由於全球化、國際化趨勢使生產要素已形成以全球為市場進行流動，故本文遂以人員異動問題為核心進行研究，並體察全球化、國際化趨勢，再將人員異動問題置於多國籍企業之經營型態下進行思考，並以我國赴大陸投資企業人員異動狀況實行訪談以期對實況有所了解。 　　本文於探討人員異動問題時是由勞動關係角度出發，由於勞動關係具有從屬性及專屬性，故人員異動時首重勞動關係之釐清，遂於文中將人員異動之類型、學說、依據與限制、可能發生之問題有詳細之整理。 　　本文將人員異動分為企業內人員異動及企業間人員異動兩類，至於如何區分筆者主張應由實質面加以判斷，實因在未來多國籍企業經營關係勢將日趨複雜情勢下，使僅以形式認定勞動關係將日漸困難。筆者主張援引公司法中法人格否定之概念以實質面確認勞動關係，以因應企業經營多樣化之趨勢，達到實質正確的確認勞動關係，保障勞動者權益之目的。 　　此外異動之學說則隨時空演進日漸趨向於尊重勞動者意願、明確規範企業間異動時勞資之間權利、義務之方向發展。 　　至於因人員異動所可能衍生之問題極多，一般而言其問題之發生率與嚴重性與異動之原因及類型有密切關係，其中以萎縮型企業間人員異動為最，其次為萎縮型企業內人員異動、擴張型企業間人員異動，最後為擴張型企業內人員異動。 　　經過文獻整理之後，將所得之理論印證於我國赴大陸投資之企業，發現我國赴大陸投資之企業有其特殊性，因其投資經驗與時間接尚短淺，以致所有關於異動的問題上多未受重視或尚單純。 　　因此，建議為因應未來趨勢仍需由建立完整之勞動契約法治體系；加強對異動之相關勞動保護；強化工會及勞動參予功能及健全就業安全體系等方面著手，以因應未來日趨多樣、多元之人員異動問題。

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當面對總體蘊藏資訊量極為龐大，單筆資訊則較為零碎的資料來源時，社會網路分析同時兼具微觀及巨觀分析特點的方式，提供了一獨特的切入分析角度。目前在社會網路分析領域中，針對網路性質所發展的分析指標等相關理論，大多以1-mode網路為主要的探討模式，對於2-mode網路模式下的著墨則較為稀少。在本研究論文中，以政府人事異動資料庫為主要資料來源，建構出同時具有人物以及職務兩種不同類型節點的2-mode網路，並選擇以適用於2-mode網路模式下的連結預測理論為主要核心，建置出職務接替人選預測系統，其後透過配合不同的實驗模式設計進行接替人選的預測行動，希望能以此來探討單一職位對於其未來接替人選的考量上，受到其歷任人員職務歷程的影響程度。 實驗數據結果顯示，本研究所建置出的接替人選預測系統，對於不同的職務分類層級以及針對不同部門間的職務預測，均會產生不同的預測成效，而這些成果均可適切反映出因應於升遷法制規範或是部份部門於專業知識上的需求條件，因而使得其在對於職位接替人選的考量上，較易受到歷任人選於職務歷程方面的影響。 / When coping with the information source which can store quite high information load in total while one piece of that tends to be fragmentary, Social Network Analysis provides a unique viewpoint to contain analyzing characteristics from both of microcosmic and macrocosmic perspectives. To date, when it comes to theories related to analysis indicator established from different analyzing characteristics in the field of Social Network Analysis, effort is mainly made to explore 1-mode network. By contrast, little emphasis is put on 2-mode network. In this study, the database of government’s personnel change is adopted as the major information source. This study then establishes a 2-mode network with two different types of node, that is, personnel and position. Choosing Link Prediction Theory as the major core with its applicability of 2-mode network, the present study sets up a prediction system of position taking-over candidate. Then, in accordance with different designs of experimental model, the prediction is conducted in an attempt to investigate whether the consideration of future taking-over candidate for a certain position would be influenced by position courses of all past personnel in this position. According to the experimental data, the prediction system of position taking-over candidate established in this study shows different prediction efficiency when predicting different position layers and positions from different sectors. These results all appropriately reflect that the consideration of position taking-over candidate is more easily influenced by position courses of past personnel due to the rules of promotion and the conditions of professional knowledge in some sectors.

本研究乃針對董監事異動進行分析探討，主要議題有二，第一項議題為董監事異動之決定性因素，而另一項議題為董監事異動後對經營績效之影響。在影響董監事異動的決定因素中，首先探討公司前期經營績效與董監事異動之關聯性，以分析經營績效不佳是否為發生董監事異動的因素之一，接著分析股權結構如何影響董監事異動。最後再探討董監事異動後之經營績效是否得以改善。 本研究以2000年到2008年間上市(櫃)公司為研究對象，以董監事是否發生異動與董監事異動比率作為董監事異動變數以對上述關係加以探討。實證結果發現，前期經營績效與董監事異動為顯著負相關，意謂前期經營績效差時，會導致董監事異動之發生。且機構投資人持股與董監事異動為顯著正相關，當機構投資人持股比率高，董監事異動增加，說明機構投資人發揮其監督功能。不過，本研究未能發現在董監事異動後，公司績效有顯著的提升。 / This paper examines the determinants of board director turnover behavior and whether board director turnover signals the firm performance of subsequent period. The empirical findings show that board director of firms with poor firm performance and high institution ownership are more likely to have turnovers. While there is no relationship between the frequency of board director turnover and improvement in firm performance.

