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在中國大陸的法律環境中，外商私募股權基金是較新的議題，它同時牽涉了「外商投資」與「私募股權投資」兩個領域。因此，就外商私募股權基金而言，其為中國大陸在國外法律繼受嬗變後，再於法律雙軌制下的二次嬗變。 外商私募股權基金，是指由外國投資者注資或者外國投資者管理的私募股權基金。因此，它的市場屬性為「外國直接投資」、「國際金融服務」。 由於中國大陸對外商採取「外資法群」進行規範，而並沒有一部外商法典做集中、統一的規定。因此，彼此間存在一定程度的分散、重複、衝突等問題。再加上中國大陸對外商、內資採取雙軌制立法，故法律規範雖有創新但也常有彼此扞格或不足之處。也因此造成運作上的幾個問題：外匯管制、投資待遇、雙軌制、地方政府隨意的政策、實務操作的衝突(投資協議、有限合夥)、及優先股的欠缺。 財經法律因應經濟市場而生，惟經濟市場逐年改變。外商私募股權基金既是經濟市場的產物，就無法透過行政力量加以限制，也無需透過偏頗政策揠苗助長。僅需創造一個平等的法治環境，讓市場自行運作。 本文探討中國大陸對外商私募股權基金相關法規的發展現狀、投資障礙與內外資衝突等議題。除對如何完善立法略盡棉薄之力外，並希冀能提供台灣投資者於前進中國大陸時有所參考。 / In the legal environment of China, the foreign private equity fund is a relatively new issue, it involves two areas of "foreign investment" and "private equity investment” simultaneously. Therefore, with respect to the foreign private equity fund, it is subject to transmutation of foreign laws and subsequently the second transmutation under the dual system of laws in China. The foreign private equity funds refer to the private equity funds injected by foreign investors or managed by foreign investors. Therefore, its market attribute to the "foreign direct investment", "international financial service." Although China has adopted a series of laws to regulate foreign enterprises, there is not one foreign investment code as centralized and unified regulation. Thus, there exists a certain degree of dispersion, overlap, conflict problems among them. Along with the duel system of legislation adopted for foreign enterprises and domestic investments, there are often discrepancies or deficiencies between the legal requirements, although they have been innovated. This resulted in several operational problems: foreign exchange controls, investment treatments, duel system, arbitrary policies of local governments, conflict in practices (investment agreement, limited partnership), and the lack of preference shares. Financial laws are established in response to the market economy, but the economic market changes every year. Since the foreign private equity funds are the production of the market economy, they cannot be restricted only by the administrative power, and they don’t need partial polices to pull up. They only require creating an equal legal environment to make the market operate under its own mechanism. This paper discovers the issues with respect to the current development status of related regulations on the foreign private equity funds, foreign investment barriers and conflicts between domestic and foreign investment in China. In addition to make a little contribution to improve the legislation, it’s also expected to provide reference to Taiwan investors for developing business in China.

