在2002年朝核危機引發後，中共居中折衝尊俎，舉辦「三方會談」及數輪「六方會談」，使朝核危機相關諸國得以齊聚北京協商處理朝核問題，揭開朝鮮半島歷史之新頁。中共雖非當事國，然涉入與影響之程度均較前次危機為深，其政策及角色皆有研究之必要。「新安全觀」提出迄今已近十年，做為中共國際關係的「理論」，直接指導其外交政策，其意涵著重於與冷戰思維的差異，以「互信、互利、平等、協作」及對「非傳統安全」的關照為其理論核心，在實踐上則以多邊安全合作為最要，而近歲於朝鮮半島發展之多邊安全合作正為「六方會談」。是故，本論文冀望能從「新安全觀」意涵在「六方會談」的實踐與挑戰，探析中共朝鮮半島政策之走向。主要的研究目的包括：（一）詮釋中共「新安全觀」的動機與意涵；（二）具體呈現中共與各國在朝核問題的立場及互動作為；（三）評估「新安全觀」在「六方會談」中的實踐與挑戰，並分析其朝鮮半島政策取向。 / 「新安全觀」在「六方會談」中體現於以下幾項作為：（一）穿梭籌辦歷輪會談；（二）戮力於會談制度化；（三）保障參與各方權益。然而，「新安全觀」同時也面臨許多挑戰，最值得關切者有冷戰時期所遺留下來的軍事同盟、朝核危機當事兩國的立場分歧、「中國威脅論」的陰影等。大體上，中共對於朝核問題的政策立場有三：（一）朝鮮半島非核化；（二）區域的和平與穩定；（三）以外交談判解決。此外，還強調在解決朝核問題的同時，必須照顧到北韓的生存利益，而為因應諸多挑戰，中共的朝鮮半島政策可能將朝以下方向發展：（一）擴大多邊安全合作；（二）鞏固大國共同利益；（三）強化南韓合作關係；（四）引導北韓經濟改革。因此，就現階段政策取向而言，中共應會並用多邊與雙邊外交途徑，在朝鮮半島持續勸和促談，扮演多重建設性角色，而「新安全觀」若要被徹底落實，將取決於中共的國家利益能否持續與「新安全觀」所訴諸的理念相結合。 / This study anticipates exploring the trend of the Korean Peninsula Policy of China by understanding the implementation and challenge of New Security Concept (NSC) in the Six-Party Talks. The main research goal includes: to interpret the motivation and meaning of NSC, to present China’s position and behavior with other nations in terms of 2002 North Korea nuclear issue, and to evaluate the practice and challenge of NSC in Six-Party Talks. In the past rounds, NSC has been embodied in holding meetings, endeavoring to institutionalize, and ensuring the right and interest of all participants. Even so, NSC has been confronted some challenge in the meantime; embracing the military alliances remained from the cold war era, the gap between North Korea and United States, and so-called “China Threat.” / Briefly speaking, China has three positions in 2002 North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Denuclearization, peace and stability, and solutions through the negotiation in Korean Peninsula. China also emphasizes that every decision dealing with the crisis should be given consideration to North Korea’s interest. It is highly likely to blossom into what follows for the sake of replying these challenges: To extend multilateral corporation, to consolidate the common interest with other powers, to strengthen the relation with South Korea, and to guide North Korea to reform its economy. Therefore, China might use multilateral and bilateral approach simultaneously; continue to mediate and to play a multiple role in the constructive way. The further implementation of NSC depends on the extent of combining with China’s national interest and the ideal of NSC.

