After the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed, the debate about counterinsurgency (COIN) has once again been stirred up. Some researchers claim that the old proven theories and methods of successful COIN are still relevant. Other researchers, however, consider that today's opponents have developed and differ compared to the earlier, claiming that yesterday's theories are out dated and inadequate in a modern context. Today's view of successful counterinsurgency is heavily influenced by David Galula, whose theories were developed in the 1950s and 1960s. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether past theories are useful in contemporary insurgency. To investigate the question, the study examines whether the United States followed Galula's strategies in practice during the counterinsurgency in the Al-Anbar province (2003–2008). The study's findings indicate that there are similarities between U.S. action in Al-Anbar and Galula's models for successful COIN. Galula implies that the local population's support needs to be gained in order to achieve success in counterinsurgency. The focus on the population is clearly reflected in the U.S. approach and can be interpreted as the cause of success. In addition to similarities regarding the central parts of the theory, differences can also be found. In the two cases studied, the importance of cooperation with local armed forces and the media's role in the conflict is clearly highlighted, which is not mentioned in Galula's theory. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that other aspects not declared in Galula's theory might have influenced the outcome of the conflict as well. To be able to determine the usefulness of Galula's theory in modern time with greater certainty, further research is proposed to investigate more recent cases, using the results of this study as a starting point.

Guerrilla warfare in the Baltic- How to trade space for time, and use the time to produce will. 1944-1952; a fierce battle against the Soviet occupations of the Baltic states elapsed. The Baltic resistant organization named The Forest Brothers fought against overwhelming Russian security force for almost a decade. This thesis analyzes the guerilla warfare fought by The Forest Brothers in Lithuania. The study uses the central meaning of Mao Tse-Tung theory On Guerrilla Warfare, how to trade Terrain for Time and how to produce Will. This is a case study to enhance the knowledge about the guerrilla warfare in Lithuania 1944-1952 and to test the validity of Mao Tse-tung theory On Guerilla Warfare. In 1991 the former Soviet archives was opened to the public which gives comprehensive material to source from. Despite the range of background material available there are still a lot to learn from the guerilla warfare conducted during the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. A wide range of material on guerilla warfare is used in this study. This study shows on both similarities and differences with Mao´s theories about guerrilla warfare. The study identifies the importance of a guerilla to be a legitimate security provider for the people to be able to gain the support from the people over a long time. It shows on difficulties for a regular force to adapt and understand guerilla warfare.

In recent years, experience from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has led to considerable debate regarding counterinsurgency theories and their application in reality. Therefore, it could appear strange that both International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and American forces applied strategies in Afghanistan that contradict fundamental knowledge of counterinsurgency theory. One example is the use of indiscriminate force when combating insurgents, resulting in the loss of civilian lives, even though civilian casualties risk alienating the local population from the counterinsurgent. This thesis aims to examine if the three objectives of force protection, destruction of the insurgent, and protection of civilians can be achieved at the same time in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, or if a trilemma-like relationship exists between the three, whereby only two of the three objectives can be achieved simultaneously. By examining statistics such as death tolls within the categories of civilians, insurgents and own forces – and comparing the results over two time periods – some conclusions can be drawn with regard to what happens when the strategic focus changes. This thesis focuses on two time periods, 2006-2009 and 2009-2012, and investigates the strategic focus in COIN operations in each period, and whether or not the outcome in terms of death toll can be explained accordingly. The result of the thesis reveals that the statistics point toward the fact that a trilemma like relationship indeed does occur between the three objectives of counterinsurgency. From these results the thesis suggests that this theoretical framework could prove useful in future conflicts by helping to foresee what will happen when working towards the three different objectives.

In modern times, NATO-countries had difficulties defeating insurgency around the globe. Russia on the other hand, succeeded in winning the second Chechen war against insurgents. How could this be? The purpose of this study is to investigate whether Russia’s victory in the second Chechen war can be explained by population-centric theories of counterinsurgency, thus understanding the outcome of the conflict. The result of this study show that Russia followed much of both Galula’s and Trinquier’s theories, but none of the theories could explain the victory. Russia did not share the theories view of the civilians being the key to victory. The conclusion is that if counterinsurgency is carried out without any regards to the civilians, operations can be carried out in a way that makes the situation unsustainable to the insurgents. If artillery and air-bombings are made against the insurgents without caring for the consequences for civilians, victory can be achieved. This could explain why NATO-countries have had difficulties with counterinsurgency due to their population-centric doctrines.

