監察院近年因彈劾政務官問題，屢引發爭議，彈劾政務官被視為監察權興衰的指標。 我國自訓政、行憲迄五十年代，彈劾權行使曾有輝煌記錄，於澄清吏治上收效甚宏。 近年因監察院內外環境影響，監察權普受譏評為積弱不振，輿論甚至出現學者特廢除 監察院的主張。 本論文擬以歷史研究法、制度研究法和行為研究法等研究途徑（APPROACH），靜態研 究我國政務官彈劾制度的良窊，動態研究監察院彈劾權行使的過程。在以制度和運作 建構的史料為經、以彈劾政務官為緯的勾勒下，本文擬自中外彈劾權淵源入手，比較 中外制度之異同，再回顧我國彈劾政務官案件，進而分析介入彈劾權行使的外環境因 素，其後再深入制度運件堂奧，對影響彈劾權行使的細節過程考察研討，期能端詳出 我國監察院這一特殊制度設計的面貌、內涵和未來發展趨向。 茲將本論文各章提要分述如后： 第一章 緒論：闡明研究動機與目的，以及本文研究方法。 第二章 彈劾權的淵源與內涵：從我國歷代監察制度沿革、歐美彈劾權緣起，省察彈 劾權的內涵。強調中國歷代御史制度主要在為君主耳目，而歐美彈劾制原始意義在濟 司法制度不健全之窮，具有「準司法」性質，故彈劾權行使貴在超然獨立。 第三章 政務官彈劾制度：對政務官範圍界定、彈劾制本以政務官為主要對象、以「 違法失職」彈劾政務官是否妥適，以及政務官的彈劾、懲戒，作制度上的探討。 第四章 政務官彈劾的歷史回顧：比較訓政時期迄今的政務官彈劾案，就重要個案運 作過程，映證監察院對政務官彈劾趨式微，懲戒似亦聊備一格。 第五章 政務官彈劾涉及的因素：試圖為彈劾權式微作詮釋，分析強人政治、行政權 居優勢、政黨介入和監察院本身積弱等對彈劾政務官的影響。 第六章 政務官彈劾制度和運作的檢討：在制度方面，從憲法規定到監察院內部運作 的靜態程序細節逐一剖析，在運作方面，對黨政運作、利益和派系介入、民意壓力等 動態因素作檢視探討。 第七章 監察權獨立與政黨政治：自理論面和現實面，分別探究監察權獨立與國民黨 三控政局間的衝突，就監察院是否為民意機關、監委選舉制度、監委應否脫離政黨活 動、政黨介入監察權未來是否引發黨爭等爭論焦點分別討論。 第八章 結論與建議：剖析制度與運作後，提出幾項可能的發展和相對建議。監察權 前景並不樂觀，未來我國發展，司法制度如臻獨立健全，政黨政治且步上正軌，監察 權功能將為司法和選舉制度取代，如修憲沒有顧慮，甚至可考慮將監察權併入立法權 。

無良好之決策，難有高效益之執；決策之良窳，則決定於參與決策之人選、相關資訊 及制度。又民主國家制定政策的主要層級在於政務體系，因此，政務官之人選與政府 效能實有密切關係。基於上述之理念，本人擬擇我國政務官之研究為論文主題。 文中之分析架構，將綜合系統、精英及人才甄選等三種模式，作為分析之基礎；政務 官之甄選，個人認為深受當時生態環境之影響；在甄選過程中，甄選主體首先考慮被 甄選者之社會背景及其資歷，因此本文將以政務官之社會背景及其經歷為探討之重心 ；另將分析政務官之任期及其離職後出路，以期對政務官之甄選有全盤之瞭解。此外 ，內閣制與總統制之兩個代表國家－－英、美，其甄選政務官之經驗，實可作為本文 檢視我國政務官甄選之立論根據。 因此，本文之章節安排，共分為六章，第一章緒論，介紹本文之分析架構及政府遷台 後生態環境之變遷及其對政務官甄選之影響；第二章介紹英、美兩國政務官之甄選制 度；第三章分析我國政務官之社會背景，分任職年齡、地域關係、教育程度及所屬政 黨四項來探討；第四章分析我國政務官任職前之經歷，分任職前之最後職業及主要經 歷來探討，以瞭解我國政務官多歸屬於何類政治精英。第五章分析我國政務官之任期 及其離職後之出路；第六章結論，擬對中、英、美三國之甄選經驗作一比較，並提出 研究發現與心得，全文約計十三萬字。

政務官面對急速變遷的環境，必須洞察時代的脈動，妥為因應，才能永續發展組織的業務。因此，不論工作計畫的擬定、問題的解決、或危機處理，必須掌握先機，蒐集資訊，並運用決策模型，縝密分析後採取行動，才能達到預期的目標，而正確的決策，對於機關業務的推動，更具關鍵性的影響。 　　本研究主要採取文獻探討、比較分析、深度訪談等研究方法。為能更深入了解我國政務官決策之方法、過程及面臨之困境，本研究參考決策相關理論，諸如，認知性決策過程、理性選擇、結構式溝通、利益團體、影響決策過程因素、政治系統過程等問題設計訪談題綱，並抽樣分別向行政院所屬相關部會，如法務部、經濟部、教育部、大陸委員會、勞工委員會、青年輔導委員會、蒙藏委員會等機關首長深度訪談，從其決策經驗及實案分析，以了解其決策之模型，並避免本研究流於理論之空談。 　　本研究發現：一、政務官在決策前，對於政策都能充分理解。二、政務官的決策方式，都有採用有限理性模型。三、政務官的決策方法，都有採用群體決策。四、政務官對於利益團體的活動，都認為有其必要性。五、政務官認為影響其決策的因素，可歸納為時間的壓力、輿論的反應、預算的通過、高層意見、立法院、法律限制等。六、政務官對於國內的政治生態環境皆能適應。 　　根據文獻探討及深度訪談發現，本研究提出以下建議，作為政務官決策之參考：一、理解政策問題。二、確定政策目標。三、建構備選方案。四、設定篩選準則。五、爭取政策支持。六、監督政策執行。 / Government officials especially for those who are responsible for ministerial portfolio have to make decisions in response to the constantly changing environment. Hence, it requires takes excellent foresight, good data mining skills, superior strategic models and deliberate analysis to draft plans, solve problems, and deal with the crisis. Making the right decision serves as the key factor in the process of successful governance. 　　In this research, the author applies the methods of literature review, comparative analysis, and in-depth interview in order to understand the decision-making process, decision methods, as well as decision dilemma confronting ministerial officials with portfolio. Further more, this research uses relevant decision -making theories, such as cognitive decision process, rational choice, structured communication, and factors affecting decision-making process, such as interest groups & political system process. Based on the parameters of literature review, the author designs the outlines of interviews and selects ministerial officials with portfolio from the ministry of justice, ministry of economic affairs, ministry of education, mainland affairs council, national youth commission, and Mongolian and Tibetan affairs commission and conducts in-depth interviews. 　　