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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

財務槓桿對於多角化企業價值之再探討 / none

林秀倩 Unknown Date (has links)
多角化經常是許多企業追求持續成長、價值創造所採取的策略之一,然而,大多數的實證結果均發現多角化策略減損了公司價值,而且企業的總價值顯著低於各部門獨立經營應有之價值,存在折價現象,顯示出多角化策略不僅無法創造價值,反而有損於公司價值。如此一來,「多角化」似乎背離了管理者理應採行提昇股東財富之策略。 為何多角化企業會存在折價現象呢?從實證上觀察到多角化企業的財務槓桿程度愈高,價值減損的幅度愈大,似乎兩者存在某種關係。因此,本研究將驗證財務槓桿與多角化企業價值之關係,探究多角化企業折價幅度是否與財務槓桿有關,以瞭解實務中多角化企業普偏負債比率較高的現象是否合理。本研究以美國公開交易公司作為研究對象,樣本期間為1996年至2001年,利用Berger & Ofek(1995)所提出的超額價值作為公司價值的衡量指標,本研究實證結果發現: 一. 不同多角化策略階段下,財富移轉效果之影響存在顯著差異 二. 不同多角化策略階段下,多角化策略與財務槓桿的交互作用效果與公 司價值之關係存在顯著差異 三. 多角化策略確能帶來舉債利益,但隨著多角化程度增加而遞減。 在實證的過程中發現,若以靜態觀察多角化公司價值與財務槓桿間的關係,兩者的確存在顯著負向關係;然而,若捕捉策略調整下的動態過程,發現多角化策略價值變動數與財務槓桿之間為正向關係,意即財務槓桿愈高之企業,進行多角化策略後,價值增加的幅度愈大抑或價值減損的幅度愈小。換言之,財務槓桿並非導致多角化公司折價之因素,反而有利於價值創造。
2

產業環境因素與企業競爭策略關係之研究--以我國營建業為例

蘇拾忠, SU, SHI-ZHONG Unknown Date (has links)
本文係以個案研究的方式,針對我國營建業之發展歷程,進行有關產業環境中之各項 因素對產業內企業競爭策略影響的研究。由於企業競爭策略的決定,必須考慮該企業 所身處的產業環境,以及該企業本身的條件,經過所謂「衡外情」、「量己力」的功 夫,而做出正確而有助於企業生存發展並可以指導企業功能性政策執行的策略;因此 如何掌握產業環境的各項有利(機會)、不利(威脅)的因素,並從而制定競爭策略 ,就成為企業主管所關切的課題。本文即嚐試經由個案的分析,了解產業環境諸項因 素對企業制定策略的影響過程及涵意,並發展出足以提供企業主管參考的原則。本文 之理論架構係參考有關產業組織、產業經濟、競爭策略、企政策等文獻,並參考有關 產業政策的理論,綜合而成。 我國營建業自民國34年台灣光復後始逐漸出現有規模、有組織的團體,並在民國5 6年太平洋公司成立後至民國62年第一次能源危機民國69年,第二次石油危機止 ,是一段相當快速的成長,建設公司一夜之間暴增,並且多人因而一屋致富,但經政 府連串壓抑房價措施,便銷售銳減,一時間許多財務不健全的公司因而倒閉,房地產 景氣低迷,並持續至民國74年;75年,76年是一次空前的房價漲升,並且出現 仲介公司、建築經理公司以及海外投資房地產的多化功能,營建業一片欣欣向榮。 經個案分析,吾人得知營建業依賴資金極重,若一公司財務槓桿優良自可渡過難關, 但許多財務不健全的公司,追求營業上的風險,因而倒閉,是足警惕;此外,政府政 策對營建之影響應十分驚人,值得施政者注意。
3

公司系統性風險與會計變數關聯性之研究 / A study on the relationship between firm systematic risk and accounting variables

