[pt] A presente tese se propõe a fazer uma comparação das obras de Schelling e Hegel. Com a diferença entre coisa em si e fenômeno, Kant teria operado uma cisão entre sujeito e objeto. A partir disso, se descortina para nós um problema epistemológico, na medida em que há a delimitação das condições para nosso conhecimento, assim como uma questão ontológica, uma vez que se tem a mudança do sentido de objetividade e, por conseguinte, de realidade exterior. Nossa investigação então se concentra nas Antinomias da razão que apresentam dois discursos filosóficos opostos (organizados como tese versus antítese), tendo como horizonte a distinção entre fenômeno e coisa em si. Dando prosseguimento a isso, Fichte não apenas retém o sentido de subjetividade proposta por Kant com o sujeito transcendental, como ainda ressignifica o argumento antinômico a partir da distinção entre Eu (sujeito) e não-Eu (objeto). Essa diferença fundamenta duas tendências do pensamento filosófico, uma idealista, mais voltada para o sujeito e outra realista, que tem o objeto como ponto de partida. Assim, buscamos propor como a filosofia de Schelling e Hegel se encaixam nessa estrutura antinômica tanto presente em Kant como em Fichte com a distinção entre Eu e não-Eu e, respectivamente, as posições do idealismo e realismo. Schelling concebe um pensamento que se volta mais para a realidade exterior, algo que analisamos tanto em relação à sua Filosofia da Natureza e da Identidade. E na medida em que há uma filosofia que se volta para explicações ontológicas, Schelling propõe a intuição intelectual e a construção como meios epistemológicos de acesso ao Todo da Natureza, assim como à Identidade primeira. Ao contrário, Hegel resgata a questão transcendental na Fenomenologia do Espírito, não apenas demonstrando um desenvolvimento histórico inerente à consciência universal e ao Espírito, como também determina o que seria o Conceito. É então que nossa tese se concentra a investigação do que seria o conceitual como meio complexo para a organização da realidade. Observamos, assim, que Schelling e Hegel trazem dois projetos opostos tanto no que tange à epistemologia quanto à ontologia. Enquanto Schelling preza por uma filosofia centrada na realidade e seu desenvolvimento e, desse modo, o conhecimento será mais intuitivo, Hegel pensa em uma realidade organizada a partir do Conceito, o que lhe garante uma ontologia em que se torna claro o aspecto intelectualista ou melhor, lógico. Essa diferença se torna mais evidente no último capítulo, em que de fato comparamos a obra dos dois a partir do recorte proposto. É nesse sentido que, para responder à questão kantiana sobre sujeito e objeto, de modo a propor uma reunificação desses dois elementos, Schelling e Hegel optam por posições opostas, o que os coloca em uma configuração antinômica por natureza. / [en] This dissertation aims to compare the works of Schelling and Hegel. Taking the difference of thing in itself and phenomenon as a starting point, Kant came up with a split between subject and object. This division is the origin of an epistemological problem, since it implies a sharp definition of the conditions for knowledge. But even more, it also suggests an ontological matter, since it proposes a change in the meaning of objectivity and, therefore, of external reality. Our research entails an analysis of the so-called Antinomies of reason that shows two opposing philosophical standpoints (arranged as thesis versus antithesis), that are constructed according to the previous distinction of phenomenon and thing in itself. Following from Kant s philosophy, Fichte not only maintains the idea of subjectivity proposed by Kant s transcendental subject, but also transforms the argument present in the Antinomies with his distinction between the I (subject) and the Non-I (object). This difference underlies two trends in philosophical thinking, one idealistic, more focused on the subject and the other realistic, which has the object as a starting point. Thus, we suggest that the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel fit into this antinomic structure both present in Kant and Fichte with the distinction between I and Not-I and, respectively, the positions of idealism and realism. Schelling develop a thought that turns more towards external reality, something that is evident when we analyze his Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Identity. And insofar it concerns an ontological explanation of reality, it is possible to understand why Schelling sees the intellectual intuition and the construction of matter as the two possible epistemological access of the Whole of Nature, as well as the original Identity. On the contrary, Hegel brings back the transcendental problem in his Phenomenology of the Spirit, not only demonstrating a historical development regarding consciousness and Spirit, but also exposing what he calls the Notion (or the Concept). Therefore, we try to consider what Hegel meant with the Notion and how it is a sort of complex medium used to organize reality. It is possible to think that Schelling and Hegel bring two opposing alternatives concerning both an epistemological perspective and an ontological plan. While Schelling values a philosophy centered on reality and its development and, thus, a more intuitive kind of knowledge, Hegel thinks of reality as organized through the Concept, which clearly implies a conceptual, or even better, logical ontology. This distinction between the two philosophers becomes more evident in the last chapter, in which we compare Schelling and Hegel. In this sense, in relation to the Kantian problem about subject and object, they try to offer a reconciliation of these two terms. And they do this by formulating two different philosophical perspectives, something that place them in an antinomic position.

