement of progressive assimilation of aliens to nationals, that criminal law can also lose interest in foreign origin. On one hand, this assimilation meets to a requirement of equality that one may observe not only in criminal lawsuits but also in matters of criminal immunities in favor of some aliens. On the other hand, this assimilation is based on broader fight against impunity of offenders as required by international criminal cooperation and recognized by the mechanism of universal jurisdiction.

The purpose of this study has been to investigate the prospects for identifying and prosecuting individuals suspected of war crimes, within the process of exclusion from refugee status under article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and using subsequent mechanisms for extradition or prosecution in international criminal law. A number of principles within human rights law and public international law have been advocated by the UNCHR and several human rights NGOs as necessary for a thorough application of the exclusion clauses; one that takes individual responsibility into account and upholds the aims and purposes of the exclusion clauses. There is a discussion as to whether specialised or accelerated exclusion procedures are justified for reasons of security and efficiency, or if they put the rights of the individual at risk and limit the opportunities for gathering information to support investigation and prosecution of the crime in question. Apart from the instruments of asylum law and procedure that have emerged within the EU harmonisation process, there are no general, binding rules on the procedural aspects of the exclusion clauses. One principle that regulates the consequences for the individual of exclusion from refugee status and decisions on extradition is, however, the principle of non-refoulement. Although partly contested in state practice, there is widespread consensus in international jurisprudence and doctrine that the principle, following its status as a jus cogens rule, prohibits every state from returning any individual to a territory where he or she may face torture or other cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment, irrespective of any security risks that the individual may pose to the custodial state. Extradition or prosecution of individuals suspected of crimes under article 1F(a), based on universal jurisdiction and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, has gained increased support from international conventions, such as the 1948 Convention on Genocide and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The principles are widely upheld by human rights NGOs, and tendencies in practice and policy among the member states of the EU and the parties to the Rome Statute point towards the development of a customary rule of universal jurisdiction among these states. Continuing resistance to the Rome Statute and to universal jurisdiction among influential states such as the USA, Russia, China and India nevertheless serves to exclude these states from being bound by such an emerging customary rule of universal jurisdiction. There are compelling arguments as to why breaches of jus cogens-rules should include or give rise to erga omnes rights or obligations for all states to exercise universal jurisdiction over such breaches. Without the support of major states it is, however, difficult to establish the existence of the general state acceptance of universal jurisdiction as is required for the principle to attain jus cogens-status and become universally applicable, regardless of state consent. Future prospects for adequate and efficient identification and prosecution of suspected war criminals depend on the correct and thorough application of the exclusion clauses, in combination with the development of existing rules of universal jurisdiction, and not least on the willingness and ability of states to overcome the political, economic and institutional obstacles that presently may prevent many states from extraditing or prosecuting individuals who fall within the scope of article 1F(a) of the exclusion clauses.

An important change wrought by the post-1994 South African Constitutions is the attempt to have South Africa recognised as a democratic and sovereign state in the "family of nations." The new Constitutions make extensive reference to the state's international obligations and represent an endeavour to [re]define the status of international law vis-a-vis national law. Some provisions utilise international law in the interpretation and formulation of national jurisprudence and represent an [albeit not totally successful] endeavour to attain greater harmonisation between international and national law. This is an attempt to systematize the various criticisms levelled against these provisions to date, and to highlight certain interpretational difficulties and problems that present themselves in the process. The distinction between the various terminologies and branches of international law is also taken to task. Lastly, this paper attempts to determine the extent to which international law is applied at national level under the post-1994 constitutions. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

