Nous proposons dans ce travail une interprétation de la référence à la psychanalyse chez Adorno et Horkheimer, en partant de son usage dans un champ inattendu, quoique central : la critique de la rationalité. Adorno et Horkheimer affirment, notamment dans la Dialectique de la raison, que la raison, concept à la fois central et structurant pour la société moderne capitaliste, entre en conflit avec elle-même jusqu'à son autodestruction, qui doit être comprise comme passage dans la folie. Nous entendons soutenir que cette affirmation peut être comprise de manière non-métaphorique par le recours à la psychanalyse, à partir d’une double lecture de leurs écrits, à la fois génétique et micrologique. Nous situons la genèse du croisement entre psychanalyse et critique de la rationalité dans leurs premiers travaux, au moment de traiter du rapport entre psychologie et théorie de la connaissance, d’abord dans une perspective philosophique néokantienne, puis dans le cadre du programme de recherches interdisciplinaires des années trente. Ce croisement précoce conduit Adorno et Horkheimer à s’intéresser tant à la part inconsciente qui travaille les processus de connaissance, qu’à la logique des phénomènes apparemment les plus irrationnels. Nous réinterprétons ainsi les travaux des années trente et quarante comme la mise au jour d’une conjonction de formes spécifiques de rationalisation sociale avec la montée de phénomènes sociaux particulièrement irrationnels, notamment liés à l’émergence du fascisme. Cette conjonction mène alors à la thématisation psychanalytique de l’autodestruction de la raison. Notre thèse est que la mise au jour de ce paradigme critique singulier – qui associe approche psychanalytique, critique de la raison et théorie de la connaissance – révèle de façon cohérente et globale la fonction attribuée à la psychanalyse par ces auteurs : rendre compte de la déraison comme effet de la logique contradictoire que la société moderne capitaliste établit entre nature et histoire. Nous pouvons ainsi conclure notre travail en analysant à quelle condition une théorie de la connaissance dialectique et critique est susceptible de ne pas reconduire l’écueil que la psychanalyse a permis d’identifier au niveau social, à savoir la réduction du rapport entre histoire et nature à un rapport de domination. Nous entendons ainsi montrer les potentialités critiques de ce paradigme dans le cadre des débats contemporains sur les pathologies de la raison. / In this study, we will propose an interpretation of the psychoanalytic references in the works of Adorno and Horkheimer, by starting from the way they are used in an unexpected, and yet central, field: the critique of rationality. Especially in Dialectics of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer affirm that reason, a concept that is both central and structuring to the modern capitalist society, comes into conflit with itself to the point of its self-destruction, which should be understood as a passage to madness. We intend to defend that this affirmation can be understood, by having recourse to psychoanalysis, in a non-metaphorical manner, starting from a double reading, both genetic and micrologic, of their writings. We situate the genesis of the intersection between psychoanalysis and the critique of rationality in their early works, when they were dealing with the relationship between psychology and the theory of knowledge, at first in a neo-Kantian perspective, then within the framework of the program of interdisciplinary research in the thirties. This precocious intersection led them to become interested as much in the unconscious part which works through the process of knowledge, as in the logic of phenomena which are apparently the most irrational. We therefore interpret their works from the thirties and forties as the unveiling of a conjunction of specific forms of social rationalization with the rising of particularly irrational phenomena, especially related to the emergence of fascism. This conjunction then leads to the psychoanalytical thematisation of reason’s self destruction. Our thesis is that by disclosing this singular critical paradigm – which links together the psychoanalytical approach, the critique of reason, and the theory of knowledge – the function attributed to psychoanalysis by these authors can be revealed in a global and coherent fashion: accounting for unreason as an effect of the contradictory logic that the modern capitalist society establishes between nature and history. We can therefore conclude our work by analyzing on what condition a dialectical and critical theory of knowledge is likely to avoid the pitfall that psychoanalysis has allowed to identify at the social level, i.e. the reduction of the relation between history and nature to a relation of domination. In this way, the critical potentials of this paradigm within the framework of contemporary debates on the pathologies of reason can be brought to light.