邱垂昌, Chiou, Chei Chang Unknown Date (has links)
本研究旨在探討公司系統性風險與會計變數之關聯性。影響公司系統性風險之因素應包括公司內部因素與公司外部總體經濟因素,但過去文獻並未完全涵蓋到,致使其模式解釋力皆不高。為彌補過去文獻之不足,本研究先以理論推導方式將公司內部與外部因素納入系統性風險模式中,再以實證資料驗證之。   模型推導結果顯示,影響系統性風險之因素包括公司盈餘、營運槓桿度、財務槓桿度、帳面價值、股利、市場組合報酬率、無風險報酬率,以及其他總體經濟因素等。理論推導結果產生三大主要命題:   1. 在公司前期盈餘為正及當期銷貨成長率為正,以及公司當期之每股盈餘、每股帳面價值及每股現金股利對股價具有正向影響時,公司當期總槓桿程度(營運槓桿度與財務槓桿度之乘積)對系統性風險具有正向影響。   2. 在公司前期盈餘為正,以及公司當期之每股盈餘、每股帳面價值及每股現金股利對股價具有正向影響時,公司當期每股現金股利對系統性風險具有正向影響。   3. 當公司當期銷貨成長率為正時,營運槓桿度與財務槓桿度為正向相關;但當公司當期銷貨成長率為負時,營運槓桿度與財務槓桿度具有抵換關係。   根據上述命題,本研究設立三項假說。第一,公司總槓桿程度對系統性風險具有正向影響,而營運槓桿度與財務槓桿度對系統性風險之影響皆為正向(或負向)。第二,公司發放現金股利對系統性風險具有正向影響。第三,在系統性風險與盈餘皆不變的額外前提下,當銷貨成長率為負時,營運槓桿度與財務槓桿度具有抵換關係;當銷貨成長率為正時,營運槓桿度與財務槓桿度為正相關。   實證結果部分支持上述三項假說。首先,公司總槓桿程度、財務槓桿度及現金股利皆對系統性風險具有顯著正向影響。因此,公司可利用降低總槓桿程度、財務槓桿度及減少現金股利之策略來減低系統性風險。其次,市場組合報酬、通貨膨脹率及國民生產毛額成長率等總體經濟因素,對系統性風險皆具有負向顯著影響。此結果說明導致公司系統性風險上升之因素應該包括公司內部與外部因素。因此,公司欲降低風險時,除了利用總槓桿程度、財務槓桿度與股利政策外,尚須考慮其他總體經濟變化。最後,實證結果亦顯示,當公司正處於銷貨成長時期,以追求成長為目標,可能同時面臨高營運風險與高財務風險。然而,在銷貨衰退時,公司卻不必然會以風險控管為目標。因此,營運槓桿度與財務槓桿度並不存在抵換關係。 / This thesis examines the relationship between firm systematic risk and accounting variables. Potential determinants of firm systematic risk theoretically include accounting and macroeconomic variables, but prior research only explored part of them and most models yielded low explanatory power. This research analytically derives and empirically verifies a model of firm systematic risk.   The analytical results suggest that determinants of systematic risk at least include earnings, the degree of operating leverage, the degree of financial leverage, book value, dividend, market-portfolio return, risk-free return and other macroeconomic variables. Three main propositions are therefore derived as follows.   1. When a firm's prior year earnings and current year sales growth are both positive, if its current book value, cash dividend, and earnings all have a positive effect on its stock price, then its degree of total leverage, defined as the product of degree of operating leverage and degree of financial leverage, has a positive effect on its systematic risk.   2. When a firm's prior year earnings is positive, if its current book value, cash dividend, and earnings all have a positive effect on its stock price, then its current cash dividend has a positive effect on its systematic risk.   3. When a firm's current year sales growth is positive (negative), its degree of operating leverage is positively (negatively) related with its degree of financial leverage.   Three hypotheses are then tested empirically. First, a firm's degree of total leverage has a positive effect on its systematic risk; and its degree of operating leverage and degree of financial leverage both have a positive (or both negative) effect on its systematic risk. Second, a firm's cash dividend has a positive effect on its systematic risk. Third, if a firm's sales growth is positive (negative) without any change in its systematic risk or earnings, then its degree of operating leverage is positively (negatively) related with its degree of financial leverage.   The empirical results provide partial support for the above hypotheses. First, the degree of total leverage, degree of financial leverage, and cash dividend each has a positive effect on the systematic risk. Therefore, a firm can reduce its systematic risk by lowering its degree of total leverage, degree of financial leverage and the cash dividend. Second, macroeconomic factors such as the market-portfolio return, inflation and GNP growth have a negative effect on the systematic risk. Hence, a firm attempting to control its systematic risk should consider the changes of macroeconomics besides the leverage and dividend policy. Finally, a firm with growing sales takes a high degree of operating leverage and financial leverage, but a firm does not necessarily take a high (low) degree of operating leverage and a low (high) degree of financial leverage as target when its sales are declining. In other words, these two leverages have no offset relationship.
4

