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Estuda-se nesta tese o conteúdo jurídico do princípio da impessoalidade, previsto no art. 37, caput, da Constituição Federal de 1988, especificamente para fins de parametrização, controle e responsabilidade das decisões administrativas. Estruturam-se três eixos temáticos: a) noções introdutórias ideias de aproximação necessárias ao contexto e ao conceito do princípio da impessoalidade e do alcance de sua projeção nas decisões administrativas (póspositivismo e neoconstitucionalismo; constitucionalização; julgamento por princípios; relevância dos princípios; interesse público; direito administrativo como sistema; neutralidade política e a questão da justiça); b) impessoalidade no direito administrativo comprovação de que o princípio da impessoalidade ostenta arquétipo aberto para conferir maiores cobertura e proteção aos valores tutelados pelo texto constitucional, com ênfase à organização administrativa impessoal para assegurar um agir naturalmente impessoal (instrumentalização recíproca de princípios constitucionais; antecedentes históricos; direito estrangeiro; doutrina brasileira; impessoalidade na Constituição, nas leis e na jurisprudência; conceito de impessoalidade); c) impessoalidade nas decisões administrativas construção de um conceito de impessoalidade específico para as decisões administrativas, concebido desde a ideia de ponderação e conciliação de todos os interesses legítimos públicos e privados envolvidos em cada caso concreto (conceito e distinção de decisão administrativa impessoal em relação à decisão judicial imparcial; garantias e requisitos para a adoção de decisões impessoais, com destaque para os deveres de fundamentação (motivação), processualização e participação; algumas implicações de decisões impessoais [funcionário de fato; diminuição da discricionariedade; desvio de poder; motivação na dispensa de empregados públicos; responsabilidade civil extracontratual do Estado; necessidade de reconhecimento dos direitos dos administrados; nepotismo e revisitação da reformatio in pejus]; consequências da quebra da impessoalidade nas decisões administrativas [anulação; responsabilização do Estado e responsabilização do servidor] e, finalmente, técnicas para adoção de decisões administrativas impessoais). / This essay intends to analyze the juridical concept of the principle of impersonality, embraced in the article 37 of the Constitution of 1988, in order to establish standards of parameterization, control and liability in the administrative decisions. The essay comprises three main fields of analysis: a) introductory concepts preliminary approach to comprehend the theoretical and the political context in which is developed the scope and the enforcementof the principle of impersonality in the processes that lead to administrative decisions (postpositivism and neoconstitutionalism; the enforcement of principles; public interest; Administrative Law as a system; politic neutrality and the issue of Justice); b) the principle of impersonality within the Administrative Law - analysis of the scope of protection of the principle, aiming to demonstrate that its juridical concept must be considered in a wide open perspective in order to guarantee a strong protection of the constitutional values. In this part, it will be emphasized that the development of a impartial administrative conduct is closely related to the idea of a impartial administrative organization. (historical background; foreign legislation; Brazilian legal doctrine; the principle of the impersonality within the constitutional rules, the specific legislation and the judicial precedents; juridical concept of the principle); c) the enforcement of the principle of impersonality in administrative decisions - In this part it is developed the juridical concept of the principle in the field of the deliberative administrative proceedings. This juridical concept embraces the idea of balancing and conciliating all legitimate interests - public or private - involved in a determined situation that requires a administrative deliberation (distinctions between impersonal and impartial administrative decisions; standards to create a impersonal decision-making; specific implications of impersonal decisions; legal consequences arising from the disregard of the principle of impersonality in administrative decisions; legal techniques that lead to a impersonal administrative decision-making).