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

War Schelling ein politischer Denker? Und wenn ja, wie lässt sich seine politische Denkweise einordnen? Die Antworten auf beide Fragen gehen in der Forschung weit auseinander. Die vorliegende Dissertation schlägt daher eine neue Lesart vor, in dem sie Schelling als Antipolitiker deutet. Hierdurch gelingt es, der Ambivalenz und Breite Schellings Politikauffassung Rechnung zu tragen und die bisherige Forschung aus der Perspektive herauszuführen, die den Autor entweder als „unpolitischen Denker“ oder „politisch-reaktionären Denker“ verstanden wissen will. Die Arbeit begreift Antipolitik dabei als ein Unternehmen, welche das „Überinklusive“ und „Unausweichliche“ am Politik-Begriff zurückweist und im Gegenzug den Raum des Privatbürgerlichen, ja der Gesellschaft verteidigt. Die Praktikabilität des Begriffs wird in der Arbeit sowohl in Bezug auf Schelling als auch in Bezug auf spätere Fallbeispiele wie Heinrich von Treitschke, Constantin Franz oder Friedrich Nietzsche demonstriert. Außerdem plädiert die Untersuchung dafür, Antipolitik auch als ein aktuelles Phänomen zu begreifen, das sich in Gesellschaft immer dann formiert, wenn die Privatsphäre, der nichtpolitische Bereich, durch „staatliche Übergriffe“ oder „politisches Fehlversagen“ tangiert wird. / Was Schelling a political thinker? And if he was, what kind of political idea did Schelling prefer? These questions have been differently discussed in literature during the last decades. The following thesis argues for a new interpretation of Schelling as an antipolitician. The term antipolitics copes with Schelling’s ambivalent political thinking and avoids the recent perspective in research classifying him as a nonpolitical philosopher or reactionist. Antipolitics is described as an ambition that rejects the „unavoidable“ and „Überinklusive“ of politics in order to strengthen the area of privacy and society. The paper demonstrates the practicability of the term using the example of Schelling and also later authors like Heinrich von Treitschke, Constantin Franz or Friedrich Nietzsche. Moreover, the thesis argues that antipolitics can also be seen as a modern phenomenon, which usually takes place when privacy or the non-political space is restricted by political power.

