Thesis analyses the reception of Augustine of Hippo's (354-430) ontological discourse on the soul in late antiquity and the early middle ages, more specifically in the sixth and the ninth centuries. Since Augustine never wrote a 'De anima', nor always presented his readers with definite answers to questions, there was room for later authors to interpret and improvise. This thesis focuses on 4 texts: Cassiodorus Senator's 'De anima', Eugippius of Lucculanum's massive florilegium the 'Excerpta ex operibus Sancti Augustini', both from the sixth century, Gottschalk of Orbais' letter 'Quaestiones de anima', and John Scottus Eriugena's apologetic 'De divina praedestinatione liber', both from the ninth century. This thesis establishes that, apart from Cassiodorus, the author's main interest in Augustine's ideas on the ontology of the soul rests on the way it impinges on their contemporary predestination debates. Cassiodorus consciously wanted to produce a Christian De anima in a classical vein. Especially the question of the origin of the soul takes the interest of Eugippius and Gottschalk. This is an important question for predestination debates, since it is supposed to explain technically how original sin came to be universal. Augustine never found a satisfactory answer to this thorny question. Eriugena's genius lies in building an original ontology of the soul on Augustine's own foundations which sidesteps this problem of the origin of the soul entirely.

Le premier verset de la Genèse raconte qu’au commencement, Dieu créa le ciel et la terre. Le monde, sa forme et sa matière, de même que le temps, soutient Augustin, surgissent alors dans l’être, à partir de rien, en un seul instant, celui de la Création. Censés couronner l’œuvre créatrice, l’homme et la femme, pourtant, ne tardent pas à rompre le lien de confiance qui les unit à leur Créateur, en faisant mauvais usage d’une chose bonne : leur liberté. À cause de sa première transgression, nous dit Augustin, l’humanité portera désormais la marque du péché, que seule la figure rédemptrice du Christ, le Second Adam, pourra effacer, grâce au pardon donné à tous ceux qui choisissent d’emprunter sa voie. Or, en raison de son désir irrépressible de connaître et de faire l’expérience du monde par le biais de son propre être donné, soumis au changement, l’homme semble perpétuellement tenté par la transgression des limites essentielles de sa relativité à Dieu. Pourtant, Dieu, l’unique créateur de l’être des choses créées, crée toute chose bonne, du moins dans une certaine mesure : le mal dont semblent caractérisés l’être même et les actions des hommes, correspond, en vérité, aux multiples degrés de bien qui résultent d’une privation plus ou moins grande du Bien suprême qu’est Dieu. Berbère de culture romaine, témoin et acteur des derniers jours de l’Antiquité, penseur bouillonnant et théologien essentiel, Augustin laissera une œuvre importante et féconde. Nous tenterons ici de comprendre le contexte d’émergence de sa doctrine du péché originel. / The first verse of Genesis says that in the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth. The world, its form and matter, and time, argues Augustin, arose in Being out of nothing, in one single instant, that of the Creation. Conceived as the coronation of Creation, man, however, quickly breaks the trust relationship with his Creator, and does this by making evil use of a good thing: his free will. Because of its first transgression, says Augustine, humanity will, from now on, bear the mark of sin, which only the redemptive figure of Christ, the Second Adam, can erase, for all of those willing to follow his path. Yet, because of his irrepressible desire to acquire knowledge and experience of the world through his own given being, subject to change, man appears to be perpetually tempted by the transgression of his essential relativity to God. God, however, being the sole creator of the very being of created things, creates all things good, but to a certain degree: evil, which seems to characterize the being and actions of men, in reality, corresponds to varying degrees of goodness, which themselves result from more or less privation of the Supreme Good, namely, God. Berber of roman culture, witness and actor of the last days of Antiquity, passionate thinker and essential theologian, Augustine has produced some of humanity’s most important writings. In this work, we will attempt to understand the context which led to the emergence of his doctrine of original sin.

