O presente estudo constitui-se na Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação da Universidade de Caxias do Sul, pertencente à linha de pesquisa Educação, Epistemologia e Linguagem, e ancora-se nos pressupostos teóricos e conceituais da Epistemologia Genética. Essa teoria, criada pelo pensador suíço Jean Piaget, com o fim investigativo de entender os processos cognitivos, mais especificamente, no que se direciona a revelar a gênese do conhecimento. O intuito principal do estudo a ser apresentado está na possibilidade de desvelar os vieses apriorísticos da teoria piagetiana por meio de um estudo teórico analítico, realizado, basicamente, a partir em três obras piagetianas, a saber: Nascimento da Inteligência na Criança (1975 [1936]), Biologia e Conhecimento (2003 [1967]) e Epistemologia Genética (2007 [1970]). Como forma de elucidar o pensamento piagetiano, se fazem presentes os preceitos epistemológicos platônicos, mais especificamente a teoria da reminiscência, assim como as ideias racionalistas de Descartes, o empirismo clássico de Locke, a teoria da harmonia preestabelecida de Leibniz, o apriorismo de Kant e o evolucionismo de Lamarck e de Darwin. A partir dos entendimentos revelados pela análise e interpretação das obras piagetianas, pela reflexão acerca de seus comentadores, e pelas proposições epistêmicas contidas nos pensadores da antiguidade a modernidade nomeados acima, entende-se que Piaget foi, veementemente, um epistemólogo, por suas pesquisas teóricas e empíricas - estarem envoltas pelo propósito de esclarecimento de como se desenvolve o conhecimento. Contudo, a constituição epistêmica piagetiana se adentra, mais especificamente, pela Biologia, Filosofia e Psicologia, passando a revelar que o processo cognitivo do sujeito epistêmico ocorre na relação entre ele e o objeto a ser conhecido. Nesse sentido, Piaget elaborou uma teoria que se contrapôs aos pressupostos epistemológicos do empirismo clássico, assim como aos pressupostos racionalistas que sustentam a existência das ideias inatas , por entender que o conhecimento não está unicamente no sujeito ou no objeto cognoscível e, mas sim na relação entre ambos. Piaget não nega o papel fundamental da experiência no processo cognitivo; contudo, sua proposta se diferencia da Epistemologia Empírica por essa afirmar que a experiência é a única fonte do conhecimento. No mesmo sentido, afirma que há um sujeito cognoscente, porém esse não apresenta estruturas cognitivas inatas imutáveis, como afirmam as epistemologias de cunho inatistas, mas dirá que esse é dotado de uma funcionalidade cognitiva a priori. No campo educativo as proposições teóricas suscitadas, neste estudo, se fazem relevantes na medida em que promovem no docente uma problemática epistêmica, de cunho reflexivo, do seu agir pedagógico. O estudo divide-se em três capítulos: o primeiro deles trata dos fundamentos da Epistemologia tradicional, empirista e racionalista, enquanto disciplina filosófica, e da Epistemologia Genética; o segundo, dos processos de conhecer elencados, descritos e explicados por Piaget a partir de suas preocupações de biólogo e filósofo; e o terceiro aborda a posição e os aspectos aprioristas da Epistemologia Genética.

Ecological economics has been repeatedly described as transdisciplinary and open to including everything from positivism to relativism. I argue for a revision and rejection of this position in favour of realism and reasoned critique. Looking into the ontological presuppositions and considering an epistemology appropriate for ecological economics to meaningfully exist requires rejecting the form of methodological pluralism which has been advocated since the start of this journal. This means being clear about the differences in our worldview (or paradigm) from others and being aware of the substantive failures of orthodox economics in addressing reality. This paper argues for a fundamental review of the basis upon which ecological economics has been founded and in so doing seeks improved clarity as to the competing and complementary epistemologies and methodologies. In part this requires establishing serious interdisciplinary research to replace superficial transdisciplinary rhetoric. The argument places the future of ecological economics firmly amongst heterodox economic schools of thought and in ideological opposition to those supporting the existing institutional structures perpetuating a false reality of the world's social, environmental and economic systems and their operation. (author's abstract) / Series: SRE - Discussion Papers