L'objectif de cette thèse est d'interroger la manière dont Hegel conçoit la fondation absolue de la philosophie, c'est-à-dire la manière dont la philosophie fournit, à l'intérieur d'elle-même, la justification intégrale de la vérité absolue de son discours, justification qui, d'après Hegel, la caractérise en propre. Pour ce faire, après avoir brièvement replacé, à titre introductif, cette tentative hégélienne dans le cadre de la problématique de la fondation de la philosophie propre à la philosophie post-kantienne, nous étudions d'abord la manière dont Hegel rend compte de la genèse historique de l'exigence d'une auto-fondation absolue de la philosophie dans ses Leçons sur l'histoire de la philosophie, qui s'avèrent un espace hybride de position des problèmes philosophiques, à la fois historiquement donnés et toujours déjà philosophiquement construits. Nous interrogeons ensuite, à partir de la Doctrine de l'essence, le concept logique de fondement (Grund) dans ses tensions propres, pour montrer qu'il dégage l'espace des problèmes posés par la notion de fondation sans pouvoir leur apporter par lui-même une solution définitive : cette dernière nous paraît bien plutôt énoncée dans la Doctrine du concept, dont le mouvement d'ensemble (concept subjectif, objectivité, idée) fait l'objet d'une lecture permettant d'y faire ressortir à la fois l'Aufhebung interne du fondement et l'émergence de la notion d'auto-fondation, qui apparaît in fine dans la définition de l'idée comme processus de « développement progressif » et « fondation régressive » de soi. La fondation est alors définie comme un processus consistant à rendre raison de soi dans ses manifestations, ce que nous interprétons comme rupture avec le concept de fondement hérité de la métaphysique d'entendement, dont la logique hégélienne produit l'Aufhebung. L'idée ayant été ainsi définie, de manière formelle, comme processus de rendre raison de soi, nous étudions, dans une troisième partie, la manière dont la philosophie de la nature et la philosophie de l'esprit concourent au processus d'auto-fondation réelle de l'idée, c'est-à-dire, en dernière instance, à son effectuation comme esprit absolu ; à cette occasion, nous étudions plusieurs occurrences significatives de la notion de fondement dans la Realphilosophie, ainsi que le rapport du discours philosophique aux réalités dont il traite (rapport que Hegel nous semble prendre soin de distinguer d'une justification extérieure). Une quatrième partie vient alors étudier la manière dont la philosophie se pense elle-même comme fondation systématique de sa propre vérité : on soulève la question de savoir si le système a besoin d'un fondement externe pour garantir sa vérité (fondement que certains interprètes ont pu trouver dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit ou dans l'histoire de la philosophie), et on étudie les syllogismes finaux de l'Encyclopédie pour y lire une réflexion de la philosophie sur sa propre fondation systématique. La thèse que nous soutenons au terme de ce parcours est que le profond remaniement spéculatif du concept de fondement qui aboutit à l'idée d'une autofondation au sens de « rendre raison de soi » (en rupture donc avec tout principe ou fondement réel ou formel tel qu'on en rencontre dans l'histoire de la philosophie), converge avec une redéfinition de la philosophie comme savoir rendant absolument raison de sa propre vérité, et même, au sens strict, ne fondant que sa propre vérité comme système, ce qui lui permet en même temps de libérer le sens vrai des objets qu'il parcourt et ordonne dans son déploiement systématique. / This thesis aims at questioning the way Hegel conceives the absolute foundation of philosophy, that is to say the way philosophy provides, within itself, the integral justification of its discourse's absolute truth, which, according to Hegel, characterizes it in specific. To do so, after sketching the historical frame of Post-Kantian debates about the foundation of philosophy, we first study the way Hegel relates, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the historical genesis of the requirement of an absolute self-foundation of philosophy. We then question the logical concept of Grund within the Doctrine of Essence in order to show, that neither it or its subsequent specifications (e.g. cause) suffice to give an account of the process of foundation, whose truth we take to be stated instead in the Doctrine of the Concept ; we study Begriffslogik's overall movement (subjective concept, objectivity, idea) in order to bring out the notion of self-foundation (Selbstbegründung), which appears in fine in the definition of Idea as a process of “progressive development” and “regressive foundation” of itself. Foundation is thus defined as a process consisting in the justification of itself in its own moments, which we take to be a split from metaphysics' concept of foundation, of which the Hegelian Logic carries out the Aufhebung. In a third part, we try to study the way philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit contribute to the process of a real self-foundation of the Idea, that is to say its realization as Absolute Spirit ; on that occasion, we study multiple occurrences of “foundation” in the Realphilosophie, and also the connection between philosophical discourse and the realities it deals with, which Hegel seems to distinguish from an external justification. The fourth part then studies the way philosophy thinks itself as systematical foundation of its own truth : we raise the question of knowing if the system needs an external foundation to guarantee its truth (which could be provided by the Phenomenology of Spirit or the history of philosophy), and we read the “syllogisms of philosophy” as philosophy looking back at its own foundation. The thesis we support at the end of this demonstration is that the profound speculative reshuffle of the concept of foundation that leads to the idea of a self-foundation within the meaning of “justifying itself” (breaking thus with every real or formal principle or foundation as we know them in the history of philosophy), converges with a redefinition of philosophy as knowledge justifying its own truth in an absolute manner, and even, in a precise meaning, founding only its own truth as a system, which allows it meanwhile to free the true meaning of the objects that it browses and orders in its systematical deployment.

