本研究主要針對影響高階經理人酬勞與盈餘品質關聯性之因素進行探討。當會計績效指標在薪酬契約中的角色因為過度的操弄而受到爭議時，公司管理當局是否會為了緩和經理人的短視行為，而加入盈餘品質的考慮因素，調整會計績效指標於薪酬契約中的重要性。另外本研究從公司治理之角度，以股權結構(機構投資人持股、外部大股東持股、董監事持股持押比例、經理人是否同時為董事會成員、董事長是否兼任總經理與股份盈餘偏離倍數)相關變數，探討其對於高階經理人酬勞與盈餘品質間關聯性之影響。 實證結果顯示，外部大股東持股比例越多，對於高階經理人酬勞與盈餘品質間的關聯性越重視；而經理人同時擔任董事會成員、董事長兼任總經理與股份盈餘偏離倍數越大的公司，會降低高階經理人酬勞與盈餘品質間的關聯性。

本研究主要探討，企業社會責任這個議題，是否能跳脫傳統從企業道德﹝business ethics﹞的角度，以更實用性的思考，結合企業所最為關心的經濟利益考量，成功地說服企業用更主動積極的方式從事與企業社會責任相關的決策與投資活動。為了達成該研究目的，本研究採用由道瓊永續性北美指數2005-2007連續三年評選入榜的企業為研究標的，觀測其財務績效相關指標是否明顯優於其餘未入榜的企業。而在現今許多所有權與經營權分離的企業當中，如何成功地降低待理問題，使高階經理人能將組織長遠永續發展的目標結合自身利益，為股東與其他利害關係人帶來最大的利益是本研究第二個探討的議題。藉由分析S&P execucomp資料庫2005-2007年的資料，本研究從高階經理人的年度薪酬資料，去了解企業社會責任執行佳的企業是否在薪酬結構的設計上有不同的設計。資料分析結果顯示，連續三年評選進入道瓊永續性北美指數的企業，其公司成長性顯著優於未入榜的企業；而主要與企業短期績效表現連動的薪酬制度──紅利，其所佔比例越高，將誘使高階經理人挪用於其他能創造短期財務績效的投資活動，長遠來看，將不利於公司企業社會責任活動的執行與發展。 / The goal of this study is to examine whether business performance is affected by the adoption of practice included under the term of “Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).”To achieve this goal, the relation between CSR and some accounting or market indicators are analyzed and the existence of significant difference in performance indicators between North American firms that have adopt CSR and others that have not is also examined. Besides, this study takes a further step to explore the extent to which Boards use executive compensation to incite firms to act in accordance with social and environmental objectives. The Dow Jones Sustainability Index- North America is used for distinguishing firms that constantly comply with CSR practice for 3 years (2005-2007) from the rest. Empirical analysis supports the conclusion that differences in performance exist between firms that belong to the DJSI-North America (doing CSR good) and the rest (not doing CSR good). Moreover, the bonus of executive compensation has significant negative relationship with CSR. This finding implies that the compensation linking to short-term performance provides no incentives to executives for doing CSR which has long-term benefit for firms. This in turn suggests that executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning executives’ welfare with that of the “common good”, which results in more socially responsible firms.

