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1	Thoughts, propositions, and unities : a historical and critical examination Stevens, Graham Paul January 2002 (has links) No description available. 160 Analytical philosophy
2	Gandhian perspective on "work ethic" for substantive distributive justice/equality Tayshete, Neha 29 September 2020 (has links) (PDF) Mohandas Gandhi had an interesting conception called “work ethic”. It propounded that one ought to focus on the process of work rather than the result of the work. “Full effort is thus full victory” in Gandhi’s conception. This is because the result can be corrupted with self interest maximization of the productive sector of society. I translated this concept into the rigour of analytical philosophy with original thought experiments, Kantian contractarianism etc.I submitted that Gandhi reached a different conclusion despite unintentionally sharing the same methodology of western/analytical philosophers such as John Rawls, Gerald Cohen, T M Scanlon and others. I reiterate that the methodology pertained to Kantian contractarianism and intuitive ethics. Precisely, the different conclusion was that Gandhi espoused much lesser desert, incentives, social appraisal. (“Desert” is considered "deserving compensation of work or deserving the product of one's labour.) In contrast, Rawls, Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Scanlon et al allowed comparatively more desert, incentives and social appraisal. Lesser desert, incentives, social appraisal for the productive individuals creates higher taxes for these privileged individuals and this benefits the least advantaged. This is individual ethic but it can be the groundwork or an emerging ethos for future institutional implementations i.e. higher taxes levied on the privileged.As an example, the relevance is that Gandhi’s “work ethic” submitted that luxury consumption is regrettable and one ought to conscientiously and personally struggle to reduce this without external or governmental coercion. Contrarily, Dworkin, Rawls, Scanlon, Cohen and others respect luxury consumption as personal pursuits, especially with Cohen's latest statements and Rawls' “rational plan” concept. There are several illustrations in the thesis to demonstrate the main contribution of the thesis i.e. Gandhi’s conception espoused much lesser desert, incentives, social appraisal compared to the research of Dworkin, Rawls, Scanlon, Cohen and others. It, additionally, in the seventh chapter, submitted that humility is vital because it can provide a response in a world saturated by undeserved suffering. Humility is connected to “work ethic”. Gandhi's definition of humility is novel. It is different from the existing definitions in political theory, different from Kellenberger’s and Cooper’s account on humility, for example. The juxtaposition of Gandhi’s and Dostoevsky’s oeuvre engenders a nuanced understanding of humility. Crucially, it has significant benefits in the field of distributive justice/solidarity. It addresses many of the challenges traditionally associated with humility. Ralph Ellison, drawing from his perspective as a Black American in segregation times, propounded that humility is susceptible to be used to further oppress the already oppressed. This thesis asserts that Gandhi’s earlier writings indeed embody the dangers delineated by Ellison. However, Gandhi’s later writings not only respond to this cogent argument but also enhances it. Both Ellison and Gandhi reinvent humility as the ability of the marginalised to perform service without self promotion while not being obsequious to those in power. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished Libertés et droits de l'homme
3	A relação de necessidade entre pensamento e linguagem Gondim, Matheus Wanderley 28 February 2014 (has links) Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1177964 bytes, checksum: 5a7bb36b7ee8d091a460d8cba06bdb25 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-28 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This dissertation has the aim of accomplishing a study of the relation between thought and language, including arguments for o agains the possibility of thought in the absence of language. In order to achieve this, a review of the philosophical literature on the subject from the second half of the twentieth century until recently has been performed. The first chapter focuses on Donald Davidson‟s influential argument, particularly as established in Thought and Talk, of great importance to the field. Contrary arguments have been studied in the second chapter, Searle‟s proposal on Consciousness and Language as well as Bermúdez‟s thesis on Thinking Without Words are the main highlights. From bibliographical analysis, the third chapter