Cette dissertation est une étude sur acrasie comme un problème philosophique à partir de l\'éthique d\'Aristote. Contrairement à Socrate, qui a nié l\'existence de la acrasie dans le domaine moral, Aristote consacre une grande partie de le livre VII de lÉthique à Nicomaque pour l\'étude de ce sujet-là. Pour Socrate, si l\'agent sait la règle morale, il agira selon cette connaissance, si l\'individu agit différemment de ce qui détermine la règle morale est parce qu\'alors il ne possède pas vraiment la connaissance morale. Aristote, à son tour, soutient que lhomme acratique agit contrairement à sa décision à ce quil juge être le mieux à faire. Dans ce cadre, nous analysons la critique aristotélicienne de la tradition socratique et les arguments d\'Aristote dans la défense de l\'existence de lacrasie. / Esta dissertação consiste em um estudo sobre a acrasia como um problema filosófico a partir da ética de Aristóteles. Diferente de Sócrates que negava a existência da acrasia no campo moral, Aristóteles consagrará a quase totalidade do livro VII da Ética Nicomaqueia ao estudo desse tema. Para Sócrates se o agente conhece a regra moral, ele agirá conforme esse conhecimento, caso o indivíduo aja diferentemente ao que a regra moral determina é porque, então, ele não possuía verdadeiramente o conhecimento moral. Aristóteles, por sua vez, defende que o acrático age contrariamente a sua deliberação, àquilo que julga como sendo o melhor a ser feito. A partir desse quadro, analisamos a crítica aristotélica à tradição socrática e os argumentos de Aristóteles em defesa da existência da acrasia.

Avec la question de l’acrasie pour fil rouge, ce travail tend à dessiner les contours de l’éthique de Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248-1298). Il a ainsi pour finalité de comprendre les solutions que le Franciscain envisage pour décrire ce qui motive l’homme a parfois mal agir et ce en toute liberté et en toute connaissance de cause. Après avoir déterminé le rôle de la volonté et de son rapport avec l’intellect dans la liberté et avoir défini les diverses significations de la conscience dans l’œuvre d’Olivi, cette thèse démontre que la notion de personne que propose Olivi en tenant compte des diverses occurrences, tant juridiques que théologiques, qui ont cours à son époque est essentielle dans la question du choix volontaire pour le mal. Enfin, après avoir déterminé si une norme éthique est présente en l’homme, notamment par la notion de goût spirituel, ce travail s’attachera à montrer que la volonté de pouvoir sur autrui et l’orgueil sont pour Olivi la source de tout péché. Nous conclurons cette thèse par l’analyse des causes de la chute des démons, principalement de Lucifer, afin d’illustrer l’ensemble de notre propos. / With the question of akrasia as a central thread, this thesis tries to outline the ethics of Peter of John Olivi (1248-1298). More specifically, the objective is to understand the solutions the Franciscans consider to describe what motivates the human being to sometimes act in an evil way and this on the assumption of total liberty and of the knowledge of reasons. After definition of the role of the will as well as it’s connection with the intellect in freedom and having specified the diverse significations of consciousness in the work of Olivi, this thesis demonstrates that the notion of person suggested by Olivi, considering the different juridical and theological occurrences, which are applied at his epoch, is essential in view of the question of the deliberate choice of the evil. Finally, after having determined if an ethical norm exists in the human being, especially through the notion of spiritual taste, we want to show that the will of power on the others as well as the pride are, from the perspective of Olivi, the source of all sins. We conclude this thesis by the analysis of the reasons of the fall of the demons, primarily Lucifer, to illustrate the entirety of our aim.

Esta dissertação consiste em um estudo sobre a acrasia como um problema filosófico a partir da ética de Aristóteles. Diferente de Sócrates que negava a existência da acrasia no campo moral, Aristóteles consagrará a quase totalidade do livro VII da Ética Nicomaqueia ao estudo desse tema. Para Sócrates se o agente conhece a regra moral, ele agirá conforme esse conhecimento, caso o indivíduo aja diferentemente ao que a regra moral determina é porque, então, ele não possuía verdadeiramente o conhecimento moral. Aristóteles, por sua vez, defende que o acrático age contrariamente a sua deliberação, àquilo que julga como sendo o melhor a ser feito. A partir desse quadro, analisamos a crítica aristotélica à tradição socrática e os argumentos de Aristóteles em defesa da existência da acrasia. / Cette dissertation est une étude sur acrasie comme un problème philosophique à partir de l\'éthique d\'Aristote. Contrairement à Socrate, qui a nié l\'existence de la acrasie dans le domaine moral, Aristote consacre une grande partie de le livre VII de lÉthique à Nicomaque pour l\'étude de ce sujet-là. Pour Socrate, si l\'agent sait la règle morale, il agira selon cette connaissance, si l\'individu agit différemment de ce qui détermine la règle morale est parce qu\'alors il ne possède pas vraiment la connaissance morale. Aristote, à son tour, soutient que lhomme acratique agit contrairement à sa décision à ce quil juge être le mieux à faire. Dans ce cadre, nous analysons la critique aristotélicienne de la tradition socratique et les arguments d\'Aristote dans la défense de l\'existence de lacrasie.