中、美關係一直以來都是國際的焦點問題且持續發展變化。自1972年中、美關係開始正常化以來，兩國的關係經常是在進展與停滯、合作與對抗中來回折衝，中、美之間在許多方面存在著矛盾，又在眾多領域裡有著共同利益。冷戰結束後，美國對中國的政策進行了大幅度的調整，新的矛盾與利益也逐漸凸顯出來。諸如人權問題、貿易不平衡問題和臺灣問題等等，皆是當前中、美鬥爭的焦點，但在安全、經濟貿易與科技文化教育和非傳統安全領域等方面又都有著共同的利益。在這種利益與矛盾交織的狀態下決定了雙邊以合作取代對抗的政策基調，也是中、美間在現今國際趨勢下必須的戰略選擇。 朝鮮半島位處陸權國家的心臟地帶與海權國家的邊緣地帶，對陸權國家而言，是連接海洋建立海權的重要跳板，對海權國家來說，則是向陸地擴張勢力的戰略捷徑，而此區域更是中國、俄羅斯、日本、南韓、北韓等權力競逐的主戰場，再加上美國在此經營布局已久，複雜的國際關係在此合縱連橫，時而欣欣向榮充滿希望，時又戰雲密布一觸即發。自朝鮮半島爆發第一、二次朝核危機後朝鮮半島的局勢更加詭譎多變，而朝核議題便如同一顆未爆彈時刻牽動中、美間最敏感的神經，金正日去世後，更增朝鮮半島的不確定性；在此嚴峻的挑戰下，中、美兩國的態度更是動輒得咎。 本文的主要目的於分析中美兩國自冷戰後迄今對朝鮮半島的政策比較，並針對外交、經貿、戰略佈署等方面作一全面探討，並以權力平衡角度分析在中、美共管亞洲的戰略結構下對南、北韓的影響，期能為未來欲從事相關研究的人提供參考。 / Relationship between the U.S. and China has always been one of the most focused issues internationally and it continues to develop and changes its shape as time goes by. Since 1972 both countries normalize their relationships, the U.S. and China had been going back and forth of deciding whether being collaboration or opposition, fits their benefits in a dynamic field. While the cold war ends, United States had made an adjustment by a wide margin on its policy to China, for instance, the Human Rights, Trade Imbalance, and Taiwan are the causes explain how China and the U.S. are constantly in conflict. However, correlates with Security, Economical trading, Technology, Culture, Education and Non-Traditional Land Security, the U.S. and China are aware of the importance of each other. All of the consequences, contradiction, and benefits led China and the U.S. to work together instead of being in battles which can be described “the strategic choices” 2 giants have made in the current international trend. The Korea peninsula locates in the heart of continental countries and at the edge of sea countries. For continentals, the peninsula can be the elevator of establishing its sea-power; and for the ocean authorities, owning the peninsula is one of the fastest strategic shortcut of expanding its power to the land. For decades, the area had been the battlefield for China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea, and adding the glimpse of the U.S, which makes the peninsula one of the most comprehensive international involvements in the world. Since the 1st and the 2nd North Korean nuclear crisis occurred, the discussion of nuclear weapons in North Korea tangles the sensitive nerves between the U.S and China. As Kim Chong Il dies and leaving all the questions left to rest of the world, the uncertainty of the peninsula had increased; under rigorous challenges in the international community, the attitudes of China and the U.S. can entirely influence the globe. The essay mainly focuses on the analysis of the comparative policies to the Korean Peninsula in between China and the U.S after the Cold War, as well as the probing into Diplomacy, Trade, Deployment for a entire scan, in order to understand the angel of power of balance to mutually manage Asia’s strategic structures and how it can be effective to North and South Korea. The article hopes can provide critical information for scholars in future to attempt related research on sphere in such matter.

