Submitted by Conrado Rocha Veloso Freire (conradofreire@hotmail.com) on 2015-02-03T14:53:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_MEX_v11.pdf: 1315514 bytes, checksum: 6423dc03fda9fcea9dea7c0aced96c63 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2015-02-04T19:14:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_MEX_v11.pdf: 1315514 bytes, checksum: 6423dc03fda9fcea9dea7c0aced96c63 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2015-02-11T19:20:05Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_MEX_v11.pdf: 1315514 bytes, checksum: 6423dc03fda9fcea9dea7c0aced96c63 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-11T19:20:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_MEX_v11.pdf: 1315514 bytes, checksum: 6423dc03fda9fcea9dea7c0aced96c63 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-12-10 / Given the significant increase in the granting of stock options by companies as means of compensation which sometimes leads to overindulgence such as executives having earned millionaire bonuses before their companies generated cash or even at firms which went bankrupt, this research sought to discover what were the main determinants of the exercise period of the stock options. Through a cross section regression, we analyzed the characteristics of 109 companies listed in the Bovespa’s best levels of governance and / or components of Brazil’s biggest stock indexes in order to find out which of them influenced the aforementioned period. The results were not statistically relevant, which means that for the purposes of this study the exercise periods set by the companies are not related to those variables. Therefore, further research should address the exercise period definition together with compensation consultants and board members. / Diante do aumento expressivo da outorga de opções de ações por parte das companhias como forma de remuneração e dos consequentes excessos, como por exemplo, executivos tendo exercido bônus milionários antes que suas companhias gerassem caixa ou mesmo em empresas que foram à falência, esta pesquisa buscou encontrar quais eram os principais determinantes do prazo de exercício das opções de compra. Por meio de uma regressão cross section, foram analisadas as características de 109 empresas listadas nos melhores níveis de governança e/ou nos maiores índices de ações do Brasil a fim de verificar quais delas influenciavam o prazo supramencionado. Os resultados encontrados não se mostraram estatisticamente relevantes, o que quer dizer que para efeito deste estudo os prazos definidos pelas empresas não guardam relação com àquelas variáveis e, portanto, com suas características intrínsecas. Logo, novas pesquisas devem abordar a definição de prazo junto aos consultores de remuneração e membros de Conselho de Administração.

Submitted by Tales Lima Freire (taleslfreire@hotmail.com) on 2016-03-04T17:25:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Tales Freire V3.docx: 124164 bytes, checksum: f4f7691e9f148153171837b07169785b (MD5) / Rejected by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br), reason: Tales, boa tarde Devido às normas da ABNT, deverá realizar as seguintes alterações para que possamos aceitar seu trabalho junto à biblioteca: O arquivo deve estar em pdf. Retirar a acentuação de Getúlio. Em seguida, realizar uma nova submissão. Att on 2016-03-04T17:45:57Z (GMT) / Submitted by Tales Lima Freire (taleslfreire@hotmail.com) on 2016-03-04T18:31:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Tales Freire.pdf: 247166 bytes, checksum: c5289dffba6f4285958522e79171dd33 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2016-03-04T18:39:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Tales Freire.pdf: 247166 bytes, checksum: c5289dffba6f4285958522e79171dd33 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-04T19:03:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Tales Freire.pdf: 247166 bytes, checksum: c5289dffba6f4285958522e79171dd33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-15 / This paper seeks to better understand the relation between the financial and stock performance of companies and executive compensation, in order to analyze whether there is good alignment of interests between shareholders and executives. Multiple linear regressions under the ordinary least square and TOBIT methods were run for a sample of 128 companies listed in the Brazilian stock market, using data for the year of 2014. The variables of financial performance had a positive correlation with the total executive compensation and fixed compensation, but they were not statistically significant to explain the variable compensation and the compensation related to stock options, aftermath inconsistent with the bibliography and the objective of the executive compensation structure. In addition, it was observed that the size of the company has a positive influence over executive compensation, while shareholder structure, public controlling stake and debt level have a negative effect over executive compensation, with debt level having a negative effect mostly on the executive compensation through stock options. / Este artigo busca compreender melhor a relação entre o desempenho financeiro e de mercado das empresas e a remuneração dos executivos, de modo a verificar se os interesses dos executivos estão alinhados com os dos acionistas. Foram realizadas regressões lineares múltiplas pelo método dos mínimos quadrados ordinários e pelo método TOBIT para uma amostra de 128 empresas listadas na bolsa de valores brasileira, com base nos dados do ano de 2014. As variáveis de desempenho financeiro tiveram correlação positiva com a remuneração executiva total e remuneração fixa, mas elas não foram estatisticamente significantes para explicar a remuneração variável e por meio de stock options, resultado inconsistente com a literatura e o objetivo da própria estrutura de remuneração. Além disso, foi observado que o tamanho da empresa tem influência positiva sobre a remuneração executiva, enquanto que a concentração acionária, controle acionário público e endividamento têm efeito negativo sobre a remuneração executiva.

