It is within the realm of the international civil society that religions play out their important public roles as charities and advocacy organizations in globalization. World governance models in the post-Cold War era stress the important role that civil society plays in building and sustaining democracy. Indeed, the participation of the Catholic Church in the "third wave of democratization" confirms this. Yet, twenty-five years after the collapse of international socialism, problems with American-led models of development have come to the fore in glaring ways. Growing wealth inequality and what Gayatri Spivak calls "sustainable underdevelopment" are the norm, and these problems highlight the dangers and instability of liberal economic policies. Religious organizations, and proponents of the Catholic social tradition in particular, have been the strongest voices for advocating social justice and advancing policies that pursue "the common good." Both working to alleviate poverty as charities ([i]NGOs and FBOs) and using their voices as a "public religion" (José Casanova) in civil society, Catholic institutions navigate the historically constructed and contingent boundaries among the three spheres of the state, the market, and civil society. Studying this interplay has provided fruitful theories deconstructing the religious/secular binary. In light of these theories, this thesis applies the critique of liberalism supplied by world-systems analysis to the development of Catholic social thought, in the process highlighting a complex history of complicity and dissent with U.S. liberalism's unfolding hegemony. In circulating Catholic social thought through the economic focused paradigm of world-systems analysis, I explore the possibilities of seeing religion and globalization outside a culturally focused framework. How the social magisterium is responding to the problems of economic globalization in an increasingly unstable world will affect its future legitimacy. I explore where the Church has been and its capacity to be a continuingly proactive force for "social justice" and "the common good."

Dans cette thèse nous avons cherché à prendre la mesure de la rupture épistémologique produite par l’analyse des systèmes-monde dans le champ des sciences sociales à travers l’étude d’un de ses principaux représentants, Immanuel Wallerstein. Dans un premier temps, ses recherches sur les mouvements nationalistes, la décolonisation et les indépendances africaines, se sont inscrites dans le cadre de ce qu’on a appelé la théorie de la modernisation qui corrélait changements sociaux et développement. Un tel modèle reposait sur une philosophie de l’histoire progressiste ordonnant les sociétés pensées comme des entités discrètes sur un axe menant de la tradition à la modernité, de sociétés agraires et rurales pauvres et oppressives pour l’individu à des sociétés urbaines industrielles prospères et individualistes. L’échec du développement des pays africains au cours des années 60 a fait douter Wallerstein de la pertinence de ce modèle. Il a alors cherché à élaborer une théorie alternative de la modernité à l’échelle globale. Au lieu de lire l’histoire mondiale selon le fil d’une modernisation qui serait un processus se réalisant à l’échelle sociétale, il l’a organisée autour de l’échange inégal entre zones exploiteuses et exploitées appartenant à un même système social appelé « système-monde moderne. » L’histoire de la modernité depuis la Renaissance et la conquête de l’Amérique devenait alors celle d’une polarisation continue entre les différentes zones de ce système, sa globalisation à partir de la deuxième moitié du dix-huitième siècle et durant tout le dix-neuvième ne faisant qu’étendre au monde entier l’inégalité entre un centre développé et une périphérie sous-développée. Au-delà de la critique de la théorie de la modernisation et du développementalisme, l’analyse des systèmes-monde a aussi procédé à une remise en cause de l’image progressiste de l’histoire qui s’était imposée depuis la philosophie des Lumières. Le système-monde moderne apparu au tournant du quinzième et du seizième siècle, comme tout système, aura une fin, comme il a eu un début. Nous vivons dans un système social qui en tant que tel est voué à disparaître sans qu’on puisse dire s’il constitue un progrès par rapport aux précédents (jamais aucun système social n’a été aussi inégalitaire), ni s’il donnera naissance à un système qui sera meilleur (en bifurcation chaotique l’avenir est incertain).En élaborant une autre « chronosophie » (Krystof Pomian), une autre « image » (Thomas Kuhn) de l’histoire que celle, progressiste, qui sous-tendait le développementalisme et la théorie de la modernisation, c’est bien une révolution copernicienne et une rupture épistémologique dans les sciences sociales qu’expose l’analyse des systèmes-monde. C’est donc bien un nouveau paradigme qu’elle se propose de constituer, l’œuvre de Wallerstein incarnant le passage des histoires mondiales classiques fondées sur le nationalisme méthodologique et l’idée de progrès, vers les histoires globales actuelles. / This PhD thesis aims to study the epistemological break produced by world-systems analysis in the field of social sciences, through the study of one of its major representatives, Immanuel Wallerstein. Initially, his research on nationalist movements, decolonization and African Independences was part of what has been called modernization’s theory. Such a model, built on a progressist philosophy of history, orders societies - perceived as discrete entities - on a linear axis leading from tradition to modernity, from poor and oppressive agrarian societies to prosperous and individualistic urban, industrial societies. The failure of development in African countries during the 1960s caused Wallerstein to doubt the relevance of this model. He then sought to elaborate an alternative theory of modernity on a global scale. In this theory, modernisation - a process realizable