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Minimální věk pro požívání alkoholických nápojů v USA: Oprávněná výjimka z principu plnoletosti? / Minimum Legal Drinking Age in the U.S.: A Reasonable Exception to Age of Majority?Lokajíčková, Jana January 2012 (has links)
The MA thesis "Minimum Legal Drinking Age in the U.S.: A Reasonable Exception to Age of Majority?" examines the U.S. legal limit for consumption of alcohol from the perspective of policies aimed at controlling drunk driving because the minimum drinking age was set to twenty-one - higher than the age of majority - in order to reduce drunk-driving fatalities. The thesis analyzes different aspects of this issue and concludes that the high minimum legal drinking, which constitutes a severe limitation of personal freedom of those aged eighteen to twenty, did not fulfill the expectations with which it was introduced in 1984. The thesis suggests alternatives to the high age limit, and examines how and if they are implemented or what prevents their frequent use. The thesis has four parts: one provides basic facts about drinking, driving, and drunk driving in the U.S. society including the attitudes of the public toward the issue. The following part looks into the legal developments of the drinking age limits and legal challenges to the law arranging the age limit for its supposed unconstitutionality. The third chapter looks at the results of scientific research and suggests ways to deal with drunk driving more efficiently. The last part examines what prevents these more effective measures from being widely...
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La création d'un État palestinien, une solution possible au conflit israélo-arabe?Machon, Elodie 05 1900 (has links)
Pourquoi créer un État palestinien ? Avant tout parce qu’il s’agit de l’unique solution qui détient un fondement juridique, à travers la résolution 181 des Nations-Unies votée en 1947. Cette résolution préconisait la création de l’État israélien et celle de l’État palestinien comme deux facettes d’une unique solution. La création d’un État palestinien n’est pas seulement légale au regard du droit, elle permettrait également le partage des responsabilités revenant à chacun des acteurs du conflit.
Une telle création est-elle possible en l’état actuel de la situation au Moyen-Orient ? Telle est la problématique de notre étude, qui comprend deux volets, l’un théorique, l’autre pratique. L’objectif est de revoir les règles du droit international relatives aux critères de formation d’un État palestinien, d’examiner si ces règles sont respectées et de déterminer quels sont les obstacles qui compliquent l’application d’une telle création.
La première partie qui consiste à s’interroger sur la formation d’un État palestinien nous mène à examiner quatre éléments : la population permanente, le territoire déterminé, le gouvernement effectif et la capacité à entrer en relation avec les autres États. L’étude de ces éléments montre que la Palestine est un embryon d’État.
Même si le concept d’un État palestinien peut être envisagé en droit, qu’en est-il de sa viabilité ? La deuxième partie de notre étude porte sur les obstacles juridiques à la création d’un État palestinien. Quatre éléments qui sont l’occupation, l’édification d’un mur entre Israël et les territoires palestiniens, les colonies de peuplement israéliennes en territoire palestinien occupé incluant la question de Jérusalem et enfin le droit au retour des réfugiés sont étudiés.
Il ressort de cette recherche qu’un État palestinien pourrait être créé en droit mais sa viabilité reste conditionnée au bon vouloir d’Israël sur les questions évoquées ci-dessus. Aujourd’hui, les dimensions du conflit rendent particulièrement complexe une entente entre les deux parties. Le cadre juridique international représenté par l’ONU ne peut s’appliquer au conflit israélo-palestinien que s’il bénéficie de l’appui diplomatique clair et sincère de l’ensemble des acteurs internationaux. / Why creating a Palestinian State? Because it is the unique solution which has a legal background according to the 181 resolution of the United Nations Organization voted in 1947. This resolution recommended the creation of the State of Israel and the Palestinian one as two sides of an unique solution. The creation of a Palestinian State is not only legal, it would also allow the share of responsibilities between the protagonists of the conflict.
Is this creation possible considering the current situation in the Middle-East? This is the problematic of the study which consists of two parts, the first one being theoretical and the second one looking at practical issues. The purpose is to review the rules of international law related to the criteria required for the creation of a Palestinian State and to examine if these rules are respected in order to determine which are the obstacles that make this creation difficult to achieve.