Estuda-se nesta tese o conteúdo jurídico do princípio da impessoalidade, previsto no art. 37, caput, da Constituição Federal de 1988, especificamente para fins de parametrização, controle e responsabilidade das decisões administrativas. Estruturam-se três eixos temáticos: a) noções introdutórias ideias de aproximação necessárias ao contexto e ao conceito do princípio da impessoalidade e do alcance de sua projeção nas decisões administrativas (póspositivismo e neoconstitucionalismo; constitucionalização; julgamento por princípios; relevância dos princípios; interesse público; direito administrativo como sistema; neutralidade política e a questão da justiça); b) impessoalidade no direito administrativo comprovação de que o princípio da impessoalidade ostenta arquétipo aberto para conferir maiores cobertura e proteção aos valores tutelados pelo texto constitucional, com ênfase à organização administrativa impessoal para assegurar um agir naturalmente impessoal (instrumentalização recíproca de princípios constitucionais; antecedentes históricos; direito estrangeiro; doutrina brasileira; impessoalidade na Constituição, nas leis e na jurisprudência; conceito de impessoalidade); c) impessoalidade nas decisões administrativas construção de um conceito de impessoalidade específico para as decisões administrativas, concebido desde a ideia de ponderação e conciliação de todos os interesses legítimos públicos e privados envolvidos em cada caso concreto (conceito e distinção de decisão administrativa impessoal em relação à decisão judicial imparcial; garantias e requisitos para a adoção de decisões impessoais, com destaque para os deveres de fundamentação (motivação), processualização e participação; algumas implicações de decisões impessoais [funcionário de fato; diminuição da discricionariedade; desvio de poder; motivação na dispensa de empregados públicos; responsabilidade civil extracontratual do Estado; necessidade de reconhecimento dos direitos dos administrados; nepotismo e revisitação da reformatio in pejus]; consequências da quebra da impessoalidade nas decisões administrativas [anulação; responsabilização do Estado e responsabilização do servidor] e, finalmente, técnicas para adoção de decisões administrativas impessoais). / This essay intends to analyze the juridical concept of the principle of impersonality, embraced in the article 37 of the Constitution of 1988, in order to establish standards of parameterization, control and liability in the administrative decisions. The essay comprises three main fields of analysis: a) introductory concepts preliminary approach to comprehend the theoretical and the political context in which is developed the scope and the enforcementof the principle of impersonality in the processes that lead to administrative decisions (postpositivism and neoconstitutionalism; the enforcement of principles; public interest; Administrative Law as a system; politic neutrality and the issue of Justice); b) the principle of impersonality within the Administrative Law - analysis of the scope of protection of the principle, aiming to demonstrate that its juridical concept must be considered in a wide open perspective in order to guarantee a strong protection of the constitutional values. In this part, it will be emphasized that the development of a impartial administrative conduct is closely related to the idea of a impartial administrative organization. (historical background; foreign legislation; Brazilian legal doctrine; the principle of the impersonality within the constitutional rules, the specific legislation and the judicial precedents; juridical concept of the principle); c) the enforcement of the principle of impersonality in administrative decisions - In this part it is developed the juridical concept of the principle in the field of the deliberative administrative proceedings. This juridical concept embraces the idea of balancing and conciliating all legitimate interests - public or private - involved in a determined situation that requires a administrative deliberation (distinctions between impersonal and impartial administrative decisions; standards to create a impersonal decision-making; specific implications of impersonal decisions; legal consequences arising from the disregard of the principle of impersonality in administrative decisions; legal techniques that lead to a impersonal administrative decision-making).