Le Contra Iulianum, écrit entre 421 et 422, appartient à la seconde phase de la controverse pélagienne, qui opposa Augustin à Julien, évêque d’Eclane. Cette thèse comporte trois parties. Tout d’abord, dans une introduction à l’ensemble du Contra Iulianum, sont étudiés les différents aspects de l’œuvre, dont ses enjeux théologiques (le péché originel et le mariage), son genre littéraire, les modes d’argumentation, l’hérésiologie augustinienne, la postérité du traité et sa tradition manuscrite. Puis est proposée une édition critique du livre III, qui vient corriger la dernière édition en date (établie par les Mauristes au XVIIème siècle), ainsi qu’une traduction française annotée (la première depuis le XIXème siècle). Enfin, dans une dernière partie, le commentaire du livre III vise à expliciter les passages les plus difficiles et à montrer les divers intérêts, philologiques, historiques, littéraires ou philosophiques, du texte. / The Contra Iulianum, written between 421 and 422, belongs to the second phase of the pelagian controversy, which opposed Augustine and Julian, bishop of Aeclanum. This thesis is divided into three parts. First of all, in a general introduction to the whole Contra Iulianum, we study the main interests of this text : its theological stakes (the original sin and the marriage), his literary genre, the ways of argumentation, the augustinian heresiology, the posterity of the text and its manuscript tradition. Then, we give a new critical edition of the book III, which emends the Maurists’one (XVIIth), with a french translation with notes. In the last part, the commentary of the book III, we explain the most difficult passages and study the text’s different interests (philological, historical, literary or philosophical).

Ce mémoire propose une analyse de la théorie de la volonté en relation avec le mal dans la pensée de Thomas d’Aquin. Le mal est une privation d’être et l’être est identique au bien. La volonté est une forme intellectuelle d’appétit, ainsi que la gouvernante des puissances inférieures, mais aussi de la raison qui est à la fois son principe. L’appétit est un mouvement vers ce qui est le bien d’une nature, il est donc difficile d’accepter que la volonté puisse élire son contraire qui est le mal. La thèse de Platon selon laquelle le mal n’est désiré que par ignorance est écartée, puisque le propos de Thomas est d’expliquer le consentement en faveur du mal connu. Or, si le mal peut être voulu, on ne peut le vouloir sans le référer au bien. Ainsi, le libre arbitre, bien qu’ayant Dieu pour principe, est le principe du premier mauvais choix. La compréhension de la problématique passe par la division de ce qui appartient à l’extérieur de la volonté et ensuite à l’intérieur. De soi, un acte extérieur peut être immoral, comme le vol, mais la volonté d’une intention bonne qui choisit cet acte devient mauvaise, bien qu’elle garde le mérite de sa bonne intention. Son choix mauvais est parfois dû à une certaine ignorance, mais, puisque nous n’ignorons pas toujours le mal, il faut attribuer une faiblesse à la volonté, car elle n’accomplit pas pleinement sa nature. Quand elle répète ses actes de faiblesse à l’égard du mal, elle se dispose à accueillir l’habitus de la malice, et alors elle cherche d’elle-même le mal. Aucun de ces principes, cependant, ne peut s’appliquer à l’homme originel ni au diable. Ceux-ci n’auront pour principe de leurs choix que l’orgueil dans le libre exercice de la volonté. / This paper proposes to analyse the theory of will in interaction with evil in Thomas Aquinas’s thought. Evil is a privation of being, and being is identical to good. The will is an intellectual form of appetite, as well as the governor of lower faculties and of reason, which is also its principle. Appetite is a movement towards the good of a nature; it is therefore difficult to accept that will could elect its opposite, which is evil. Plato’s thesis consisting of attributing the will towards bad to ignorance is discarded, because Thomas’s explanation concerns the consent towards evil witch is known. Now, if evil can be wanted, we cannot want it without referring it to good. In that way, free will, though having God for principle, is the principle of the first bad choice. The comprehension of the problem has to go through the division of that which belongs to the will’s exterior and to it’s interior. In itself, an exterior act can be immoral, like stealing, but the good intentioned will that choses this act then becomes evil, keeping nonetheless the merit of its good intention. The bad choice is sometimes attributable to ignorance, but since we do not always ignore evil, we have to accuse a certain weakness in the will for not being able to fulfill its nature. When it repeatedly acts weakly towards evil, it makes itself available for the mischievous habitus, and it then, on its own, searches the evil act. None of these principles, though, can apply to the original man or for the devil. They will not have any other principle for their choice than that of pride in the free exercise of their will.