本研究將總經理之異動分為自願性與非自願異動二種，主要探討董事會之特性與、控制股東與總經理發生非自願性異動間之關聯性，並且強調從董事會獨立性及最終控制者對董事會之控制力觀點，探討董事會解除總經理職務之決策行為。除此之外，本研究尚探討總經理異動後影響董事會選任繼任總經理之決策行為，主要從董事會之獨立性與異動前績效兩項觀點。研究樣本為民國八十八年至九十二年之台灣上市公司，探用Logit model來檢驗假說。 在總經理發生非自願性異動方面，實證結果顯示，當前期的績效愈差時，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈高，本研究並將董事會特性分為股權結構及董事會獨立性兩種，並加入最終控制者觀點，實證結果顯示，獨立董事的比率愈高，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈高，惟其結果不具統計上的重大性。總經理之持股比率佔董事全體持股比率較高時，愈容易發生總經理非自願性異動，但不具有統計上的重大性。當董事長與總經理為同一人時，較不易發生總經理非自願性異動。此外，在最終控制者方面，實證結果顯示，當控制股東席次控制權愈高時，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈低，控制股東的盈餘分配權與席次控制權的偏離程度愈大時，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈低，但不具統計上的重大性。 在繼任總經理特性與董事會特性關聯性方面，實證結果顯示，當異動前績效愈差時，董事會愈傾向於選用外部繼任者，但不具有統計上的重大性。獨立董事比率愈高，董事會愈傾向於選用外部繼任者。 　　整體而言，績效是影響我國上市公司總經理發生非自願性異動的重要原因之一，除此之外，董事長兼任總經理之情形，讓董事長有能力去阻止他們被撤換，進而降低總經理非自願性的離職機率。由於我國上市公司特殊的股權結構，使得控制股東掌控了董事會並且積極參與公司經營，造成董事會流於形式，無形中降低了董事會的監督職能，而設置獨立董事是提高董事會職能發揮的重要機制之一，在本研究中，雖未發現獨立董事的設置對於董事會的監督職能之顯著助益，但發現設置獨立董事在決定繼任者方面，能提出專業建言，使得董事會選任繼任總經理能有更廣泛的人選，而非侷限於公司內部。 / This research CEO turnover will divide into voluntary turnover and non- voluntary turnover. This research discusses the relationship among corporate performance, characteristics of board of the directors, non- voluntary CEO turnover and controlling shareholders. This research emphasizes the board of directors independence and the controlling shareholders’ controlling force over the board of directors and discusses the board of directors’ policy-making behavior of firing CEO.In addition, this research also discusses how does the board of directors appoint succeed CEO.The sample consists of all public companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation over the four-year period 2000-2003.According to previous studies, the characteristics of the board of directors are ownership structure and independence. This research also considerate the controlling shareholders. This research provides evidence on the relationship between non- voluntary CEO turnover and corporate performance. The likelihood of non- voluntary CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to the pre-performance. Non- voluntary CEO turnover rate is low when the chairman of the board and CEO are the same person. In addition, this research provides evidence on the relationship between the board of directors independence and the characteristics of the succeed CEO.When the fraction of outside directors is high, the board of directors comparatively possibly appoints the outsider successor.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・論文博士 / 博士(経済学) / 乙第12943号 / 論経博第386号 / 新制||経||274(附属図書館) / 32202 / (主査)准教授 矢野 剛, 教授 久本 憲夫, 教授 岡田 知弘 / 学位規則第4条第2項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第19461号 / 経博第530号 / 新制||経||276(附属図書館) / 32497 / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 小佐野 広, 教授 西山 慶彦, 教授 柴田 章久 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

傳統經濟學者只從工資所得的差異，作為研究區位選擇決策的基礎。但個人的消費當 包括私有財及公共財，筆者從公共財的利益與負擔探討其關係；並圖利用其差異，來 調節人口分佈，達成區域均衡發展之目標。 首章：緒論。 第二章：地方財政差異之經濟意義。旨在說明差異的原因及對社會福利的不良影響。 第三章：地方財政差異與人口異動。主要在探討﹁以足投票﹂過程，是否可使人口分 佈達到最適。 第四章：地方財政變數資本化與人口異動。本章將前章擴充，如果資本化問題存在， 將使Tiebout 效率更不樂觀。 第五章：地方財政差異的調節措施。本章除說明中央政府調節功能，並以簡單模型說 明調節方法。 第六章：我國現況分析與政策建議。 第七章：結論。