Εντός ενός εκτεταμένου φάσματος τόπων και χρόνων της ανθρώπινης διανόησης, τόσο ο ορισμός όσο και η επίλυση του προβλήματος του σχετικού με το κακό θα αναζητούνται διακαώς και αδιαλείπτως. Τα πλέον κεντροβαρή θέματα, τα οποία θα αποτελέσουν τα κλειδιά για τη διάνοιξη μίας ικανοποιητικής κατανόησης σχετικά με το διαχρονικό ρίζωμα του κακού εντός της κοσμικής ολότητας, επιβάλλουν τη διερεύνηση της σχέσης της ύψιστης οντότητας με αυτό, όπως και της πεπερασμένης έλλογης οντότητας με την ελευθερία της, έστω και εάν η ελευθερία αυτή αποδειχθεί εντέλει δυνητική, ενδεχομένως ανύπαρκτη. Επικεντρωμένη στα κορυφαία έργα: Essais de Théodicée sur la Bonté de Dieu, la Liberté de l'Homme et l'Origine du Mal (Δοκίμια Θεοδικίας για την Καλοσύνη του Θεού, την Ελευθερία του Ανθρώπου και την Καταγωγή του Κακού) (1710) του Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz [Λάιμπνιτς, 1646‒1716] και Philosophische Untersuchungen Über das Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit und die Damit Zusammenhängenden Gegenstände (Φιλοσοφικές Έρευνες για την Ουσία της Ανθρώπινης Ελευθερίας και Περί Συναφών Θεμάτων) (1809) του Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling [Σέλλινγκ, 1775–1854], στα πλαίσια της κοσμοθεωρίας του καθενός στοχαστή, η παρούσα εργασία επιχειρεί σε δύο κύρια μέρη να αναδείξει το σχεσιακό πλέγμα επί του οποίου δομείται μία, όσο το δυνατόν περισσότερο, σαφής έννοια του κακού. Επιπρόσθετα, η εκπόνησή της φιλοδοξεί στον εντοπισμό των πιθανών σημείων επαφής–απόκλισης αναφορικά με τη συγκεκριμένη έννοια. Το πρώτο μέρος της εργασίας αφορά την έννοια του κακού που θα δεχθεί επεξεργασία, θα αποσαφηνιστεί και θα επικρατήσει στη σκέψη του Leibniz. Κάτι τέτοιο κρίνεται ως εφικτό κυρίως μέσω της παρουσίασης, όπως και της διευκρίνισης των δύο βασικών επιχειρημάτων που θεμελιώνουν το εγχείρημα της θεοδικίας, δηλαδή του κακού εντός των ορίων της Θεωρίας του Καλύτερου Δυνατού Κόσμου και του κακού ως έλλειψης. Θεωρείται απαραίτητο το να διερευνηθούν λεπτομερώς οι συσχετίσεις της θεϊκής και της ανθρώπινης οντότητας με το κακό, όπως και η μεταξύ των δύο οντοτήτων διασύνδεση. Η προσπάθεια αυτής της διερεύνησης διεξάγεται στα πλαίσια της κοσμοθεώρησης του Leibniz η οποία άπτεται της περίοπτης θέσης της Μονάδας [La Monade], όπως και της Προδιατεταγμένης Αρμονίας [Le Système de l'Harmonie Préétablie] εντός αυτής. Ο λαϊβνίτειος Θεός, ο δημιουργός, κατόπιν ο συντηρητής της κοσμικής ολότητας, κατέχει τη δύναμη και τη γνώση για να καταστρώσει, να πραγματώσει ελεύθερα το υπέρτατο σχέδιό του για έναν κόσμο που θα είναι ο καλύτερος δυνατός στη σύγκρισή του με τον οποιονδήποτε. Μόνο που το εν λόγω σχέδιό του φέρει ένα άκρως σημαντικό ψεγάδι που, αναφορικά με όλα ανεξαιρέτως τα «γνώριμα» όντα που βιώνουν το συγκεκριμένο συμπαντικό μοντέλο, διαβρώνει στον μέγιστο βαθμό την εικόνα που τείνει προς την τελειότητα. Αυτό το διαχρονικά αξιόμεμπτο ελάττωμα του συστήματος θα είναι το κακό [le mal]. Η Θεοδικία θα επιχειρήσει τη διεισδυτική προσέγγισή της στην έννοια, τη φύση και την προέλευση του κακού σε συνάρτηση με τον Θεό και τον άνθρωπο, συντάσσοντας συνάμα τη δεξιοτεχνικά δομημένη απάντηση στους διάφορους επικριτές της, στους φιλοσόφους μα και τους θεολόγους οι οποίοι θα επιμείνουν αφενός στο ασύμβατο της θεϊκής φύσης με το κακό, αφετέρου στο δισυπόστατό της. Πριν από την έναρξη του δεύτερου μέρους το οποίο θα επικεντρωθεί στην έννοια του κακού βάσει της συλλογιστικής γραμμής του Schelling, στο κεφάλαιο «O Schelling για το “Κακό” του Leibniz» αντιπαρατίθεται το κακό τής ισχυρά ενεργής πνευματικής δύναμης στον αντίποδα της αντίστοιχης λαϊβνίτειας όψης, της βασισμένης σε ένα κακό στερημένο και συνάμα ελλειπτικό. Αυτή