朝鮮半島由於地理位置特殊，在戰略上極具重要性，長久以來一直為列強覬覦爭奪之地。第二次世界大戰之後，朝鮮半島亦籠罩在兩極對峙的氣氛裡，首先是南北韓的分裂，而韓戰的發生，使美蘇在東亞地區的對抗局面更為激化，冷戰時期的朝鮮半島遂成為東亞地區內兩極對峙氣氛最為明顯的「火藥庫」，因而獲得「東方的巴爾幹」的稱號。隨著東歐變天、蘇聯瓦解，雖然冷戰時期的兩極對峙局面已不復見，國際瀰漫一片和解氣氛，然而東亞地區並未因此脫離冷戰的陰影，尤其是朝鮮半島的南北對抗依然持續、北韓引發的核武危機更使東亞地區陷入隨時可能爆發衝突的臨界點。由於朝鮮半島的局勢不僅攸關區域安全，亦與東亞列強間的權力平衡息息相關，後冷戰時期朝鮮半島已然成為國際關注的焦點，不論是區域傳統強權──美國與俄羅斯，抑或東亞新興的力量──中共與日本，皆極力爭取在朝鮮半島事務的發言權，一方面確保自身國家利益，另一方面更意圖在區域內發揮影響力，提升國際地位。 綜觀諸強權對朝鮮半島的政策，以美國最為大眾所知，各種期刊與學者論著足以證明美國影響之深度與廣度。中共與日本的參與和影響，亦有諸多學者研究，然而關於俄羅斯與朝鮮半島關係之研究卻少之又少。事實上俄羅斯在冷戰前後對於朝鮮半島的政策有相當幅度的變化，也是朝鮮半島穩定局勢的重大變數之一。從冷戰時期為與美國制衡、確保區域強權地位，極力與北韓維持密切關係，並刻意斷絕與南韓的接觸，到八０年代為求內部經濟發展，極力塑造周邊環境的穩定，開始與南韓接觸，乃至蘇聯解體後為求取經濟資源向南韓一面倒、以及1996年之後為維持在朝鮮半島的影響力而採取「等距離外交」，皆對朝鮮半島局勢產生相當程度的影響。基於意識型態與國家利益，對朝鮮半島所採取的政策因時而異，筆者欲就後冷戰時期俄羅斯的朝鮮半島政策作一番通盤整理，將莫斯科在朝鮮半島政策上的變化加以分析。 本文主要目標係探討後冷戰時期俄羅斯對朝鮮半島的政策，因此對於冷戰時期蘇聯對兩韓的政策著墨不多，僅以少部分篇幅對戈巴契夫主政前各蘇聯領導人的朝鮮半島政策作一番概述，提供讀者了解莫斯科當局在決定對兩韓政策時的歷史背景。筆者除了對葉爾欽時期俄羅斯對朝鮮半島的政策詳細加以整理與歸納之外，由於朝鮮半島的安全穩定攸關東亞區域的安全，並涉及周邊列強的國家利益，筆者認為在探究俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策時，亦須對美國、中共、日本的朝鮮半島政策有基本認知，因此亦以一個章節來討論列強在此地的競逐與制衡。俄羅斯長期以來為維持周邊環境的穩定，推動亞太安全不遺餘力，而朝鮮半島事務是當前俄羅斯最能發揮區域影響力的議題，本文亦將探討俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策對亞太安全的影響，諸如兩韓統一、核武問題皆在研究範圍之內。 本文共分七章，第一章為緒論，第二章先概述冷戰時期朝鮮半島的地緣政治與蘇聯的關係，並以蘇聯領導人作為區隔，就戈巴契夫主政前蘇聯與兩韓的關係加以探討。第三章分析戈巴契夫新思維對蘇聯亞太政策產生的衝擊，並分析朝鮮半島在戈氏新思維當中扮演的角色，此外更詳述戈巴契夫時期對朝鮮半島政策的調整。第四章為本論文的主要章節，筆者先就俄羅斯內部自蘇聯解體後持續進行的對外政策激辯過程加以概述，分析俄羅斯對外政策的重大變化，並探究朝鮮半島政策受到的影響，以及俄羅斯與南北韓關係的發展；其次筆者就俄羅斯1996年之後對朝鮮半島政策的調整過程加以分析，「等距離外交」的執行與障礙亦為研究重點。第五章係討論有關朝鮮半島周邊列強在此地的競逐與制衡，筆者分別就美國、中共與日本的朝鮮半島政策加以論述。第六章俄羅斯對兩韓統一與核武問題的立場有詳細說明，此外讀者亦可自本章得知俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策與亞太安全的關聯，第七章為結論。 第一章　　緒論 第一節 研究動機與目的..................................1 第二節 研究方法與限制..................................2 第三節 論文架構........................................3 第二章 冷戰時期蘇聯的朝鮮半島政策 第一節 二次大戰結束後的東亞局勢與韓國的處境...............5 第二節 蘇聯的東亞政策與朝鮮半島地緣政治...................6 第三節 第二次世界大戰結束後蘇聯與南北韓的關係............11 第三章 戈巴契夫時期蘇聯的朝鮮半島政策 第一節 戈巴契夫「新思維」與俄羅斯外交政策之轉變..........33 第二節 戈巴契夫初期蘇聯對朝鮮半島的政策..................42 第三節 蘇聯對兩韓政策之轉變..............................45 第四章 葉爾欽時期的朝鮮半島政策 第一節 蘇聯解體與俄羅斯對外政策大辯論.................69 第二節 「新東方政策」與朝鮮半島..........................74 第三節 俄國對兩韓的等距離外交............................96 第五章 朝鮮半島周邊其他列強之角逐 第一節 美國朝鮮半島政策……………………………………..131 第二節 中共朝鮮半島政策……………………………………..145 第三節 日本朝鮮半島政策……………………………………..161 第六章 俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策與亞太安全 第一節 俄羅斯對兩韓統一之看法………………………………175 第二節 俄羅斯對核武問題之立場………………………………182 第三節 俄國朝鮮半島政策對亞太安全之意義………………..192 第七章 結論…………………………………………………………..213 參考書目……………………………………………………………………217 / Summary Based on the specialty of its location, the Korean Peninsula has been extremely important on strategy, and the surrounding major powers have fought for it for a long time. After the World War II, the Korean Peninsula was also under the atmosphere of confrontation like other regions and the Korean War made the confronting situation more irrigated. Although the international society has been filled with reconciliation since the sudden change of Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, East Asia didn’t get rid of the shadow of the Cold War. The situation of confrontation between North and South on the Korean Peninsula has still existed, and the nuclear crisis caused by DPRK made the East Asia Region involved in a critical point, at which various of conflicts would burst out at any time. The situation of the Korean Peninsula not only affects the regional security, but also concerns about the balance of power among the East Asian major