Submitted by Andre Espozel (andre.espozel@gmail.com) on 2017-04-19T17:47:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Andre Espozel - FGV-EPGE.pdf: 856389 bytes, checksum: 16cd3a3bbe1de2cc9ab98b718b21acb8 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2017-05-04T12:58:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Andre Espozel - FGV-EPGE.pdf: 856389 bytes, checksum: 16cd3a3bbe1de2cc9ab98b718b21acb8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-12T13:05:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Andre Espozel - FGV-EPGE.pdf: 856389 bytes, checksum: 16cd3a3bbe1de2cc9ab98b718b21acb8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-22 / This papers tests theoretical predictions concerning to agent compensation, debt structure and investment in the models of dynamic agency in DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and DeMarzo, Fishman, He and Wang (2012). The results related to agent compensation are consistent with the patterns predicted in the models, indicating that the firm-years that the models would have as more likely to pay dividends are indeed the ones more likely to pay; also, among firms that pay dividends, more profits generate higher dividend payments and higher executive compensation, as predicted in the models. The prediction that firms that go well and reach a payment threshold present marginal q equal to average q, and thus after controlling for average q cash flows would not explain investment is also supported by the tests in here. On the other hand, predictions related to the role of the credit line and to the debt structure are not compatible with the results in here. The credit line doesn’t seem to be the provider of financial slack that protects the firm from low cash flows and also doesn’t seem to have the dynamics of being paid when profits are high and being more used when profits are low.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T21:00:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 4 Ricardo de Campos.pdf.jpg: 11790 bytes, checksum: f62f62917fd52cbf6c378bb5e5cea4e3 (MD5) Ricardo de Campos.pdf.txt: 83013 bytes, checksum: eca072f6011ce6da4c88017bc8e476fc (MD5) Ricardo de Campos.pdf: 750546 bytes, checksum: 0875a330170e7373e68de5b4e5e9a553 (MD5) license.txt: 4886 bytes, checksum: 1f599778e1903815e2e57303803c774b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-02-06T00:00:00Z / This study aims to analyse the relationship between high profile management compensation and Brazilian firm’s performance. In other words, investigate if real increases in executive compensation are significantly correlated to the firm’s performance. The analysis was underpinned by the economic theory, mainly through the Principal-agent model. This empirical study was carried out using data disaggregated by sub sectors of economic activity, for Brazil within the period of 2001 to 2006. Information about management’s real compensation were retrieved from the Brazilian Employment and Labour Ministry’s Annual Relation of Social Information (RAIS). The information about the firm’s profits was extracted from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics’ Annual Industrial, Services and Commerce Surveys. The estimated regressions aimed at verifying whether the evolution of high profile managers’ average real compensation of each sub-sector was correlated with the evolution of firm’s profit per worker. Particularly it was noted if previous soars in compensation were followed by increases in profits, given the macroeconomic factors ceteris paribus. For this purpose, binary dummy variables were included for each year and the autocorrelation within the real profit per worker was also controlled. According to the data, it can be concluded that both variables have a contemporaneous correlation, suggesting that executives can extract rent from the firms’ profit. However, the correlation between lagged managers’ real compensation and firm’s real profit per worker, although positive, is not statistically significant. Therefore, the assumption that executive’s compensation could have positively influence in the firm’s performance needs to be investigated more thoroughly. / Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a relação entre a remuneração da alta gerência e a evolução do desempenho das firmas brasileiras. Isto é, investigar até que ponto os aumentos da remuneração real da alta gerência estão realmente correlacionados de forma significativa ao desempenho da empresa. A análise foi feita sob a luz da teoria econômica, sobretudo a partir do modelo agente-principal. O