η αντιπαράθεση αποσκοπεί στην ανάδειξη των σημείων τομής, υπό την προϋπόθεση του ότι θα ληφθούν επίσης υπόψη τα διαφορετικά πλαίσια εντός των οποίων εκτυλίσσεται το έργο του καθενός στοχαστή: εκκινώντας από τον ενστερνισμό ενός αμετάκλητου Θεϊσμού προς την, μετέπειτα από έναν αιώνα, ενδυνάμωση, κατόπιν ακόμα και υπέρβαση των ορίων του Γερμανικού Ιδεαλισμού. Στην Εισαγωγή της πραγματείας για την Ουσία της Ανθρώπινης Ελευθερίας, ο Schelling προαναγγέλλει τη στροφή, την πρωτότυπη μα συνάμα και προκλητική, στο ξετύλιγμα των διαδρομών της έρευνάς του: το ξερίζωμα της παραδοσιακής τοποθέτησης του πνεύματος αντιμέτωπου με το υποθετικά άλογο της φύσης και την αντικατάστασή του με το, εξίσου υποθετικά αντιθετικό, ζεύγος αναγκαιότητα–ελευθερία. Καθ’ όλη τη διάρκεια της ολοκληρωτικής αυτής σάρωσης του εσώτερου φιλοσοφικού κέντρου, η πρωταρχική τοποθέτηση του καινοτόμου δίπολου θα ταλανίζει, χωρίς τη δυνατότητα απόρριψης ούτε του ενός ούτε του άλλου πόλου, εντατικά και επίμονα τους προβληματισμούς του Γερμανού φιλοσόφου. Διαποτισμένη από μία εσώτερη πανίσχυρη βουλητική δραστηριότητα, η δυνατότητα για την ανθρώπινη ελευθερία περιστρέφει τον κύριο άξονα της πραγματείας, ενσωματώνοντας τη βαθειά απόφαση για το καλό, μα συνάμα και για το κακό ως την ειδοποιό διαφορά, σε σύγκριση με τη θεϊκή και όλες τις υπόλοιπες οντότητες, του ανθρώπινου Wesen, δηλαδή του είναι που συγκρατεί το ανθρώπινο μαζί με την ιδιαίτερη ελευθερία η οποία ουσιαστικά διεκδικεί την ιδέα του ανθρωπισμού. Ο ίδιος ο Schelling επισημαίνει πως στην πραγματεία του θα εκφράσει τη διαλογική γένεση των πάντων μέσα στο κείμενο. Σε μία έτερη ερμηνευτική διαδρομή της ανάγνωσης του κορυφαίου αυτού φιλοσοφικού κειμένου, ο Wirth θα παραλληλίσει την εν λόγω γένεση με διαλεκτική καταιγίδα εν μέσω της διαφωνίας και της ανισορροπίας του Wesen, το οποίο εξάλλου, σε τελική ανάλυση, αναδεικνύεται μέσα από αυτήν τη λεκτική ρευστότητα. Μα θα είναι ο φιλόσοφος, εντέλει, εκείνος που θα γνωρίσει το ανέφικτο της όποιας απόπειρας για την εξ ολοκλήρου ιδιοποίηση του εννοιολογικού πλέγματος μίας τόσο αρχέγονης υφής, καθόσον ο διάλογος εκτυλίσσεται μεταξύ συνομιλητών που δεν είναι του ίδιου είδους. Μάλλον φαντάζει σαν κάποια στιχομυθία στην απόπειρα της επικοινωνίας με την ίδια τη φύση. σα να μιλά το φως με το κεκαλυμμένο, και μόνιμο, σκοτάδι του, και εκείνο να απαντά (Jason M. Wirth, The Conspiracy of Life ‒Meditations on Schelling and His Time, State University of New York Press, USA, 2003, σ.σ. 158‒160). / Within an extended spectrum of places and times of the human intellect, both the definition and the solution of the problem of evil will continuously and eagerly be sought. The most important issues, that form the key for the opening of a satisfactory understanding concerning the timeless evil's rootstock in the cosmic totality, impose the investigation of the relationship between the supreme entity with evil, just as the relationship between the finite rational entity with its freedom, even if this freedom is ultimately proven potential, possibly non-existent. Focused on the outstanding works: Essais de Théodicée sur la Bonté de Dieu, la Liberté de l'Homme et l'Origine du Mal (Essays of Theodicy on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil) (1710) by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646‒1716) and Philosophische Untersuchungen Über das Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit und die Damit Zusammenhängenden Gegenstände (Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Related Matters) (1809) by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775‒1854), the present paper attempts, in two main parts within the framework of