on the societal scale - is not the guiding thread to the reading of world history. Rather, world history is organised through the unequal exchange between exploitative and exploited zones belonging to the same social system he called “modern world-system”. The history of modernity from the Renaissance and the conquest of America onwards became one of continuous polarisation between different zones of the system. Its globalisation from the second half of the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century expanded inequality between a developed centre and an underdeveloped periphery to the entire world. Further to the critique of modernisation and developmentalism, the world-systems analysis has also called into question the progressive image of history which had been imposed since the Enlightenment philosophy. The modern world-system as it emerges at the turn of the fifteenth to the sixteenth century will have a demise as it had a beginning. As a social system, it is bound to disappear. It does not constitute an improvement with regard to the precedent systems (never has any social system been so inegalitarian) and it is unlikely to breed a better system since in a chaotic bifurcation, the future is uncertain.By elaborating a new “image” (Thomas Kuhn) of history, a new chronosophy (Krzysztof Pomian), the world-systems analysis operates a Copernican revolution and an epistemological rupture in the social sciences with regards to the theory of modernisation presented as the compendium of nineteenth century social science. As such, the world-systems analysis emerges as a new paradigm. Wallerstein’s work constitutes the passage from world histories founded on methodological nationalism and the idea of progress to the current non-Eurocentric global histories.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study explores the claim that Great Power Wars are a necessary condition for successful hegemonic ascent in the modern world-system, primarily from the standpoint of World- Systems Analysis. This study advances the conception of hegemony primarily in economic and state terms, and it was investigated, by way of a historical case study, how the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) impacted the economic domains of agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, and its main rival for systemic leadership, Hapsburg Spain. The variables utilised in the study were Great Power War, and the ‘material base’ of the state involved (both independent), the three abovementioned economic domains (intervening), and hegemony or defeat (dependent). The case study was primarily descriptive and explanatory, with the use of process-tracing in its compilation, and a method of within-case structured, focused comparison was utilised with the aim of tentatively producing standardised, generalised knowledge concerning the wider link between Great Power War and hegemony beyond the Dutch case. The findings of the study, although derived from only one historical case of hegemonic ascent in the modern world-system, strongly support the argument that Great Power War is necessary to secure the hegemony of the leading insular core state, which is physically removed from the fighting during the conflict, since the full mobilisation of its economy is effected, while the economies of most other core states are impaired, especially the main continental rival for hegemony. However, the ascending hegemon must also possess the requisite favourable ‘material base’. Further research on this topic is called for, given the potential destructiveness of a future Great Power War, and its role in establishing hegemony in the modern world-system. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie ondersoek die bewering dat Groot Moontheid Oorloë ‘n noodsaaklike vereiste is vir suksesvolle hegemoniese bestyging in die moderne wêreld-sisteem, hoofsaaklik vanaf die standpunt van Wêreld-Sisteem Analise. Hierdie studie bevorder die konsepsie van hegemonie hoofsaaklik in ekonomiese en staat terme, en dit het ondersoek, deur middel van ‘n historiese gevallestudie, hoe die Dertig Jaar Oorlog (1618-1648) ingewerk het op die ekonomiese arenas van agri-industriële produksie, handel, and finansies van die Verenigde Provinsies van Nederland, en hul mededinger vir sistemiese leierskap, Spanje. Die veranderlikes wat in die studie ingespan was, was Groot Moontheid Oorlog, en die ‘materiële basis’ van die state in kwessie (onafhanlik), die drie bogenoemde ekonomiese arenas (albei tussenkomend), en hegemonie of nederlaag (afhanklik). Die gevallestudie was hoofsaaklik beskrywend en verduidelikend, en proses-nasporing (oftewel ‘process-tracing’) is in die samestelling daarvan benut, en ‘n metode van gestruktureerde, gefokusde vergelyking (oftewel ‘structured, focused comparison’) is gebruik binne die gevallestudie met die doel om tentatiewe gestandardiseerde en veralgemeende kennis te genereer wat bydra tot die verduideliking van die wyer skakel tussen Groot Moontheid Oorlog en hegemonie buite die geval van die Verenigde Provinsies. Die bevindinge van die studie, hoewel gegenereer aan die hand van slegs een historiese geval van hegemoniese bestyging in the moderne wêreld-sisteem, het sterk steun verleen aan die argument dat Groot Moontheid Oorloë nodig is om die hegemonie van die vernaamste insulêre kern staat te bewerkstellig, wat fisies verwyderd van die gevegte is tydends die oorlog, aangesien die volle mobilisasie van die ekonomie van hierdie staat bewerkstellig word, terwyl die ekonomieë van die meerderheid van die ander kernstate benadeel word, veral die vernaamste kontinentale mededinger om hegemonie. Die opkomende hegemoon moet egter ook oor die vereiste gunstige ‘materiële basis’ beskik. Verdere navorsing in hierdie veld word benodig, gegewe die waarskynlike vernietiging wat gesaai kan word deur ‘n toekomstige Groot Moontheid Oorlog, en die rol daarvan in die daarstelling van hegemonie in die moderne wêreld-sisteem.