My dissertation argues that the writings of Virginia Woolf and D. H. Lawrence are animated by a shared belief that the way human beings experience and understand their worlds needs to be radically transformed. Their works expose how human experience is canalized by habits reinforced through education and custom, and they explore the ways people might overcome these limitations to expand the receptive possibilities of their experience, illustrating more fruitful ways their readers might engage their worlds. Their novels offer a radical recasting of the human subject and its situation in the environment, one that valorizes a turn away from the fixity of conceptual certainty and an embrace of experiences that trouble clean distinctions between the human being and its world. Reading through the lens of radical empiricism, this project makes the case that Woolf and Lawrence are together engaging in a similar project: they are working from a shared interest in intensive explorations of the seemingly ineffable qualities in concrete human experience and in bringing those accounts into language to suggest the relational constitution of the human being with other people and the environment. They are working experimentally to discern the extent to which the human being can know first-hand its place in the extensive world. In doing so, the authors come to understand such a human being differently, as simultaneously discrete and non-discrete. By examining the methodological and philosophical intersections of these two authors, this project serves as a first step in suggesting a radical empirical British modernism. Woolf’s and Lawrence’s approaches to experience have philosophical implications that become more apparent when read in conjunction with William James’s philosophy of radical empiricism and the related philosophies of Henri Bergson and A. N. Whitehead. While “radical empiricist” is not a common moniker for these philosophers, my project makes the case for the consideration of several of their works as reflective of a line of confluent thought that illuminates the concerns of some modernist literature with developing a new understanding of the human situation through an inclusive attention to lived experience. The project is organized into four chapters. In the first chapter, I establish the radical empirical philosophical situation of Woolf’s and Lawrence’s writing, revealing in their novels how the dispositions of the characters facilitate different worlds, and elaborating the attentive approaches that they valorize through their novels. In the second chapter, I explore their critiques of abstraction, elaborating their concern with fixed abstract forms while countering readings of their work as anti-intellectual or apophatically mystical. In the third chapter, I examine how in and through their novels they engage the difficulty of articulating preconceptual experience, and I explore how they productively use ambiguity towards this end. In the fourth and final chapter, I examine the relational situation of the human individual that their novels disclose and the sort of self-understanding that they champion through their work.

La tentative menée ici consiste à s’adresser au travail de William James (1842-1910) afin d’y chercher des moyens pour répondre à un problème qui nous concerne intensément :celui du décret séparant la connaissance et le changement. James nous rend en effet sensibles à la manière dont les conceptions habituelles avaient constamment maintenu un point de vue qui interdisait en principe qu’une idée puisse faire une différence. Il nous permet également de sentir à quel point ces conceptions ne peuvent qu’être profondément désespérantes. Cinq moments vont se succéder. Dans un premier temps, il s’agira, avec James, de nous connecter à la situation déconnectée, de saisir cette situation dans les dispositifs mêmes qui y creusent un gouffre séparant « la pensée » d’une « réalité » qui lui semble étrangère. Cette « saisie » s’efforce de remédier à l’anesthésie face à des conceptions qui produisent le désespoir et l’indifférence (« Se connecter / Situer »). Dès lors qu’est, au moins partiellement, levée la sidération qu’entraînent les versions rationalistes des connaissances, il devient possible de ré-épaissir ce que James appelle les « trois départements » de l’intelligence, ces modes d’expériences qui nourrissent les pratiques concrètes de connaissance. Pour commencer, c’est « agir » qui n’apparaît plus comme une incongruité quand il est question de connaître. La quête de certitudes indifférentes n’est pas tenable :connaître requiert la culture d’une confiance active et collective capable de rendre vraies des idées non-garanties (« Faire confiance / Agir »). Ensuite, c’est à propos des sensations que l’on s’aperçoit combien rien ne justifie de les vider de toute activité et de toute capacité. Cinq contraintes jamesiennes (épaissir, particulariser, pluraliser, relativiser, machiner) sont convoquées pour explorer les possibilités ouvertes à cet égard par un empirisme radical (« Faire le plein / Sentir »). Mais, les sensations ne se distinguant des conceptions que d’un point de vue pratique, les premières ne retrouvent pas des couleurs sans que les secondes n’en fassent autant. Les conceptions sont libérées de l’obligation qui leur était faite de seulement « copier » une réalité supposément toute faite ;prises concrètement, elles apparaissent comme pouvant désigner ces opérations délicates qui permettent aux mondes de déplier de multiples versions. C’est toute une agitation que de concevoir (« Faire des histoires / Concevoir »). Ces opérations jamesiennes (« se connecter », « faire confiance », « faire le plein », « faire des histoires ») ne visent aucunement la révélation d’une « nature » qui définirait la « pensée », mais, au contraire, elles visent l’activation de possibilités inattendues d’inventer des connaissances significatives, particulières et intéressantes. Il apparaît que ces possibilités – c’est l’hypothèse de James – avaient été tout spécialement limitées par l’omission des expériences concrètes de relation. Cette omission s’était accompagnée de la constitution tout à fait effective d’une pensée « privée » (« privée » à plus d’un titre). Il s’agit alors de relayer encore cette autre opération jamesienne – qui irriguait toutes les autres mais qui exige pour finir une attention spécifique –, celle qui consiste à restaurer les expériences de relation et à intensifier l’importance des « marges » et des « radicelles » (« S’associer / Agirpâtir »). / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The topic of this diploma thesis is the position of scientific realism presented in the framework of naturalized philosophy of science. The aim is to clarify this position and to show that if one denies realism, scientific practice does not make sense. For this purpose main focus is first devoted to the key parts (metaphysical realism, semantic realism, and epistemological realism) which constitute the scientific realism. Next, a detailed analysis of the arguments against and in favor of realism is offered, and concrete examples taken from the sciences are used to illustrate key points. Space is also devoted to the analysis of a physical theory of heat of the 18th and 19th centuries in connection with an antirealist argument directed at the history of science. Also, one of the few fully elaborated antirealist positions, constructive empiricism, is presented and critically evaluated. In a similar fashion, this thesis pays attention to a specific form of realism, called entity realism. Though the resulting image is a thoroughly realist position, this position strives to accurately capture the numerous nuances of the scientific practice, offering a fresh perspective on some of the traditional views.