財務比率之一般應用及其預測功能之研究

卓傳陣, Zhuo, Zhuan-Zhen Unknown Date (has links)
第一章說明本研究之目的、研究範圍與限制、研究方法並扼要說明論文各章節彙要。 第二章財務報表分析與財務比率:(一)財務報表分析之意義及功能:報表分析乃是 將所應用之分析工具資訊。其功能可就內部與外部分論之。(二)說明報表分析種類 與常見之分析工具(三)分析工具之一──財務比率之發展歷史之介紹(四)探討財 務比率分析之特性。 第三章財務比率之類型:就財務比率分析之目的,將其分為四類型:(一)安全性評 估之比率(二)衡量獲利能力之比率(三)測驗財務槓桿之比率(四)衡量經營成效 之比率。並各就其常見且具重要性之比率分別探討其意義。 第四章財務比率之應用:先就如何有效應用財務比率,探討分析的原則與可能的問題 ,並就比率之實際應用,分管理階層、投資者、債權人等說明之。 第五章財務比率與預測功能:(一)說明財務比率曾應用於企業預測之種類並將重點 置於企業破產預測之功能上(二)探討破產企業其財比率可能具有之特性(三)相關 學者之實證研究介紹與討論。第六章結論與建議。
5

金融契約與廠商投資之研究-股價資訊、抵押品的實質效果 / The Theoretical Studies of Financial Contracts and Firms' Investment Decisions-The Real Effects of Stock Price Information and Collateral