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:29:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2011-05-20Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:59:47Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 borgato_r_me_arafcl.pdf: 251424 bytes, checksum: bd0fb277990bef95983a257159877337 (MD5) / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) / O presente trabalho tem o objetivo de analisar a presença do elemento trágico no romance O tempo e o vento, do escritor brasileiro Erico Verissimo. Tal proposta justifica-se não apenas por abordar um aspecto pouco estudado em relação à obra selecionada, mas também por possibilitar o levantamento de questões teóricas relevantes em relação ao gênero romance. A metodologia de pesquisa consiste de etapas distintas. Primeiramente, foi feito um levantamento histórico do conceito de trágico, desde o surgimento da Tragédia Grega até sua apropriação pelos filósofos do idealismo alemão pós-kantiano, com o intuito de formular uma concepção sobre o conceito de trágico. Em seguida, discute-se a possibilidade de manifestação do trágico dentro da forma romance, especificamente por meio da figura do herói; para isso, são abordadas possíveis relações entre três obras modelares da literatura moderna: Hamlet, Werther e Mrs. Dalloway. Na terceira etapa do trabalho, são analisados aspectos de O tempo e o vento que situam a obra na tradição do trágico no romance e, ainda, os elementos da narrativa que demonstram o quanto a narrativa de Verissimo pode ser original dentro dessa tradição. Conclui-se, então, que o fator de originalidade da trilogia é a forma de abordagem da questão autoral. Por meio desta, há a mediação do conflito trágico central do romance, além da busca por trazer unidade à realidade representada através do trabalho estético. Sendo assim, o romance mostra-se capaz de conciliar elementos épicos (busca da unidade) e trágicos (processo dialético representado no conflito do herói) / It is this work’s objective to analyze the presence of the tragic element in the novel O tempo e o vento (written by Brazilian novelist Erico Verissimo). The proposal is justified not only because it approaches a seldom studied aspect about the selected work, but also because it enables the surveying of relevant theoretical questions about novel as a literary genre. The research method consists in different steps. First of all it was made a historical survey about the tragic concept, since the raising of Greek Tragedy until its appropriation by the German idealistic philosophers of the post-Kant era, in order to formulate a concept of tragic. Then it is discussed the possibility of tragic manifestation into the novel’s form, specifically through the hero’s figure; in order to illustrate this possible relations, three archetype works of modern literature (Hamlet, Werther and Mrs. Dalloway) are approached. In the third step of this work some aspects of O tempo e o vento are analyzed, in order to situate the novel in a tradition of the tragic into modern novel, and still elements of the narrative which demonstrate the originality of Verissimo’s work to this tradition are also analyzed. So it is concluded that the factor of originality in Verissimo’s trilogy is the form under which the authorial question is approached. It enables the mediation of the central tragic conflict in the novel, and conveys unity to the reality represented throughout the aesthetic work. In doing so the novel shows itself capable of conciliate epic (the pursuit of unity) and tragic (the dialectic process represented in the hero’s conflict) elements

This thesis presents Hegel’s account of abstract ‘understanding’ (Verstand) and asserts that his thought is to be read as primarily presenting a critique of abstract understanding. Verstand involves the methodological supposition of a self-subsistent fundament of what it speaks of, and hence the critique of understanding is the critique of the supposition of self-subsistent fundaments. Grasping his account and reading him in its critical light yields a very different image of Hegel than the caricature of ‘totalizing systems’. The dimension of the Verstandeskritik has been relatively neglected in Hegel-reception and misunderstandings result from trying to ‘understand’ Hegel, by overlooking the topic of ‘understanding’ in his work as critique. Many caricatures result from understanding Hegel as a proponent of what he actually critiques (‘absolute knowing’ is often understood as a mega-understanding). The thesis then addresses the historically influential criticisms raised by his contemporary, F.J.W. Schelling, to give a voice to a Hegel that has been hitherto drowned out by caricatures that began with Schelling.