本研究主要探討審計品質與盈餘反應係數之關係，擬回達下列之研究問題：接受高品質會計師事務所查核之公司，其盈餘反應係數是否較接受低品質會計師事務所查核之公司為高。 　　本論文以台灣股票市場民國70年至82年之更換會計師公司為樣本，首先採用未預期盈餘(UE)與股票市場累積異常報酬(CAR)的簡單迴歸分析，嘗試驗證盈餘資訊與股票報酬間之關係；採用盈餘反應係數決定因素的複迴歸分析探討審計品質是否會影響盈餘反應係數。實證結果顯示： 　　一、如以曾經由六大會計師事務所查核財務報表更換為非六大會計師事務所之上市公司，或曾經由非六大會計師事務所更換為六大會計師事務所查核簽證財務報表之上市公司為樣本公司，台灣股票市場之未預期盈餘與異常報酬間方向是一致的，但並不具統計顯著性。 　　二、審計品質是否會影響盈餘反應係數之實證結果：六大會計師事務所客戶之盈餘反應係數是大於非六大的客戶，但亦並不具顯著性。 　　換言之，以國內會計師事務所與美國六大結盟作為衡量高品質的審計品質，其與盈餘反應係數之關係並未如預期呈顯著的正相關。

本研究係以裁量性應計數字及其組成成分衡量盈餘管理，以審計人員產業別市場佔有率與產業別客戶集中度之綜合衡量捕捉審計品質，探討不同樣本公司之盈餘管理特性，以及審計品質對不同盈餘管理特性之影響。管理者對應計項目的認列通常有某種裁量權，此裁量權可用以顯露私有資訊而增進盈餘的價值攸關性，或可投機性地管理盈餘而減低盈餘為公司績效衡量的可靠性。所以探究盈餘管理行為是增加財務報告資訊性(information)或雜訊(noise)即非常重要。研究內容依盈餘管理特性區分為投機性盈餘管理與訊息發放性盈餘管理二大部分。每一研究內容則是先辨認盈餘管理本質，其次探討審計品質對盈餘管理之影響。在研究設計上，為避免實證代理變數之衡量誤差重大影響結果，乃採用實驗組公司與控制組配對公司相比較，以凸顯出前者之盈餘管理型態。 　　研究結果顯示，門檻公司從事盈餘管理以達前期盈餘門檻，且此盈餘管理不具未來現金流量持續性之涵義，係符合「隱藏當期不利績效、遞延本期不尋常盈餘至未來年度」以減低會計盈餘數字波動性之特性。就自願性盈餘預測此一資訊揭露工具而言，在盈餘預測偏屬樂觀之傾向下，仍有管理者自願揭露壞消息預期，即可知管理者之誠意，不失為一可資信賴之訊號。但自願預測盈餘增加，則不必然具有高公信力。甚至在管理者降低盈餘差距之動機下，易引起管理者操縱盈餘。此為財務報表使用者所需注意。就持股變動此一資訊揭露工具而言，在我國家族企業居多之情形下，增加持股並未代表任何特定之涵義。反而是減少持股所透露之訊息，值得投資人注意，尤須慎防其盈餘操縱行為。 　　面對增加所得之裁量性應計數字，審計品質有效阻止投機性盈餘管理。面對顯露私有資訊之盈餘管理，審計品質能夠協助管理者選擇最能彰顯未來現金流量預期之會計方法，以增強裁量性應計數字與未來現金流量變動之關聯性。在高審計品質所賦予之資訊公信力下，盈餘資訊在投資人之決策過程中有一定之重要性，故投資人發現裁量性應計數字增加（減低）盈餘價值攸關性，因而增加（減低）盈餘評價係數。然而對低審計品質所查核的財務報表，較低的資訊公信力，使盈餘未在投資人評價過程中扮演重要角色，因而盈餘管理特性亦不受投資人重視。 / This research examined characteristics of earnings management and effects of audit quality therein. Specifically, the magnitude of earnings management was proxied by the discretionary accruals, which are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones model. Different from prior research, the audit quality was captured by a combined measure of the auditor's market share and client concentration. The market share measured the auditor's competence (industry specialty) and the client concentration measured the auditor's independence. Managers usually exercised discretion to recognize accruals. They could either signal private information to enhance earnings' value relevance, or opportunistically manage earnings to reduce the reliability of earnings as the performance measure of the firm. As a result, it was important to examine earnings management and to identify whether it would increase the informativeness or noise of financial reports. This study was organized according to the characteristics of earnings management: opportunistic earnings management and signaling earnings management. For both parts, the nature of earnings management was identified first, and then the effects of audit quality therein examined. To reduce the impact of measurement errors of proxy variables, the treatment group and controlled group were compared and contrasted to make earnings management pattern of the treatment group more evident. 　　The results showed that threshold firms managed earnings to sustain last year's earnings level. Discretionary accruals of the threshold firms were not significantly associated with future cash flow changes. Those discretionary accruals were used to hide the current unfavorable performance, or to defer current unusual earnings to the future, so that managers could reduce the volatility of accounting earnings. As a means of information disclosure, voluntary earnings forecasts tended to be optimistic, but we still could observe some voluntary forecasts which decreased earnings. In those situations, we might conclude that managers tried to convey credible signals. However, it was not necessarily credible in the case of voluntary forecasting which increased earnings. Managers would manipulate earnings to reduce the difference between forecasted earnings and reported earnings. In respect of the information signal of changes in directors' share holding percentages, it signaled nothing when directors increased holding percentages because most companies were family businesses in Taiwan. Nonetheless, investors should look out the possibility of earnings manipulation when directors decreased their holding percentages. 　　