estudo empírico foi implementado a partir de dados desagregados por sub-setor de atividade econômica, para o Brasil ao longo do período 2001-2006. As informações sobre a remuneração dos executivos foram obtidas através dos dados da Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS) do Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego. Já as informações sobre o lucro real de cada sub-setor foram colhidas das Pesquisas Anuais de Serviços (PAS), Comércio (PAC) e Indústria (PIA), realizadas pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). As regressões estimadas tiveram como objetivo verificar se a evolução da remuneração real média dos executivos de cada sub-setor tem correlação com a evolução do lucro real por trabalhador de cada sub-setor. Em particular, verificou-se se o aumento prévio da remuneração real dos executivos é seguido de um aumento do lucro real por trabalhador, controlados os fatores macroeconômicos, através da inclusão de variáveis binárias para cada ano, e controlada a autocorrelação da variável lucro real por trabalhador. De acordo com os dados analisados neste trabalho, conclui-se que há correlação contemporânea entre o rendimento real dos executivos e o desempenho das firmas, sugerindo que os executivos têm poder de barganha para se apropriar de parte dos lucros. Contudo, a correlação entre o aumento prévio da remuneração real dos executivos e o lucro no período seguinte, apesar de positiva, não é estatisticamente significativa. Assim sendo, a hipótese de que melhora da remuneração dos executivos pode influenciar positivamente o desempenho das empresas requer mais investigações para ser respondida com segurança.

The Internal Revenue Code invokes the concept of reasonableness as the major qualification for the stockholder executive compensation deduction for federal income tax purposes. However, neither the Code nor Regulations contain general guidelines for determining reasonable compensation. Consequently, disputes with the IRS are frequent, resulting in substantial litigation. The primary hypothesis of the study was that the IRS guideline variables were incapable of discriminating taxpayers who have won litigated reasonable compensation cases from those who have lost. The secondary hypothesis was that the IRS guideline variable group, the court case variable group, or the two groups combined were equally powerful in discriminating taxpayers who have won litigated reasonable compensation cases from taxpayers who have lost. The study included all unreasonable compensation cases litigated in the Tax Court from 195^ to September, 1980. Only cases related to the reasonableness of officer-shareholder compensation of closely-held corporations were included.

[pt] O objetivo desse estudo é identificar as práticas de remuneração adotadas para os executivos no Brasil e medir a relação entre a performance das companhias e a remuneração desses executivos. Ao analisar a relação entre remuneração dos executivos e a performance das companhias, deveríamos observar uma relação positiva e estatisticamente (e economicamente) significante entre as duas variáveis, caso a elaboração dos contratos de remuneração dos executivos endereçassem os problemas mencionados na teoria do Agente-Principal. Foram utilizadas diversas regressões para medir a sensibilidade entre a remuneração dos executivos e a performance das companhias. Podemos observar pelos resultados que, em algumas das regressões encontramos uma relação estatisticamente significante entre a remuneração dos executivos e a performance da companhia a um nível de significância de 5 por cento, no entanto, com um significado econômico muito baixo, o que parece inconsistente com o problema do Agente-Principal. / [en] This paper seeks to identify and describe the executive compensation practices in Brazil, and measure the relationship between company performance and executive compensation in Brazil. When analyzing the relationship between executive compensation and company performance, we should observe a positive and statistically (and economically) significant relation between the two variables, in case the compensation contracts addressed the problems involved in the Principal-Agent theory. Several regressions were used to measure the sensibility between executive compensation and company performance. In some of the regressions we found a statistically significant relation between executive compensation and company performance at a 5 percent significance level, but not economically significant, which seems to be inconsistent with the Principal-Agent theory.