The first part is analyzing if the four key requirements for the creation of a Palestinian State i.e. the population, the territory, the real government and the international legal capacity are met. The survey of these items shows that Palestine is an embryonic State.
Even if the concept of a Palestinian State could be legally considered, could it be viable? The second part of the study deals with the legal obstacles of the creation of a Palestinian State. We are then reviewing four major issues which are the occupation, the building of a wall separating Israel and the Palestinian territories, the Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, including the specific situation of Jerusalem and finally the right of return of the Palestinian refugees.
This study shows that a Palestinian State could be legally created but its viability would be conditioned to the willingness of Israel regarding the questions mentioned above. The various dimensions of the conflict make today an agreement between the two protagonists very difficult to achieve. The international legal scope represented by the United Nations Organization can apply to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict only if it gets a clear and strong support of all the countries.
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La création d'un État palestinien, une solution possible au conflit israélo-arabe?Machon, Elodie 05 1900 (has links)
Pourquoi créer un État palestinien ? Avant tout parce qu’il s’agit de l’unique solution qui détient un fondement juridique, à travers la résolution 181 des Nations-Unies votée en 1947. Cette résolution préconisait la création de l’État israélien et celle de l’État palestinien comme deux facettes d’une unique solution. La création d’un État palestinien n’est pas seulement légale au regard du droit, elle permettrait également le partage des responsabilités revenant à chacun des acteurs du conflit.
Une telle création est-elle possible en l’état actuel de la situation au Moyen-Orient ? Telle est la problématique de notre étude, qui comprend deux volets, l’un théorique, l’autre pratique. L’objectif est de revoir les règles du droit international relatives aux critères de formation d’un État palestinien, d’examiner si ces règles sont respectées et de déterminer quels sont les obstacles qui compliquent l’application d’une telle création.
La première partie qui consiste à s’interroger sur la formation d’un État palestinien nous mène à examiner quatre éléments : la population permanente, le territoire déterminé, le gouvernement effectif et la capacité à entrer en relation avec les autres États. L’étude de ces éléments montre que la Palestine est un embryon d’État.
Même si le concept d’un État palestinien peut être envisagé en droit, qu’en est-il de sa viabilité ? La deuxième partie de notre étude porte sur les obstacles juridiques à la création d’un État palestinien. Quatre éléments qui sont l’occupation, l’édification d’un mur entre Israël et les territoires palestiniens, les colonies de peuplement israéliennes en territoire palestinien occupé incluant la question de Jérusalem et enfin le droit au retour des réfugiés sont étudiés.
Il ressort de cette recherche qu’un État palestinien pourrait être créé en droit mais sa viabilité reste conditionnée au bon vouloir d’Israël sur les questions évoquées ci-dessus. Aujourd’hui, les dimensions du conflit rendent particulièrement complexe une entente entre les deux parties. Le cadre juridique international représenté par l’ONU ne peut s’appliquer au conflit israélo-palestinien que s’il bénéficie de l’appui diplomatique clair et sincère de l’ensemble des acteurs internationaux. / Why creating a Palestinian State? Because it is the unique solution which has a legal background according to the 181 resolution of the United Nations Organization voted in 1947. This resolution recommended the creation of the State of Israel and the Palestinian one as two sides of an unique solution. The creation of a Palestinian State is not only legal, it would also allow the share of responsibilities between the protagonists of the conflict.
Is this creation possible considering the current situation in the Middle-East? This is the problematic of the study which consists of two parts, the first one being theoretical and the second one looking at practical issues. The purpose is to review the rules of international law related to the criteria required for the creation of a Palestinian State and to examine if these rules are respected in order to determine which are the obstacles that make this creation difficult to achieve.
The first part is analyzing if the four key requirements for the creation of a Palestinian State i.e. the population, the territory, the real government and the international legal capacity are met. The survey of these items shows that Palestine is an embryonic State.