Condictio indebiti innebär att felaktiga betalningar skall gå åter. Banker har emellertid svårt att förlita sig på denna huvudregel. Bankernas centrala ställning i samhället kombinerat med deras uppgift att korrekt förmedla transaktioner, försätter dem i en förtroendeställning. Mottagaren skall kunna lita på att en utbetalning från en bank är korrekt. Bankernas utbetalningar har blivit ett genomgående undantag till principen om condictio indebiti. Praxis har stadgat att banker i princip aldrig återfår en felaktig utbetalning. Av detta kan en ny huvudregel för banker konstateras, att en felaktig utbetalning från en bank skall kvarstå hos mottagaren. Liknande strikta regler finns för förvaltningsmyndigheter. Förvaltningsmyndigheter meddelar beslut och uppsatsen fokuserar på beslut av gynnande karaktär. Det vill säga beslut som innebär någon form av fördel för mottagaren, till exempel tillstånd, ekonomiskt bistånd eller bifallen ansökan. Huvudregeln för gynnande förvaltningsbeslut är att dessa inte kan återkallas utom i fyra undantagsfall. Detta på grund av att den enskilde skall kunna förlita sig på beslutet och inrätta sig efter det. Huvudregeln för återkallelse av förvaltningsbeslut och den nya huvudregeln för återbetalning till banker, är lika. Anledningen till svårigheten att återkalla/återfå något från den gynnade parten är att både banker och myndigheter anses ha en förtroendeställning. Förtroendeställningen beror dels på den enskildes trygghetsperspektiv men även på bankers och myndigheters större möjligheter att ha en god överblick över dessa situationer. Begränsningarna i återkallelse/återbetalning motiveras vidare med att det alternativ som är minst kännbart, skall väljas.  Detta resulterar i att mottagaren av beslutet eller transaktionen i princip alltid påverkas mer om återkallelse eller återbetalning skulle ske, än vad banker eller myndigheter påverkas av att beslutet eller transaktionen kvarstår. Likheterna i dessa motiveringar visar att banker behandlas, trots att de är att anses som privaträttsliga subjekt, såsom ett offentligrättsligt subjekt. / The principle of condictio indebiti means that a faulty transaction should be repaid. This general rule is however, not easily applicable on banks.  The central position the banks possess in our community combined with one of its main tasks, to correctly manage transactions and payments, put the banks in a position of trust. Customers should have unconditional trust in a transaction from a bank and its correctness. Hence, the bank has become an exception to the principle of condictio indebiti. Case studies have shown that banks will never be repaid for a faulty transaction. According to this, a new principle can be stated, that a faulty transaction from a bank shall remain with the recipient. Similar strict rules are to be found for the administrative authorities. Administrative authorities pass decisions and this essay focuses on decisions of favorable character. That is decisions that involve some kind of benefit for the recipient such as; permissions, financial assistance and approved applications. The general rule for favorable administrative decision is that these can not be withdrawn because the recipient should be able to trust, and act according to, a decision of an administrative authority. The general rules for these actions, withdrawal and reimbursement, are similar. The reason for the difficulty in withdrawal and reimbursement is that both banks and administrative authorities are considered to have a position of trust. The individual should always be able to trust an action from these two institutions. The position of trust is based on individuals need for security and that banks and administrative authorities have more knowledge and ability to overview the situation. Withdrawal and reimbursement should therefore never be preceded if it generates a disadvantage for the individual. The court should select the available option resulting in least negative impact. This justifies the difficulties in withdrawing or reimbursing an action that is favorable for the individual. Withdrawal and reimbursement will often have more negative impact on the recipients compared to how it affects banks and administrative authorities if the transaction or decision withstands. These similarities show that banks are treated as a public entity even though they are regarded as a private entity.

This Master thesis is about the issue of execution of administrative decision, which are regulated in the Administrative Procedure Code. The thesis deals with the concept of Enforcement order and it defines the key points of enforcement order. This thesis seeks also to put this kind of enforcement in context with administrative proceeding and to describe every step before start of execution and also how to start process of execution. In chapter which contains process of execution itself, thesis examines procedural requirements of Execution's attachment, kinds of execution and order of steps done by an administrative authority. Thesis describes specific points of each kind of making an execution and it seeks to find characteristics of every kinds of administrative execution. Thesis seeks how to make execution without any violation of laws and maxims established by administrative law and without violation of laws and maxims from another branches of law too. Thesis is focused on executions on kind, which contains E.G. Eviction, removing of movable property (including rules about personal searching and flat's searching), enforcement fine etc. Executions in money are introduced only marginally in thesis and it describes issues in locations and competence of administrative authorities. Thesis contains...