This Master’s Thesis seeks to explain the internal conflicts faced by Guyon, the titular hero of Book II of Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene. Starting with Thomas Aquinas’ designations of the sensitive versus the intellectual appetite, I show that Guyon struggles to maintain the dominance of his intellectual appetite as he puts his vaunted temperance to a series of tests. The hero manages to appease his sensitive appetite through the vice of curiositas, yet the power of his sensitive appetite demands dramatic and violent acts of repression to quash it in Mammon’s Cave and in the Bower of Bliss. Guyon’s intellectual appetite to maintain temperance in Gloriana’s kingdom, aided by the guidance of the Palmer, leads Guyon to succeed in his quest yet reveals the incompatibility between temperance and the desirous and glory-seeking life of a knight errant.

Ce mémoire propose une analyse des justifications du paternalisme étatique dans les cas d’acrasie. Nous explorerons d’abord quelques théories et conceptions de l’acrasie, démontrant la nécessité de développer une conception de l’agent acratique qui soit en quelque sorte subdivisible. Mous exposerons par la suite en quoi cette conception de l’individu remet en question certains présupposés fondamentaux du libéralisme. Notre second chapitre sera consacré à une redéfinition de certains principes libéraux en fonction de notre conception de l’individualité. Cette redéfinition nous permettra d’expliquer comment l’intervention étatique de type paternaliste peut être parfois justifiée d’un point de vue libéral. Le cœur de notre argumentation mettra l’accent sur l’importance pour l’État d’assurer l’autonomie de ses citoyens en concevant leur raison comme faculté d’intégration personnelle. Notre troisième chapitre tentera d’explorer divers exemples de cas concrets où les principes développés plus tôt pourront s’appliquer. / The purpose of this master thesis is to analyze paternalistic justifications for State intervention in cases of acrasia. We first start by exploring some theories and conceptions of acrasia showing the necessity to develop a conception of the acratic agent as somehow subdivisible. We then show that this conception of the individual challenges some of the most central presuppositions for political liberalism. Our second chapter means to redefine some liberal principles according to our conception of individuality. This redefinition will enable us to explain how paternalistic State intervention can sometime be justified from a liberal point of view. Our argumentation will focus on the importance for the State to ensure the autonomy of its citizens by securing the role of their reason as a faculty of personal integration. Our third chapter means to explore diverse practical cases in which the principles developed earlier can apply.