為釐清經理人異動對公司日常營運決策及績效之影響及資訊內涵，本研究透過分析國內近五年來上市櫃公司樣本後發現，大多數發生經理人異動之公司多為一次且自願性之異動，而不是經常性之活動，此為一家公司經營權輪替之正常行為。至於其他發生非經常性異動之公司則多在5年內有高於2次以上之異動行為，此和該類公司經營績效不佳及集團內部有爭權行為有很大之關係。關於經理人異動事件宣告效果方面，本研究實證結果顯示，無論是何種異動原因，市場似乎皆呈現負向反應，且以非自願性異動事件負向反應程度為大。 至於經理人異動對公司投資及融資比例之影響方面，本實證結果顯示，不同之異動原因對公司投資、融資比例之影響亦不同。以自願性異動事件來說，事件發生前之固定資產成長率呈現遞增的現象，顯示經理人異動前其投資決策普遍較同業為積極，而事件發生後卻轉而成為較同業保守，顯示新上任者可能因為經驗之不足而不敢採行太積極的策略，而其負債比例在事件發生前逐年遞減，發生後則呈逐年遞增的現象。至於非自願性異動事件，本研究發現其在事件發生前即開始採行較保守的投資策略，推論可能和此類公司基本面較差，或是經理人進行資產誤置之行為所導致，異動後新繼任者之投資轉趨積極；而其於事件發生前負債比例增加，發生後則呈現減少的現象。 至於經理人異動後公司之績效情況，本研究結果顯示無論是會計指標或是市場績效指標，自願性異動樣本之結果在事件發生後公司經營績效皆較之前為差，和市場對事件宣告之反應相符合；但以非自願性異動樣本來說，事件發生後公司經營績效之指標皆較之前為佳，顯示當初事件發生時市場之反應似乎太過悲觀，但這部分的結果可能存在有存在偏誤(survival bias)之問題。 上述的實證結果使得台灣公司經理人異動和市場宣告反應、經營決策及績效首次獲得連結，對投資人在未來從事投資時可作為參考依據。 / In order to understand the information content of CEO turnover to corporate operating decision and performance, from analyzing the listing companies between 1997-2002 in TW, this research found that the most CEO turnover is once and voluntary activity, this is normal in the daily operation. As for the other involuntary turnover activity, which often happened in the company with bad performance or takeover. As for the announcement effect about CEO turnover, the article found that no matter what reasons, the effect is negative, and more significant in involuntary turnover. About the CEO turnover influence on corporate investing and financing decision, this article shows that different turnover reason would result in different decision. Take the companies with voluntary turnover for instance, the fixed asset growth rate grew before turnover but fell afterward. I assume that’s because new CEO takes more conservative investment decision than original one. And the leverage rate in this kind of companies falls before the event but grows afterward. As for the companies with involuntary turnover, this article found that the original CEO took more conservative investment decision than new CEO, this might be because of the worse fundamental situation in this kind of companies or the asset misallocation of the original CEO. And the leverage rate of involuntary turnover grows before the event but falls afterward.

本文主要換討SOX之後宣告重編公司之經濟後果。探討如下議題:(1)信用評等是否/如何反應公司的重編資訊;(2)重編內涵與經理人異動之關聯性;(3)經理人異動、信用評等改變以及重編嚴重性三者之關聯性。 / Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the increasing occurrence of accounting restatements has drawn considerable attention concerning the financial statement quality and adverse consequences of accounting restatements from investors, regulators, auditors and business communities. The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the economic consequences of accounting restatements announced after SOX based on their relations with credit ratings and management turnover. To examine the following research issues of (1) whether and how the credit rating reacts to companies’ restatements, (2) whether restatement characteristics are associated with management turnover, and (3) what the association among management turnover, credit ratings, and restatement severity is, I gather data on 1,838 companies that restated financial statements between 1997 and 2005. In the first part of the study, my results provide empirical evidence consistent with the conjecture that higher severity restatements are more likely to be followed by subsequent unfavorable ratings. Furthermore, rating agencies using accounting-based measures to predict the probability of bankruptcy perform better in assessing ratings in the post-SOX period. Moreover, rating agencies give auditor changes a “fresh-look” after SOX. In the second part of the study, the likelihood of CEO/CFO turnover significantly increases for companies with higher restatements of severity, and a CEO is more likely to be terminated if the company credit rating following restatements is downgraded. The results show that there is no “cop a plea” effect and when restatements are prompted by companies, management turnover appears to be more concerned with the dollar amount of overstatement on income and/or restatements affecting core earnings. In addition, when executives window-dress earnings to portray a more favorable earnings picture, they are more likely to be terminated following subsequent financial restatements. Moreover, results also indicate that after SOX companies seem more likely to blame their auditors for restatements of higher severity and dismiss their auditors afterwards to maybe avoid the replacements of management.