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FIL - Edson Dognaldo Gil.pdf: 1469522 bytes, checksum: 93803423295828ce6d57adf7e6ced90d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-10-19 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The aim of this dissertation is to present and toanalyse the first principle of Fichteʹs Doctrine of Science, namely, that of the self‐position of the I, in the same way the German idealist philosopher expounds it in the firstparagraph of his masterpiece Grundlage der gesammten issenschaftslehre [Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge], published in 1794‐1795. The historical presentation situates Fichteʹs issue in the context of the modern philosophy in general, and of German idealism in particular. Remarks are provided on the relation and mutual influence of German thinkers, especially on the continuity between the transcendental philosophy of Kant and that of Fichte, pointing out, however, the originality of the project of the Doctrine of Science. Some attention is also given to the current state of the Fichte‐Forschung. The systematic analysis, wish constitutes the core of the work, concentrates on the thorough reading of the first paragraph of the Grundlage, pointing out its implications to the question of the relation between being and thinking, morespecifically, the respective transcendental transformation of the Cartesian cogito. Thus, the I, in so far as it is (characterized as) pure intelligence, is the genetic, originary and pre-predicative Act (Tathandlung). Therefore, it is previous toboth discursive thought and objective consciousness (ofa substantiated Cartesian subject), and yet it is accessible by means of an intuitive method; it is nonetheless purely intellectual and authentically meditative meditative philosophy, philosophy as art (ars). There is enclosed a reproduction of the original text of the first paragraph of the Grundlage, as well as the respective translation, of my authorship. There is also a small glossary of the most important terms used by Fichte translated from German into Portuguese / O escopo desta dissertação consiste em apresentar e analisaro chamado Primeiro Princípio da autoposição do Eu da Doutrina da Ciência de Johann Gottlieb Fichte, tal qual o idealista alemão o expõe no primeiro parágrafo de sua obra‐prima Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschriftfür seine Zuhörer [Fundamento de toda a Doutrina da Ciência como manual para seus ouvintes], publicada em 1794‐1795. A apresentação histórica visa a situar a problemáticafichteana no contexto da filosofia moderna, em geral, e, em particular, do idealismo alemão. Tecem‐se considerações sobre a relação e a influência mútua dos pensadores alemães, especialmente sobre a continuidade entre a filosofia transcendental deKant e a de Fichte, destacando‐se porém a originalidade do projeto da Doutrina da Ciência. Dedicam‐se, além disso, algumas palavras ao estado atual da Fichte‐Forschung. A análise sistemática, que constitui o cerne do trabalho, concentra‐se na leitura minuciosa do primeiro parágrafo da Grundlage, destacando‐se suas implicações no que respeita à questão da relação entre ser e pensar, mais especificamente, a respectiva transformação transcendental do cogito cartesiano. Conclui‐se que, para Fichte, o eu, enquanto inteligência pura, é Ato genético, originário (Tathandlung), pré‐predicativo e, portanto, anterior ao pensamento discursivo e à consciência objetiva (de um sujeito hipostasiado, cartesiano), ao qual se tem acesso por meio de um método intuitivo, mas puramente intelectual, autenticamente meditativo filosofia meditativa, filosofia como arte (ars). Como anexos, seguem‐se a reprodução do texto original do primeiro parágrafo da Grundlage, bem como a respectiva tradução, de minha autoria. Além disso, um pequeno vocabulário, alemão‐português, dos termos mais importantes utilizados por Fichte

Ce travail réinterroge la philosophie sociale critique d’Adorno à partir des concepts de règle et de jeu. Il a pour objectif d’exposer la théorie de la société d’Adorno et d’en questionner les fondements. Ces fondements, telle est notre thèse, peuvent être conceptualisés dans un langage propre à la sociologie de l’action si on les reformule en termes de « règles », de « suivi des règles » et de « jeu » – concepts qu’Adorno lui-même utilise afin de décrire le social, plus précisément la société capitaliste dans laquelle il vivait. Le fameux tout « non-vrai », qu’est la société selon Adorno, peut ainsi être compris comme un jeu réglé par lui-même, indépendamment de l’intentionnalité des acteurs. Cette reformulation de la philoso-phie sociale d’Adorno nous permet de la faire dialoguer avec d’autres conceptions du social (Weber, Ha-bermas, Descombes, Searle et le structuralisme) et de montrer à quel point l’objet d’Adorno diffère de celui de Weber, de Habermas et de Searle alors qu’il est commensurable à celui du structuralisme. La méthode pour saisir cet objet, à savoir les règles non intentionnelles qui structurent le jeu social, est celle de Freud (interprétation, lecture symptômale). Adorno, toutefois, se distingue du structuralisme et aussi de Freud en ce qu’il pense pouvoir établir un lien entre société capitaliste et le social réglé comme un jeu inaccessible