powers. In the post-Cold War Era the Korean Peninsula has been an international focus, concerned by both the traditional regional powers, such as U.S.A. and Russian, and the new powers, such as PRC and Japan. All the surrounding nations are trying to have the floor in the Korean Peninsula affairs, not only to secure their own national interests, but also to produce a marked effect in the region and promote national status. The intent of the thesis is trying to study Russia’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the post-Cold War Era. In order to introduce the historical background of Moscow’s policy making toward Korea, the thesis is classified into several parts according to various Kremlin leaderships. After a series of arrangement and analysis, we can find that Moscow’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula since 1945 has been influenced by the changes of the international environment, but also by the development of domestic politics and economy in Russia. In addition, the latter affects Moscow’s foreign policy in the post- Cold War Era much more than the former. Based on the need of democratic policy and economic reform after the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991, Russia decided to approach the West to get political and economic support. Therefore, getting along with ROK, which has democratic experience and strong economic capability, while cutting original ties with DPRK gradually, is the best choice for Moscow. As for ROK, Russia’s influence on DPRK can promote direct dialog between the two sides, and then secure the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Under the consideration of economy and politics, Russia and ROK accordingly established formal diplomatic relations on September 30, 1991, and the bilateral relationships has been developed smoothly. On the other hand, based on the differences of political structure and economic system, Russia and DPRK have departed for a long distance. Although Moscow insisted to develop full-scale relations with ROK without regarding to the objection of DPRK, the achievement of developing relations with ROK couldn’t fit the expectation of Russian people. The bare economic situation hadn’t been improved, and at the same time, Russians felt be treated as a debtor by ROK. Based on the poor economy and the declining nation status in the international society, Russia had been filled with a conservative atmosphere since 1993. The extreme complaint about the domestic and external affairs provoked the Communism and Nationalism, and the foreign policy inclining to the West suffered from fierce critics. Judging from the distribution of the Duma in 1993 and 1995, we can easily find the dramatic change of Russian domestic politics. To preserve national interest and dignity, Kremlin decided to change its policy toward the Korean Peninsula in 1996. The former policy inclining to ROK has been given up, and Moscow makes efforts to regain close relationships with DPRK while developing normal ties with ROK to maintain Russia’s importance and floor not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also in East Asia affairs. In addition, keeping in touch with DPRK and providing any possible assistance will prevent the sudden collapse of Pyongyang Government, which might result in dramatic turbulent in the region. In short, maintaining close ties with North and South at the same time not only promote peace and stability in the region, but also fit Russia’s national interests.