is construed more argumentatively, with the objective of evaluating the theses which have been presented in an informed manner. / Esta dissertação de mestrado tem por objetivo realizar um estudo sobre a relação entre pensamento e linguagem, englobando argumentos acerca da possibilidade ou não de pensamento sem linguagem. Para isso, empreende-se uma revisão de alguns elementos da literatura filosófica produzida sobre o assunto na segunda metade do século XX e começo do século atual. O primeiro capítulo é dedicado à análise do influente argumento de Donald Davidson, com ênfase particular ao seu artigo Thought and Talk, de grande importância para o tema. Argumentos contrários também são contemplados no segundo capítulo, a proposta de Searle, presente em Consciousness and Language, e a tese de Bermúdez, em Thinking Without Words são os principais destaques. A partir da análise bibliográfica, o terceiro capítulo é construído com teor mais argumentativo, com o objetivo de avaliar as teses apresentadas de maneira informada. Mente Linguagem Pensamento Davidson Filosofia Analítica Mind Language Thought Davidson Analytical Philosophy CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
4	Ciência e educação no pensamento de Alberto Torres, Fernando de Azevedo e Florestan Fernandes : das rupturas paradigmáticas à análise retórica / Totti, Marcelo Augusto. January 2009 (has links) Orientador: Denis Domeneghetti Badia / Banca: Vera Teresa Valdemarin / Banca: Raquel Discini de Campos / Banca: Nelyse Apparecida Melro Salzedas / Banca: José Carlos de Paula Carvalho / Resumo: O trabalho que ora apresentamos tem como objetivo analisar a concepção de ciência no pensamento educacional brasileiro, tendo como base três gerações de intelectuais com reconhecida contribuição no campo educacional: Alberto Torres, Fernando de Azevedo e Florestan Fernandes. Esses autores consolidaram interpretações teóricas, científicas sobre os fenômenos educacionais. Alberto Torres esteve preocupado em organizar a República; a educação era um fator de organização nacional, mantendo o homem no meio agrícola, devido à fatalidade geográfica e histórica do país. Torres alicerçou as bases de seu pensamento no positivismo comteano, adaptando-a à realidade brasileira, pretendendo um país soberano e um Estado forte. Fernando de Azevedo procurou dar moldes científicos aos estudos educacionais; a ciência proposta é teórica, utiliza Durkheim, mas recontextualiza-o, dando uma nova interpretação dos fatos sociais, que na sua visão são múltiplos e diversos, e as ciências humanas calcadas nesta visão devem ter como premissa a imprevisibilidade dos acontecimentos humanos. Florestan rearticula o pensamento de seus predecessores, estabelecendo novos parâmetros do proceder científico, em que estão presentes o planejamento, a racionalidade, a previsibilidade e a intencionalidade. Denominamos as mudanças ocorridas como rupturas paradigmáticas, ocasionadas através de conflitos. O que torna a concepção de Florestan hegemônica é o fato de o sociólogo constituir uma escola de pensamento. Observamos, ainda, que essas mudanças não são apenas teóricas; Florestan utiliza técnicas retóricas como a dissociação de noções e a petição de princípio no intuito de persuadir e convencer o seu auditório para que sua visão de ciência torne-se hegemônica. / Abstract: The work which is now presented aimed to analyze the conception of science in Brazilian educational thought, based on three generations intellectuals, with recognized contribution in the educational field: Alberto Torres, Fernando de Azevedo and Florestan Fernandes. These authors consolidated theoretical, scientific interpretations on the educational phenomena. Alberto Torres was concerned with organizing the Republic; education was a factor of national organization in keeping the in the man agricultural environment, due to geographical and historical fate of the country. Torres founded the basis of his thinking on Comte's positivism, adapting it to Brazilian reality, having in his mind a sovereign country and a strong State. Fernando de Azevedo tried to shape studies on education scientifically, the proposed science is theoretical, he uses Durkheim's theories but recontextualizes them by giving them a new interpretation to social facts, which in his view are many and various, and human sciences based on this vision must have as a premise the unpredictability of human events. Florestan Fernandes rearticulates the thought of his predecessors, setting new standards of scientific procedures, in which planning, rationality, predictability and intentionality are present. We consider these changes as paradigmatic ruptures, provoked by conflicts. What makes Florestan Fernandes's conception hegemonic is the fact that he established a school of thought. We also can observe that these changes are not just theoretical; Florestan uses rhetorical techniques such as decoupling of concepts and the petition of principle in order to persuade and convince his audience so that his vision of science becomes hegemonic. / Doutor Educação - Brasil. Educação - História. Educação - Filosofia. Sociologia educacional. Análise retórica. Brazilian educational thought. eng Analytical philosophy. eng Sociology of education. eng