aux acteurs : ce jeu est non seulement l’objet de recherche d’Adorno mais aussi l’objet de sa critique. Notre travail s’emploie à étayer la possibilité de cette critique qui ne vise rien de moins que les conditions de possibilité du vivre en commun telles qu’elles ont été établies par la philosophie sociale structuraliste ainsi que par Freud : des règles à effet inconscient qui font en sorte que tous les acteurs ne réalisent ou ne di-sent pas les mêmes significations font l’objet de la critique adornienne. Critiquer ces règles implique de montrer qu’une critique de l’institution verticale des sujets est possible sans détruire ni poser comme abso-lu la subjectivité elle-même. Cette critique devient envisageable à partir du moment où l’on examine la pratique qui est incluse dans le suivi aveugle de la règle : au sein de cette « fausse » pratique – qu’Adorno appelle la pratique d’identification – se dégage une pratique autre qui met en question la soumission aveugle à la règle. Cette pratique critique est également appelée « jeu ». Notre travail se conclut sur l’exposition de cette pratique et de son potentiel critique au sein du jeu qu’est la société capitaliste. / This work reexamines the social critical philosophy of Adorno, starting form the concepts of rule and of game. It aims to expose the social theory of Adorno and to question its foundations. These foundations can be conceptualized in a language specific to the sociology of action if they are rephrased in terms of rules, rule-following and game; concepts which Adorno himself uses to describe the social, spe-cifically the capitalist society in which he lived. The famous all "non-true" which society is according to Adorno, can be understood as a game working in itself, regardless of the intentionality of the actors. This rephrasing of the social philosophy of Adorno allows us to dialogue with the other approaches of the social (Weber, Habermas, Descombes, Searle and the structuralism) and to show how the object of Adorno differs from that of Weber, Habermas and Searle, how it is commensurable with that of structuralism. The Method to seize the object, i.e. the rules that structure the unintentional social game, is the method of Freud (interpretation, symptomatic reading). Adorno, however, differs from structuralism and also from Freud’s conception of the social because he thinks that he can establish a link between capitalist society and the social regulated as a game inaccessible to players: for Adorno this game is not only the object of research but also the object of his criticism. Our work goes on to justify the possibility of such criticism that targets nothing less than the conditions of possibility of common living. What was established by structur-alist social philosophy as well as by Freud is the subject of criticism of Adorno: rules whose effects are unconscious, which ensure that all players do not realize or do not say the same meanings. To criticize these rules implies showing that the critique of vertical instituted subjects is possible without destroying subjec-tivity nor positing it as absolute. This criticism becomes possible from the moment you look at the prac-tice included in the blind following of the rule which is the "wrong" practice - Adorno calls this practice of identification ; the right practice included in practice of identification challenges the blind submission to

The dissertation situates the Goethean sublime in an obscured countermovement of resistance to the aestheticization the concept underwent in the 18th century. Before the encounter with the English aesthetic concept of the sublime, the German notion of das Erhabene (the sublime) named not a category of aesthetic experience, but a social affect. In contrast to the Sublime of Edmund Burke's theory, which explicitly excludes melancholy from the sources of the Sublime, das Erhabene is an affect related to the self-overcoming of melancholic subjectivity. As the aestheticized notion of the sublime displaced das Erhabene, Goethe became one of the most radical innovators of the aesthetics of the sublime. But as is demonstrated in chapters on The Sorrows of Young Werther, Elective Affinities, Faust and Wilhelm Meister, he did so with the aim of recovering the displaced meaning of das Erhabene as social affect. Goethe's sublime aims to show at every turn that the so-called "aesthetic experience" of the sublime is really displaced social affect. His treatment of the sublime therefore constitutes a radical critique of the establishment of aesthetics as an independent sphere of inquiry. There is for Goethe no way to understand aesthetic experience independently of its social context. By reconnecting the sublime it to the original social meaning of das Erhabene, Goethe recovers the aesthetics of the sublime as a means of mediating and facilitating the movement of subjectivity from frustrated stasis to divine creativity; i.e., from exclusion to participation in the material creation of reality.