Ce travail de recherche explore le thème des négociations dans les opérations de fusion et acquisition et leurs résultats en termes d’aboutissement de l’opération. Le premier chapitre de la présente thèse porte sur la volonté de vendre des actionnaires de l’entreprise cible et cherche à mesurer l’influence de cette caractéristique sur le dénouement des négociations au travers des trois éléments suivants : la probabilité de succès de l’offre, le montant de la prime et l’effet net sur le niveau de richesse des actionnaires de la société cible, en tenant compte de l’intensité concurrentielle entre les acquéreurs potentiels. Le second chapitre de la présente thèse explore la relation entre la durée du processus denégociation et la probabilité de succès de l’offre, mettant l’accent sur l’importance de la phase privée des négociations qui se déroule avant l’annonce publique de l’opération. Enfin, le troisième chapitre cherche à déterminer le lien entre la structure de rémunération des dirigeants et l’attention qu’ilsprêtent aux réactions des marchés financiers en modifiant ou non leurs décisions d’investissement en matière de fusions-acquisitions. Notre travail de recherche contribue à améliorer la compréhension des résultats observables dans les opérations de fusion et acquisition en apportant des facteurs nouveaux qui influencent la probabilité de succès d’une offre, notamment, la volonté de se vendre de l’entreprise cible et le temps passé dans l’interaction directe avec les acquéreurs potentiels. Ce travail souligne également l'importance des motivations des agents économiques dans le processus d'allocation des ressources et permet de vérifier la pertinence du lien qui existe entre les mécanismes d’incitation financière et la qualité des décisions managériales / This research work explores the theme of negotiations in mergers and acquisitions and their outcome in terms of deal completion. The first chapter focuses on the target company’s willingness to sell and seeks to measure its influence on the outcome of negotiations through the following three elements:the probability of bid success, the amount of premium paid and the resulting net wealth effect for thetarget shareholders, taking into account the intensity of competition between potential acquirers. The second chapter explores the relationship between the duration of the negotiation process and the likelihood of deal completion, putting emphasis on the private part of the negotiation process that takes place before the public announcement of the deal. Finally, in the third chapter we aim todetermine the relationship that may exist between the executive compensation structure and the amount of attention they pay to the financial markets by changing or not their present investment decisions with regard to mergers and acquisitions. This research contributes to improving our understanding of the outcome of mergers and acquisitions, bringing new factors that influence theprobability of bid success, namely, the willingness of the target’s shareholders to sell and the time spent in the direct interaction with potential buyers. This work also highlights the importance of acknowledging economic agents’ motivations (both for the acquirer and the target) as determinants of observable outcomes in the resource allocation process and allows checking the relevance of financialincentive mechanisms for the quality of managerial decisions

Diese Dissertation stellt empirische Evidenz zu den Fragen der Verguetung von Fuehrungskraeften. Analyse der Daten der US-Firmen auflistet, finde ich eine umgekehrte U-foermige Beziehung zwischen Management Ownership und Unternehmensperformance, aber diese Beziehung verschwindet, wenn Unternehmensperformance von den letzten Jahr kontrolliert wird. Ich finde auch, dass die Executive Option Awards positiv auf Unternehmensperformance bezogen, während Executive Stock Awards hat keinen statistischen signifikanten Einfluss auf den Unternehmensperformance. Statistische Evidenz zeigt auch, dass die Struktur der Verguetung von Fuehrungskraeften Vertraege zu Unternehmen Eigenschaften und Executive persoenlichen Merkmalen zusammenhaengt. / This dissertation provides empirical evidence on the issues of executive compensation. Analyzing data of U.S. listing firms, I find an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm performance, but this relation vanishes when firm performance from last period is controlled. I also find that executive option awards is positively related to firm performance, while executive stock awards has no statistically significant impact on firm performance. Evidence also indicates that the structure of executive compensation contracts is related with observable and unobservable firm attributes and executive personal characteristics.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T19:11:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 22 / Nenhuma / Na esteira da recente desproporção da remuneração executiva e dos escândalos corporativos, alguns críticos têm reclamado que essa é excessiva. Outros têm reclamado que a remuneração não é propriamente atrelada ao desempenho. Adicionalmente, a tênue conexão entre a remuneração e o desempenho, tem levantado considerações a respeito dos propósitos dos executivos e a ineficácia dos mecanismos de governança corporativa, especialmente nos Estados Unidos e no Reino Unido. Consequentemente, a determinação da remuneração dos gestores tem emergido como uma questão de considerável importância na literatura de governança corporativa e numerosos estudos têm buscado identificar os mais importantes fatores que impactam na remuneração executiva. O objetivo dessa pesquisa é estudar os determinantes da remuneração executiva na América Latina com base em indicadores contábeis, indicadores do mercado de ações e características de governança corporativa (incluindo características do conselho e do principal executivo, e estrutura / In the wake of the recent runaway executive compensation and corporate scandals, some critics have claimed that the compensation of executives is excessive. Others have claimed that the compensation is not properly tied to performance. Furthermore, the tenuous link between incentive ompensation and performance has raised concerns regarding executive entrenchment and ineffectiveness of corporate governance mechanism, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. Consequently, the determination of management compensation has emerged as an issue of considerable academic importance in the corporate governance literature, and numerous studies have tried to identify the most important factor impacting executive compensation. The aim of this research is to study the determinants of executive compensation in Latin America from financial accounting measures, stock market measures, and corporate governance characteristics (including both board and CEO characteristics, and owner