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:26:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andrei Venturini Martins.pdf: 1778229 bytes, checksum: 55fe21833ba1001bae979fbe899bfda2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-11-11 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The main goal of this inquiry is to analyze the issue of human condition after the Adamic Fall, according to Blaise Pascal. We have chosen his Lettre that dates from October 17th, 1651, as our main object of analysis. This Lettre is anything but a marginal text within the author s work, representing, on the contrary, the debut of several meditations on themes such as death, compassion, providence, consolation, sacrifice, original sin, self-love, the infinite emptiness, the horror of death before and after the Fall, the love of live before and after the Fall. Our departing hypothesis is that, according to Blaise Pascal, man lives on attempting to deflect the infinite emptiness that dwell in him and fill it somehow, even though only Jesus Christ, as a mediator, is capable of fulfilling the void left by God. To sustain this hypothesis, two major concepts - that of self-love and that of infinite emptiness - present in the foresaid Lettre shall be analyzed throughout the two parts that form this research: A Theory of Original Sin and its Consequences and The Infinite Emptiness of man without God . In Part I, the focus is on the Jansenist spiritual direction of the XVIIth century, and its implications with regards to our object (First chapter). The second chapter focuses on the concepts of Self-Love and Infinite Emptiness, and there we raise the question whether, to Pascal, self-love as detachment from God is the root of all evil and all vices, and whether it is the cause of the infinite emptiness that dwells in man. Apart from Self-Love and Infinite Emptiness, the Lettre also mentions the will to domination and laziness as other consequences of the Adamic Fall. At the end of the first part (Third chapter), we intend to demonstrate the consequences of the Fall as Pascal puts them in the Écrits sur la Grâce: ignorance, concupiscence, guilt and eternal death. Thus, we shall have a more thorough perspective on the consequences of the Fall - something we shall name subjective collage , since we bring the Lettre near to the Écrits sur la Grâce and compose a picture with the consequences of the Fall. In Part II, titled The Infinite Emptiness of man without God , we have elaborated two chapters in order to meditate about human condition based on the concept of infinite emptiness. Chapter IV (the first in Part II) focuses on the relation between infinite emptiness and the Pascalian concept of divertissement; finally, the fifth and last chapter brings the concept of infinite emptiness near to that of Christ as Mediator / O principal objetivo desta pesquisa é analisar a condição humana depois da Queda Adâmica em Blaise Pascal, tendo como objeto central a Lettre de 17 de outubro de 1651. Este texto não pode ser considerado um texto marginal na obra do filósofo francês, mas sim o início de inúmeras reflexões temáticas como a morte, a compaixão, a providência, a consolação, o sacrifício, o pecado original, o amor próprio, o vazio infinito, o horror da morte antes e depois da queda, o amor pela vida antes e depois da queda. A hipótese que norteia este trabalho é que o homem tenta desviar-se e preencher esse vazio infinito causado pela queda através do divertissement, mas só o Cristo Mediador pode ocupar o vazio que Deus deixou. Para demonstrá-la, são investigados dois conceitos capitais na Lettre o Amor Próprio e o Vazio Infinito , ao longo das duas partes que compõem este trabalho: Teoria do pecado original e suas consequências e O Vazio Infinito do homem sem Deus . Na primeira, é investigado