5	Ciência e educação no pensamento de Alberto Torres, Fernando de Azevedo e Florestan Fernandes: das rupturas paradigmáticas à análise retórica Totti, Marcelo Augusto [UNESP] 09 April 2009 (has links) (PDF) Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:31:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009-04-09Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T21:02:37Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 totti_ma_dr_arafcl.pdf: 483718 bytes, checksum: e9dd46e13759108a377815366883a0d9 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O trabalho que ora apresentamos tem como objetivo analisar a concepção de ciência no pensamento educacional brasileiro, tendo como base três gerações de intelectuais com reconhecida contribuição no campo educacional: Alberto Torres, Fernando de Azevedo e Florestan Fernandes. Esses autores consolidaram interpretações teóricas, científicas sobre os fenômenos educacionais. Alberto Torres esteve preocupado em organizar a República; a educação era um fator de organização nacional, mantendo o homem no meio agrícola, devido à fatalidade geográfica e histórica do país. Torres alicerçou as bases de seu pensamento no positivismo comteano, adaptando-a à realidade brasileira, pretendendo um país soberano e um Estado forte. Fernando de Azevedo procurou dar moldes científicos aos estudos educacionais; a ciência proposta é teórica, utiliza Durkheim, mas recontextualiza-o, dando uma nova interpretação dos fatos sociais, que na sua visão são múltiplos e diversos, e as ciências humanas calcadas nesta visão devem ter como premissa a imprevisibilidade dos acontecimentos humanos. Florestan rearticula o pensamento de seus predecessores, estabelecendo novos parâmetros do proceder científico, em que estão presentes o planejamento, a racionalidade, a previsibilidade e a intencionalidade. Denominamos as mudanças ocorridas como rupturas paradigmáticas, ocasionadas através de conflitos. O que torna a concepção de Florestan hegemônica é o fato de o sociólogo constituir uma escola de pensamento. Observamos, ainda, que essas mudanças não são apenas teóricas; Florestan utiliza técnicas retóricas como a dissociação de noções e a petição de princípio no intuito de persuadir e convencer o seu auditório para que sua visão de ciência torne-se hegemônica. / The work which is now presented aimed to analyze the conception of science in Brazilian educational thought, based on three generations intellectuals, with recognized contribution in the educational field: Alberto Torres, Fernando de Azevedo and Florestan Fernandes. These authors consolidated theoretical, scientific interpretations on the educational phenomena. Alberto Torres was concerned with organizing the Republic; education was a factor of national organization in keeping the in the man agricultural environment, due to geographical and historical fate of the country. Torres founded the basis of his thinking on Comte’s positivism, adapting it to Brazilian reality, having in his mind a sovereign country and a strong State. Fernando de Azevedo tried to shape studies on education scientifically, the proposed science is theoretical, he uses Durkheim’s theories but recontextualizes them by giving them a new interpretation to social facts, which in his view are many and various, and human sciences based on this vision must have as a premise the unpredictability of human events. Florestan Fernandes rearticulates the thought of his predecessors, setting new standards of scientific procedures, in which planning, rationality, predictability and intentionality are present. We consider these changes as paradigmatic ruptures, provoked by conflicts. What makes Florestan Fernandes’s conception hegemonic is the fact that he established a school of thought. We also can observe that these changes are not just theoretical; Florestan uses rhetorical techniques such as decoupling of concepts and the petition of principle in order to persuade and convince his audience so that his vision of science becomes hegemonic. Educação - Brasil Educação - Historia Educação - Filosofia Sociologia educacional Analise retorica Brazilian educational thought Analytical philosophy Sociology of education