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T19:14:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A remuneração executiva por meio de Opções de Ações tem sido considerada um mecanismo capaz de alinhar os interesses dos gestores aos objetivos de longo prazo dos acionistas. Entretanto, estudos têm investigado possíveis problemas associados ao seu uso, corroborando a idéia de que a remuneração executiva não é apenas um mecanismo de incentivo, mas também parte do problema de agência em si. As fraudes contábeis ocorridas no mercado norte-americano geraram ainda maior cautela quanto à sua utilização e, internacionalmente, refletiram-se no aumento do número de requisitos para a divulgação desses planos. Entre os anos de 2006 e 2007 cresceu significativamente o número de empresas listadas no Brasil que passaram a utilizar planos de Opções de Ações para remunerar seus executivos, mas a regulamentação da divulgação de informações ou evidenciação (disclosure) desses planos não acompanhou tal crescimento. Até o final do ano de 2007, apenas o Ofício-Circular nº 01/2007 da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) identifi / Executive compensation through Stock Options has been considered a mechanism capable of aligning the interests of managers and the long-term objectives of shareholders. Nevertheless, studies into possible problems associated with the use of stock options in executive compensation have corroborated the idea that executive compensation is not merely an incentive mechanism, but also part of the agency problem in itself. The accounting frauds that have occurred in the North-American market have produced even greater caution in relation to its use and, internationally, this is reflected an increase in the number of demands for disclosure of such plans. Between the years 2006 and 2007 the number of listed companies in Brazil that used Stock Options plans to compensate their executives grew significantly, but the regulations regarding the disclosure of such plans failed to accompany that growth. Until the end of 2007, only Notification nr. 01/2007 from the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission (Comissão de Val

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2017-06-06T13:58:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Bianca Karoline Ahlert_.pdf: 756645 bytes, checksum: 3c23d1117f2f72a32c6c1374d89e3b9e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-06T13:58:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bianca Karoline Ahlert_.pdf: 756645 bytes, checksum: 3c23d1117f2f72a32c6c1374d89e3b9e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-09 / UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos / Esta dissertação abarca como objetivo geral analisar se a forma de remuneração dos executivos impacta o desempenho das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto. A literatura sugere que a remuneração dos executivos por incentivos visa reduzir o problema de agência e alinhar seus interesses aos dos investidores. Utilizando a base de dados do IBrA, este trabalho procura testar a hipótese de que a remuneração dos executivos impacta positivamente o desempenho das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto. A análise de 150 empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, listadas no IBrA, do período entre 2010 e 2015, indica impacto significante entre remuneração dos executivos e desempenho, com presença de maior significância entre a relação de remuneração dos executivos e o desempenho calculado pelo Q de Tobin, e menor significância através do desempenho calculado pelo retorno do patrimônio liquido. Ao analisar a amostra de dados dividida em critério de controle acionário ou origem de capital de empresas familiares, estatais e demais privadas, de controle acionário não familiar, as organizações familiares evidenciaram significância próxima às empresas privadas, e as empresas estatais não revelaram significância nas variáveis de remuneração total e índice da remuneração variável. A análise por setor também denotou maior significância em relação ao Q de Tobin do que em relação ao retorno do patrimônio líquido. / This dissertation covers as general objective to analyze if the form of executive compensation impacts the performance of Brazilian publicly traded companies. The literature suggests that the executive compensation by incentives aims to reduce the agency problem and align its interests with those of investors. Using the IBrA database, this paper seeks to test the hypothesis that executive compensation has a positive impact on the performance of Brazilian publicly traded companies. The analysis of 150 Brazilian publicly traded companies, listed in the IBrA, between 2010 and 2015, indicates a significant impact between executive compensation and performance, with a greater significance between the executive remuneration and the performance calculated by the Q of Tobin, and lower significance through the performance calculated by the return of shareholders' equity. By analyzing the sample of data divided into criteria of stock control or capital origin of family, state and other private companies, with non-family stock control, the family organizations showed close significance to the private companies, and the state companies did not reveal significance in the total remuneration variables and variable remuneration index. The analysis by sector also showed greater significance in relation to the Q of Tobin than in relation to the return of stockholders' equity