The dissertation situates the Goethean sublime in an obscured countermovement of resistance to the aestheticization the concept underwent in the 18th century. Before the encounter with the English aesthetic concept of the sublime, the German notion of das Erhabene (the sublime) named not a category of aesthetic experience, but a social affect. In contrast to the Sublime of Edmund Burke's theory, which explicitly excludes melancholy from the sources of the Sublime, das Erhabene is an affect related to the self-overcoming of melancholic subjectivity. As the aestheticized notion of the sublime displaced das Erhabene, Goethe became one of the most radical innovators of the aesthetics of the sublime. But as is demonstrated in chapters on The Sorrows of Young Werther, Elective Affinities, Faust and Wilhelm Meister, he did so with the aim of recovering the displaced meaning of das Erhabene as social affect. Goethe's sublime aims to show at every turn that the so-called "aesthetic experience" of the sublime is really displaced social affect. His treatment of the sublime therefore constitutes a radical critique of the establishment of aesthetics as an independent sphere of inquiry. There is for Goethe no way to understand aesthetic experience independently of its social context. By reconnecting the sublime it to the original social meaning of das Erhabene, Goethe recovers the aesthetics of the sublime as a means of mediating and facilitating the movement of subjectivity from frustrated stasis to divine creativity; i.e., from exclusion to participation in the material creation of reality.

The purpose of this study is to present the different approaches, which Hegel and Marx have developed regarding the relation between consciousness and life, consistent with their aims. Hegel&rsquo / s aim is to combine all the opposed ideas and beliefs proposed throughout the history of philosophy into a unified whole. Hegel&rsquo / s dialectics which is immanent to life can also explain the opposition between consciousness and life. Self-consciousness, which appears as subjectivity in Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy, at first, treats the life as an object of desire. Later, however, self-consciousness which cannot thus realize itself desires another self-consciousness who will recognize itself, so it relates with an other self-consciousness. This relation is defined as a &ldquo / life and death struggle&rdquo / . At the end of the struggle, there arise new forms of self-consciousnesses, Master and Slave. While the Slave produces for its Master, it relates itself to Life and this relation between Slave and Life brings about Slave as self-consciousness. On the other hand, the aim of Marx is not only to combine the oppositions but also to create a worldly philosophy. To this end, Marx puts economic relations of human beings at the centre of his theory. According to Marx, relations of production condition classes. While one class produces, the other exploits the productions of the former class. In Hegel, the Slave obtains its certainty as self-consciousness while it produces, whereas in Marx, the worker, who produces, is alienated form him/herself in the capitalist mode of production. To sum up, both Hegel and Marx emphasize the mutual relation between consciousness and life, but their divergent aims lead to them constructing this relation with different concepts on different foundations.

