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Together with an basic assumption of the main thesis of the theory of singular direct reference, this paper formulates two original theses grounded in the Kripkean notion of proper names. Regarding the assumption of the main thesis, efforts have been made to explicitly explain its essence as a reactionary theory against the description theory of proper names, a theory mainly due to Bertrand Russells (1905) influential article "On Denoting". Grounded in Russell, outlining the fundamental idea of proper names as abbreviated or disguised definite descriptions, this paper moves forward through the critiques of Strawsons (1950) "On Referring", Donnellans (1966) "Reference and Definite Descriptions" and Kripkes (1977) "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference". With the historical background in place, in accordance with Salmons (1982) "Reference & Essence" the arguments against the theory of descriptions for proper names are put forward, which leads to the assumption of the mentioned main thesis. Regarding the papers more original theses, the first of these distinguishes between different kinds of proper names depending on whether or not they refer to an object capable of cognitive functioning. The main thrust of this paper is however made through the formulation of the second thesis, as it is being aimed at challenging Kripke's Millian notion of all proper names as being non-connoting. However, in contrast to this view in accordance with the view being put forward in this paper, cognition-referring proper names are connoting. Additionally, a finishing discussion is supplemented concluding descriptions of such connotations as being questions for pragmatism.

In this thesis, I describe and evaluate two recent accounts of naming. These accounts are motivated by Kripke?s response to Russell?s Description Theory of Names (DTN). Particularly, I consider Kripke?s Modal Argument (MA) and various arguments that have been given against it, as well as Kripke?s responses to these arguments. Further, I outline a version of MA that has recently been presented by Scott Soames, and consider how he responds to the criticisms that the argument faces. In order to evaluate the claim that MA is decisive against all description theories, I outline the Nominal Description Theory (NDT) put forth by Kent Bach and consider whether it constitutes a principled response to MA. I do so by exploring how Bach both responds to Kripke?s arguments against descriptivism and highlights the problems with rigid designation as a purely semantic thesis. Finally, I consider the relative merits of the accounts put forth by Bach and Soames. Upon doing so, I argue that MA is not as decisive against description theories as it has long been thought to be. In fact, NDT seems to provide a better account of our uses of proper names than the rigid designation thesis as presented by Kripke and Soames.

Deux interrogations sont à l'origine de cette recherche: un « problème herméneutique » qui porte sur ce que l'injonction pascalienne « travaillons donc à bien penser » est en mesure de signifier dans le contexte de l’augustinisme cartésien qui disqualifie les voies traditionnelles de la raison et un questionnement méthodologique qui porte sur la manière dont on peut travailler à bien penser la somme fondamentalement incertaine constituée par les petits papiers découverts à la mort de Pascal. La première partie pose que la déconstruction et la dissémination du Texte pascalien ne peuvent autoriser une méthode herméneutique que si elles sont éclairées par une intention qui en pense la nécessité et le sens, très exactement sur le modèle gnoséologique de la Bible, que l'exégèse renaissante commence à ressaisir dans son historicité. Le renoncement visible des « petits papiers » aux trois principes de la congruence, de la non-répétition et de la non-contradiction, qui fondent dans notre coutume le « texte » peut être qualifié d'intentionnel. Sur ce fondement, qui légitime une méthode herméneutique, la seconde partie montre que si la nature de l'homme se reflète dans sa pensée, tout entière suspendue par nature entre une double polarité qui la fait osciller entre hasard et nécessité, vide et intentionnalité, ordre et désordre, alors le seul discours auquel il s'agit de se soumettre en tant qu'il restaure un sens et une nécessité au monde jusqu'au coeur du hasard apparent et du fonctionnement de la pensée humaine (que seule la pensée peut penser) est l'enseignement des deux Testaments. / This research work stems from two main questions: on the one hand, from a 'hermeneutical problem' funded on what Pascal‟s famous injunction -'Let us strive, then, to think well' -might mean in the context of Augustinian Cartesianism, which disqualifies traditional reasoning, and on the other hand, from a methodological questioning funded on the ways in which one might strive, then, to think well the notes found on the many scraps of paper discovered after Pascal‟s death. The first part argues that the deconstruction and dissemination of the Text can only authorize a hermeneutical approach provided they are enlightened by a specific intention, which might think out its very necessity and meaning, on the same mode as the gnoseological model of the Bible, which the emerging exegesis is just beginning to seize again by adopting a historicist approach. In the „scraps of paper‟, the renunciation to the three principles of congruence, non-repetition and non-contradiction, which are the foundations of the „text‟, can clearly be described as intentional. There entails from that a legitimate hermeneutical approach, which is developed in the second part. It shows that if the nature of man is reflected in his thought, itself held up by nature between a double polarity, with thought oscillating between chance and necessity, emptiness and intentionality, order and disorder, then the only discourse to which one can be submitted is the teaching of the two Testaments, inasmuch as it re-installs some meaning and necessity to the world, as well as to the workings of human thought (which our thought only can think).