Audit quality could effectively deter opportunistic earnings management but not the income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Based on information signaling perspective of earnings management, auditors with higher audit quality tended to assist managers to choose accounting methods that might signal cash flow expectations. Stronger associations between discretionary accruals and future cash flows were observed for firms audited by higher quality auditors. Because higher audit quality might increase information credibility, earnings would play a more important role in the decision process of investors. When discretionary accruals increased (decreased) earnings' value relevance, earnings association coefficients would be increased (decreased). However, for the financial reports audited by lower quality auditors, earnings did not play an important role in the valuation process because of lower information credibility. Therefore, empirical results showed that investors of firms audited by lower quality auditors did not make decisions according to different characteristics of earnings management.

過去研究說明具產業專長之會計師仍能在客戶財務資訊不完整情況下，利用其行業特定知識與較高技術能力執行完善的審計工作(Thibodeau 2003; Moroney 2007; Hammersley 2006)。本論文定義資訊不確定性為客戶之財務資訊無法幫助預測公司的價值(Zhang 2006; Autore et al. 2009)。本論文推論若公司的財務報表具有不確定性會需要聘請產業專長會計師以減緩資訊不確定性的程度，並進一步研究具資訊不確定性公司若由非產業專長更換為產業專長會計師是否能提升其審計品質。由於審計工作目的在於提供資訊品質的確認(Dye 1993; Knechel et al. 2008)，審計人員會依據審計客戶的環境，設計和執行適當的審計計劃以減輕資訊不確定性情況。本論文以會計師角度建立一資訊不確定性架構，進一步將資訊不確定性分為基本價值波動不確定性與資訊品質不確定性，並推論產業專長會計師比較能在資訊品質不確定性中發揮其價值。本論文分為兩部分：第一部分檢驗資訊不確定性是否會影響產業專長會計師之選任，第二部分則檢測具資訊不確定性之審計客戶若選擇產業專長會計師之後，其審計品質是否會提升。 / Previous studies establish that a specialist auditor has more industry-specific knowledge and higher technological capability that can pertinently benefit situations in which client financial information is incomplete (Thibodeau 2003; Moroney 2007; Hammersley 2006). In this paper, we define information uncertainty as the ambiguity with respect to the implications of new information concerning a firm’s value (Zhang 2006; Autore et al. 2009). Because some financial statements present information in uncertain terms, we infer that companies whose financial statements provide uncertain information demand specialist auditors to alleviate the extent of information uncertainty. We further examine the improvements on audit quality made by those companies under information uncertainty which chose to switch from non-specialist auditors to specialist ones. As an assurance of information quality (Dye 1993; Knechel et al. 2008), an auditor, based on his knowledge of the auditee and its environment, will alleviate the uncertainty level of the auditee’s financial information through designing and executing an appropriate audit plan. We build a framework of information uncertainty and develop comprehensive measurements of information uncertainty from the auditor’s point of view. Moreover, this study disentangles the information uncertainty effects into fundamental volatility uncertainty and information quality uncertainty, and proposes that specialist auditors manifest their merits more under information quality uncertainty than under fundamental volatility uncertainty. In the first part of this study, we examine the auditors chosen by companies whose financial statements are characterized by information uncertainty. Previous studies on auditor choice address many reasons why companies switch their auditors (Lennox 2000; Carcello and Neal 2003; Blouin et al. 2007). Information uncertainty makes stakeholders lower their reliance upon company financials and even downgrade the filers, triggering negative stock price reactions (Merton 1987; Beneish et al. 2005; Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley et al. 2008). Based on prior research, we can infer that a company under information uncertainty chooses to hire a specialist auditor to signal the credibility of the financial statements and improve market perception. We hypothesize that companies suffering uncertainty demand specialist auditors to alleviate their information uncertainty. The auditor’s information role is to ensure the reliability of financial information, and a specialist auditor is equipped with superior audit knowledge and technology. Therefore, we further infer that a company whose specific information uncertainty is attributable to information quality issues (rather than fundamental volatility issues) is more inclined to choose a specialist auditor. This is because a specialist auditor improves the credibility of financial information instead of being involved with the client’s business decisions. We use an auditor switching sample of U.S. companies from 2001-2009 to examine whether the information uncertainty is an issue of auditor choice or not. Consistent with our conjecture, companies under information uncertainty prefer to hire specialist auditors. Evidence partially supports that relative to companies under fundamental volatility uncertainty, companies suffering information quality uncertainty are more inclined to choose specialist auditors. In the second part of this study, we find evidence for the economic consequences of upgrading switches to a specialist auditor when the company is experiencing information uncertainty. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter, SOX), many companies began to take the cost-effect issue into consideration; they ultimately decided to go private (Zhang 2006; Engel et al. 2007) in order to avoid the high-cost of Section 404 or switch to a non-Big N audit firm (Calderon et al. 2007). There's no such thing as free lunch; the specialist auditor usually has greater ability and concomitant higher charges (Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2000; Francis et al. 2005; Cahan et al. 2008). It is natural to question whether every company needs to engage specialist auditors if it has to pay high audit fees. In this paper, we attempt to determine in which circumstances specialist auditors can make a significant difference in improving audit quality. We investigate the relationship between auditor specialization and audit quality in an information uncertainty setting using an auditor switching sample taken from 2001 to 2009 in the United States. We examine ex post facto whether (1) specialist auditors improve audit quality more than their non-specialist counterparts; and (2) specialist auditors manifest their merits more under information quality uncertainty than the fundamental volatility uncertainty. Since the value of auditor industry specialization is reflected by the perceived and actual audit quality (Balsam et al. 2003; Nagy 2005), we examine both earnings response coefficient (ERC) and accruals quality to proxy audit quality (DAC). In both models, the audit quality of companies that suffer fundamental volatility uncertainty along with comprehensive uncertainty is not enhanced substantially following upgrade switching to a specialist auditor. We find strong empirical results that demonstrate companies under information quality uncertainty show significant improvements in audit quality after switching to specialist auditors. However, specialist auditors are significantly more capable of mitigating the information quality uncertainty than the fundamental volatility uncertainty. That is, auditor specialization is a critical solution when companies encounter information quality uncertainty.

我國關係人交易普遍且具重要性，而過去研究顯示關係人交易會對公司產生負面效果，且關係人交易之查核具有困難度，因此本研究以關係人交易較多且查核風險較高之高科技公司為研究對象，將關係人交易分為關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易、關係人應收款與關係人應付款等四項類別，探討關係人交易與審計品質的關係。進一步探討當關係人交易分為發行公司與關係人皆受相同會計師查核與受不同會計師查核兩類型，對發行公司財務報表審計品質的影響。實證結果發現：關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易與審計品質呈負向關係；關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易與關係人應收款兩造受不同會計師查核者，對其發行公司財務報表審計品質之負面影響較兩造受相同會計師查核者強。 / Related party transactions are common and important in Taiwan, and empirical studies in Taiwan show that related party transactions have negative impact on earnings management and company performance. Based on auditing standards and literature, related party transactions are difficult to audit, and high technology firms have more related party transactions which may result in higher audit risk than other industry. Therefore, we investigate the association between related party transactions (including sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and payable to related parties) and audit quality (proxied by accrual quality) in high technology firms, and find that sales to related parties and purchases from related parties have negative impact on audit quality. Next, we investigate the impact of related party transactions audited by the same auditor or different auditors. Empirical results show that sales to related parties, purchases from related parties and accounts receivable from related parties audited by different auditors show stronger negative impacts on audit quality than those audited by same auditors.