This diploma thesis is focused on David Hume's analysis of causality. The two major philosophical works about this topic are A Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiries concerning Human Understanding. The first chapter is about intellectual background which Hume came from when he is dealing with cause-effect problem. At that time there were two main epistemological theories: rationalism and empirism. Both will be discuss there. The next chapter is about Hume's way of thinking about human understanding. This chapter is important for us beacuse there are many terms which will be useful for understanding causality. Crucial role plays The Theory of Ideas, according to each content of a mind has a source in experience. The first perceptions are called impresions and their copies are called ideas. Ideas are processed by memory and imagination. There are two categories of contents of human understanding: relations of ideas and matters of facts. We will focus on matters of facts because they are based on causality. Hume as a empirist is searching for a source of idea of causality in our experience. He finds out that we cant find it in objects of our minds themselves, but is based on relations among them. These relations are: contiguity, constant conjunction, priority of time in the cause before the effect and...

I och med covid-19-pandemin som startade 2020 har fler kontakter mellan människor flyttats online för att minska smittspridningen, så även det sociala arbetet. Syftet med denna studie var att ta reda på hur personal som arbetar med behandlingsprogram inom Frivården har upplevt att det har varit att genomföra behandlingsprogram via videosamtal. Frivården började med detta arbetssätt i samband med covid-19-restriktionerna 2020 och då fenomenet är nytt i Sverige finns inte mycket tidigare nationell forskning kring detta. Studien bygger på kvalitativa intervjuer med behandlingspersonal på fyra frivårdskontor i Sverige och vill skapa en bild av deras upplevelse. Av intervjuerna framgick att personalen upplever problem med det tekniska genomförandet och i samarbetet med klienterna. Man anser dock att det fungerat bättre än förväntat. Problemen kring genomförandet förklarats i detta examensarbete med hjälp av mottaglighetsprincipen och tankar kring kollaborativ empirism. Det har framgått att genomförandet till stor del påverkas av klienternas mottaglighet och att denna i sin tur påverkar möjligheten till kollaborativ empirism i arbetet med behandling. / With the start of the covid-19 pandemic 2020, more contacts between people have been moved online to reduce the spread of infection, as has social work. The purpose of this study was to find out how staff who work with treatment programs within the Swedish probation service have experienced that it has been to implement treatment programs via video calls. The probation service began with this approach in connection with the covid-19 restrictions in 2020 and since the phenomenon is new in Sweden, there is not much previous national research on this. The study is based on qualitative interviews with treatment staff at four probation offices in Sweden and wants to create a picture of their experience. The interviews showed that the staff experience problems with the technical implementation and in the collaboration with the clients. However, it is believed that it worked better than expected. The problems with implementation have been explained in this thesis with the help of the principle of responsivity and thoughts about collaborative empiricism. It has been shown that the implementation is largely affected by the clients' responsivity and that this in turn affects the possibility of collaborative empiricism in the work with treatment.

This dissertation examines the philosophical and spiritual beliefs that underpin William Blake’s account of the imagination, his objections to empiricism and his understanding of poetic language. It begins by considering these beliefs in relation to the idealist principles of George Berkeley as a means of illustrating Blake’s own objections to the empiricism of John Locke. The philosophies of Locke and Berkeley were popular in Blake’s society and their philosophical positions were well known to him. Blake and Berkeley are aligned against Locke’s belief in an objective world composed of matter, and his theory of abstract ideas. Both reject Locke’s principles by affirming the primacy of the perceiving subject. However, Blake disagrees with Berkeley’s theologically traditional understanding of God. He views perception as an act of artistic creation and believes that spiritual divinity is contained within and is intrinsic to man’s human form. This account of human perception as the creative act of an immanent divinity is further elucidated through a comparison with the twentieth-century existential phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In the Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty examines human experience as the functioning of an embodied consciousness in a shared life-world. While Merleau-Ponty does not make any reference to a spiritual deity, his understanding of experience offers a link between Berkeley’s criticisms of Locke and Blake’s own objections to empiricism. Through a comparative examination of Blake and Merleau-Ponty, the imagination is revealed to be the creative or formative consciousness that proceeds from the integrated mind-body complex of the “Divine Body” or “human form divine”. This embodied existence locates the perceiving self in a dynamic physical landscape that is shared with other embodied consciousnesses. It is this communal or intersubjective interaction between self and other that constitutes the experienced world. Merleau-Ponty’s account of the chiasm and his notion of flesh, discussed in The Visible and the Invisible, are applied to Blake in order to elucidate his belief in poetic vision and the constitutive power of language. The form and function of language are compared with that of the body, because both bring the individual experience of a perceiving subject into being in the world and facilitate the reciprocal exchange between the self and other. Ultimately, this dissertation argues that Blake characterises the body and language as the living media of the imagination, which facilitate a creative exchange between a perceiving self and a shared life-world.

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