Bis es im 19. Jahrhundert in die globale Peripherie abgedrängt wurde, war China selbst Zentrum eines ostasiatischen Weltsystems. Seither versucht das „Reich der Mitte“ die frühere Zentrumsposition innerhalb des modernen Weltsystems wiederzuerlangen. Hochschulbildung, ein ausländischer Import des späten 19. Jahrhunderts, dient der Modernisierung des Landes und spielt eine wichtige Rolle im Nationswerdungsprozess des Landes. In der jüngsten Vergangenheit fanden Veränderungen enormen Ausmaßes im chinesischen Hochschulsystem statt. Offizielle Forschungs- und Innovationsdaten deuten auf einen raschen Aufschluss Chinas an die Leistungen westlicher Industrienationen hin. Gemäß der Zielvorgaben der Entscheidungsträger in der Bildungspolitik hat die VR China nicht nur einen Aufholkurs, sondern einen Überholkurs eingeschlagen. China ist nicht mehr nur das wichtigste Herkunftsland für international mobile Studierende, sondern es will auch zu einem der wichtigsten Gastländer werden. Neue Stipendienprogramme (incoming wie outgoing) und Programme zur Rückgewinnung chinesischer Talente aus dem Ausland wurden eingerichtet. Zahlreiche internationale Kooperationsprogramme bieten „ausländische Bildung” innerhalb chinesischer Grenzen als Bereicherung des nationalen Bildungsangebots an. Gleichzeitig strebt China zunehmend danach eigene nationale Bildungsangebote am Weltbildungsmarkt zu etablieren. Die vorliegende Arbeit stellt einen Beitrag zur Positionsbestimmung Chinas im globalen Kontext dar. Zu diesem Zweck wurden statistische Daten durch Aussagen aus semi-strukturierten narrativen Interviews mit Akademikern und Entscheidungsträgern der chinesischen Hochschulbildung ergänzt. Die meisten befragten Experten arbeiten an einer von drei strukturell sehr unterschiedlichen chinesischen Hochschule, die dieser Arbeit als Fallbeispiele dienen. Bei den Fallbeispielen handelt es sich um die Tsinghua-Universität, die Qiqihar-Universität und die Xi’an Jiaotong Liverpool University. / China used to be a core country within an East-Asian world-system but was forced into periphery status during the 19th century. Ever since China strives to regain its former core position within the modern world-system. University education, a foreign import of the late 19th century, has become an important tool for China’s endeavor for modernization and nation building. In recent years the Chinese higher education landscape was subject to gigantic changes. Official research and innovation data seem to indicate a rapid affiliation with the achievements of western industrialized nations. Following the agenda of decision-makers in educational policy in the People’s Republic, the suggested course of action would be to overtake, not just to catch up: By 2020 technology imports should sink to under 30 per cent; in the same year China would like to receive a half million international students and thus become not only the most important sending country for international students, but also an important host country. New scholarship programs (incoming and outgoing) as well as programs to recover Chinese talent from abroad, were established. A multitude of international cooperation programs have been created to provide “foreign education“ within Chinese borders to further enrich the Chinese landscape of higher education. At the same time China also urges to establish its own brand of higher education abroad. This dissertation represents a contribution to determine the position of Chinese higher education within its global context. Statistical data is completed by semi-structured narrative interviews with academics and decision makers in Chinese higher education. Most interviewees are working at one of three structurally quite different institutions of higher education in China that serve as case studies in the thesis: Tsinghua University, Qiqihar University and Xi’an Jiaotong Liverpool University.