從美國的安隆(Enron)、世界通訊(WorldCom)、全錄公司(Xerox)，義大利的帕瑪列(Parmalat)，相關專業機構包括安達信(Arthur Andersen)、美林證券(Merrill Lynch)、花旗銀行(Citibank)；到臺灣的太電、博達、訊碟….等，一連串上市公司及專業機構爆發財務弊案，投資大眾人心惶惶。會計師受託查核公司財務報表並對報表表示意見，在健全資本市場的任務中擔任極為重要的角色，社會大眾對會計師之職責賦予相當大的期待，但弊案連續爆發卻使會計師的專業遭受嚴重質疑。因此，一般而言，弊案爆發或會計師受主管機關懲處後，會計師姓名就會與「審計品質不佳」劃上等號，因此先前由被懲處之會計師所簽證之其他受查公司，不論有無類似弊病，都會被人以放大鏡來觀察。然而，究竟懲戒制度實施結果是否合乎立法初衷而提升會計師之審計品質？被懲戒之會計師是否真代表其審計品質較低？則無法得知，此即為本研究欲探討的議題。 本研究以裁決性應計數報導幅度大小將會計師之審計品質予以量化，並參考Nagy(2005)的研究模式，將樣本分為會計師更換前後期，並對獨立及配對樣本作分析，以探討因懲戒而更換會計師對審計品質之影響。研究結果發現，在更換會計師的前提下，即便懲戒更換會計師並未能顯著抑制公司對於正向裁決性應計數之報導幅度，卻能避免一般情況下更換會計師對審計品質所造成的負面情形。另外，研究結果顯示，會計師長任期(6年以上)審計品質較高；會計師短任期(2年以下)且更動過於頻繁的情況下審計品質較低。在懲戒程度與審計品質之關係方面，研究結果顯示，會計師懲戒輕重程度未與會計師審計品質高低一致；而受警告及申誡懲戒但未被客戶更換之會計師在懲戒後次期，傾向調低公司盈餘，查核工作態度變保守，但審計品質並未提升。再者，本研究發現，受懲戒而更換會計師之效果大致而言並不受客戶談判籌碼的影響。最後，就單一時點(PC=0)的會計師審計品質而言，會計師被懲戒與否其審計品質並未有顯著不同；然將樣本群組進行分析後，發現有三位至四位被懲戒會計師其審計品質顯著不佳，而被懲戒之會計師中，即使差異未達顯著，卻是幾乎每2人就有1人審計品質較一般會計師低，因此懲戒制度基本上具適當性。基於以上發現，本研究肯定會計師懲戒制度對審計品質提升之效用。 總而言之，懲戒制度在於避免專業人士怠忽其職、違規行事而侵害大眾利益，不僅處分已違法之會計師，對於其他會計師亦有警惕之意味，因此實有其存在之必要。然其制度設立之適當性，可由懲戒制度實施案例之相關研究略知一二，主管機關應參考學者研究，找出目前會計師懲戒制度效用不彰的癥結點，進行改善，以增進大眾利益，符合社會期待。 / rom USA to Taiwan, lots of frauds upset investors in recent years. Accountants are asked to express their opinions toward the financial reports, and have played an important role in the capital market. Investors rely on what accountants assure to make decisions. However, with so many frauds broke up, accountants’ professionalism and assurance quality are being questioned. Sanctions may be due to the profession’s self-regulation system or based on judgment of the regulators’ administrative power. Nevertheless, does the sanction system actually protect or enhance accountants’ audit quality as it is originally set up for？Do the punished accountants really provide lower quality on the audit they perform? The answers to these questions are unknown, and they are the subject of this study. The study quantifies accountants’ audit quality by the amount of discretionary accruals of the financial statements of their audit clients. Referring to the research model of Nagy(2005), we classify samples into two periods, i.e., before and after changing accountants. Moreover, the study matches each observation sample with a paired sample and analyzes whether the sanction has affected the audit quality. The study concludes that the sanction system is appropriate basically. The results approve that the accountant sanction system in Taiwan is somewhat effective on improving audit quality. In short, the purpose of CPA sanction is to enforce professional conduct on all members of the profession. It not only punishes the accountants that break laws, but also alerts others. Therefore, the sanction system is necessary. The regulators should refer to these findings and solve the problems that diminish the effect of the sanction system. After all, the sanction system may be able to offer investors a more matured investment environment and achieve their expectations.