La « responsabilité de protéger », concept politique adopté en 2005 pour prévenir et mettre fin aux atrocités criminelles, repose sur un premier pilier —l'obligation de l'Etat de protéger ses populations— dont le consensus apparent a conduit à un manque d’analyse institutionnelle dans sa double dimension constitutionnelle comparée et internationale. Or, l’obligation de l’Etat incombe enparticulier au chef d'Etat. Son obligation de protéger est un élément commun de définition de sa fonction, mais aussi un critère essentiel de différenciation —selon que le chef d’Etat relève d’un modèle étatiste, privilégiant la protection de l’Etat quitte à suspendre le droit, ou d’un modèle libéral, privilégiant la protection de la Constitution et la soumission permanente de l’action politique au droit. La thèse analyse d'abord les sources de l'obligation de protéger du chef d’Etat,successivement théorisée, constitutionnalisée et internationalisée, puis l'exécution de cette obligation résultant de prérogatives, d'immunités et de contrôles de la protection. Les sources de l’obligation révèlent que le chef d’Etat, à l’interface des ordres juridiques interne et international, aune obligation spécifique, non réductible à celle de l’Etat ou de l’individu, qui comporte à la fois une dimension négative (ne pas commettre de crimes contre la population) et une dimension positive(empêcher la commission de tels crimes) et dont l’internationalisation permet de combler les lacunes des Constitutions. Si l’exécution par le chef d’Etat de son obligation de protéger, par la mise en oeuvre de ses prérogatives de protection, est soumise à un contrôle croissant, tant politique que juridictionnel, ce processus reste néanmoins inachevé, faute d'une responsabilité politique internationale, systématique et institutionnalisée. La thèse conclut à l’utilité d'une individualisation de la « responsabilité de protéger » et à l’enrichissement de ce concept par le contrôle de l’obligation de protéger du chef d’Etat. / The political concept of the “responsibility to protect” was adopted in 2005 to prevent and p ut anend to criminal atrocities. The apparent consensus over its first pillar, the State’s obligation to protect its populations, has resulted in a lack of institutional analyses regarding its combined comparative constitutional and international aspects. Importantly, the State’s obligation rests in particular with the Head of State. The obligation to protect is common to all heads of state, but it also differentiates among them, depending on whether their obligation is State-oriented (with the aim to protect the State, even if that requires the suspension of the rule of law) or Rule-of-law oriented (with the aim to protect a liberal constitutional order while always subjecting political actionto the rule of law). The thesis begins with an analysis of the sources of law relating to the Head of State’s obligation to protect, as it was successively theorised, constitutionalised and internationalised. It then turns to the execution of this obligation, which derives from the Head of State’s prerogatives, the relevant immunities involved and available institutional review over his orher activities. The study of the sources reveals that the Head of State (at the interface between the domestic and the international legal orders) is bound by a specific obligation, which exceeds the confines of the obligations of either the State or the individual. This obligation is both negative and positive as it requires both not to commit crimes against the population, and to prevent and put an end to such crimes. Its international dimension supplements the missing parts in the Constitutions.The execution of this obligation, by the implementation of the Head of State’s prerogatives, is subject to an increasing political and judicial control. However, this control remains under construction due to a lack of systematic and institutionalized international political responsibility. The thesis concludes that the “responsibility to protect” could be usefully “individualized” and enriched by institutional supervision and judicial review of the Head of State’s obligation to protect.