林育秀, Yu Shou Lin Unknown Date (has links)
本論文包含兩篇獨立但主旨相關的文章, 目的均在探討融資契約與廠商投資的關聯,以分析融資契約的實質效果。第一篇文章「股價資訊外部性與新投資之採行」研究權益證券(股票)集訊、揭訊功能的實質效益,我們由股價資訊公開所產生的外部效果,分析股價資訊效率性與廠商投資效率之間的關聯。在1.眾多異質廠商,2.投資具實質選擇權(real options)特性的假設下,內生化廠商與股市交易者的資訊取得決策,發現1. 均衡時廠商的投資與資訊取得決策取決於廠商技術水準與股價效率性之高低:高股價效率性時,無廠商取得新資訊,皆根據股價判斷投資,低股價效率性時,僅較低技術廠商根據股價資訊投資。2. 股價有額外的資訊揭露效果:由於廠商僅能獲得新資訊的部份效益,且廠商利用資訊有機會成本,將投資證券化可提高新資訊被揭露的可能性,使得資訊可被充份利用,提昇投資效率。3. 股價資訊可提增投資效率,增加廠商期望報酬,但當體系平均技術水準落後,新資訊的實質效益低落時,股價資訊公開的外部淨效益亦趨薄弱,故經濟發展初期,股市資訊公開的外部效益相對不重要。 第二篇文章「抵押品、財務槓桿與廠商投資」研究借貸契約中,抵押品舒緩借貸限制的作用,及其可能產生的實質效果。我們採用Williamson(1986,1987)的狀態確認成本模型(costly state verification model),在該訊息不對稱模型,廠商向外融資面臨借貸限制,僅較高自有資金廠商可獲融資。當借貸市場資金相當寬鬆,資金供給恆大於資金需求,資金成本(無風險利率)為一由模型外因素所決定的外生參數時,抵押融資不影響資金成本,此時抵押品具有舒緩借貸限制的作用,體系財務槓桿提高,期望查帳成本下降,投資的期望淨產出增加。若資金相對緊俏,無風險利率須由借貸市場均衡所內生決定時,長期而言,財務槓桿僅受體系資金寬鬆程度的影響,短期間抵押融資雖能提高財務槓桿,但隨槓桿之提高,資金需求增加,無風險利率上揚,在新的均衡,較低自有資金廠商投資的期望報酬下降,借貸利率上漲,反而增加其應負債務,資產狀況惡化,此即本文所欲突顯之抵押融資的潛在成本。 第一章 緒論 3 第一節 研究動機 3 第二節 研究內容與架構 5 第二章 文獻回顧 7 第一節 融資契約的功能 7 第二節 金融結構與實質經濟活動 13 第三節 股價資訊與廠商投資 18 第四節 抵押品與廠商投資 22 第三章 股價資訊外部性與新投資之採行 27 第一節 前言 27 第二節 基本模型 29 第三節 期中股市均衡與股價效率性 35 第四節 股價資訊外部效益 41 第五節 小結 46 附 錄 47 第四章 抵押品、財務槓桿與廠商投資 53 第一節 前言 53 第二節 基本模型 55 第三節 抵押融資模型-資金寬鬆時的抵押品效果 62 第四節 抵押融資模型-資金緊俏時的抵押品效果 66 第五節 小結 70 第五章 結論 72 第一節 研究限制 72 第二節 未來研究方向 77 參考文獻 79 / This dissertation collects two separate but related papers, both study the channel through which financing contracts can affect firms' investment decisions and the corresponding real effects. The first paper " Informational Externality of Stock Prices and Firms' New Investment Decisions" analyzes what real benefits the information acquisition and signaling function of stocks can produce. From the viewpoint of informational externality, stock prices may disclose some valuable information beneficial to firms' investment decisions. Under the assumptions of " heterogeneous technology" and "new investment as a real option", this paper finds 1. Firms' investment and information acquisition decisions are determined both by their own technology level and stock prices efficiency. With high price efficiency, no firms acquire information directly, all make investment decisions based on stock prices. With low price efficiency, most firms acquire information directly, only few low-tech firms make decisions according to stock prices. 2. Stock prices have additional signaling effect. Firms can ony get half benefits of new information, besides they have opportunity costs in using information. As a result, stock prices can enhance the possibility of information disclosure, improving investment efficiency. 3. When the economy is underdeveloped and the real benefit of new information is small, the net benefit produced by informational externality will be tiny. The stock prices externality effect is thus comparatively unimportant at the beginning stage of economy. The second paper " Collateral, Financial Leverage and Firms' Investment"analyzes the constraints-smoothing function of collateral and its real effects. By adopting Williamson's costly state verification model(1986,1987), I find that with this specific asymmetric information structure, there are financing constraints in capital markets, only firms whose own capital inputs are higher above some level can get borrowed capital. The question is " Can offering collateral smooth this kind of financing constraints?" In markets with abundant capital where capital supply always exceeds demand, capital cost(riskless interest rate)will be an exdogenously-determined parameter which won't be affected by collateral financing. In this scenario, collateral can smooth financing constraints, increase financial leverage and improve the net expected return of investment. On the contrary, if capital is not so abnudant that the capital cost should be determined endogenously by capital market equilibrium, then in the long run this economy's financial leverage depends only on the relative abundance of capital. Though collateral financing can increase financial leverage in the short run, as capital demand increases, capital cost will also increase. This will offset the initial smoothing effect of collateral. After full adjustment of capital cost, at the new equilibrium the financial leverage remains unchanged. However, the expected return of firms with lower own capital inputs become smaller, and their borrowing rates become higher which mean they have heavier debt burden and less net worth at the new equilibrium.
6