Denna uppsats undersöker problematiken kring revisorernas personliga engagemang och mänskliga beteenden. Revisorer och klienter har båda incitament vilka används för att nå en viss önskad situation. Oavsett vad incitamenten används för är syftet att subjektivt tillfredsställa ett visst intresse. Uppsatsen är baserad på tidigare publicerade vetenskapliga artiklar och är en vidare forskning baserad på Tepalagul och Lins studie från år 2015, vilken innefattar en undersökning av fyra hot. Denna studie kommer medföra en fördjupad undersökning kring dessa fyra oberoendehot som anses kan komma att påverka revisorns oberoende ställning. Hoten är: klientens betydelse, erbjudandet av andra tjänster utöver revisionstjänster, mandatperioden och anknytning mellan revisor och klient. Syftet med uppsatsen är att finna klarhet i om dessa hot i praktiken faktiskt kan hota revisorernas oberoende gentemot klienten, samt om dessa hot kan motverkas och i så fall på vilket sätt åtgärder kan framstå. I studien kommer en koppling göras till psykologiska påverkningar av mänskliga beteenden. Här lyfts kognitiv dissonans fram för att förklara etiska dilemman som revisorn ställs inför i sitt yrke. Studiens syfte är även att finna en klarhet i hur kognitiv dissonans kan ge en utökad förklaring kring problematiken angående revisorernas oberoende. Beroende på hur revisorn ställer sig i situationer av olika oberoendehot med medföljande påtryckningar från klienter och omgivning kan revisionskvalitén skifta. Uppsatsen kommer att genomföras utefter den hermeneutiska traditionen och i form av en kvalitativ ansats med besöksintervjuer som datainsamlingsmetod. Utifrån respondenternas åsikter kan vi dra slutsatsen att dessa hot existerar inom revisionsyrket, men att mycket beror på revisorn som person och dennes integritet och motståndskraft. Resultaten bekräftar även att människor normalt sett vet att deras bedömningar bör vara objektiva, men att de omedvetet kan göra felaktiga bedömningar då de blandar ihop vad som är personligt fördelaktig med vad som är rättvist eller moraliskt. För var och ett av dessa hot diskuterar vi erhållna resultat från empirin och tidigare forskning. Detta med avseende på klientens och revisors olika incitament, hot, kognitiva processer, samt revisionskvalité. Studien mynnar ut i idéer kring fortsatt forskning. Vi lyfter här fram vikten av att bland annat utföra en liknande forskning med kvinnliga auktoriserade revisorer som respondenter. / This essay examines the problems concerning auditors personal engagement and human be- haviours. Auditors and clients have different incentives, which are used to reach a certain preferred situation. Regardless of what the incentives are used for, the aim is to subjectively satisfy a certain interest. The essay is based on previously published scientific articles and is a further research based on Tepalagul and Lins study from year 2015. This essay includes a survey of four threats concerning auditor’s independence. The study will present a detailed investigation of these four threats that may have an affect on the auditor's independence. The threats are: the clients importance, the offering of non-audit services, auditor tenure and the client affiliation. The purpose of this essay is to find clarity if whether or not these threats in practice may actually threaten the auditor's independence towards the client, and if these threats can be prevented and if so, in what way measures may appear. The study will be making associations to psychological factors influencing human behaviours. The concept cognitive dissonance is used in this study to explain the ethical dilemmas that auditors face in their profession. The study's purpose is also to find a clarity of how cognitive dissonance can give an extended explanation about the problems concerning auditor’s independence. Depending on how the auditor stands in situations of various threats to the independence with accompanying pressures from their clients and the environment, the audit quality may shift. The essay will be performed in line with the hermeneuthic tradition in the form of a qualitative approach with interviews as data collection methods. Based on respondents’ opinions, we can conclude that these threats exist within the audit profession, but much depends on the auditor as a person and his or her integrity and resilience. The results also confirm that humans usually know that their assessments should be objective, but they unknowingly make incorrect judgments when they mix up what is personally beneficial with what is fair or moral. For each and everyone of these threats we discuss the empirically given results and previous research. This with regard to the clients and the auditors different incentives, threats, cognitive processes, and audit quality. The study empties into the ideas about further research. We emphasize the importance of among other things carrying out a similar research with female certified auditors as respondents.