Le droit international classique volontaire basé sur la notion absolue de la souveraineté étatique est remis en cause par l’émergence des règles impératives (jus cogens). A cet égard, la cristallisation des droits humains impératifs est le résultat du processus d’humanisation du droit international moderne où les règles impératives des droits humains de rangs supérieurs se situent au sommet. On peut estimer que l’acceptation des droits humains impératifs créée des obligations erga omnes de protection pour les États membres de la communauté internationale. Dans ce cadre, dans le cas de violations des droits humains impératifs, tous les États sont directement affectés, touchés et lésés par les violations en question et ont le droit d’agir. A cet effet, il nous semble que tous les États peuvent adopter des contre-mesures individuelles à l’encontre de l’État fautif, violateur des droits humains impératifs. Dans le cas de violations des droits humains impératifs, il nous paraît aussi que, sous certaines conditions, les États peuvent recourir à une intervention militaire à but humanitaire, même sans l’avis favorable du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Aussi, selon certaines conditions, les États peuvent fournir une aide humanitaire aux victimes des violations des droits humains impératifs survenues à l’extérieur de leur territoire, même sans le consentement de l’État territorial. Les États sont aussi tenus de réprimer les crimes de jus cogens commis à l’extérieur de leur territoire. Dans ce contexte, il nous semble que les États en appliquant la règle aut dedere aut judicare, peuvent poursuivre les étrangers suspectés d’avoir commis des crimes de jus cogens. Dans ce cadre, les États doivent appliquer la règle aut dedere aut judicare en respectant l’obligation de non refoulement afin de prévenir les violations des droits humains impératifs à l’étranger. Il nous paraît aussi que les États en appliquant la règle aut dedere aut judicare, doivent prévoir la compétence universelle des juridictions internes. A cet égard, les États peuvent exercer la compétence universelle à l’encontre des crimes de jus cogens commis à l’étranger par l’étranger et sur l’étranger. Dans ce cadre, il nous semble que les États peuvent exercer la compétence universelle absolue. A cet effet, un État peut déclencher une poursuite pénale à l’encontre de l’étranger suspecté d’avoir commis des crimes de jus cogens, même si ce dernier n’est pas présent et/ou en détention sur le territoire de l’État du for. Il nous semble aussi que, l’immunité des hauts représentants d’État, ainsi que les lois d’amnistie étrangères, ne peuvent pas empêcher l’État du for d’exercer la compétence universelle afin de protéger les intérêts généraux de la communauté internationale dans son ensemble. / Traditional international law based on absolute notion of state sovereignty, is challenged by theemergence of peremptory norms Çus cogens). In this respect, the crystallization of peremptory humanrights norms is the result of the process of humanization of modern international law where theperemptory human rights norms of superior ranks place at the summit. We could believe that theacceptance of peremptory human rights norms creates erga omnes obligations of protection for States,members of the international community. In this context, in the case of violations of peremptoryhuman rights norms, all States are directly affected and injured by the violations in question and have the right to react. To this end, we believe that all States can adopt individual countermeasures against the wrongdoer state, violator of peremptory human rights norms. In the case of violations ofperemptory human rights norms, under certain conditions, States may resort to military interventionfor humanitarian purposes, even without the autholization of the United Nations Security Council.Also, under certain conditions, States can provide humanitarian aid to victims of violations ofperemptory human rights norms occurred outside their territory, even without the consent of theterritorial state. States are also required to suppress jus cogens crimes committed outside their territory. In this context, we believe that States can apply the principle of aut dedere aut judicare and prosecute aliens suspected of jus cogens crimes. In this context, States that apply the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, must respect the obligation of non-refoulement to prevent violations of peremptory human rights norms abroad. It seems to us that States that apply the principle of aut dedere aut judicare must also apply the principle of universal jurisdiction before their internal courts. In this regard, States can exercise universal jurisdiction againsl jus cogens crimes committed abroad, by foreigners and against foreigners. In this context, we believe that States may exercise the absolute universal jurisdiction. To this end, a State may initiate criminal proceedings against alien suspected of jus cogens crimes, even if helshe is not present and/or in custody in the territory ofthe forum State. It also seems to us that the immunity of senior state representatives and foreign amnesty laws, cannot prevent the forum State to exercise universal jurisdiction in order to protect the general interests of the international community as a whole.

Le génocide des Tutsi du Rwanda est singulier au regard des génocides du XXème siècle. Il l’est par le nombre de ses victimes, par sa rapidité, ses modes d’exécution et surtout par le nombre de ses auteurs. Ce sont plus d’un million de Rwandais (Hutu) qui ont pris part directement aux massacres. La sanction de ces crimes de masse dans une société en quête de reconstruction soulevait d’innombrables difficultés notamment dans l’appréhension d’une criminalité collective en termes de responsabilité individuelle. L’ampleur et le paroxysme atteint dans ce drame a nécessité un traitement spécifique. Trois instances de justice ont été activées de manière concomitante : les juridictions classiques rwandaises (relayées par des juridictions coutumières dites Gacaca), le Tribunal international créé par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et enfin les juridictions nationales étrangères en application du principe de la compétence universelle. L’intérêt scientifique de notre démarche réside justement dans l’étude de ce traitement juridictionnel multiniveaux. Deux questions se posent : quelle est la pertinence de ce modèle de justice 20 ans après le drame rwandais ?Quel bilan provisoire peut-on tirer de tous les jugements rendus par ces différentes juridictions ? / The Tutsi genocide in Rwanda is singular in consider genocides of the XXth century. It is true by the number of victims, the speed and methods of implementation and, above all the number of the authors. These are more than one million Rwandan (Hutu) who participated directly in the massacres. Punishment of the massive crimes in a society in search of reconstruction, run into problems of group crime and individual responsibility. The scale and the speak of human tragedy needed specific treatment. Rwandan ordinary courts (replace by customary Courts called Gacaca), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (created by United Nations Security Council) and lastly, national foreign jurisdictions are also begin simultaneously in application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. The interest of our scientific approach lies in the study of multilevel constitutionalism. This raises two obvious questions: What is the relevance of this justice model twenty years after the Rwandan tragedy? What has been the interim review of all the judgments handed down by the different jurisdictions?