中國自第十一屆三中全會朝改革開放發展，住房制度改革前以前蘇聯為目標，透過工作單位制實施福利分房制度，然而實物配給制發展產生諸多問題，如：收租失衡、分配不公、住房存量不足等制度運作結果，因此隨著經濟改革的同時，住房制度也朝向透過商品化與市場化解決住房問題。中國於1998年正式停止福利分房制度，朝市場化轉型過程中，亦同步發展住房保障制度，包括：建設廉租房及經濟適用房等保障性住房、建立多層次保障性住房體系、推廣公積金制度等措施，試圖在市場運作之外保障人民安居權利。在中國住房制度轉型過程中，重慶於2010年以公共租賃住房為核心，建立一套保障性住房體系，整合既有的商品房市場，試圖保障性住房與商品房市場雙軌並行的體制，並在制度運作上以國有資產投入建設、由土地儲備中心提撥建設用地，透過諸多政策手段快速發展住房雙軌制，重慶的住房制度設計亦被稱為住房的「重慶模式」，在政策設計上體現「具有中國特色的社會主義市場經濟」的目標。 重慶的住房模式在短短幾年間引起學界關注，主因在於近年中國城市面臨高房價的困難，雖自1998年即開始推動各種保障性住房，但在各城市的運作中面臨許多困難，對社會弱勢保障效果有限。重慶近年在住房制度設計上形成住房保障與商品住房雙重運作體系，透過各種推動公共租賃住房及其他保障性住房，為中國各城市乃至世界各國面臨居住問題者所關注。有鑑於目前尚未有完整探討重慶住房制度改革的文獻，對住房的重慶模式也未有完整的討論，因此本文以中國住房制度改革做為背景脈絡，探討重慶住房改革歷程，分析重慶保障性住房政策與商品房市場的政策設計，進一步聚焦住房的「重慶模式」運作內容，整理分析重慶住房制度超越其他城市建立雙軌制的因素，並探討重慶住房保障體系能在幾年內快速建設的關鍵，為後續研究中國住房改革及重慶住房雙軌制者提供研究發現。 / As China went through the progress of economic reform during late 1980’s, the housing policy also started to change. It was used to be welfare housing distribution system in the past years, however, many problems raised in practice, such as insufficient charge in rent, unfair distributions, or insufficient housing units. Therefore, the housing policy started to practice commercialization and marketization, in order to resolve the old problems. Chinese government officially stopped the welfare housing policy in 1998. During the transformation to commercialized housing market, the Chinese government also developed indemnificatory apartments with multilayer protections, including the construction of low-rent housing, affordable housing and public housing accumulation fund. The government attempted to provide dual housing system by investing constructions, providing land for housing and other policies. The most well known case is the “Chongqing model” The goal of their policy is to realize “the socialism market economy with Chinese characteristics”. The “Chongqing model” drew a lot of attention in academia in very few years. The main reason is the rising housing price in the cities in China. Although indemnificatory apartments project formed since 1998, the practical operation is problematic with limited protection for people with lower social status. By having public rental housing and other secured housing, the city government of Chongqing has developed a dual system with both secured housing and commercialized housing. Their achievement is known by other Chinese cities and the rest of the world. This thesis will address the background of the reform of Chinese housing policy, the progress of the reform of the housing policy in Chongqing , the analysis of the policy design and the operation of their policy. The reason why the “Chongqing model” is better than other cities in China will be discussed as well. We hope that we will provide the key of the fast and growing development of the Chongqing’s housing system, to people who are interested in reform of Chinese housing policy and the dual housing system in Chongqing.

2006年1月11日公布之證券交易法修正條文，正式將「獨立董事」、「審計委員會」等制度納入我國公開發行公司法制中，因此，我國目前公開發行公司的董事會，可分為三種型態：第一種是傳統的董事會，不設獨立董事，僅設董事會及監察人；第二種是設立獨立董事，且同時設有監察人；第三種類型則是有董事會及審計委員會，但無監察人。 這樣劇烈的變革，毫無疑問地，勢必將對我國公司治理法制中內部監控機關之設置帶來深刻的影響。譬如說：獨立董事與監察人二者並用，是否在組織機制層面上會疊床架屋，其相互間之權責會否不易界定而混淆不清，進而相互推諉？監察人和審計委員會之間是否為可相互取代之制度？二者設計的目的、監控方法和範圍在本質上有何異同？又如何的設計才能確保其「獨立性」和監控機能的有效發揮，但又不致陷入只會除弊不會興利的刻板印象？2006年修正之證券交易法的相關條文，其優劣為何，是否尚有不足之處仍待補充？本文即以此為研究方向，進行探討，惟鑑於國內研究監察人之專著專文已汗牛充棟，故本文著重於介紹此次證券交易法所正式引進之審計委員會制度在美國法下之相關規範及運作情形，並就引進獨立董事和審計委員會制度須搭配之相關配套措施及監察人制度之改善等相關問題提出淺見。 針對以上三種模式，本文認為，在模式二下的獨立董事，有責無權，頂多只能在董事會中扮演「諍友」的角色，其力量之極限亦僅止於透過公開其「諍言」來引起外部力量對公司之注意與監督。此種逐步、分階段實施獨立董事制度之設計，雖然優點是對企業之衝擊較小，但壞處是使得獨立董事制度的健全性，仍有很大的進步空間 。蓋立法者若真希望獨立董事能發揮其監督功能，則至少要讓其權責相符，如此一來功能性委員會之運作配合便是不能少的，且尚須使獨立董事能占董事會及功能性委員會之多數，才能使其較無懼地發揮監督之功能，此亦為國外法制之發展趨勢 。