o contexto da direção espiritual jansenista no século XVII e seus ecos na Lettre, o que constitui o capítulo I; é trabalhado o conceito de Amor Próprio e Vazio Infinito, no capítulo II, com o intuito de saber se para Pascal o amor próprio desligado de Deus está na raiz de todos os males e de todos os vícios, assim como a causa do vazio infinito no homem sem Deus, pois, além do amor próprio e do vazio infinito, encontra-se na Lettre o desejo de dominação e a preguiça como consequências da queda; e, para finalizar a primeira parte, no capítulo III, são mostradas as consequências da queda expressas nos Écrits sur la Grâce, como a ignorância, a concupiscência, culpa e morte eterna, para que se possa ter, assim, uma visão mais completa, o que foi denominado, neste trabalho, colagem subjetiva , em função da aproximação da Lettre aos Écrits sur la Grâce. Na segunda parte, elaborada em dois capítulos, a fim de refletir a condição humana a partir do conceito de vazio infinito, é estudada, de forma específica, a relação do vazio infinito e o divertissement e, no último capítulo, o mesmo conceito de vazio infinito é aproximado ao Cristo Mediador

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T14:27:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Roberto Abreu de Mattos.pdf: 1065680 bytes, checksum: e698392ff109025c1b789802d20da2ac (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-06-05 / The aim of this monographic paper is to reflect upon the problem of evil. For a better understanding of the subject we decided to approach fundamental issues issues such as : what is evil, the reason of evil, its origen and mainly the meaning of evil and its suffering in relation to one s free will. Appealing to specialized bibliography, other concepts are seen essential for the understanding of this subject like: grace, freedom, divine prescience, will, love and so on. Basically all the answers about the issue of evil envolve directly or indirectly a reflection about God, in other words everything about evil envolves human suffering, and one of the strong points regarding modern atheism is why do I suffer? Where is God? Well, looking precisely through this prespective that is, approaching the issue of evil together with the issue of God arises the legitimaly and necessity to conceive and defend a right concept of as being almighty googd and fair / Uma vez que o objetivo deste trabalho monográfico é apresentar reflexões sobre a questão do problema do mal, para melhor compreensão do tema decidimos abordar questões fundamentais, tais como: o que é o mal, porque o mal, qual a sua origem e, principalmente, qual o sentido do mal e do sofrimento em relação ao livre-arbítrio. Buscando recurso na bibliografia especializada vamos encontrar outros conceitos que se apresentam como essenciais para a compreensão do tema proposto, dentre os quais destacamos: Graça, liberdade, Presciência divina, vontade, amor, etc. Não há como deixar de observar que praticamente todas as tentativas de respostas sobre a questão do mal envolvem, direta ou indiretamente, uma reflexão sobre a questão de Deus . Ou seja, toda a questão sobre o mal envolve a realidade do sofrimento humano, e uma das rochas do ateísmo moderno é justamente a questão do porque sofro? , onde está Deus? . Pois bem, é justamente dentro desta perspectiva, isto é, do afrontamento da questão do mal , arrostando conjuntamente a questão de Deus , que surge a legitimidade e a necessidade de conceber e defender um justo conceito de Deus como Onipotente, Bom e Justo

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T14:27:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dayvid da Silva.pdf: 1495725 bytes, checksum: 8d277fe01cdd12f6310f0828ccf14b5f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-09-22 / This study intends to work up the origins fault topic and its consequences to human nature, which will be called in the 5th century Original Sin by Saint Augustine, directly in reference to Adam s sin. However, before dealing with Adam s sin, as related in Judeo-Christian Holy Writ, aiming at answering the question that names this dissertation Original Sin: an Augustinian inheritance? , it seemed advisable to increase research field, although moderately. So the possibility of finding the idea of origins fault in other traditions is considered, as related in the Book of Genesis. As a result, before entering the biblical narration about Adam s and Eve s sin, this