Orientador: Marcos Lutz Muller / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-08T02:41:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lima_ErickCalheirosde_D.pdf: 2308487 bytes, checksum: 6dfb3fccea5c3fb1cb1bf08e6d614a3b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: Este trabalho pretende desenvolver uma tese de leitura acerca das motivações e da consolidação da filosofia social de Hegel, qual seja: a importância da assimilação da teoria fichteana da intersubjetividade para a constituição do modelo hegeliano do desenvolvimento da eticidade. Na primeira parte, pretende-se mostrar que a teoria fichteana da intersubjetividade, desenvolvida no contexto da dedução da relação de direito, possui um potencial ético que parece cristalizar-se numa concepção não limitativa, não excludente e positiva da relação intersubjetiva. Na segunda parte, após investigar a contraposição, nos escritos de Hegel em Frankfurt, entre a intersubjetividade limitativa e potencialmente desagregadora, própria às relações contratuais do direito privado, e a harmonia intersubjetiva do amor, pretende-se mostrar que a derrocada da expectativa de Hegel com respeito ao ideal de integração social pela via de uma Volksreligion conduz a contraposição entre a intersubjetividade ¿solidária¿ e a ¿restritiva¿ ao projeto de uma ¿subjugação¿ da esfera econômica juridicamente regulada sob o âmbito político-público da eticidade absoluta. Em seguida, perseguindo a tese de que o problema do Einssein entre universal e singular pressupõe uma solução intersubjetivista, procura-se explorar as peculiaridades da ¿gênese intersubjetiva¿ do espírito do povo no System der Sittlichkeit e no Jenaer Systementwurf 1803/04, com especial ênfase na progressiva imbricação entre teoria da consciência, reconhecimento e desenvolvimento conceitual da eticidade, a qual interpretamos como uma articulação sócio-filosófica entre a intersubjetividade formadora e a intersubjetividade limitativa. Na terceira parte, pretende-se clarificar, a partir de uma análise comparativa do reconhecimento em suas versões ¿fenomenológicas¿, a conexão do mesmo com a efetivação da liberdade individual na eticidade. A intenção é mostrar que a ¿generalização¿ do movimento, pela sua inserção na ¿filosofia do espírito subjetivo¿, não conduz necessariamente ao seu desligamento dos estágios de efetivação intersubjetiva da liberdade, mas antes à sua pressuposição como forma normativa da relação social efetiva, de maneira que não apenas a relação intersubjetiva participativa e formadora da individualidade e a relação solidária, que constitui a gênese do estado ético, como também a relação de respeito recíproco à intangibilidade da pessoa, podem, enquanto ¿relações éticas¿, ser tematizadas no registro comum de um ¿ser-reconhecido¿. Finalmente, procura-se mostrar como Hegel insere, no Systementwurf 1805/06, a ¿luta por reconhecimento¿ em uma argumentação que articula a forma participativa de intersubjetividade com a gênese da solidariedade ética que tem de estar vinculada à efetividade social de uma vontade universal, a qual é, entretanto, compreendida pela primeira vez por Hegel, em sua imediatidade, como direito. O resultado mais amplo do trabalho é a tese de que tal interpretação poderia ser ¿aplicada¿ em uma leitura das Grundlinien, o que, entretanto, será apenas aqui indicado / Abstract: This work intends to delineate some motives underlying the development of Hegel's social philosophy. According to the interpretation we attempt to formulate, Fichte's view of intersubjectivity plays a decisive role in Hegel's comprehension of the conceptual unfolding of ¿ethical life¿ (Sittlichkeit). The first part focuses on Fichte's theory of intersubjectivity, particularly on its version presented in the Foundations of Natural Law, where it is deduced as a condition for the ¿juridical relation¿(Rechtsverhältnis). The main task is to show that Fichte's conception of the intersubjective mediation of individual conscience, when considered apart from its endurable form as a relation of reciprocally limited spheres of action, seems to contain the ethical potential for a ¿non-limited¿, ¿non-exclusive¿ and positive actualization of individual freedom. In the second part, after elucidating, in Hegel's early writings, the opposition between the ¿juridical¿, potentially disintegrative conception of intersubjectivity and the harmony of love, we intend to indicate how the frustration of Hegel's expectations, regarding social integration through a Volksreligion, conduces to the project of ¿subordination¿ (Bezwingung) of juridically regulated economics under the political realm of the abolute ethical life. Thus, after demonstrating that the problem of the Einssein of universal and individual pressuposes an intersubjective solution, the aim is to delineate the intersubjective genesis of the ¿Spirit of a People¿ in the System of Ethical Life and in the Philosophy of Spirit 1803/04, always emphazising the progressive articulation of theory of conscience, recognition and the conceptual unfolding of ethical life. The third part aims to elucidate, through a comparative investigation of the ¿phenomenological¿ versions of Hegel's theory of recognition, its connection with the actualization of individual