Le statut du chef de l'État et des gouvernants, qui n'était déjà plus un obstacle insurmontable aux poursuites judiciaires depuis le droit de Nuremberg, apparaît désormais comme un bastion menacé. Les principes classiques du droit international comme l'immunité des chefs d'État, la sauvegarde de la fonction représentative et la souveraineté de l'État permettaient aux gouvernants d'échapper à toute poursuite pénale. Le droit international, qui s'analysait simplement comme un droit interétatique, a connu de profondes mutations. Ce droit ne se limite plus aux seuls États : de nouveaux sujets comme de nouveaux domaines de compétence émergent. Les individus ont ainsi pris une place de plus en plus importante dans le droit international avec des préoccupations d'humanité afin de prévenir les atrocités qu'a déjà connues le monde à l'occasion de différents conflits armés. La responsabilité du chef de l'État n'est dès lors plus une affaire d'ordre interne, mais bien également d'ordre international, avec l'émergence d'une nouvelle branche du droit international : le droit pénal international. Les nouvelles tendances du droit pénal international, marquées par l'exigence croissante de répression des crimes les plus graves, s'opposent désormais à la conception classique de l'immunité qui a longtemps triomphé dans l'ordre juridique international et visent à atténuer la raison d'État. Ce mouvement part de la conception selon laquelle « on ne saurait plus accepter l'idée même d'immunité lorsqu'il est commis un crime qui ébranle les fondements mêmes de la communauté internationale et révolte la conscience de tous les hommes ». Cette prise de conscience de l'incompatibilité entre immunités et droits de l'homme se manifeste à travers l'évolution de la protection internationale des droits de l'homme favorable à une « immunisation » du régime des immunités des gouvernants, organes de l'État coupables de violations graves du droit international. En dépit de quelques réticences, la responsabilité pénale du chef de l'État est aujourd'hui une réalité qui mérite d'être universellement approuvée et soutenue. / The status of the Head of State and governments, which was already no longer an insurmountable obstacle to prosecution since Nuremberg law, has emerged as a threatened bastion. The traditional principles of international law as the immunity of Heads of State, the protection of the representative function and state sovereignty allowed the rulers to escape criminal prosecution. International law, which is simply analyzed as an interstate law, has undergone profound changes. This right is no longer limited only to States: new topics as new emerging areas of competence (areas of competence or fields of jurisdiction). Individuals have taken an increasingly important role in the international law with the concerns of humanity to prevent atrocities which the world has already known on the occasion of various armed conflicts. The responsibility of the Head of State is therefore no longer a matter of a domestic order, but also an international one, with the emergence of a new branch of international law: international criminal law. New trends in the international criminal law, marked by the increasing demand for dealing with the most serious crimes, henceforth oppose to the classical conception of immunity that has prevailed for a long time in the international legal order, and aim at reducing the State cause. This movement starts from the idea according to which "we can no longer accept the idea of immunity when a crime is committed that undermines the very foundations of the international community and revolts the conscience of all mankind." This awareness of the incompatibility between immunities and human rights is developed through the evolution of the international protection of human rights in favor of "immunization" of the regime of immunities of rulers, State bodies responsible for serious violations of international Law. Despite some misgivings, the criminal responsibility of the Head of State is a reality that should be universally endorsed and supported.

An important change wrought by the post-1994 South African Constitutions is the attempt to have South Africa recognised as a democratic and sovereign state in the "family of nations." The new Constitutions make extensive reference to the state's international obligations and represent an endeavour to [re]define the status of international law vis-a-vis national law. Some provisions utilise international law in the interpretation and formulation of national jurisprudence and represent an [albeit not totally successful] endeavour to attain greater harmonisation between international and national law. This is an attempt to systematize the various criticisms levelled against these provisions to date, and to highlight certain interpretational difficulties and problems that present themselves in the process. The distinction between the various terminologies and branches of international law is also taken to task. Lastly, this paper attempts to determine the extent to which international law is applied at national level under the post-1994 constitutions. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.