research studies other myths, namely: Prometheus s and Pandora s myth; Zoroastrian Myth on the world creation. After analyzing the above mentioned myths, the study focuses on the biblical narration about Adam s and Eve s sin and its interpretation by Paul the Apostle and by Church Fathers, who had in Saint Augustine s thought their theological systemization under construction about Adam s sin. A systemization that takes place mainly because of Pelagian controversy, which denied human nature s defectibility attributed to the first parents sin, called by Augustine original sin . Finally, the influence of Augustinian thought concerning the original sin in the Church will be studied; the first definitions; Augustinian thought through two great Scholastic theologians: Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas; the Council of Trent and the dogmatic definition to all the Church about the original sin, based on Augustine s thought; the relation between two dogmas: Original Sin and Immaculate Conception; the concept of original sin in face of new scientific discovers and of the Second Vatican Council. Thus this study intends to ponderate the concept of original sin not properly as an Augustinian idea, but an idea that is part of human thought, because when asking about the existing goods in the created reality, it is asked also about evil existence / O presente estudo tem por objetivo trabalhar o tema da falta das origens e suas consequências para a natureza humana, que, no século 5, será chamado por Santo Agostinho de Pecado Original , fazendo referência direta ao pecado de Adão. Porém, antes de se falar do pecado de Adão, como se encontra nas Escrituras judaico-cristãs, visando responder à questão que dá título à dissertação Pecado Original: uma herança agostiniana? , achou-se por bem ampliar, mesmo que de forma moderada, o campo de pesquisa. Dessa forma, cogita-se a possibilidade de em outras tradições se encontrar o tema da falta das origens, como se faz presente no livro do Gênesis. Desta forma, antes de se adentrar no relato bíblico do pecado de Adão e Eva, esta pesquisa se detém em outros mitos, a saber: o mito de Prometeu e Pandora; o Mito de Tântalo; o Mito zoroástrico da criação do mundo. Analisados tais mitos, parte-se para o estudo do relato bíblico do pecado de Adão e Eva e a interpretação que se fizera deste pecado, principalmente pelo apóstolo Paulo e pelos padres da Igreja, que encontram em Santo Agostinho um sistematizador da teologia que se estava construindo sobre o pecado de Adão. Uma sistematização que acontece, principalmente, por causa da querela pelagiana, que negava a defectibilidade da natureza humana advinda com o pecado dos primeiros pais. A este pecado, Agostinho chamará pecado original . Por fim, estudar-se-á a influência do pensamento agostiniano sobre o pecado original na Igreja; as primeiras definições; o pensamento de Agostinho em dois grandes teólogos da escolástica: Anselmo de Cantuária e Tomás de Aquino; o concílio de Trento e a definição dogmática para toda Igreja do pecado original, tendo como base o pensamento de Agostinho; o encontro de dois dogmas: Pecado Original e Imaculada Conceição; a ideia de pecado original diante das novas descobertas científicas e do concílio Vaticano II. Assim, este estudo trabalha a ideia de pecado original não como uma ideia propriamente agostiniana, mas como tema da reflexão humana, pois, ao se questionar sobre os bens que existem na realidade criada, questiona-se também a existência do mal

In reading the literary criticism on Janet Frame's work it soon turns out that Frame was deconstructive before the concept was even invented. Thus, deconstruction is used in this essay to close-read a passage in the title story of her collection of short stories, The Lagoon (1951). The main hierarchical dichotomy of the passage is found to be the one between "the sea" and "the lagoon," in which the sea is proven to hold supremacy. "The sea" is read as an image of the great sea of English literary/cultural reference whereas "the lagoon" is read as an image of the vulnerably interdependent, peripheral pool of it, in the form of New Zealand literary/cultural reference. Through this symbolic and post-colonial reading the hierarchical dichotomy between "the sea" and "the lagoon" is deconstrued and reversed. In the conclusion, a post-colonial trace of Maori influence displaces the oppositional relation between "the sea" and "the lagoon."