Submitted by Paulo Henrique Andreoli (pandreoli@uol.com.br) on 2018-08-16T19:07:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Paulo Final.pdf: 1121423 bytes, checksum: 2df69c25ef493b5b366550c4ddc825d1 (MD5) / Rejected by Simone de Andrade Lopes Pires (simone.lopes@fgv.br), reason: Prezado Paulo, Recebemos seu trabalho na biblioteca digital, mas será necessários fazer alguns ajustes: 1º Contra Capa: o título deve ser em letra maiúscula. 2º Folha de aprovação: deve conter a instituição do professor. Por favor, faça as alterações e submeta o trabalho novamente na biblioteca digital. Atenciosamente, Simone on 2018-08-21T21:13:18Z (GMT) / Submitted by Paulo Henrique Andreoli (pandreoli@uol.com.br) on 2018-08-22T16:24:01Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Paulo Final.pdf: 1121423 bytes, checksum: 2df69c25ef493b5b366550c4ddc825d1 (MD5) TA final biblioteca.pdf: 1122937 bytes, checksum: 9e7db8e1535765087a471dce8c22708b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Simone de Andrade Lopes Pires (simone.lopes@fgv.br) on 2018-08-22T17:01:14Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Paulo Final.pdf: 1121423 bytes, checksum: 2df69c25ef493b5b366550c4ddc825d1 (MD5) TA final biblioteca.pdf: 1122937 bytes, checksum: 9e7db8e1535765087a471dce8c22708b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-08-22T17:15:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Paulo Final.pdf: 1121423 bytes, checksum: 2df69c25ef493b5b366550c4ddc825d1 (MD5) TA final biblioteca.pdf: 1122937 bytes, checksum: 9e7db8e1535765087a471dce8c22708b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-22T17:15:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Paulo Final.pdf: 1121423 bytes, checksum: 2df69c25ef493b5b366550c4ddc825d1 (MD5) TA final biblioteca.pdf: 1122937 bytes, checksum: 9e7db8e1535765087a471dce8c22708b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-07-18 / Ao mesmo tempo que estudos sobre modelos de remuneração executiva que alinhem os interesses de acionistas e administradores são crescentes no Brasil, as boas práticas de governança corporativa sugerem uma maior transparência na divulgação da remuneração dos executivos ao mercado. Este trabalho objetivou primariamente analisar o nível de transparência na divulgação da remuneração executiva em momentos distintos da economia brasileira, em período de estabilidade e de crise econômica e adicionalmente, com base nos dados levantados, compreender a proporção da remuneração variável nos diferentes períodos, imaginando observar se a parcela de remuneração variável paga aos administradores seria menor no período de maior dificuldade econômica. Para uma melhor análise comparativa, selecionamos três segmentos relevantes e distintos, incluindo setores regulados e não regulados, sendo eles os segmentos de alimentos, de bancos e de energia elétrica. Com base nos principais indicadores econômicos, selecionamos os anos de 2012 e 2015, onde consideramos o ano de 2012 um ano de estabilidade econômica no Brasil e o ano de 2015, ano de crise. Os resultados indicaram que mesmo em 2015, alguns segmentos analisados apresentaram boas performances em seus resultados, em comparação a 2012. O eventual declínio nos níveis de divulgação da remuneração executiva, que poderiam ser esperados, mostraram-se bastante estáveis para ambos os anos. Mesmo com resultados adversos entre os segmentos em 2015, foi possível observar que a remuneração variável de curto prazo deixou de ser utilizada como ferramenta de remuneração por parte das empresas no segundo ano analisado. Uma certa migração da remuneração variável de curto prazo para a remuneração baseada em ações foi constatada, com aumento expressivo nos valores médios pagos através desse tipo de incentivo em dois dos três segmentos analisados. O comportamento observado ilustra vários estudos sobre o assunto e as boas práticas de governança corporativa ao mostrar a busca pelo alinhamento dos interesses dos acionistas e gestores e balanceamento de metas entre curto e longo prazos, principalmente em época de maior dificuldade econômica. / While