freedom in the institutional framework of ethical life. In this context, it is aimed to show that the ¿generalization¿ of the process of recognition, due to its insertion into the ¿philosophy of subjective spirit¿, in despite of its immediate disconnection from the stages of intersubjective actualization of freedom, points toward the possibility of its pressuposition as the normative form of the actual social relation. According to this view, this ¿generalization¿ allows that not only the formative intersubjective ralation and the solidary connection among the individuals, that engenders the ¿ethical state¿, but also the interpersonal relations, based on reciprocal respect to the intangibility of individual freedom, could be reduced to the common denominator of a ¿being-recognized¿ (Anerkanntsein). Finally, the task is to consider how Hegel integrates, in the Philosophy of Spirit 1805/06, the ¿struggle for recognition¿ into an argumentation that articulates the participative form of intersubjectivity with the genesis of the ethical solidarity that is vinculated to the social actuality of the universal will, which is, for the first time in Hegel's philosophical development, understood in its immediacy as right (Recht). As a conclusion, we summarize some indications of a possible extension of this presented view to an interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of Right / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Philosophie und Frühantisemitismus bilden den Themenbereich der Arbeit. Der Frühantisemitismus reicht von 1780 bis 1850. Speziell verweigert er die Bürgerrechte für Juden. In diesem Sinn wenden Deutsche Liberale sich während der Entstehungsphase der bürgerlichen Gesellschaften im frühen 19. Jahrhundert gegen die jüdische Emanzipation: F. L. Jahn, E. M. Arndt, K. Follen, C. F. Rühs und J. F. Fries. Im Gegensatz zu ihnen votiert Hegel mit seinen Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts entschieden für sie. Er schließt damit an die Erklärung der Menschenrechte in den USA und Frankreich an und führt deren Normativität fort. Es ist das Ergebnis konsequenten Denkens und Hegel überwindet einige seiner früheren antijüdischen Ansichten. Er betont die klare Verbindung zwischen Menschenrechten und Judenemanzipation, geht aber auch darüber hinaus: Sein Konzept fordert eine Integration, die zudem wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Teilhabe verlangt. Hegel opponiert unter historischen Bedingungen gegen die liberalen Frühantisemiten, was ebenso zu berücksichtigen ist, wie die systematischen Argumente der Rechtslehre. Nichtsdestotrotz gelingt ihm kein konsistentes Konzept. Der Grund dafür liegt jedoch in der Realität, die dargestellt werden soll, und nicht bei ihm. Hinsichtlich der internationalen Beziehungen zwischen den modernen Staaten gibt es keine universellen Institutionen mit Macht. Hegel opfert letztlich sein Vorhaben, die universelle Ethik weiterzuentwickeln, weil er dies reflektiert und sich ihm beugt. Unter Berücksichtigung dieses Kontextes müssen seine Konzepte zum Volksgeist betrachtet werden. Die Partikularität des Volksgeistkonzepts gefährdet seinen Entwurf zur Emanzipation, der universal fundiert ist; doch der Grund der Probleme liegt in den internationalen Beziehungen. / In this thesis early anti-semitism is discussed in the context of G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy. Early anti-semitism spanning from 1780-1850 is particularly concerned with declining Jews any equal civic status. Against the backdrop of civil societies arising in the early 19th century, a group of German authors, including F.L. Jahn, E.M. Arndt, K. Follen, C.F. Rühs, and J.F. Fries, in spite of their liberalism opposed Jewish emancipation in this specific sense. In contrast, Hegel in his Philosophy of Right clearly argues in favour of Jewish emancipation, following modern normative ideals as established by Human Rights Declarations in the U.S. and in France. Overcoming some of his earlier anti-Jewish views Hegel arrives at this result by way of consistent thinking. He not only stresses the obvious relationship between Human Rights and Jewish emancipation, but also further develops this idea: His concept calls for equal integration that involves economic and cultural participation as well. Hegel opposed liberal anti-semites under specific historical conditions that have to be taken into account alongside his philosophical arguments put forward in the Philosophy of Right. If he finally didn‘t achieve to develop an overall consistent concept it‘s not to be attributed to a lack of efforts on his part but rather to the reality his theory reflects. International relations between modern states don‘t involve universal institutions with actual power. Hegel, reflecting on and giving in to that reality, finally dismisses his earlier attempts to advance universal ethics. His concept of a nation‘s particular volksgeist and especially the Germanic spirit have to be assessed with this context in mind. Hegel‘s idea of emancipation which rests on universal claims is at odds with his preference for the particular that‘s being expressed in his concept of a volksgeist. The source for this problem however has to be sought in the international relations themselves.