Les animaux, longtemps considérés comme des êtres appartenant au régime juridique des biens, tendent aujourd’hui à s’éloigner de cette catégorie. Si en France le droit leur refuse le statut de personne non-humaine, la qualification d’être sensible leur est toutefois attribuée et reconnue. Cette singularité juridique – où l’animal est à la fois un être vivant et appartient à la catégorie juridique des biens – a fait l’objet de nombreux travaux, et certains chercheurs sont parvenus à résoudre ces paradoxes. Toutefois, si l’animal a été abondamment abordé sous le prisme du droit privé, peu de travaux spécialisés ou d’ensemble ont été menés en droit public. Pourtant, il semble que l’étude de l’animal en droit public apporte des questionnements et des réponses tout aussi intéressantes. C’est ainsi que la présente thèse, « L’animal en droit public », a suivi deux choix principaux et complémentaires : celui de l’inventaire, puis celui de la théorisation. Enfin, le droit public offre de nouvelles perspectives dans la réalisation d’un véritable droit de l’animal. Cette construction, qui a pour principal résultat d’apporter de nouveaux éléments de déréification, et d’éviter certaines incohérences, permettrait une mise en avant des intérêts animaliers, notamment en les assimilant à un nouvel ordre sociétal à protéger ou en apportant une nouvelle approche dans la personnification des animaux. En outre, l’étude du droit public comparé nous offre des perspectives différentes dans la défense de la cause animale, notamment par le biais de la constitution / Animals, which for a long time were legally classified as property, are nowadays beginning to be recategorised. Even if French law denies them the status of non-human persons, they are nonetheless recognized as being sentient. This legal oddity, in which animals are at one and the same time both living beings and property, has been the subject of numerous studies, and certain researchers have succeeded in resolving these paradoxes. However, if the status of animals has been frequently examined from a legal angle, little specific or overall research has been undertaken in the domain of public law. And yet, it appears that the study of animals in public law raises questions and answers that are equally interesting. That is why the present thesis, « Animals in public law », follows two main, complementary choices: that of being an inventory, and that of theorizing. Charting, first of all, the reality of the situation seems essential in order to facilitate doctrinal or jurisprudential interpretation. Secondly, this study has made possible the theorizing of certain judicial questions. Finally, public law offers new perspectives for the creating of a true system of laws concerning animals. This work, whose main outcome is to contribute new elements to dereification and to avoid certain inconsistences, would foreground animal interests – notably by placing animals in a new societal order to be protected, or by setting forth a new approach to the personification of animals. Moreover, the study of comparative public law offers us different perspectives in the defence of animal rights – notably through the constitution

<p>The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature-considerism (AN) and non-analogy-based nature-considerism (NN). I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former.</p><p>The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show (i) that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and (ii) that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of (i) its unique complexity, and (ii) its indispensability (to all moral agents). I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them.</p><p>Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region.</p>

The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature-considerism (AN) and non-analogy-based nature-considerism (NN). I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former. The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show (i) that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and (ii) that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of (i) its unique complexity, and (ii) its indispensability (to all moral agents). I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them. Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region.

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This diploma thesis deals with the environmental education of young people and it highlights its importance for the transfer towards the sustainable society. It emphasizes the need to get into the core of the problem, which is the emotional alienation of present-day people from the nature and environment. In the theoretical part it proves the existence of many various attitudes towards the world and the possibility of environmental education to bring students to those less self-centred and more considerate. It then presents the basis of environmental education, its development and mainly its trends reflecting today's need to focus on environmental sensitivity and personal responsibility of each individual. It shows that both areas are possible to cultivate in lessons of civics and social sciences, which provide significant space for the integration of environmental education. These subjects stress the need to educate students in the way which would help them to acquire skills of both responsible citizens of the society and considerate inhabitants of this beautiful planet. The practical part therefore suggests concrete ways for integration of environmental education into the subjects of civics and social sciences which would lead students towards sustainable living in the society and in the whole of...

當人們談論動物保護時，可能提出的問題大約不脫「人類是否應該保護動物」、「人類為何保護動物」、「人類應該保護哪些動物」，以及「人類如何保護動物」之延伸範疇，針對這四個問題又可以依所採之研究基礎偏重倫理學或法學，而有各種不同的回應。 本文採取偏重法學角度之立場，從實定法出發，隨時序個別分析我國及德國動物保護法之歷史發展及現行法呈現之樣貌後，藉由與咸認先進的德國動物保護法制及其背後所可能隱含之人與動物關係的歷史變遷進行比較研究，試圖在同與異之間尋找我國動物保護法所隱含的人與動物關係之可能解釋，此乃嘗試從實定法追溯背後的倫理學意涵，並在此解釋基礎上，進一步探求動物保護法益之可能回答，由倫理學再回歸法學領域，均是試圖回應「人類是否應該保護動物」及「人類為何保護動物」二問。 最後嘗試藉由求得之動物保護法益「道德感情」來建構我國動物保護刑事規範，則是試圖給出「人類應該保護哪些動物」及「人類如何保護動物」二問在刑事法層面上之回答，對現行動物保護法刑事規範提出修正建議，包括將動物一般保護規定及刑事規範分勾，擴張動物一般保護之客體範疇而維持刑事規範涉及之行為客體範圍，以重構本文理想之動保刑事規範。 / When referring to animal protection, the most popular questions probably will be within the range of the following four. Should humans protect animals? Why should humans protect animals? What kind of animals should humans protect? And the final one, how do humans protect animals? The answers can be changed depending on the different views, like ethics view or legal point of view. This study basically focuses on the legal point of view, starting with Taiwan’s Animal Protection Act and German’s Animal Welfare Act (in German: Tierschutzgesetz), by comparing those two different animal protection systems, trying to figure out the development level of Taiwan’s Animal Protection Act in the tide of the world’s development of animal welfare, then using the conclusion to explore the legal interest of animal protection, attempting to answer the first two questions: Should humans protect animals? And why? Furthermore, using the legal interest “moral emotion” to construct ideal animal protection criminal legal norms, attempting to answer the rest of the questions: What kind of animals should humans protect? And how to protect? The final purpose is to reconstruct an ideal animal protection criminal law system in Taiwan.