studies on executive compensation models that align the interests of shareholders and managers are increasing in Brazil, good corporate governance practices suggest greater transparency in the disclosure of executive compensation to the stakeholders. This paper aimed primarily at analyzing the level of transparency in the disclosure of executive remuneration at different moments of the Brazilian economy, in a period of stability and economic crisis and additionally, based on the data collected, understand the proportion of variable remuneration in different periods, figuring to observe if the variable remuneration paid to managers would be lower in the period of greatest economic difficulty. For a better comparative analysis, we selected three relevant, distinct, regulated and unregulated segments, such as food, banking and electric energy. Based on the main economic indicators, we selected the years 2012 and 2015, where we consider 2012 a year of economic stability in Brazil and 2015, a year of crisis. The results indicated that even in 2015, some segments analyzed showed a good performance in their results compared to 2012. The eventual decline in levels of disclosure of executive compensation, which could be expected, proved to be quite stable for both years. Even with adverse results among the segments in 2015, it was possible to observe that short term variable compensation was no longer used as a remuneration by some companies in the second year analyzed. A certain migration from short-term variable compensation to share based compensation was observed, and a significant increase in the average values paid through this type of incentive in two of the three segments analyzed. The observed behavior illustrates several studies on the subject and the good practices of corporate governance in showing the search for the alignment of the interests of the shareholders and managers and balance of goals between short and long term, especially in times of greater economic difficulty.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / This thesis aims to conduct an empirical study on Labor Economics, with the application of microeconometric techniques. We develop two independent chapters. The first chapter deals with the structure of executive compensation: specifically it tries to estimate the elasticity of executive compensation in relation to the performance of firms, measured by revenues. The estimations are carried out in two stages: at the first stage, we use crosssectional data, allowing the comparison of the annual information and at the second, we employ panel data. The main focus of this chapter is the analysis of results coming from the panel data set, because it has the advantage of eliminating the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, giving greater representativeness to the estimates. We found significant effects of the performance of local companies on the remuneration of its executives, with elasticity values similar to those obtained from studies conducted in European countries. The second chapter focuses on the analysis of strikes in Brazil, with emphasis on the impact of the 1988 Federal Constitution in its dynamics. Two different modeling exercises are conducted. The first examines the determinants of the duration of strikes by means of Cox proportional hazards model, controlling for the effects related to the size and characteristics of firms and macroeconomic indicators. The second exercise evaluates the factors that influence the final results of the demands of the strikers through the development and estimation of an ordered logistic model, controlling for size and business characteristics and duration of outages. The results show that the size of strikes is not conducive to agreement between the parties, being inversely related to duration and reducing the likelihood of meeting the demands of the strikers. Analyzing the direct relationship between duration and outcome of claims, it appears that longer strikes tend to have low probability of agreement between the parties. The study also highlights