上市上櫃公司股票買回宣告對股價影響之比較研究

費騏葳, Fei ,Chi-wei Unknown Date (has links)
庫藏股制度於國外已經行之有年,特別是美國,早在1960年代即有庫藏股交易。我國上市上櫃股票可合法買回自己公司股票制度始於2000年所通過的上市上櫃公司買回本公司股份辦法,除了希望藉以提振東南亞金融危機中不振的股市表現,也賦予企業多一種能向投資人傳遞訊息的管道。本研究基於股票買回的各項假說,希望探究公司股票買回宣告的動機還有事件宣告後對於公司股價的影響效果,最後並檢視公司的宣告決策是否會受到前次購回宣告的表現所影響。 在假說驗證方面,以2000至2004年上市公司832家、上櫃公司236家曾經宣告買回自家股票的公司為研究樣本,輔以選出與買回樣本同時間的相同數量「未買回樣本」,透過1-way ANOVA測試與鑑別分析探討影響公司宣告股票買回的因素符合哪些假說的推論結果。此外,依據各項假說,進ㄧ步利用1-way ANOVA測試和複迴歸分析找出與公司事件宣告後股價異常報酬率之間的關係,接著以1-way ANOVA檢視最後一部份研究主題。經由上述的實證分析,本研究獲得以下主要結論: 1.公司買回自家的股票平均而言對於股價有正面的影響效果。 2.以上市公司而言,影響公司宣告股票買回的假說包括了:自由現金流量假說、個人所得稅節稅假說與財務槓桿假說。以上櫃公司而言則包括:自由現金流量假說、個人所得稅節稅假說與資訊信號假說。 3.以上市公司而言,股票買回宣告後,股價的正向異常報酬與:自由現金流量假說、管理者的誘因假說呈現相關關係。上櫃公司則包括:自由現金流量假說。 4.本次是否再度宣告股票買回會受前次買回的正向累積異常報酬率所影響。 / Stock price reactions on stock repurchase announcements among publicly traded corporations have been widely studied over 40 years in United States. Several hypothesizes were established and provide logical reasons for why corporations buy back their own stocks. References show large proportion of positive effect on post-announcement stock price after stock repurchase announcements from empirical researches. It is since 2000 that corporations are allowed to repurchase their own stocks legally in Taiwan. Although many efforts were put in surveying the post-announcement stock price reactions, few focused on examining how corporations’ repurchase decision would be influenced by different hypothesizes. Moreover, whether or not previous repurchase outcome may affect future repurchase judgments met contradict conclusion from recent studies. This research aims on exploring the two main topics which form 7 hypothesize. Data collecting from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database, Commercial Times and Economic Daily News contains publicly traded corporations had ever made stock repurchase announcement except financial and government institutions. The period of the study was from Aug. 6, 2000 to Jul. 31, 2004 and total number of announced corporations included was 832 listed on the Taiwan Security Exchange with 236 listed on the OTC separately. Hypothesis 1 to 6 were tested both from individual model using 1-way ANOVA Analysis and integrated model using Discriminate Analysis on Hypothesis 1 to 5, Event Study Analysis on Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 7 was also verified with 1-way ANOVA Analysis. The empirical results show supports in several hypothesize which reflect corporations did concern free cash flow amount, leverage level, stock underpriced and dividend payout level issues when making repurchase announcement. The stock price after announcement has certain degree of moving correlation toward the same direction as free cash flow level and managerial stockholding level. Finally, previous repurchase outcome was found holding opposite relation with future repurchase judgments.

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