There are several important findings derived from our 〝empirical〞case studies. First, before a government official makes his decision, he has a full grasp with the policy issue. Second, the decision models of government officials are mostly based on limited-rational model. Third, government officials often make decisions based on group consensus. Fourth, government officials think it is necessary to take opinions of interest groups into account. Fifth, government officials spend a lot of time in response to public pressure, budget & legal constraints demands of Legislative Yuan and in fathoming the attitudes of higher authorities before they make their decisions. Sixth, most government officials are quite accustomed to the political environment. 　　According to our literature review and in-depth interviews, this study makes the following suggestions before a government official makes his or her policy decision. First, fully comprehend the content and implications of a policy. Second, set an objective for the policy. Third, keep a substitute project on hand. Forth, set criteria or standards for policy implementation. Fifth, to garner for support from government and related actors. Sixth, monitor the execution of a policy.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(法学) / 甲第22208号 / 法博第241号 / 新制||法||167(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院法学研究科法政理論専攻 / (主査)教授 毛利 透, 教授 土井 真一, 教授 曽我部 真裕 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Laws / Kyoto University / DGAM

隨著民主治理的發展，有效調和民主憲政與文官專業價值，才能夠確保民主政治運作的效能。背景因素使得政務官與事務官間的互動，愈具舉足輕重的角色。從相關研究可以理解，欲直接觀察政務官與事務官細部的互動並不容易，兩者間細部的互動對外界而言始終是一個黑盒子。因此，本研究使用鮮少作為該議題研究主體的影視產品進行分析。選擇英國經典影集「Yes, Minister」，乃因該劇主要以描繪政務官與事務官互動為主，描寫程度相當細膩。藉此旁觀的角度一窺政務官與事務官的互動，確實是個能夠協助深入理解該議題的良好個案。 研究設計的基礎為文本分析法，透過建構分析路徑，分別從兩者本質、選擇偏好、表現作為，以及互動後對政策產出的討論。先將14集研究樣本進行相同路徑的文本化，再將文本化的樣本進行論述與類型化。研究發現事務官的互動技巧，包括行政權力的作為與不作為、可行性評估、影響政務體系與政務官以及納入外部勢力等，目的為提升參與決策的條件，細部列出24項互動技巧；另一方面，政務官則可透過經驗複製、行政學習、媒體與聲望經營與納入外部力量等，目的為提升統治便利性與正當性，細部列出13項互動技巧。兩者的互動呈現出互相制衡的本質，若各自無法有效負責與調和時，易形成雙重價值選擇的壓力。 本研究提出以「鐘擺效果」解釋政務官與事務官的互動，兩者在制衡關係的基礎上，隨著時序性的影響而改變互動模式。基本上的互動如鐘擺式擺盪，進而系統性因素將會因時序性遞減，激發出最適的政策結果。最終提出兩大項建議：首先，從制衡到動態平衡的關係，正視制衡現象的存在、立基於分權制衡上的信任關係、減少彼此錯誤解讀的機會，以及培養持續監督與自省能力；其二，設定政策決策的妥協底線，認知非任務型指標的超然價值，以及試著創造沒有共識的共識。 / In any democratic state’s development, how to effectively reconcile the two values of constitutional democracy and bureaucratic expertise is fundamental to ensure the proper functioning and efficacy of democratic politics. As Taiwan further consolidates its democracy, the interaction between the political appointees and senior civil servants becomes ever more important in achieving a balance of pluralistic values on the one hand, and government’s administrative efficiency, on the