that the State of SÃo Paulo, place of beginning and development of major strike movements in Brazil, is also more conducive to settlements between workers and firms, since the strikes started on it tend to have lower durations and higher proportions of attendance of strikers claims. Regarding the main objective of the chapter, we highlighted differences in the characteristics of strikes in the post-constitutional period compared with the period before the Constitution. The results suggest that the Federal Constitution had a significant impact on the dynamics of the Brazilian strike movements, especially by expanding its regulations and giving greater bargaining power for workers. So, the legislation appears to favored agreements between parties, resulting in a trend of larger strikes and increasing the likelihood of meeting the demands of the strikers. / A presente tese tem por finalidade realizar um estudo empÃrico em Economia do Trabalho, com a aplicaÃÃo de tÃcnicas microeconomÃtricas. SÃo desenvolvidos dois capÃtulos independentes. O primeiro capÃtulo tem por objetivo verificar a estrutura de compensaÃÃo dos executivos, mais especificamente estimar a elasticidade da remuneraÃÃo em relaÃÃo ao desempenho das firmas, medido pelo faturamento. As estimaÃÃes sÃo realizadas em duas etapas: a primeira com dados transversais, permitindo a comparaÃÃo das informaÃÃes anuais e a segunda utilizando dados em painel. O foco principal deste capÃtulo à a anÃlise atravÃs de dados em painel, pois possui a vantagem de eliminar o problema da heterogeneidade nÃo observada, dando maior representatividade Ãs estimaÃÃes. Destacando a escassez de estudos brasileiros, realiza uma revisÃo de literatura internacional referente, permitindo comparar os resultados dessa pesquisa com os encontrados nos demais artigos publicados. O estudo encontra efeitos significativos do desempenho das firmas brasileiras sobre a remuneraÃÃo de seus executivos, com valores semelhantes aos obtidos por pesquisas realizadas em paÃses europeus. O segundo capÃtulo destaca a anÃlise das greves brasileiras, com Ãnfase no impacto da ConstituiÃÃo Federal de 1988 em sua dinÃmica. SÃo realizadas duas pesquisas distintas. A primeira analisa os condicionantes da duraÃÃo das paralisaÃÃes atravÃs do modelo de risco proporcional de Cox, controlando para efeitos relacionados ao tamanho e caracterÃsticas das firmas e indicadores macroeconÃmicos. A segunda pesquisa avalia os fatores que influenciam nos resultados finais das reivindicaÃÃes dos grevistas, considerando especificamente as informaÃÃes sobre as greves por motivos salariais; o estudo desenvolve uma ordenaÃÃo dos resultados dos acordos finais entre trabalhadores e empresas, possibilitando a realizaÃÃo da estimaÃÃo atravÃs do modelo logÃstico ordenado, controlando para tamanho e caracterÃsticas das empresas e duraÃÃo das paralisaÃÃes. Os resultados demonstram que o tamanho das greves nÃo à favorÃvel ao acordo entre as partes, estando inversamente relacionado com sua duraÃÃo e reduzindo a probabilidade de atendimento das solicitaÃÃes dos grevistas. Analisando a relaÃÃo entre duraÃÃo e resultados das reivindicaÃÃes, verifica-se que greves mais longas tendem a apresentar menor probabilidade de acordo entre as partes. O estudo ainda destaca que no Estado de SÃo Paulo, local de surgimento e desenvolvimento dos principais movimentos grevistas brasileiros, à tambÃm o mais favorÃvel ao entendimento entre trabalhadores e empresas, pois as paralisaÃÃes nele iniciadas tendem a ter menores duraÃÃes e maiores proporÃÃes de atendimento das reivindicaÃÃes. Em relaÃÃo ao objetivo principal do capÃtulo, sÃo evidenciadas as diferenÃas nas caracterÃsticas das greves no perÃodo pÃs-constitucional. Os resultados sugerem que a ConstituiÃÃo causou impacto significativo na organizaÃÃo dos movimentos grevistas, ampliando sua regulamentaÃÃo e dando maior poder de barganha aos trabalhadores. Assim, sÃo favorecidos os acordos entre as partes, resultando em uma tendÃncia de greves mais longas e elevando a probabilidade de atendimento das reivindicaÃÃes dos grevistas.