David Galula var en fransk officer som 1964 skrev ner sina teorier om upprorsbekämpning.Dessa teorier har därefter fått ett enormt stort utrymme i både utbildningar och itillämpningar på konflikter världen över. Uppsatsen avhandlar skillnader och likhetermellan Galulas åtta operationella steg och NATO:s nya doktrin för COIN-operationer från2011.Syftet med uppsatsen är att studera de två verken för att utröna hur mycket Galulas teorieranvänds i en modern handbok gällande upprorsbekämpning. Kopplat till användet avGalula i doktrinen vill uppsatsen bedöma hur mycket plats Galulas teorier bör få i denmoderna svenska officersutbildningen.Uppsatsen har nyttjat sig av en kvalitativ textanalys samt en komparativ del där de tvåverken jämförs. NATO:s doktrin för COIN-operationer har analyserats med hjälp avGalulas åtta steg. Resultatet visar att Galulas teorier till viss del går att finna i doktrinen,men det är även mycket som ej går att koppla mellan verken.

Should classical theories about counterinsurgency remain in the past or be considered in relation to future insurgencies? Scholars have discussed the relevance of classical counterinsurgency theories earlier in this century and disagreed about how relevant the classics are. The aim with this bachelor thesis was to study if Robert Thompson's Basic Operational Concept could explain the progress U.S. troops made in the insurgency that took place in Iraq under Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. troops had problems controlling the insurgency but other scholars asserted that progress was made after 2006 when classical theories about counterinsurgency were applied to the emergency. This thesis has a case study design and the author used qualitative text analysis of secondary sources, including interviews and research material from RAND Corporation. The theory used was based on Thompson's Basic Operational Concept. The majority of the concept was found to have been rigorously applied after 2006 and therefore, based on the result from this thesis, should be considered as a possible rationale for the progress U.S. troops made in the emergency.

There is a discrepancy in the contemporary debate on how to implement counterinsurgency successfully. The population-centric method appears to be more advocated. To widen the debate, it is of interest to examine the explanatory power in the opposite method: enemy-centric counterinsurgency. Jacquline Hazelton questions the population-centric methods and believes that the use of brute force is more successful.  The study was conducted as a case study with a theory-testing approach, to examine to what extent her theory could explain the outcomes of the Russian counterinsurgency operations in the two Chechen wars. The results show that her theory has a very limited ability to explain these outcomes, due to its high presence in both cases, which weakens her theory. Based on the results and part of the purpose of this essay, it is arguable that it to some extent also weakens the whole enemy-centric method. To be able to draw further conclusions about this, additional studies are required.

This study aims to highlight the consequences on outposts in Afghanistan in the context of COIN and ISAF during 2003-2012. Previous research in this area is more oriented towards the perspective of COIN at the strategic and operational level and not at the tactical and local level. For example, previous research has written about how important military presence and adaptation are, but not what consequences the company that is deployed to an area and conducts the COIN operation receives. The study was designed with Kilcullen’s theory about COIN and his 28 articles as a basis, and the study was conducted with in-depth interviews as the main empirical material, with officers who served in the Swedish Armed Forces, and the British Army during 2005-2012 in Afghanistan. The study finds that one consequence at one of the outposts was from the terrain, which was that the local infrastructure couldn’t support heavy military vehicles that came to the outpost, which resulted in the roads and irrigation ditches being destroyed by the vehicles' weight. The study also found interesting patterns amongst the informants that had the same consequences, which was that the roads leading towards the outposts were often very few, which led to a predictability for the enemy to use against the units stationed at the outpost. Another interesting find in this study is that there was a difference in how open each outpost was. For example, the British Army’s outposts were more open to civilians than the Swedish outposts, although the British Army had more fighting in their area than their Swedish counterpart.

In the history of warfare there has been numerous attempts of creating definitions and theories to explain the results and the used methods. Peacekeeping and counterinsurgency are, at the moment, two separate areas of research. They come with an associated debate which includes inquiries such as, how and in what ways they are related to each other. The purpose of this study is to further examine how peacekeeping operations and counterinsurgency relates to each other through the lens of a public-centric counterinsurgency theory applied on a unit participating in a peacekeeping operation. David Kilcullens theory about the 28 articles is used to represent the perspective of counterinsurgency and the selected case of a peacekeeping unit is the swedish contribution to NORDBAT 2 and their time in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The results indicates that Kilcullens theory of counterinsurgency partially can explain how the swedish unit in the peacekeeping operation functioned before, during and after the operation. The results further indicates that similarities in the relation between peacekeeping operations and counterinsurgency can be identified. Not only on a strategic and political level, but also on a lower level of operations.

There is a discrepancy in today's view of how to succeed with counterinsurgency. On the one hand, we have legitimacy and on the other hand brutality as a method of achieving success the end state goals. The previous research is dominated by legitimacy, to contribute to the research I will examine brutality. Earlier scholars point out the use of brutal methods is required in order to achieve success, which contradicts with most democratic states’ values.  To contribute to the previous research, I will conduct a case study and investigate whether Gil Merom's theory of brutal counterinsurgency can explain the cases of the Second Chechen War and the Iraq War.  The results show that the theory can explain success and loss in counterinsurgency. Which strengthens the brutal counterinsurgency theory. The results of the study show that the use of brutal methods leads to success and thus proves the methods of brutality.