each thinker's worldview, to feature the relational grid upon which has been structured a definite, as far as possible, sense of evil. Additionally, this paper aims to identify possible points of contact‒deviation regarding this specific concept, mainly within their stated works. The first part of this thesis concerns the concept of evil that will be edited, elucidated, and also will be prevailed on the thought of Leibniz. This has been considered possible primarily through the presentation, as well as the clarification of the two key arguments that ground the operation of theodicy: evil within the Best of All Possible Worlds Theory and evil as a deficiency. It is essential to investigate in detail the correlations of the divine and the human being with evil, as well as the two entities interconnection. The essay of this investigation is conducted within the cosmic view of Leibniz which relates to the prominence of the Monad [La Monade], just as the Pre-established Harmony [Le Système de l'Harmonie Préétablie] therein. The leibnizian God, the creator, then the cosmic whole maintainer, possesses the power and the knowledge to design, to realize freely his ultimate plan for a world that will be the best possible, comparing to any other. Though his project has a very important flaw which, at least for all, without any exception, its “familiar” beings that are experiencing this universal model, corrupts at the fullest extent the image which tends towards perfection. Evil [le mal] will be this timeless censurable fault within the system. The theodicy will attempt its penetrating approach to the conception, nature and origin of evil in relation to God and man, by composing the skillfully structured response to various critics, philosophers and theologians who will insist on both the incompatible of the divine nature with evil, and on the possibility of God's two natures. Before the beginning of the second part, which will be focused on the concept of evil under the line of Schelling's reasoning, in chapter “ Schelling On Leibniz's 'Evil' ”, an evil of a powerful active spiritual power confronts the corresponding leibnizian aspect, based on a deprived yet elliptical evil. This debate aims to highlight the sectional points, provided that is also needed to take into account the different contexts within which each thinker's philosophical work is unfolding: starting from the embracement of a irrevocable Theism to, a century later, the reinforcement, then even the transcendence of the limits of German Idealism. In the essay's Introduction on the Essence of Human Freedom, Schelling foreshadows the turn, both innovative yet provocative, during the unraveling of the inquiry's paths: the uprooting of spirit's traditional placement be faced with the hypothetical irrational nature and its replacement by the equally hypothetical oppositional pair of necessity‒freedom. Throughout the duration of this thoroughgoing total screening of the inner philosophical center, the central placement of the innovative dipole will torment, without the possibility of rejection either one or the other pole, intensively and persistently Schelling's thoughts. Permeated by a mighty inner volitional activity, human freedom's potential rotates the main axis of the treatise, incorporating profound decision for good, but at the same time for evil as the determinant distinction, both from divine and all the other entities of the human Wesen ‒of being which is holding together the humane with the particular freedom that claims the very idea of humanity. Schelling himself points out the essay as a dialectical genesis of everything within the text. In a