一、信心建立措施，最早出現於1975年歐洲安全暨合作會議（Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 簡稱CSCE）的赫爾辛基會議（Helsinki Conference）所簽署的赫爾辛基最終議定書（Helsinki Final Act），嗣後，被國際間廣為運用以降低敵對國家間衝突與避免戰爭的重要途徑與模式。信心建立是一系列的相對措施，旨在促進彼此了解，防止誤判和誤解，其重要條件是雙方能持續漸次的降低敵對緊張關係，使得雙方能在協談中尋求和平解決爭端的共識，成為一種常態性互動式的行為模式。 　　二、不論是先前歐洲安全暨合作會議或是改組後的歐洲安全暨合作組織，在策訂信心建立措施的條文上是依據當時的背景環境及相對的威脅程度來策訂，並結合時空移轉，環境變遷循序增修訂，在互信不足的狀況下採較寬鬆的措施作為，以增加互信的基礎為主，在互信條件較成熟的時候，則相對採取較嚴格及緊縮的措施作為，而非一成不變，更不是可一次到位的。 　　三、中共從改革開放開始，施政的重心在於政局穩定及經貿發展，中共力求營造與維持一個穩定的國際安全環境，以全力從事經濟建設。在對外改善關係及參與信心建立措施之基本立場與原則：（一）推動多極的國際新秩序；（二）消弭「中國威脅論」；（三）壓縮中華民國國際空間。在過去十多年當中，中共對信心建立措施的看法由負面的、消極的，轉而採用信心建立措施來改善與潛在衝突國家間的關係。在相當的程度上可印證，中共對其它國家所推動之信心建立措施已經取得相當的成果，而中共也從推動信心建立措施獲得實質之利益。 　　四、兩岸關係正處在十字路口，如何化解僵局，將成為二十一世紀初兩岸焦點問題，兩岸是戰是和，也是亞太地區穩定與否關鍵。兩岸間現況的互信措施在不具正式的條文約制下，有學者將其稱之為默契式的互信措施。兩岸之所以遲遲不能展開正式信心建立措施，仍存在的幾個問題癥結：如單方面的共識匯集不易、缺乏脈絡連貫的運作組織體、中共正統自居的傲慢；雙方面的一個中國的認知困境、缺乏溝通有效途徑、漸趨失衡的兩岸軍力；在多邊方面的第三者美國的戰略模糊政策、效能不彰的第二軌道、多邊組識國家的選邊站等問題。在兩岸間推動信心建立措施或許解不開兩岸政治上的結，推動兩岸信心建立措施最大的目的，是在促進兩岸雙方以和平的、溝通的方式，達成互信、共存、共榮的目標。信心建立措施最終目標固然在於追求穩定、確保和平，但它是一種過程與方法，是通往和平之路的開啟，而不是終點。不論是美蘇間的互信機制或是歐洲的信心建立措施亦或是東協間的安全對話，甚至東西德統一、朝鮮半島正在進行的和解，都是經過長時期的醞釀、溝通、協調，且相對方皆隨著時空而逐步調整修訂各自觀點與包容，並藉助區域組織、第二軌道或第三國的協助，待最佳時機或相對方咸感需要時，始建立相對間的互信措施。