In this thesis, I exploit accounting issues in the Chinese context with a particular focus on the role of government. The thesis consists of three empirical essays, examining how the state coordinates among the state-owned enterprises in executive compensation (essay 1), how the government regulates the dividend payouts of listed firms (essay 2) and how the delisting regulation influences the accounting choices of listed firms (essay 3).The first essay examines relative performance evaluation (RPE) in China. Previous studies of RPE for executive compensations in Western developed markets have produced mixed findings. This is partly because the dispersion of share ownership in Western capital markets does not closely correspond with the single-principal/multi-agent theoretical setting assumed by Holmstrom (1982). In this study, I exploit the existence of a large number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China to examine RPE in a setting closer to the theoretical assumption. I find that SOEs are more likely to use RPE for executive compensation than non-SOEs. This is consistent with better cross-firm coordination in executive contracting among SOEs under a common “state” principal than among non-SOEs with dispersed principals similar to Western firms. Furthermore, I find a more pronounced RPE effect among SOEs that are larger or have poorer past performance. This implies that the state principal has greater incentives to monitor strategically important firms or those in distress. The second essay examines the market reaction to and earnings management choices around changes in the regulations requiring a higher minimum dividend payout in China to shed new light on the determinants of dividend payout policy. I find that the market reaction is more positive for firms that paid less than the new required minimum payout than for those that paid more than the new required minimum, consistent with agency cost explanations of dividend payout. In addition, I find that low dividend payers exhibit a greater tendency to manage their earnings downwards to comply with the earnings-based threshold, and investors can “see through” such earnings management behaviors. My findings support the view of DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2009) that agency costs of free cash flow retention are an important part of the dividend payout story. The third essay explores the earnings-based delisting rule in China that provides particularly strong motivation to manage earnings above the loss/profit threshold. I identify two groups of firms that successfully avoid being ST-ed, i.e. firms with a one-year loss before returning to profit, and firms with consecutive small profits. I provide a comprehensive examination of earnings management in terms of accruals management, real earnings management and non-operating income, to investigate whether Chinese firms manage earnings either to avoid reporting a loss or to avoid reporting two consecutive losses. Though there are mixed results sensitive to the research design for earnings management pattern in the two groups of firms, this study provides insights into earnings management induced by a government regulation.

ESSAY 1We examine the effect of governance environment on the composition of a country's external capital structure, specifically foreign equity investment. In addition to the absolute quality of the host country's governance environment, we consider the host country's governance quality relative to that of the source (investor) country. Unlike previous studies, which utilize country totals, we examine foreign investment positions between pairs of individual countries. Our sample includes 3,891 bilateral investment positions among 49 source countries and 69 host countries for years 2009 through 2011. We find that relative governance, rather than absolute governance, plays a role in foreign investment. Specifically, a host country with lower governance quality relative to the source country (a greater difference) attracts less FDI as a share of foreign equity investment. Our results suggest that prior studies, which identified absolute governance as a significant factor, were evaluating an incomplete picture. When the focus is solely on the host country, the policy prescription appears rather straightforward--all countries should pursue higher governance quality to attract more foreign investment from all sources. We challenge this notion by showing that: a) different source countries evaluate host-country governance differently; and b) this evaluation is influenced by the difference between the governance environments of the two countries. ESSAY 2Highly publicized governance failures in recent years have renewed research efforts to investigate the consequences of specific governance mechanisms. A better understanding of executive compensation contracts, specifically golden parachutes, is especially critical given their notorious status in the corporate governance debate. Instead of examining the explicit incentive role of golden parachutes (GPs) in influencing managerial behavior, we study their role as a tool for screening and recruiting reputable CEOs in a situation where recruitment would otherwise be difficult--severe financial distress that eventually leads to Chapter 11 bankruptcy. If GPs enable distressed firms to recruit reputable CEOs, there should be an observable link between the presence of GPs in employment contracts for newly hired CEOs and value-preserving firm outcomes. For our sample of firms, all of which filed for bankruptcy, this can be measured by the outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings, specifically the avoidance of liquidation. Thus, we hypothesize a negative relationship between the presence of GPs for newly hired CEOs and the probability of liquidation in bankruptcy. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that firms led by newly hired CEOs with GPs are liquidated less often than other firms. This suggests that, regardless of their efficacy as corporate governance mechanisms, GPs can create value for shareholders.