A transcript of the audio that constitutes the work by the same title, along with an introduction and relevant bibliography.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

De quelle notion de sujet avons-nous besoin rendre compte de nos pratiques et notamment de notre pratique du langage ? Cette question du sujet et de la subjectivité se pose à nouveaux frais dans le cadre de la philosophie du langage ordinaire et tout particulièrement à partir de la théorie des actes de parole de J.L. Austin. En effet, si le langage n’a de signification qu’en tant que parole, et même qu’en tant qu’acte d’un sujet qui prend la parole, le langage ne saurait être un processus sans sujet. Un acte nécessite un agent et si cet acte est un acte de parole, il faut un agent capable de comprendre la signification de ce qui est dit, en d'autres termes, il semble bien qu’il faille un sujet pensant, un sujet psychologique. C’est dans cette voie que s’engagèrent les premières interprétations d’Austin. Les actes de parole donnèrent naissance d’une nouvelle discipline : la pragmatique, où le rôle de l’intention dans la signification est primordial. Or, la philosophie du langage ordinaire se situe dans le projet initial de la philosophie analytique, tel que mené par Frege, Russell et le premier Wittgenstein, qui détachaient la signification de la subjectivité des représentations en la liant à la référence ou dénotation. Le sujet psychologique se trouve alors hors du champ de la pensée et de la vérité. Austin poursuit et radicalise ce projet : dans la théorie des actes de parole, la vérité devient la dimension d’évaluation de certains énoncés à l’intérieur de la catégorie plus générale de la félicité, évaluation qui n’est possible qu’en situant l’énonciation dans son contexte. C’est donc le contexte, et non l’intériorité du sujet parlant qui permet la compréhension. Ainsi, Le sujet des actes de paroles n’est pas le sujet intentionnel du mentalisme. C’est en fait un sujet pensant dont la pensée se lit dans le comportement, un sujet dont la pensée publique se fonde et s’exprime dans des conventions sociales qui le rendent responsables de ses paroles. Le sujet parlant est un sujet social pour qui l’enjeu est de parvenir à trouver et faire entendre sa voix alors même qu’il parle dans les mots des autres, un sujet responsable et mis en position de fragilité car il doit répondre de plus qu’il ne le voudrait. / What kind of a notion of subject do we need in order to account for our practices, and especially our practice of language? The issue of subject and subjectivity is raised anew within the ordinary language philosophy, more particularly within J.L. Austin's speech acts theory. As a matter of fact, if language has a meaning only inasmuch as it is a speech—the speech act of a subject—language cannot be a process devoid of subject. There must be an agent to perform an act, and if the act is a speech act, the agent must be able to understand what is meant, in other words, what seems to be needed is a thinking, psychological subject. Austin's first interpretations actually went down that path. Speech acts gave birth to a new theory: pragmatics, in which intention plays a key role in meaning. Nevertheless, ordinary language philosophy is in continuity with the original project of analytical philosophy as conducted by Frege, Russell and the first Wittgenstein, who separated the meaning from the subjectivity of representations and linked it instead to the reference or denotation. The psychological subject is then excluded from the field of thought and truth. Austin continues and toughens that project. Within the speech acts theory, truth becomes the assessment dimension of some utterances within the more general category of felicity—such an assessment being possible only when the issuing of the utterance is inserted in its whole context. Therefore, what enables comprehension is context, not inwardness. So, the subject of speech acts isn't the intentional subject of mentalism. In fact, it's a subject whose thought is to be read in their behaviour, a subject whose public thought is based on and expressed in social conventions which make them responsible for what they say. The speaking subject is a social subject whose issue is to find their voice and make themselves heard, although they speak in other people's words, a responsible subject in a vulnerable position as they must answer for more than they care for.

Using a poststructural and reader-response theoretical framework, the author explores competing ideas of interpretation, epistemology, and the problematic nature of truth and meaning in Henry James’s novel, The Golden Bowl. The author analyzes the ways in which emergent nineteenth century communication technologies, specifically how telegraphy both mediates and facilitates intimacy in a modern landscape. James anticipates modern forms of social media by exploring the nuances and the potential erotic nature of mediated communication and knowledge.