other. Yet past research has found that it is not easy to observe directly the details of the interaction between political appointees and civil servants; to the external world, the actual interaction between the two has always been a black box. Therefore, to shed light on that black box, this study analyzes the interaction between appointees and civil servants as depicted in film and television programs. The classic British series, “Yes Minister,” was chosen as the study’s research subject because it portrays the minister-bureaucrat interactive behavior skillfully and poignantly, which allows a deeper understanding of the issue. The study employs textual analysis as the principal research method. Each of the series’ 14 episodes had been textually reinterpreted by using the same analytical paths, which were constructed by first categorizing the nature, choice preferences, display behaviors, and post-interaction reaction to policy outputs for both political appointees and senior civil servants. The research has found that civil servants, in their pursuit for greater participation in decision-making, exhibit as many as 24 distinct interactive behaviors with their political superiors. Some of these behaviors include administrative action and inaction, call for feasibility assessment, manipulation of the political system, and incorporation of external forces. On the other hand, political appointees, in their effort to achieve political expediency and legitimacy, have 13 behaviors of their own through experience replication, administrative learning, media and reputation management, and inclusion of external forces. Both sets of interactive behaviors are essentially parts of a checks-and-balances system. When responsibilities are unclear and actions cannot be coordinated effectively, the agency then becomes vulnerable to role ambiguity and double value selection problems. This research proposes a “pendulum effect” to explain the interaction between political appointees and civil servants. Because the appointees and civil servants have a mutual checks and balances relationship, both parties will alter their interactive behavior depending on the timing of events. Essentially, the interaction between the two sides will initially swing freely like a pendulum; subsequently, system factors will cause the pendulum to progressively decrease its swing, ultimately arriving at the most optimal policy result. In conclusion, this study makes two major recommendations. First, both political appointees and civil servants need to understand that they are in a dynamic equilibrium, in which they check and balance each other’s actions. By acknowledging the check and balance nature of their relationship, both minimize the chance of misinterpreting each other, and may develop the healthy capacity of ongoing oversight and self-introspection. Second, both political appointees and civil servants must establish a baseline in any policy negotiation and compromise, recognize the (sometimes) extraordinary value of non-mission-based indicators, and attempt to create a consensus when no consensus exists.