No capítulo 3 do livro VII da Ética Nicomaquéia, Aristóteles explica a acrasia atribuindo ao acrático um erro cognitivo que consiste na não atualização da premissa particular do silogismo prático. A premissa particular do silogismo prático está vinculada à percepção sensível. Mas o que Aristóteles tem em mente ao fazer referência à percepção sensível? Ele deve ter em mente outra capacidade além dos cinco sentidos, ele deve ter em mente também a phantasia. Isto fica claro a partir do método utilizado para tratar das faculdades da alma. Segundo o método em questão, as faculdades da alma devem ser investigadas de acordo com a sua atividade própria e, antes disto, de acordo com o seu objeto correlato. Este método parece adequado para individualizar os cinco sentidos. As cores servem para individualizar a visão, os sons, a audição, os odores, o olfato, etc... Este método, contudo, tem as suas limitações, não é apenas quando sou estimulado por objetos externos que eu faço uso dos sentidos, é possível pensar em cores de olhos fechados, por exemplo. O objeto, portanto, não é o bastante para definir cada sentido, é necessário fazer referência à experiência que temos ao utilizar os sentidos. Esta experiência mental que está envolvida no uso dos sentidos corresponde a atividade da phantasia. A minha posição fica mais clara ainda a partir da discussão entre literalistas e espiritualistas. Essas duas tendênciaas interpretativas compreendem a afirmação de Aristóteles segundo a qual perceber é receber a forma sensível sem a matéria de formas distintas. Segundo o espiritualismo, receber a forma sensível sem a matéria significa alterar-se formalmente sem sofrer alteração material, isto é, perceber a cor branca, por exemplo, sem ser branqueado. Enquanto que, para o literalista, receber a forma sensível sem a matéria significa receber a forma sensível por transmissão. Temos assim uma fisiologia da percepção. O princípio da transmissão, contudo, não pode esgotar a explicação da percepção, é necessário pressupor um princípio formal irredutível que é a consciência sensível. A consciência sensível, por sua vez, é a phantasia. Uma evidência de que a phantasia é a consciência para Aristóteles é o fato de ela estar envolvida em todas as capacidades da alma que envolvem consciência: as capacidades sensíveis, a capacidade de desejar e de inteligir. É impossível tratar a percepção sem fazer referência à phantasia. Isto tudo que foi dito é vantajoso para análise da acrasia, uma vez que Aristóteles atribui duas características à phantasia. A phantasia depende da nossa vontade e pode ser influenciada pelos nossos desejos e emoções. Sendo assim, é possível encontrar uma espécie de conflito moral no caso da falha cognitiva de EN 7.3. / In chapter 3 of book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains acrasia atributing to the acratic a cognitive failure which consists in the non-actualization of the particular premise of the practical syllogism. The particular premise of the practical syllogism is linked to sense perception. But what does Aristotle have in mind when he makes reference to sense perception? He must have in mind another capacity beyond the five senses, he must have in mind also phantasia. This is clear from the method used to deal with the faculties of the soul. According to the method in question, the faculties of the soul must be investigated according to their proper activity and, before that, according to their correlate object. This method seems appropriate to individualize the five senses. Colors serve to individualize sight, sounds, hearing, odors, smell, etc... This method, however, has its limitations, it is not only when I am stimulated by external objects that I make use of the senses, it is possible to think of colors with closed eyes, for example. The object, therefore, is not enough to define each sense, it is necessary to make reference to the experience that we have when using the senses. This mental experience that is involved in the use of the senses corresponds to the activity of phantasia. My position gets even clearer from the discussion between literalists and spiritualists. These two interpretative tendencies understand Aristotle's assertion that to perceive is to receive the sensible form without matter in distinct ways. According to spiritualism, to receive the sensible form without matter means to change formally without suffering material change, that is, to perceive the white color, for example, without being whitened. Whereas, for the literalist, receiving the sensible form without matter means receiving the sensible form by transmission. Thus we have a physiology of perception. The principle of transmission, however, can not exhaust the explanation of perception, it is necessary to presuppose an irreducible formal principle which is the sensitive consciousness. Sensitive consciousness, in turn, is phantasia. One evidence that phantasia is Aristotle's consciousness is that it is involved in all the capacities of the soul that involve consciousness: sensitive capacities, the capacity to desire and to understand. It is impossible to treat perception without reference to phantasia. All that has been said is advantageous for the analysis of acrasia, since Aristotle attributes two characteristics to phantasia. Phantasia depends on our will and can be influenced by our desires and emotions. Thus, it is possible to find a kind of moral conflict in the case of cognitive failure of EN 7.3.

Ce mémoire propose une analyse des justifications du paternalisme étatique dans les cas d’acrasie. Nous explorerons d’abord quelques théories et conceptions de l’acrasie, démontrant la nécessité de développer une conception de l’agent acratique qui soit en quelque sorte subdivisible. Mous exposerons par la suite en quoi cette conception de l’individu remet en question certains présupposés fondamentaux du libéralisme. Notre second chapitre sera consacré à une redéfinition de certains principes libéraux en fonction de notre conception de l’individualité. Cette redéfinition nous permettra d’expliquer comment l’intervention étatique de type paternaliste peut être parfois justifiée d’un point de vue libéral. Le cœur de notre argumentation mettra l’accent sur l’importance pour l’État d’assurer l’autonomie de ses citoyens en concevant leur raison comme faculté d’intégration personnelle. Notre troisième chapitre tentera d’explorer divers exemples de cas concrets où les principes développés plus tôt pourront s’appliquer. / The purpose of this master thesis is to analyze paternalistic justifications for State intervention in cases of acrasia. We first start by exploring some theories and conceptions of acrasia showing the necessity to develop a conception of the acratic agent as somehow subdivisible. We then show that this conception of the individual challenges some of the most central presuppositions for political liberalism. Our second chapter means to redefine some liberal principles according to our conception of individuality. This redefinition will enable us to explain how paternalistic State intervention can sometime be justified from a liberal point of view. Our argumentation will focus on the importance for the State to ensure the autonomy of its citizens by securing the role of their reason as a faculty of personal integration. Our third chapter means to explore diverse practical cases in which the principles developed earlier can apply.