因此，此種既非純粹雙軌制亦非純粹單軌制之過渡階段的模式二設計，將來修法時實宜予以廢除，改由公司從經過修法補強完備之模式一（即水平式雙軌制）或模式三（即單軌制）中，依公司本身之需求，選擇適用其一，如此一來不但可避免現行架構上之混亂，亦符「公司自治」之法理。 而關於現行模式一下尚存如監察人之專業性、獨立性不足，欠缺對內、外審計單位之人事權及相關權責執行規定不夠細緻與選任方式不甚理想等缺失部分，本文建議可透過確立監察人獨立性資格；改善監察人提名、選任、報酬決定機制；賦予監察人辭任時之意見陳述權及引進監察人會等方式加以改進。 至於模式三之部分，本文則建議透過明確劃分董事會、管理階層及審計委員會之責任範圍；引進獨立董事責任免除或減輕之機制；明文要求公司應同時設置提名委員會及報酬委員會；加重對金融犯罪之處罰與設立專責法庭及禁止違反相關規定者轉任至其他發行公司擔任董事或經理人和引進預警機制等方法，以補強現制未臻完美之處，期使單軌制能真正於我國法制中落地生根、成長茁壯。

中國共產黨建政8年後，就宣布完成全行業社會主義改造（1949-1956），實現了公有制與計畫經濟體制，取消了中國既有的混合經濟體制與私有財產制度。然而，自70年代末期開始，一連串試圖搞活經濟的措施開啟了中國經濟制度變化的序幕，30年來，中國已經由公有制計畫經濟體制，轉變到今日混合所有制市場經濟形態。 那些力量驅動了這場變化？那些變數與其交互作用影響，變化了經濟改革的方向？通過經濟制度變化的過程，那些成果帶來經濟制度走上不歸路的效用呢？這是筆者試圖解釋的課題。 事實上，中國經濟制度的變化，是一連串政權行動者「始料未及」的變化的結果，這場制度變遷─中國由公有制計畫經濟體制重新回到混合所有制市場經濟體制，一開始並未有指引變革行動的藍圖，變革的方向亦是在變化的過程上才漸次浮現的，它受到制度的限制，也受到偶發事件的影響，當然也就不意味是整體領導層的共識結果，它是在特定歷史結構與制度交錯相互影響下的產物。換句話說，是歷史（時間序列上的事件與變化）、制度與行動者組構了這場變遷。同時，這也是一場動態的變遷過程，變遷的路徑有來自制度遺產的影響，它也存在著路徑依賴的現象。 不過，路徑因行動者與制度安排的激勵而強化，從而實現變遷，但也在行動者基於觀念（意識形態）或利益下予以限制，從而轉折到不同的方向上。筆者認為，在中國獨特的政經體制下，路徑自我強化的現象不是內部自我激勵造成的結果，而是來自外部的因素；在路徑依賴的背後，制度結構與行動者的作用具有不容忽視的影響。 筆者認為，改變中國經濟制度最重要的取徑，就是「雙軌制」。「雙軌制」是一項行動者非意圖的創造，它始自陳雲倡議「摸著石頭過河」，獲得鄧小平的贊同，從而形成「試點」模式，並作為該模式的指導原則。 此外，觀念的引進與衝突是這場變化過程的重要部份，像是在推動「經濟特區試點政策過程中尤為明顯；當政權領導人受外部引入的觀念的影響，產生經濟特區政策，而領導人內部也因觀念的分歧，形成足以阻滯特區試點政策的衝突；他們之間的衝突（正統派vs改革派）貫穿整個變遷過程，這也正好說明了觀念因素在中國改變經濟制度過程上的重要影響。 / 8 years after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party claimed that socialist reform has been successfully conducted. Public ownership and planned economy replaced mixed economy as well as private ownership. In the end of 1970s, however, a series of economic reform challenged public ownership with planned economy, which leads China enter into a mixed ownership economy. This thesis attempts to sort out the forces and consequences that drive economic reform. Through the transition of economic system, which leads China’s economy into a no return road. In fact, economic reform in China is an unexpected result by political regulators. Originally, it did not have a blueprint to lead the way. The direction from public ownership to mixed economy emerged throughout the reform, which is not a common consensus from the political leaders. Instead, it is dominated by history, political system as well as regulator in a dynamic way. This path dependency with institutional heritage character is the spot light of economic reform. The author claims the importance and direction of this reform is dominated by external factor. The most importance factor that change China’s economic is the launch of dual system. This system, with the slogan of “crossing the river by groping the stones along the way,” is proposed by CHEN Yun and approved by Deng Xiao-Ping. The introduction of concept is an important factor through the reform, which can be seemed from the process during the promotion of Special Economic Zones SEZs. When political regulators received outer concept and launched SEZs, internal diversity emerged that blocking the reform. Conflicts between orthodoxy and reformist can be seemed throughout reform period, influencing the forces and consequences of China’s economic system.