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政治衝突的研究黃年, HUANG,NIAN Unknown Date (has links)
本文嘗試以源自社會學並已發展為科際整合性的「喳突理論」,來探討有關政治衝突
的問題。
主要內容在整理引介此一理論的發展概況,並在能力範圍內略作討論與補充,作為政
治衝突研究的參考架構。
本文約十二萬余字,一冊,分為八章、二十二節。各章名稱依序為: (一) 導論。 (
二) 衝突研究的概念架構。 (三) 政治衝突的環境因素。 (四) 衝突參與者--個人
。 (五) 衝突參與者--團體。 (六) 衝突的目標。 (七) 衝突的增強與緩和。 (八
) 結語。
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一九六九年至一九八四年中蘇共邊界衝突與談判之評估--試就衝突理論、決策理論及談判規則來分析李榮華, LI, RONG-HUA Unknown Date (has links)
全篇共一冊,十三萬字,分成五章二十節,本文係以珍寶島事件為中心,以中共部分
為重點。
第一章:簡介一般邊界問題的起源、演變、重要性及其相關概念,並說明研究動機、
目的、範圍、限制、途徑與方法,藉以作為整個研究架構展開之起點。
第二章:從幾個中共對外戰爭的個案裡,歸納出五個導致中共發動對外武裝衝突行為
的主要驅動力,藉以進一步瞭解其對外戰爭的特色和形成模式。
第三章:檢證上述五個主要驅動力在中蘇共邊界武裝衝突個案中的解釋能力,並說明
珍寶島事件及其後來的邊境衝突的經過情形,最後分析這些衝突事件對國際政治和中
共外交政策的影響。
第四章:探討中蘇共邊界談判的促成原因、經過情形、雙方立場、在國際法上的法律
效果及其在雙方「關係正常化談判」中的內容和性質。
第五章:評估邊界及領土問題在中共外交政策上所扮演的角色,和內政目標在中共外
交決策上所具有的地位和影響力,確認中蘇共邊界衝突的性質,並展望中蘇共邊界問
題在未來可能的發展趨勢。
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從中蘇共邊界衝突與談判看中共外交政策李榮華, Li, Rong-Hua Unknown Date (has links)
全篇共一冊,十三萬字,分成五章二十節,本文係以珍寶島事件為中心,以中共部分
為重點。
第一章:簡介一般邊界問題的起源、演變、重要性及其相關概念,並說明研究動機、
目的、範圍、限制、途徑與方法,藉以作為整個研究架構展開之起點。
第二章:從幾個中共對外戰爭的個案裡,歸納出五個導致中共發動對外武裝衝突行為
的主要驅動力,藉以進一步瞭解其對外戰爭的特色和形成模式。
第三章:檢證上述五個主要驅動力在中蘇共邊界武裝衝突個案中的解釋能力,並說明
珍寶島事件及其後來的邊境衝突的經過情形,最後分析這些衝突事件對國際政治和中
共外交政策的影響。
第四章:探討中蘇共邊界談判的促成原因、經過情形、雙方立場、在國際法上的法律
效果及其在雙方「關係正常化談判」中的內容和性質。
第五章:評估邊界及領土問題在中共外交政策上所扮演的角色,和內政目標在中共外
交決策上所具有的地位和影響力,確認中蘇共邊界衝突的性質,並展望中蘇共邊界問
題在未來可能的發展趨勢。
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編定工業區開發模式之研究 / The research of projected industrial site development mode黃明芳, Huang, Ming Fang Unknown Date (has links)
台灣地區工業區開發已近50年,民國84年中央工業主管機關不再開發工業區,由地方政府與興辦工業人接續為工業區開發主流。就工業區開發資料顯示,有興辦工業人開發大型工業區不易,及開發商不易尋找之情況,前者乃取得完整大面積土地困難,為開發主體問題,後者乃在政府開發工業區未編列預算所致,為開發模式問題,因此本文認為「編定工業區開發模式」課題,有研究之必要。
本研究宗旨就工業區開發模式中資金籌措為主題,以工業區開發規劃至開發完成之過程為軸線,經由(一)市場與政府理論,論證工業區開發主體及數量變化。(二)對不同開發主體在開發過程中,所產生交易成本、代理成本、衝突成本異同討論。(三)對開發模式之交易成本等相關文獻、法制面、實務面、分析研究,以及對實際參與工業區開發人士進行深入訪談,發覺工業區開發困境所在。
經研究認為地方政府擁有公權力及行政資源,所開發工業區交易成本最低,為編定工業區開發最佳模式,爰此本研究建議編定工業區開發必須搭配以下措施:(一)政府編列預算。(二)公私統包開發。(三)引進不動產估價師制度。(四)引進銀行融資制度。(五)工業區銷售採預售制度。
透過上述工業區開發配套措施,除有益於開發商參與工業區開發,及減少民眾抗爭之衝突成本,使得開發順利外,尚可降低搜尋成本、協商成本,及時間成本等,達成降低編定工業區開發交易成本之目的,提昇工業區開發之效率。 / The development of industrial sites in Taiwan has been carried out continuously for nearly 50 years. In 1995, the central government made a decision that they no longer played an active role in developing industrial sites, and thereafter, the task was taken over by local governments as well as host industrialists. The literature that recorded such development shows that some host industrialists encountered difficulty in developing large-scale industrial sites, and also it was difficult to find developers. The problem of the former was caused by the difficulty in looking for large area of land, which was a problem of development entity, and the problem of the latter was caused by no budget arranged by the government, which was a problem of development mode. Thus, in this text, it is considered that a study on “the Development Mode of Projected Industrial Sites” has become essential.
The purpose of this study is to explore the subject of fund raising in the process of industrial site development, from the stage of its planning up to its accomplishment, which goes through (1) the theory of market and government: to discuss and verify entity and quantity variation in industrial site development. (2) the discussion about similarities and dissimilarities in transaction cost, agent cost, and conflict cost emerging in the process of development. (3) the analysis and research of transaction cost of development mode through relative literature, legal aspect, and practical aspect, as well as interviewing personnel who took take part in the actual development of industrial sites in order to find out potential problems.
As a result of research, it is deemed that the transaction cost in developing industrial sites is lowest when executed by a local government as it holds civic rights and administrative resources, so that turns out to be the best mode in projected industrial site development. It is therefore proposed in this study that when developing projected industrial sites, following measures should be taken: (1) budget planned by the government (2) execution of consolidated development contract for both public and private projects (3) introduction of real estate appraiser system (4) introduction of bank loan system (5) adoption of advance booking for selling and purchasing premises in industrial sites.
By taking above supplementary measures for developing industrial sites, the benefits include encouraging developers’ involvement in developing industrial sites, reducing conflict cost arose by mob protest so as to facilitate development process, and further lowering searching cost, negotiation cost, time cost etc. As a result, the purpose of reducing transaction cost of developing projected industrial sites can be achieved, and the efficiency of such development can be elevated.
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