parallel interpretive course that will be followed by reading this philosophical masterpiece, Wirth will compare that genesis with a dialectical storm amid the discordance and the imbalance of Wesen, which furthermore, in the final analysis, will be emerged through this verbal fluidity. But the very philosopher knows that it's not achievable to have totally appropriated the conceptual grid of this so much primitive texture, whereas the dialogue unfolds between interlocutors not of the same kind. Probably it is showing more like some crosstalk attempting communication with nature itself; it is like light addressees to its disguised and permanent darkness, and darkness responds (Wirth, 2003, p.p. 158‒160).

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

In this study of the nineteenth-century German-Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen, I argue that Cohen’s revision of Kantian ethics and moral theology is permeated with concepts drawn from and logically contoured by his interpretation of Maimonidean rationalism and Jewish sources, more generally. Through an idealizing hermeneutic, Cohen normativizes certain philosophical problems in post-Kantian philosophy and addresses them under the title of "pantheism" and "positivism". Between both pantheism and positivism, Cohen’s idealism presents a middle path, which I describe as "prophetic idealism", or a philosophy of time and ideality that interprets history, law, and ethical normativity as future-oriented. In other words, "prophecy" intimates a methodological role for temporality in practical philosophy and introduces a new meaning for legality in ethics. Cohen therefore offers a philosophy of Judaism, as a philosophy of religion, by normativizing the idea of prophecy and making it a conceptual model for reason-giving, agency, legal norms and ethical action. By focusing upon the critique of both pantheism and positivism, this dissertation therefore argues that Cohen’s negotiations of nineteenth-century philosophical problems introduces a normative role for Judaism as a public philosophy and the argument concludes by suggesting that Cohen’s philosophy of Judaism is instructive for contemporary public philosophy.

In this study of the nineteenth-century German-Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen, I argue that Cohen’s revision of Kantian ethics and moral theology is permeated with concepts drawn from and logically contoured by his interpretation of Maimonidean rationalism and Jewish sources, more generally. Through an idealizing hermeneutic, Cohen normativizes certain philosophical problems in post-Kantian philosophy and addresses them under the title of "pantheism" and "positivism". Between both pantheism and positivism, Cohen’s idealism presents a middle path, which I describe as "prophetic idealism", or a philosophy of time and ideality that interprets history, law, and ethical normativity as future-oriented. In other words, "prophecy" intimates a methodological role for temporality in practical philosophy and introduces a new meaning for legality in ethics. Cohen therefore offers a philosophy of Judaism, as a philosophy of religion, by normativizing the idea of prophecy and making it a conceptual model for reason-giving, agency, legal norms and ethical action. By focusing upon the critique of both pantheism and positivism, this dissertation therefore argues that Cohen’s negotiations of nineteenth-century philosophical problems introduces a normative role for Judaism as a public philosophy and the argument concludes by suggesting that Cohen’s philosophy of Judaism is instructive for contemporary public philosophy.