6	Aspects du sujet dans la philosophie du langage ordinaire / Aspects of the subject in the Ordinary Language Philosophy. Boutevin-Bonnet, Valérie 28 June 2012 (has links) De quelle notion de sujet avons-nous besoin rendre compte de nos pratiques et notamment de notre pratique du langage ? Cette question du sujet et de la subjectivité se pose à nouveaux frais dans le cadre de la philosophie du langage ordinaire et tout particulièrement à partir de la théorie des actes de parole de J.L. Austin. En effet, si le langage n’a de signification qu’en tant que parole, et même qu’en tant qu’acte d’un sujet qui prend la parole, le langage ne saurait être un processus sans sujet. Un acte nécessite un agent et si cet acte est un acte de parole, il faut un agent capable de comprendre la signification de ce qui est dit, en d'autres termes, il semble bien qu’il faille un sujet pensant, un sujet psychologique. C’est dans cette voie que s’engagèrent les premières interprétations d’Austin. Les actes de parole donnèrent naissance d’une nouvelle discipline : la pragmatique, où le rôle de l’intention dans la signification est primordial. Or, la philosophie du langage ordinaire se situe dans le projet initial de la philosophie analytique, tel que mené par Frege, Russell et le premier Wittgenstein, qui détachaient la signification de la subjectivité des représentations en la liant à la référence ou dénotation. Le sujet psychologique se trouve alors hors du champ de la pensée et de la vérité. Austin poursuit et radicalise ce projet : dans la théorie des actes de parole, la vérité devient la dimension d’évaluation de certains énoncés à l’intérieur de la catégorie plus générale de la félicité, évaluation qui n’est possible qu’en situant l’énonciation dans son contexte. C’est donc le contexte, et non l’intériorité du sujet parlant qui permet la compréhension. Ainsi, Le sujet des actes de paroles n’est pas le sujet intentionnel du mentalisme. C’est en fait un sujet pensant dont la pensée se lit dans le comportement, un sujet dont la pensée publique se fonde et s’exprime dans des conventions sociales qui le rendent responsables de ses paroles. Le sujet parlant est un sujet social pour qui l’enjeu est de parvenir à trouver et faire entendre sa voix alors même qu’il parle dans les mots des autres, un sujet responsable et mis en position de fragilité car il doit répondre de plus qu’il ne le voudrait. / What kind of a notion of subject do we need in order to account for our practices, and especially our practice of language? The issue of subject and subjectivity is raised anew within the ordinary language philosophy, more particularly within J.L. Austin's speech acts theory. As a matter of fact, if language has a meaning only inasmuch as it is a speech—the speech act of a subject—language cannot be a process devoid of subject. There must be an agent to perform an act, and if the act is a speech act, the agent must be able to understand what is meant, in other words, what seems to be needed is a thinking, psychological subject. Austin's first interpretations actually went down that path. Speech acts gave birth to a new theory: pragmatics, in which intention plays a key role in meaning. Nevertheless, ordinary language philosophy is in continuity with the original project of analytical philosophy as conducted by Frege, Russell and the first Wittgenstein, who separated the meaning from the subjectivity of representations and linked it instead to the reference or denotation. The psychological subject is then excluded from the field of thought and truth. Austin continues and toughens that project. Within the speech acts theory, truth becomes the assessment dimension of some utterances within the more general category of felicity—such an assessment being possible only when the issuing of the utterance is inserted in its whole context. Therefore, what enables comprehension is context, not inwardness. So, the subject of speech acts isn't the intentional subject of mentalism. In fact, it's a subject whose thought is to be read in their behaviour, a subject whose public thought is based on and expressed in social conventions which make them responsible for what they say. The speaking subject is a social subject whose issue is to find their voice and make themselves heard, although they speak in other people's words, a responsible subject in a vulnerable position as they must answer for more than they care for. Philosophie analytique Philosophie du langage Philosophie du langage ordinaire Actes de langage Philosophie de l’esprit Analytical Philosophy Philosophy of language Ordinary language philosophy Speech acts Philosophy of the mind