<p>A word or a linguistic construction can mean various things depending on the context. The imperative is a representative example of such a construction and can express a variety of illocutionary forces such as COMMAND, REQUEST, ADVICE, and more (Quirk et al., 1985, Huddleston et al., 2002). </p> <p>However, although there are many studies that comprehensively deal with the imperative or individual illocutionary forces of it (e.g. Lakoff, 1966, Ljung, 1975, Davies, 1986, Wilson & Sperber 1988, Han, 2000, Takahashi, 2012, Jary & Kissine, 2014), there is no such study that shows a possible overall process of how we would interpret an imperative to reach a certain illocutionary force when it is uttered. Without such a shared process, we cannot explain why we can communicate using imperatives without misunderstandings. Thus, this process needs to be investigated. </p> <p>Another problem regarding imperatives is the treatment of non-directive uses of imperatives such as “Have a good day”. The illocutionary force of this imperative would be called GOOD WISH and regarded as a conventional use of imperatives (Davies, 1986). However, it has not been clearly explained why we would choose the imperative construction to express wishes. If this kind of wishes expressed in the form of the imperative are actually a use of imperative, then there should be some reason and motivation for it. </p> <p>The main purposes of this study are to provide (1) a schema of how one would typically reach the interpretation of WISH when hearing an imperative and (2) an account of such use of imperatives as WISH. In this study, examples of imperatives in two non-cognate languages are used for the analysis in the hope to substantiate the credibility of the schema and the account: Japanese and English. Based on the analyses on the imperative and individual illocutionary forces that have been presented in the literature combined with my own analysis, a schema is proposed that illustrates how one would typically reach PRIVATE WISH, the state of affairs of which is deemed to be desirable mainly for the speaker, and GOOD WISH, the state of affairs of which is deemed to be desirable mainly for the addressee. Then, an account for the use of PRIVATE WISH and GOOD WISH is provided. Specifically, the use of imperatives as WISH is an analogous use of prototypical imperatives; people would use the imperative construction to express their strong desirability, and to build and maintain a good relationship with others.</p>

O presente trabalho visa entender como o rádio se distingue dos demais sons do mundo. A hipótese aqui formulada é a de que o rádio, em sua definição, é uma linguagem, e não um aparelho. Dessa maneira, há a busca por uma caracterização da linguagem radiofônica seguindo as ideias implicadas em uma Estética da Linguagem (Derrida e antiessencialistas como Ziff, Weitz e Kennick). Com isso, há um estudo detalhado do rádio em seu jogo de linguagem (Wittgenstein) e em seus diferendos (Lyotard), considerados aqui enquanto parergon e ergon, ou seja, enquanto recorte e modelo operacional da linguagem em sua intersecção com o mundo. Para a investigação do jogo de linguagem, foram utilizados conteúdos relacionados à Filosofia Analítica, à Lógica Algébrica e à Teoria dos Jogos para desenvolver um método analítico denonimado Jogo Lógico, voltado para o estudo de jogos de linguagem comunicacionais. Já para a investigação dos diferendos, foram utilizadas as ideias pragmáticas acerca da performatividade e da lógica ilocucionária (Austin e Searle) para analisar os gêneros radiofônicos (a saber: musical, radiojornalismo, esportivo, variedades [talk radio], humorístico, ficção e publicidade). Essas duas investigações formam aquilo que é chamado aqui de Gramática do Rádio - considerando o conceito wittgensteiniano de gramática -, o ponto nodal que nos permite caracterizar o rádio enquanto linguagem. / The present work aims to understand how the radio distinguishes itself from other sounds of the world. The hypothesis formulated here is that the radio, in its definition, is a language, not a machine. Thus, there is the search for a characterization of radio\'s language following the ideas involved in an Aesthetics of Language (Derrida and anti-essentialists like Ziff, Weitz and Kennick). Here, there is a detailed study of the radio in its language-game (Wittgenstein) and their differends (Lyotard), considered in this work as parergon and ergon, i.e. as the cut and the operational model of language in its intersection with the world. For the investigation of the language-game, we used content related to Analytic Philosophy, to Algebraic Logic, and to Game Theory to develop an analytical method called Logic Game, dedicated to the communicative language-games\' study. As for the investigation of differends, we used the pragmatic concepts about the performative and illocutionary logic (Searle and Austin) to analyze the radio genres (ie: music, radio journalism, sports, talk radio, humor, fiction and advertising). These two studies form what is called here the Radio Grammar - considering the Wittgensteinian concept of grammar - the key point that allows us to characterize the radio as a language.