Amidst the upheaval of the French Revolution, the British parliamentarian and political theorist Edmund Burke received a vibrant reception in German-speaking Europe. Anxious to uncover the ideological roots of the anarchy that enveloped France – and worried that their own society might be vulnerable to a similar fate – a series of important German thinkers began studying his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). This dissertation brings into focus the diverse interpretations of Burke that were assembled in this turbulent era, and explains them vis-à-vis contemporary debates among German idealists (Kant and his heirs) about the philosophical nature of freedom. This dissertation centers on Burke’s three most perceptive and influential students: the civil servant and philosopher August Wilhelm Rehberg; the journalist, translator, and diplomat Friedrich Gentz; and the political economist and cultural critic Adam Müller. For many decades, both German- and English-speaking intellectual historians have shoehorned these thinkers into a rigid ideological box labeled ‘conservatism’. Inspired by Burke, they are said to have turned away from the ideals of Enlightenment, theorizing an illiberal form of politics that was traditionalistic, authoritarian, and reactionary. A careful, contextualized reconstruction of their engagements with Burke, however, renders this thesis untenable. Far from triggering a monolithic backlash against Enlightenment, Burke in fact inspired a series of divergent, and often incompatible, analyses of the Revolution’s origins, grounded in different readings of his Reflections. Rehberg, for instance, saw Burke as a principled skeptic: he admired the Reflections as an incisive critique of the revolutionaries’ philosophical dogmatism. Gentz, an erstwhile student of Kant, disagreed completely, arguing that Burke’s politics were entirely compatible with Kantian metaphysics. In his view, the Reflections’ central insight was that it takes political prudence to realize the rights of man in practice. Müller, finally, read the Reflections as a lament for the fall of Christendom, and as a diagnosis of the social alienation and moral confusion that had followed its demise. In other words, whereas Rehberg was a Humean skeptic and Gentz was a Kantian liberal, Müller was a Trinitarian Christian. Each of these men, moreover, claimed Burke as an ally. What this means is that Rehberg, Gentz, and Müller cannot have jointly invented a single thing called ‘conservatism’, and Burke cannot have inspired it. This becomes clear only after we recognize that at the turn of the nineteenth century, neither the meaning of Enlightenment nor the crux of Burke’s Reflections was clear: these were not fixed variables, but points of contemporary debate. By recapturing the diversity of Burke’s German reception, this thesis invites scholars to consider the ways that his students shepherded their differing visions of Enlightenment through the fires of the Revolution, down into the nineteenth century.

Aux lendemains de la Première Guerre, le bouleversement est social, politique et culturel. Cela se traduit, chez Walter Benjamin, par une pensée de l'appauvrissement de l’expérience. La pensée rationnelle, elle-même, est dans l'impasse. Au regard de la situation, comment dire un monde qui disparaît et celui qui reste ? Nous sommes, avec Benjamin, en présence d'une radicalité qui ne cède rien à la désespérance. Le messianisme est rejoué, à contre-courant du capitalisme et du fascisme qui édictent un sens de l'avenir. C'est une réflexion au gué du temps, qui se tient entre le temps venu d'un changement nécessaire, politique et intellectuel, et le temps où l'on peut dire qu'un changement a eu lieu. Ainsi, à partir de l'appauvrissement de l’expérience, c'est la question des rapports entre théorie et pratique qui est reposée. Il s'agit de penser, et de penser le politique autrement, en faisant intervenir le théologique. Or, le sauvetage de l’expérience demande de retrouver l'étincelle toujours recommencée de la transmission, que nous proposons de dire : être dans l'intelligence de l'autre. / Just after the First World War, political, social and cultural disruptions are in the forefront. In this situation, Walter Benjamin is led to a reflection on the impoverishment of experience. Even rationality has reached deadlock. How to seize by words the world that has disappeared and the one that remains ? With Benjamin, one is confronted with a radicality which concedes nothing to despair. Messianism is reenacted against capitalism and fascism, which both firmly set the direction of the future. One is faced with a‛time-fording’ thought, halfway between the time of an upcoming – both political and intellectual – necessary change, and the time of a new regime of thought. Thus, from the impoverishment of experience arises anew the question of theory and practice. The stake is to think, to think politics in another way, which involves theology. The salvation of experience, nevertheless, demands to revive the ever-rekindling spark of transmission, that is : being in understanding with the other.