Le problème de la duperie de soi constitue un défi majeur pour toute théorie de la rationalité, attendu que le sujet qui se dupe lui-même semble adhérer à une croyance illusoire tout en étant conscient de son caractère illusoire. C’est en tout cas ce que prétend la tradition « intentionnaliste » qui domine parmi les philosophes (Sartre, Davidson, Pears, Talbott, Scott-Kakures, Bermudez), qui tend à décrire la duperie de soi comme un acte intentionnel dont l’agent serait entièrement responsable. Nous soutenons au contraire une conception dite « émotionnaliste » selon laquelle la duperie de soi est un phénomène sub-intentionnel et involontaire d’illusion cognitive qui trouve son explication dans l’influence des émotions sur notre faculté de juger. Cela nous amène à développer une théorie « cognitivo-hédonique » des émotions qui vise à rendre compte du rôle que jouent ces dernières non seulement dans la naissance des croyances irrationnelles, mais même des actions irrationnelles (acrasia). / Self-deception poses a notable challenge for any theory of rationality, given that the self-deceiver appears to embrace a deceptive belief knowing of it’s deceptive nature. This is at least what is claimed by those who hold an « intentionalist » account (Sartre, Davidson, Pears, Talbott, Scott-Kakures, Bermudez), who tend to portray self-deception as an intentional act for which the self-deceiver should be held accountable. Instead, I hold a so-called « emotionalist » account according to which self-deception is a sub-intentional and involuntary process of cognitive illusion which stems from the influence our emotions may insidiously exert on our cognitive faculties, and thereby on our judgments. That leads me to develop a « cognitive-hedonic » theory of emotions with the purpose of showing how exactly our emotions are capable of inducing not only irrational beliefs, but even irrational actions (acrasia).

On n’a jamais autant parlé qu’à notre époque de l’éthique du soin. Les injonctions paradoxales se multiplient à l’hôpital, comme en témoigne l’impératif récent de « bientraitance ». Force est pourtant de constater que la réalité du soin est assez éloignée des bons sentiments affichés. La culture éthique des soignants reste ainsi indigente malgré les nombreuses formations théoriques qui leur sont proposées et les recommandations de bonnes pratiques ; les lois récentes censées éclairer et faciliter leur pratique (loi Kouchner sur les droits des malades, loi Leonetti sur les malades en fin de vie, pour ne citer que les plus importantes) sont toujours relativement méconnues.Afin que l’éthique hospitalière et du soin ne reste pas incantatoire, il convient tout d’abord d’identifier les divers facteurs qui freinent le développement de la réflexion éthique individuelle et de remonter à la source des réticences et des résistances à la mise en œuvre concrète des valeurs louables qui sont constamment préconisées d’en haut (bienfaisance, respect de l’autonomie de la personne, respect de sa dignité, etc.). Ces obstacles pour ainsi dire structurels et qui entraînent dans les faits l’abandon des patients les plus vulnérables sont ici analysés d’un point de vue à la fois épistémologique et phénoménologique s’appuyant sur une triple expérience clinique,pédagogique et managériale.Pour les surmonter, un changement de paradigme est nécessaire. Sans rien sacrifier de la rationalité et de la scientificité de la médecine, il faut prendre en compte une réalité plurielle, à la fois objective et subjective, et de nombreuses déterminations, parfois extérieures au soin, comme les incontournables réalités économiques. Il faut dire que l’éthique du soin n’est pas innée chez tous les acteurs et que les méthodes et les actions qui ont pour finalité de la développer doivent impérativement être discutées dans un contexte socio-économique en constante évolution. Le nouveau paradigme que nous esquissons devra en tout cas faire plus de place à la pratique, à la simplicité et à la quotidienneté et considérer le soin lui-même comme éthique. / The ethics of care has been a major topic of discussion in recent years. Many paradoxical injunctions are heard of in hospitals, for instance the strange insistence on “welfare”, as if a caregiver had to be told notto mistreat a patient. One has however to admit that the reality of caring isn’t exactly the ideal onepictured by the healthcare authorities. The ethical knowledge of caregivers remains pretty poor in spite ofthe numerous theoretical courses and the practice guidelines that they are provided with. Recent lawsdestined to help the physicians in their practice (the most important ones being the Kouchner law on therights of sick people and the quality of the healthcare system and the Leonetti law on the patients’ rightsand end of life) are for instance still quite misunderstood.In order for health care ethics not to remain a pious incantation, one has first of all to clarify the reasonswhy the ethical thinking is still in limbo and find out the origin of resistances to carry out in action themoral values preached by the official ethicians (beneficence, respect for autonomy, respect for dignityand so on). The structural impediments that cause patent disinterest for the most vulnerable persons arehere analyzed from an epistemological and phenomenological point of view based on a threefoldexperience (medical, pedagogical and managerial).A paradigm shift is necessary to get over these impediments. While recognizing fully the importance ofscience and rationality for medicine, one has to account for the complex reality, both objective andsubjective, of health care, including the growing pressure of economic considerations. Obviously, caringisn’t always an innate behavior when it comes to caregivers. Precise actions have thus to be taken in achanging socio-economic context to ensure that the ethics of care is incorporated by every one of them.Therefore, the new paradigm will have to be less theoretical and more practical, it will reevaluatesimplicity and commonness and will hold the act of caring as such to be ethical.