7	Filosofický výklad a možné interpretace Gödelových vět o neúplnosti / Philosophical analysis and possible interpretations of Gödel's incompleteness theorems Arazim Dolejší, Zuzana January 2016 (has links) ❆❜str❛❝t ❚❤❡ ❞✐♣❧♦♠❛ t❤❡s✐s ❞❡❛❧s ✇✐t❤ ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ ♣❤✐❧♦s♦♣❤✐❝❛❧ ❛♥❛❧②s❡s ♦❢ ●ö✲ ❞❡❧✬s ✐♥❝♦♠♣❧❡t❡♥❡ss t❤❡♦r❡♠s ❛♥❞ t❤❡✐r ✐♥t❡r♣r❡t❛t✐♦♥s ✐♥ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t ❜r❛♥❝❤❡s♦❢♣❤✐❧♦s♦♣❤②✭♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦❧♦❣②✱❛♥❛❧②t✐❝❛❧♣❤✐❧♦s♦♣❤②♦❢♠✐♥❞✱ ❑❛♥t✬s ♣❤✐❧♦s♦♣❤②✮✳ P❛rt ♦❢ t❤❡ t❤❡s✐s ✐s ❞❡❞✐❝❛t❡❞ t♦ t❤❡ ❛tt✐t✉❞❡s t♦ ♠❛t❤❡♠❛t✐❝❛❧ ❞✐s❝✐♣❧✐♥❡s ❛♥❞ t❤❡✐r ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ tr❛♥s❢♦r♠❛t✐♦♥s ❝❛✉s❡❞ ❜② r❡✈♦❧✉t✐♦♥❛r② ❞✐s❝♦✈❡r✐❡s s✉❝❤ ❛s ◆♦♥✲❊✉❝❧✐❞❡❛♥ ❣❡♦♠❡t✲ r✐❡s ❛♥❞ ✐♥❝♦♠♣❧❡t♥❡ss t❤❡♦r❡♠s✳ ❚❤❡ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥ t❤❡ s❡❝♦♥❞ ●ö❞❡❧✬s ✐♥❝♦♠♣❧❡t❡♥❡ss t❤❡♦r❡♠✱ ●❡♥t③❡♥✬s ❝♦♥s✐st❡♥❝② ♣r♦♦❢ ♦❢ P❡❛♥♦ ❛r✐t❤♠❡t✐❝ ❛♥❞ ❍✐❧❜❡rt✬s ♣r♦❣r❛♠♠❡ ✐s ❛❧s♦ ❞✐s❝✉ss❡❞✳
8	F. A. Hayek's Critique of Legislation Holm, Cyril January 2014 (has links) The dissertation concerns F. A. Hayek’s (1899–1992) critique of legislation. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify and assess that critique. I argue that there is in Hayek’s work a critique of legislation that is distinct from his well-known critique of social planning. Further that the main claim of this critique is what I refer to as Hayek’s legislation tenet, namely that legislation that aims to achieve specific aggregate results in complex orders of society will decrease the welfare level. The legislation tenet gains support; (i) from the welfare claim – according to which there is a positive correlation between the utilization of knowledge and the welfare level in society; (ii) from the dispersal of knowledge thesis – according to which the total knowledge of society is dispersed and not available to any one agency; and (iii) from the cultural evolution thesis – according to which evolutionary rules are more favorable to the utilization of knowledge in social cooperation than are legislative rules. More specifically, I argue that these form two lines of argument in support of the legislation tenet. One line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the dispersal of knowledge thesis. I argue that this line of argument is true. The other line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the cultural evolution thesis. I argue that this line of argument is false, mainly because the empirical work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom refutes it. Because the two lines of argument support the legislation tenet independently of each other, I argue that Hayek’s critique of legislation is true. In this dissertation, I further develop a legislative policy tool as based on the welfare claim and Hayek’s conception of coercion. I also consider Hayek’s idea that rules and law are instrumental in forging rational individual action and rational social orders, and turn to review this idea in light of the work of experimental economist Vernon Smith and economic historian Avner Greif. I find that Smith and Greif support this idea of Hayek’s, and I conjecture that it contributes to our understanding of Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand: It is rules – not an invisible hand – that prompt subjects to align individual and aggregate rationality in social interaction. Finally, I argue that Hayek’s critique is essentially utilitarian, as it is concerned with the negative welfare consequences of certain forms of legislation. And although it may appear that the dispersal of knowledge thesis will undermine the possibility of carrying out the utilitarian calculus, due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions – and therefore undermine the legislation tenet itself – I argue that the distinction between utilitarianism conceived as a method of deliberation and utilitarianism conceived as a criterion of correctness may be used to save Hayek’s critique from this objection. Hayek legislation rules law rationality rational action rational social order equilibrium utilitarianism method of deliberation criterion of correctness Elinor Ostrom Avner Greif Vernon Smith Joshua Epstein complexity knowledge social cooperation information know-how the Hayek problem the invisible hand Adam Smith Mises Keynes Marx welfare state Gilbert Ryle Michael Polanyi theory of legislation legisprudence jurisprudence Neo-Kantianism historicism cognitive closure theory of prices competition syntax grammar game theory generative social science agent-based computational modeling institutional policy analysis normative primacy of economics primacy of politics Sheri Berman constructivist rationalism socialism social democracy Nozick Rawls distribution justice freedom Kant polycentric government process of experimentation speculative philosophy analytical philosophy freedom under the law liberty philosophy of mind consequentialist

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