Even if the concept of a Palestinian State could be legally considered, could it be viable? The second part of the study deals with the legal obstacles of the creation of a Palestinian State. We are then reviewing four major issues which are the occupation, the building of a wall separating Israel and the Palestinian territories, the Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, including the specific situation of Jerusalem and finally the right of return of the Palestinian refugees.
This study shows that a Palestinian State could be legally created but its viability would be conditioned to the willingness of Israel regarding the questions mentioned above. The various dimensions of the conflict make today an agreement between the two protagonists very difficult to achieve. The international legal scope represented by the United Nations Organization can apply to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict only if it gets a clear and strong support of all the countries.
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La société plaideur : plaidoyer pour la reconnaissance d'un droit commun du contentieux sociétaire / The claimant company : a plea for the recognition of the governing law in company disputesAlias, Aymeric 26 June 2015 (has links)
L'accès d'une société à un prétoire est source de nombreuses problématiques procédurales. Cela étant, ces dernières n'étant pas suffisamment considérées par le législateur ou idéalement compilées au sein d'une codification spécifique, elles demeurent la cause de légitimes tourments pratiques. Les interrogations sont alors nombreuses : elles portent sur les droits susceptibles d’être invoqués devant le juge, par ou contre la société, sa capacité à jouir de l'action en justice, le pouvoir ou la qualité de ceux qui prétendent être à même de l’incarner à la barre ; la juridiction compétente pour connaître du litige qui l'intéresse ; la gestion du temps procédural en adéquation avec le rythme de la vie sociale ; l’élaboration et la communication des actes de procédure établis en son nom ou à son intention ; la garantie d'exécution des décisions rendues en sa présence. Le risque appréhendé est l’échec procédural. À l’origine de la difficulté : toute l'ambiguïté existentielle et fonctionnelle de ce justiciable atypique qu'est la société. L’on aurait pu a priori douter que le droit procédural parvienne à s’adapter aux singularités du justiciable sociétaire. Il suffisait, pour laisser place à quelques humbles mais utiles certitudes en la matière, de procéder à un rassemblement cohérent de tout ce qui constitue la substance du droit procédural sociétaire, suivant un axe de lecture le rendant compréhensible. Et c'est ce que s'efforce de réaliser la présente thèse, au gré des difficultés pratiques qu'elle traite et auxquelles elle suggère les solutions susceptibles de convenir / Going to court for a company involves many procedural issues. Since those issues are not sufficiently taken into account by legislators or ideally part of a compilation within a specific form of codification, they may be held responsible for inevitable practical difficulties. Many questions arise : concerning rights likely to be brought up before a judge by a company or against a company ; its ability to benefit from an action ; the power or quality of those who claim to represent the company before a judge, the competence of a court to hear the case at hand ; managing procedural time in line with the pace of corporate life ; drafting and communicating the procedural acts issued in the company’s name or for the company ; ensuring the court rulings taken in the company’s presence be enforced. The obvious risk is procedural failure. The difficulty stems from the existential and functional ambiguities of this a-typical company. At first sight, procedural does not seem to be able to adapt to the nature of the claimant company. In order to leave room for some humble but useful certainties in this area, one must coherently gather all that constitutes the substance of companies’ procedural law, based on an interpretation that will make it understandable. That is the aim of the present dissertation while dealing with practical difficulties and suggesting suitable solutions. “The Claimant Company” is a plea for the recognition of the governing law in disputes between companies, which deserves to be part and parcel of the many implications of jurisprudence
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The "official" version of customary law vis-a-vis the "living" Hananwa family lawRammutla, Chuene William Thabisha January 2013 (has links)
The study sought to determine, first, what the rules of the Hananwa family law were and, second, whether those rules were compatible with the Constitution. First, it documented the rules of the official family law. The problem that the study countenanced is that customary law is "corrupted, inauthentic and lacking authority".1 Second, it established and documented the rules of the Hananwa family law. The problem that the study countenanced in respect of Hananwa law was that it was difficult to ascertain the content of the rules of the "living" Hananwa law in order to determine their compatibility with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the traditional Hananwa community is inegalitarian and patriarchal.