Ce mémoire propose une analyse de la théorie de la volonté en relation avec le mal dans la pensée de Thomas d’Aquin. Le mal est une privation d’être et l’être est identique au bien. La volonté est une forme intellectuelle d’appétit, ainsi que la gouvernante des puissances inférieures, mais aussi de la raison qui est à la fois son principe. L’appétit est un mouvement vers ce qui est le bien d’une nature, il est donc difficile d’accepter que la volonté puisse élire son contraire qui est le mal. La thèse de Platon selon laquelle le mal n’est désiré que par ignorance est écartée, puisque le propos de Thomas est d’expliquer le consentement en faveur du mal connu. Or, si le mal peut être voulu, on ne peut le vouloir sans le référer au bien. Ainsi, le libre arbitre, bien qu’ayant Dieu pour principe, est le principe du premier mauvais choix. La compréhension de la problématique passe par la division de ce qui appartient à l’extérieur de la volonté et ensuite à l’intérieur. De soi, un acte extérieur peut être immoral, comme le vol, mais la volonté d’une intention bonne qui choisit cet acte devient mauvaise, bien qu’elle garde le mérite de sa bonne intention. Son choix mauvais est parfois dû à une certaine ignorance, mais, puisque nous n’ignorons pas toujours le mal, il faut attribuer une faiblesse à la volonté, car elle n’accomplit pas pleinement sa nature. Quand elle répète ses actes de faiblesse à l’égard du mal, elle se dispose à accueillir l’habitus de la malice, et alors elle cherche d’elle-même le mal. Aucun de ces principes, cependant, ne peut s’appliquer à l’homme originel ni au diable. Ceux-ci n’auront pour principe de leurs choix que l’orgueil dans le libre exercice de la volonté. / This paper proposes to analyse the theory of will in interaction with evil in Thomas Aquinas’s thought. Evil is a privation of being, and being is identical to good. The will is an intellectual form of appetite, as well as the governor of lower faculties and of reason, which is also its principle. Appetite is a movement towards the good of a nature; it is therefore difficult to accept that will could elect its opposite, which is evil. Plato’s thesis consisting of attributing the will towards bad to ignorance is discarded, because Thomas’s explanation concerns the consent towards evil witch is known. Now, if evil can be wanted, we cannot want it without referring it to good. In that way, free will, though having God for principle, is the principle of the first bad choice. The comprehension of the problem has to go through the division of that which belongs to the will’s exterior and to it’s interior. In itself, an exterior act can be immoral, like stealing, but the good intentioned will that choses this act then becomes evil, keeping nonetheless the merit of its good intention. The bad choice is sometimes attributable to ignorance, but since we do not always ignore evil, we have to accuse a certain weakness in the will for not being able to fulfill its nature. When it repeatedly acts weakly towards evil, it makes itself available for the mischievous habitus, and it then, on its own, searches the evil act. None of these principles, though, can apply to the original man or for the devil. They will not have any other principle for their choice than that of pride in the free exercise of their will.

Submitted by Noeme Timbo (noeme.timbo@metodista.br) on 2017-01-25T13:38:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Paulo Cruz.pdf: 1065817 bytes, checksum: c89d4c886e6d9f4f04095b666ec92c44 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-25T13:38:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Paulo Cruz.pdf: 1065817 bytes, checksum: c89d4c886e6d9f4f04095b666ec92c44 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This paper presents a study on C. S. Lewis’ Space Trilogy — that embraces Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra, and That Hideous Strength. We analize the theological concepts used by the author, specially the Original Sin doctrine and its relations with the concept of moral imagination, developed by the american thinker Russell Kirk. / O presente trabalho apresenta um estudo da obra Triologia Cósmica de C. S. Lewis — composta pelas obras Além do Planeta Silencioso, Perelandra e Essa força medonha —, analisando os conceitos teológicos utilizados pelo autor, sobretudo a doutrina do Pecado Original, e suas relações com o conceito de Imaginação Moral, desenvolvido pelo filósofo americano Russell Kirk.