過去研究多將焦點集中在增加高階經理人薪酬，將可促使高階經理人為公司股東的權益努力，為此探討提昇股東權益包含高階經理人獎酬與公司績效間的關聯，卻忽略了其與風險間的關係。高階經理人員可能因為獎酬的激勵，從事對公司有利且風險較低的計畫，也可能會為了提高自身的權利，將風險轉嫁給公司，因此激發出探討高階經理人員獎酬與公司風險間的關係的研究動機。 本研究以KMV模型之預期違約率作為公司風險之參數，探討高階經理人之 薪酬、自由現金流量、KMV信用風險之關係，同時瞭解公司規模是否影響高階 經理人薪酬、自由現金流量及公司績效與公司KMV信用風險間的關係。 研究結果顯示，公司高階經理人的薪酬與公司違約風險呈負相關，即高階經理人薪酬的提高，確能降低公司的違約風險，但此現象僅在大規模公司才能發現。此外，就自由現金流量而言，小規模公司之自由現金流量愈多，存在較高的風險，惟有提高公司營運績效，方能減緩公司風險的承擔。另一方面，對於高階經理人薪酬的提升，雖然在小規模公司並沒有效果，但係有助減緩自由現金流量帶來的負向衝擊。最後，前述小結僅存在於小規模公司群體，這可能是因為，大公司擁有較高的政治成本，因此為了避免社會的關注，大公司較小公司有較好的公司治理機制，因此管理當局較不可能基於自利的動機來影響公司的風險。 / Many past researches focused on senior manager will be able to work hard for raising shareholder’s equity because of higher compensation. Many researches of raising stakeholder’s equity explored the relation between senior manager compensation and financial performance, but ignored the relation with credit risk of company. Senior managers maybe perform lower or higher risk project for themselves benefit due to some higher compensation motivation. Thus this researching will refocus on exploring the relation between senior manager compensation and company credit risk. This study will discuss the relation among senior manager compensation, FCF and KMV company credit risk by EDF of KMV model as a parameter of company credit risk. And to understand the scale of company weather influence the relation among senior manager compensation, FCF and KMV company credit risk? The results of this research show that the senior manager compensation is negatively correlated with company credit default risk. On the other hand, higher senior manager compensation will reduce the risk of company credit default, but this phenomenon can be found only in lager companies. In addition, as far as small company's FCF, the more FCF, the more there is a higher risk. Increase company's operating performance, the company credit risk can be slow down. On the other hand, in small company there is no effect on raising senior manager compensation, but it will help mitigate the negative impact of FCF. Finally, the foregoing summary is just only in small company groups, may be because larger companies have higher political cost, so in order to avoid the concern of society, larger companies have better corporate governance than small companies, thus senior manager will not be able to influence the company’s credit risk for their self-interested motivation.

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

高階主管薪酬計畫與股權結構是解決公司代理問題的重要機制，代理理論提出以績效決定酬勞的制度，可提供高階主管努力誘因，促使股東與高階主管之間的目標一致；同時股權結構也會影響高階主管的努力，進而對公司的。故本研究旨在探討我國上市公司股權集中度、酬勞計畫與公司經營績效之關係，並利用模式推導相關的命題與假說。 本研究利用混合迴歸就四年度主管薪酬資料加以分析，Scheffe檢定檢驗高階主管的持股比例與薪酬計畫的關係，實證結果整理如下： 1.董事長持股比例與薪酬無關，總經理持股比例與薪酬有關。 2.公司價值與董事會持股比例呈非線性的關係。 3.機構投資人偏向效率監督假說。 4.總經理薪酬計畫中的項目比薪酬水準的高低重要。 5.公司經營績效與高階主管薪酬呈正相關。 / In agency theory, executive compensation contracts and ownership structures provide primary mechanisms for solving agency problems. Top executive compensation linked to performance can align the incentives of firms' top executive with firms'stockholder. Ownership structure can influce the effort of the top executive. The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship among top executive compensation　scheme, ownership structure and firm performance for listed companies in Taiwan, and use modelling to develop related propositions and hypotheses. Pooling regressions using four years' pool data and Scheffe test are performed to test hypothese, Empirical results are summarized as follows: 1.The holdings of chairman has nothing to do with the level of compsation and that of CEO has something to do with. 2.The non-linear relationship between firm value and holdings of board of directors. 3.The role of institution tends to be efficinet monitoring hypothesis. 4.Incentive component of CEO compensation scheme tends to be more important than level of that sheme. 5.Firm performance is positively associated with top executive's cash compensation.

本文主要研究支付給審計委員會較多的權益薪酬會不會影響到審計委員會的獨立性，從而支付較低的審計公費，選擇非產業專家的會計師。以2007至2015年間美國的上市公司為樣本，本研究發現審計委員會獲得的權益薪酬與審計公費，產業專家的會計師選擇呈負相關。此結果與預期一致，權益薪酬會誘導審計委員會妥協獨立性，從而買較少，品質較低的審計服務。

公司治理的研究,其主要的目的是了解董事會組成,董事會規模,外部董事, 董事及CEO薪酬誘因,CEO改組,外部大股東,外國股東,機構投資人,控制權和股權集中性,併購,法律制度及執行,法源…等變數對以ROA,ROE,會計盈餘,Tobin’s Q和股市報酬率所代表的公司績效之影響。與公司治理有關的重要指標包括股份控制權,現金流量權,董監事席次的控制權,控制權與股權的偏離,次大股東,金字塔結構,交叉持股,優先投票權,外部董事比例等。 本論文共計8章40節,引述國外文獻約500篇並由國際公司治理的實證結果來探討我國五家金控：開發金、台新金、復華金、富邦金、兆豐金的公司治理,最後提出九點結論和建議。