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2015-06-22T13:23:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 LuizHenriqueFigueiraMarquezan.pdf: 938223 bytes, checksum: a0f654a722bdbab2d35f3dd82200a349 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-06-22T13:23:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 LuizHenriqueFigueiraMarquezan.pdf: 938223 bytes, checksum: a0f654a722bdbab2d35f3dd82200a349 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Nenhuma / A separação entre propriedade e controle nas empresas origina a chamada relação de agenciamento, na qual os sócios (principal) delegam a autonomia das decisões a executivos contratados (agente). A Teoria de Agência, que estuda este fenômeno, tem como um de seus pressupostos o autointeresse das pessoas. Diante disso, um dos objetivos do controle de gestão é assegurar ou diminuir as eventuais divergências entre os interesses dos proprietários e dos executivos. Essa Teoria indica a concessão de incentivos, como a remuneração variável, com essa finalidade. Nesse contexto, este estudo propôs-se a estudar este fenômeno, sobre como funciona um sistema de remuneração variável para executivos utilizado como forma de controle de gestão. Para isso realizou-se uma pesquisa aplicada sobre a realidade de uma empresa, que atua no ramo de bebidas, e possui planos de remuneração variável por desempenho. Os procedimentos de coleta das evidências foram: observação direta; análise documental; e entrevistas semiestruturadas com dez executivos contemplados nestes planos. O tratamento dessas ocorreu por meio da combinação entre as técnicas de análise de conteúdo e de discurso. Dentre outros resultados, as evidências indicam que a empresa premia o desempenho com remuneração variável, por participações nos lucros e gratificações em dinheiro. Essas formas de recompensa, os momentos de pagamento ao final de cada ano, o uso de indicadores de desempenho financeiros, e o padrão de desempenho anual, combinados, podem gerar um problema de agência por direcionar o foco dos executivos ao curto prazo. Compensando isso, verificou-se o uso de uma forma de avaliar o processo do desenvolvimento profissional do executivo de forma qualitativa, com efeitos de curto e longo prazos. A composição de três planos de remuneração por desempenho propicia alinhamento de interesses: (a) entre executivos e os demais funcionários; (b) entre os executivos, por serem remunerados por metas que não apresentem divergências matemáticas e pelo uso de metas coletivas e organizacionais; (c) entre sócios e executivos tendo esses a maior possibilidade de remuneração variável vinculada ao alcance da meta principal para empresa, o indicador EBITDA. Quanto aos interesses, os executivos que são sócios demonstram tranquilidade quanto ao risco deste tipo de remuneração, apresentando preocupação maior com a continuidade da empresa a longo prazo. Constatou-se também que o desejo de possuir metas como desafios e o desenvolvimento profissional foram apontados como motivos dos executivos preferirem a remuneração variável. Além dos planos de remuneração, a presença de dois sócios entre os executivos indica redução da assimetria informacional e maior facilidade no processo de alinhamento dos interesses de ambos. / The separation of ownership and control in companies originating the call agency relationship, in which shareholders (principal) delegate decisions to empower executives hired (agent). The Agency Theory, which studies this phenomenon has as one of their self-interest of those assumptions. Thus, one of the goals of management control is to ensure or reduce any differences between the interests of owners and executives. Theory indicates that the granting of incentives such as variable pay, for this purpose. In this context, this study aimed to study this phenomenon, about how a variable compensation system for executives used as a form of management control. To this end we carried out a survey applied to the reality of a company, which operates in the beverage industry, and has variable remuneration plans for performance. The procedures for collection of evidence were: direct observation, document analysis and semistructured interviews with ten executives included in these plans. The treatment of these occurred through the combination of the techniques of content analysis and discourse. Among other results, the evidence indicates that the company rewards performance with variable pay for bonuses and cash bonuses. These forms of reward, the times of payment at the end of each year, the use of financial performance indicators, and the pattern of annual performance, combined, can create an agency problem by directing the focus of executives to the short term. Offsetting this, there was the use of a way to evaluate the process of professional development executive in a qualitative manner, with effects of short and long term. The composition of three plans pay for performance provides alignment of interests: (a) between executives and other employees, (b) between the executive, to be paid by targets that do not show differences by using mathematical and collective goals and organizational; (c) between these members and executives with the greatest possibility of variable compensation tied to the achievement of the ultimate goal for the company, the EBITDA. As for interests, executives who are members demonstrate tranquility about the risk of this type of compensation, showing more concern about the continuity of the company's long-term. It was also the desire to own goals and challenges and professional development were identified as reasons for preferring executive incentive compensation. In addition to the compensation plans, the presence of two members among executives indicates a reduction of information asymmetry and greater ease in aligning the interests of both.