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本研究檢測審計品質與經理人能力對於分析師盈餘預測行為之相對有用性。根據Compustat 及 I/B/E/S所蒐集之1996至2011年資料，本研究發現，相對於非四大會計師事務所或非產業專家，當公司被四大會計師事務所或產業專家查核時，分析師預測之準確度較高，且離散度較小。此外，本研究發現當公司經理人能力較高時，分析師預測之準確度亦愈高，而離散度亦愈小。最後，為探討沙賓法案對分析師預測行為之影響，本研究將樣本區分為沙賓法案前及沙賓法案後兩組。實證結果顯示，相對於沙賓法案前，在沙賓法案後，分析師較重視審計品質與經理人能力。整體而言，審計品質與經理人能力皆會為分析師的盈餘預測帶來正面影響，而經理人能力之影響較為顯著。 / This study examines the relative usefulness of audit quality and managerial ability on financial analysts’ earnings forecast behavior. Based on data collected from Compustat and I/B/E/S from 1996 to 2011, the empirical results show that analysts' earnings forecast accuracy is higher and dispersion is smaller when firms are audited by a Big 4 auditor or an industry specialist. Similarly, analysts' earnings forecast accuracy is also higher and dispersion is also smaller when firms employ more capable managers. To investigate whether SOX affects analysts’ behavior, sample is divided into pre-SOX and post-SOX groups. The regression results from both groups show that analysts take audit quality and managerial ability into their earnings forecasts after SOX. Overall, the results suggest that both audit quality and managerial ability are associated with analysts’ earnings forecast properties. Importantly, the effect of managerial ability appears to be larger than the effect of audit quality.

近來陸續爆出的舞弊案件已連帶引起了社會大眾對關係人交易行為的注意。本文先探討審計品質與關係人交易之關聯性，而實證結果顯示關係人銷貨、進貨、應收款項與應付款項交易與審計品質皆呈負向關係，足見關係人交易之查核是困難的。因此本文期望透過外部審計人員的專業屬性來降低關係人交易對審計品質產生的不良影響，提升投資人對公司財務報導的信任。過去文獻針對會計師專業屬性部分，指出會計師事務所規模愈大以及產業專精程度愈高者，具備較佳的查核品質。研究結果顯示當關係人銷貨、進貨及應收款項交易係由四大會計師事務所或產業專家會計師事務所查核時，因大型會計師事務所或產業專家會計師事務所具備較佳會計師專業屬性，能抑制或減少關係人交易對審計品質之負面影響，而提升財務報表之審計品質。 / Numerous financial reporting frauds over recent years have made related party transactions the center of public attention. We first investigate the association between related party transactions and audit quality (proxied by discretionary accruals), and find that four kinds of related party transactions (including sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and payable to related parties) all have negative impacts on audit quality. We posit that (1) external auditing is a monitoring mechanism to reduce audit quality decline caused by related party transactions, and (2) auditor attributes including big 4 audit firms and industry specialist audit firms can mitigate the audit quality decline thereof. Empirical results show that companies audited by big 4 or industry specialist audit firms, whose sales to related parties, purchases from related parties and accounts receivable from related parties show significantly smaller negative impacts on audit quality than companies not audited by big 4 or industry specialist audit firms.