Section 9 of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and enjoys equal and full protection and benefit of the law. The study found that the Hananwas still observe their system of customary law. However, there are visible changes. For instance, nowadays the spousal consent is a validity requirement for all customary marriages. A parent or legal guardian must consent to a customary marriage of a minor. The individual spouses, not their families, are parties to their own customary marriages. African women enjoy equal status. This development is consistent with section 9 of the Constitution read with section 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. According to the Constitutional Court, in MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC), the first wife must consent to her husband's customary marriage to another woman in addition to her customary marriage to him.
However, some rules of the Hananwa law do not comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. For instance, according to the Hananwa law, extramarital children do not enjoy equal inheritance rights and maintenance rights yet. This discrimination is inconsistent with the constitutional right to equality and the provisions of the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009.The Constitution puts common law and customary law on a par. However, the courts have often replaced customary law dispute resolution rules with the common law rules. For instance, the Constitutional Court in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) and the High Court in Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W) substituted the rules of common law for those of customary law in order to resolve customary law disputes.
The legislature could not be outdone. A meticulous study of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 reveals that their provisions almost appropriately reflect the common law marriage and intestate succession rules respectively. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act has, furthermore, adopted the provisions of the Divorce Act of 1979. Section 28 of the Constitution read with the Children's Act 38 of 2005 has generally substituted the fundamental human rights for the unequal rights provided by the customary law of parent and child. The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 has substituted the communal form of maintenance under customary law. / Public, Constitutional, & International Law / LLD (International and Constitutional Law)
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The "official" version of customary law vis-a-vis the "living" Hananwa family lawRammutla, Chuene William Thabisha January 2013 (has links)
The study sought to determine, first, what the rules of the Hananwa family law were and, second, whether those rules were compatible with the Constitution. First, it documented the rules of the official family law. The problem that the study countenanced is that customary law is "corrupted, inauthentic and lacking authority".1 Second, it established and documented the rules of the Hananwa family law. The problem that the study countenanced in respect of Hananwa law was that it was difficult to ascertain the content of the rules of the "living" Hananwa law in order to determine their compatibility with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the traditional Hananwa community is inegalitarian and patriarchal.
Section 9 of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and enjoys equal and full protection and benefit of the law. The study found that the Hananwas still observe their system of customary law. However, there are visible changes. For instance, nowadays the spousal consent is a validity requirement for all customary marriages. A parent or legal guardian must consent to a customary marriage of a minor. The individual spouses, not their families, are parties to their own customary marriages. African women enjoy equal status. This development is consistent with section 9 of the Constitution read with section 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. According to the Constitutional Court, in MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC), the first wife must consent to her husband's customary marriage to another woman in addition to her customary marriage to him.
However, some rules of the Hananwa law do not comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. For instance, according to the Hananwa law, extramarital children do not enjoy equal inheritance rights and maintenance rights yet. This discrimination is inconsistent with the constitutional right to equality and the provisions of the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009.The Constitution puts common law and customary law on a par. However, the courts have often replaced customary law dispute resolution rules with the common law rules. For instance, the Constitutional Court in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) and the High Court in Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W) substituted the rules of common law for those of customary law in order to resolve customary law disputes.
The legislature could not be outdone. A meticulous study of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 reveals that their provisions almost appropriately reflect the common law marriage and intestate succession rules respectively. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act has, furthermore, adopted the provisions of the Divorce Act of 1979. Section 28 of the Constitution read with the Children's Act 38 of 2005 has generally substituted the fundamental human rights for the unequal rights provided by the customary law of parent and child. The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 has substituted the communal form of maintenance under customary law. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LLD (International and Constitutional Law)
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Legal and regulatory aspects of mobile financial servicesPerlman, Leon Joseph 11 1900 (has links)
The thesis deals with the emergence of bank and non-bank entities that provide a range of unique
transaction-based payment services broadly called Mobile Financial Services (MFS) to unbanked,
underserved and underbanked persons via mobile phones.