Submitted by William Justo Figueiro (williamjf) on 2015-08-20T17:50:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 17e.pdf: 4833899 bytes, checksum: bf223781f226b67de43eb30160a4b491 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-08-20T17:50:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 17e.pdf: 4833899 bytes, checksum: bf223781f226b67de43eb30160a4b491 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Nenhuma / A aplicação de incentivos monetários e não monetários a executivos, com objetivo de obter uma performance empresarial, de curto ou longo prazo, constitui um dos mecanismos de governança corporativa para alinhamento entre os interesses do acionista majoritário e proprietário (principal) e executivos (agentes). Como ajustador deste alinhamento o papel do Conselho de Administração, bem como dos comitês de apoio como de riscos e de remuneração, são fundamentais. Dependendo do ajuste do sistema, poderá haver uma exposição ao risco estratégico em maior ou menor grau. No Brasil, conforme percepção de conselheiros de administração, este mecanismo não é regulado com objetivo de regular a exposição ao risco estratégico e as políticas de incentivo são alinhadas, em geral, no curto prazo, conforme a performance desejada, levando a custos de controle e monitoramento. Além disto, algumas peculiaridades brasileiras leva a necessidade de modelos de incentivo adequados ao Brasil, sendo, os componentes de incentivo usuais na Europa e Estados Unidos, em alguns casos, conflitantes com a legislação trabalhista e fiscal brasileira. / The application of monetary and non monetary incentives to executives in order to obtain a performance business, short or long term, are corporate governance mechanisms for aligning the interests of shareholders, and majority owner (principal) and managers (agents). As this alignment adjusting the role of Board of Directors and committees of support as risk and return are key. Depending on the setting of the system, there may be a strategic risk exposure to greater or lesser degree. In Brazil, as perceptions of board members, this mechanism is not regulated for the purpose of regular exposure to strategic risk and incentive policies are aligned generally in the short term, as the desired performance, leading to control costs and monitoring. Moreover, some peculiarities Brazilian models leads to the need for adequate incentive to Brazil, being the components of incentive usual in Europe and the United States, in some cases, conflicting with the Brazilian labor legislation and tax.

本研究探討經理人的風險承擔誘因與公司非以交易為目的之衍生性金融商品使用之關聯性。研究結果發現，第一，經理人之風險承擔誘因與非以交易為目的之衍生性金融商品的使用呈顯著負向關係，此結果顯示以股權為基礎之薪酬結構的確可以提高經理人之風險承擔誘因。第二，本研究比較若採不同類型之員工認股權，則指數型員工認股權較傳統型員工認股權提供較大的經理人風險承擔誘因。第三，若將股權為基礎之薪酬分為股票及員工認股權，發現經理人持有員工認股權與經理人風險承擔誘因呈正向且顯著關係；而經理人持有公司股票則與經理人風險承擔誘因呈正向關係但並不顯著。 / This study examines the relation between managerial risk-taking incentives and hedging derivatives usage. First, executives’ risk-taking incentives are negatively related to the hedging derivatives holdings, the result is consistent with equity-based compensation that promotes risk taking. Second, the indexed stock options appear to create stronger risk-taking incentives than the traditional stock options. Third, managerial risk-taking incentives are significantly related to executive stock options but not stock holdings.