Models of MFS from Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), banks, combinations of MNOs and banks, and
independent Mobile Financial Services Providers are covered. Provision by non-banks of ‘bank-type’
services via mobile phones has been termed ‘transformational banking’ versus the ‘additive banking’
services from banks. All involve the concept of ‘branchless banking’ whereby ‘cash-in/cash out’ services
are provided through ‘agents.’
Funds for MFS payments may available through a Stored Value Product (SVP), particularly through a
Stored Value Account SVP variant offered by MNOs where value is stored as a redeemable fiat- or mobile
‘airtime’-based Store of Value.
The competitive, legal, technical and regulatory nature of non-bank versus bank MFS models is discussed,
in particular the impact of banking, payments, money laundering, telecommunications, e-commerce and
consumer protection laws. Whether funding mechanisms for SVPs may amount to deposit-taking such that
entities could be engaged in the ‘business of banking’ is discussed. The continued use of ‘deposit’ as the
traditional trigger for the ‘business of banking’ is investigated, alongside whether transaction and paymentcentric
MFS rises to the ‘business of banking.’
An extensive evaluation of ‘money’ based on the Orthodox and Claim School economic theories is
undertaken in relation to SVPs used in MFS, their legal associations and import, and whether they may be
deemed ‘money’ in law.
Consumer protection for MFS and payments generally through current statute, contract, and payment law
and common law condictiones are found to be wanting. Possible regulatory arbitrage in relation to MFS in
South African law is discussed.
The legal and regulatory regimes in the European Union, Kenya and the United States of America are
compared with South Africa. The need for a coordinated payments-specific law that has consumer
protections, enables proportional risk-based licensing of new non-bank providers of MFS, and allows for a
regulator for retail payments is recommended. The use of trust companies and trust accounts is
recommended for protection of user funds.
| vi / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LLD
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Legal and regulatory aspects of mobile financial servicesPerlman, Leon Joseph 11 1900 (has links)
The thesis deals with the emergence of bank and non-bank entities that provide a range of unique
transaction-based payment services broadly called Mobile Financial Services (MFS) to unbanked,
underserved and underbanked persons via mobile phones.
Models of MFS from Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), banks, combinations of MNOs and banks, and
independent Mobile Financial Services Providers are covered. Provision by non-banks of ‘bank-type’
services via mobile phones has been termed ‘transformational banking’ versus the ‘additive banking’
services from banks. All involve the concept of ‘branchless banking’ whereby ‘cash-in/cash out’ services
are provided through ‘agents.’
Funds for MFS payments may available through a Stored Value Product (SVP), particularly through a
Stored Value Account SVP variant offered by MNOs where value is stored as a redeemable fiat- or mobile
‘airtime’-based Store of Value.
The competitive, legal, technical and regulatory nature of non-bank versus bank MFS models is discussed,
in particular the impact of banking, payments, money laundering, telecommunications, e-commerce and
consumer protection laws. Whether funding mechanisms for SVPs may amount to deposit-taking such that
entities could be engaged in the ‘business of banking’ is discussed. The continued use of ‘deposit’ as the
traditional trigger for the ‘business of banking’ is investigated, alongside whether transaction and paymentcentric
MFS rises to the ‘business of banking.’
An extensive evaluation of ‘money’ based on the Orthodox and Claim School economic theories is
undertaken in relation to SVPs used in MFS, their legal associations and import, and whether they may be
deemed ‘money’ in law.
Consumer protection for MFS and payments generally through current statute, contract, and payment law
and common law condictiones are found to be wanting. Possible regulatory arbitrage in relation to MFS in
South African law is discussed.
The legal and regulatory regimes in the European Union, Kenya and the United States of America are
compared with South Africa. The need for a coordinated payments-specific law that has consumer
protections, enables proportional risk-based licensing of new non-bank providers of MFS, and allows for a
regulator for retail payments is recommended. The use of trust companies and trust accounts is
recommended for protection of user funds.
| vi / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. D.
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