Si tous les juges sont appelés à appliquer la Constitution, le Conseil d'Etat, a une situation particulière. Il a, à apprécier, plus souvent que les autres juges, la conformité à la Constitution de l'action administrative. La soumission des actes administratifs à la Constitution ne doit pas nécessairement passer par une juridiction constitutionnelle. Le Contrôle de constitutionnalité des actes administratifs doit se superposer et même se confondre avec le contrôle de légalité. Le système de contrôle de constitutionnalité introduit en 1990, a privé les juridictions ordinaires de la faculté d'exercer le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois. Le régime du Conseil Constitutionnel offre sans doute moins de garanties du fait que la porte du Conseil Constitutionnel est étroite et demeure interdite aux particuliers, ainsi qu'aux juges ordinaires. Ce régime considère le juge ordinaire comme incompétent pour assurer un contrôle de constitutionnalité de la loi. En effet, l'article 18 de la loi 250/93 du 14 juillet 1993 relative à l'institution du Conseil constitutionnel dispose que le Conseil Constitutionnel contrôle la constitutionnalité des lois et textes ayant force de loi. Nonobstant toute disposition contraire, nulle autre autorité judiciaire ne peut exercer ce contrôle par voie d'action ou d'exception d'inconstitutionnalité ou de violation du principe de la hiérarchie des normes et textes. Ainsi, le Conseil constitutionnel ne contrôle pas la constitutionnalité des lois promulguées avant sa création, le juge ordinaire y compris le Conseil d'Etat ne peut exercer un tel contrôle par voie d'action ni par voie d'exception. Le juge ordinaire ne peut donc plus refuser d'appliquer une loi sous prétexte de son inconstitutionnalité et n'est plus autorisé, à quelque titre que ce soit, à opérer un contrôle de constitutionnalité de la loi. L'intervention du juge administratif statuant comme juge constitutionnel peut contribuer à résoudre le problème de déni de justice existant dans le système juridique libanais. Les règles constitutionnelles s'imposent au juge administratif qui doit respecter ses principes dans les décisions qu'il prend. Etant la norme suprême, la Constitution s'impose donc de manière immédiate aux autorités administratives. Pour cela les normes constitutionnelles sont incorporées dans les sources de légalité que le juge administratif se doit de faire respecter. Le Conseil d'Etat est chargé du contrôle de la conformité des actes normatifs par rapport à la Constitution. Cette fonction de contrôle induit la fonction d'interprétation des normes constitutionnelles. Le juge administratif exerce des fonctions similaires : il assure le contrôle de la conformité des actes administratifs par rapport à la Constitution et il est interprète de la Constitution. Le Conseil d'Etat ne peut pas contrôler tous les actes administratifs, puisque certains d'entre eux violent la Constitution du seul fait qu'ils appliquent une loi inconstitutionnelle. Mais selon la théorie de l'écran législatif, la loi fait écran entre la Constitution et l'acte contrôlé. La mission du Conseil d'Etat est-elle, de mettre en cause l'application de cette loi inconstitutionnelle. Cette mission ne peut se concrétiser que si le Conseil d'Etat agit comme juge constitutionnel, c'est-à-dire que s'il est amené à contrôler la constitutionnalité des actes administratifs En France, le système de contrôle de constitutionnalité instauré par la Constitution de 1958 limitait le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois à un contrôle de priori. Tout juge, ne pouvait qu'appliquer la loi, même inconstitutionnelle. Ce problème a été résolu en France en 2008 par la réforme constitutionnelle opérée par la loi constitutionnelle n°2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 qui ajoute un article 61-1 à la Constitution. / If all judges are required to apply the Constitution, the Council of State, has a special status. He has to appreciate more often than the other judges, compliance with the Constitution of the administrative action. Submission of administrative acts to the Constitution need not go through a constitutional court. Control of the constitutionality of administrative acts must overlap and even merge with the judicial review. The system of constitutional review introduced in 1990, has deprived the ordinary courts of the power to exercise control of the constitutionality of laws. The regime of the Constitutional Council has probably less guarantees that the door of the Constitutional Council is narrow and is forbidden to individuals, as well as ordinary judges. This scheme considers the ordinary courts incompetent for a constitutional review of the law. Indeed, Article 18 of the law 250/93 of 14 July 1993 on the establishment of the Constitutional Council provides that the Constitutional Council reviews the constitutionality of laws and instruments having the force of law. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, no other court may exercise this control by action or unconstitutionality or violation of the principle of hierarchy of norms and texts. Thus, the Constitutional Council does not control the constitutionality of laws enacted prior to its creation, the ordinary courts including the State Council may exercise such control by action or by way of exception. The ordinary courts can no longer refuse to enforce a statute on the grounds of its unconstitutionality and is no longer allowed in any capacity whatsoever, to exercise control of the constitutionality of the law. The intervention of the administrative judge acting as a constitutional judge may help solve the problem of denial of justice existing in the Lebanese legal system.Constitutional rules apply to the administrative judge must respect its principles in the decisions it makes. Being the supreme law, the Constitution is therefore required immediate way to administrative authorities. For that constitutional standards are incorporated into the sources of legality that the administrative judge must enforce. The State Council is responsible for monitoring the compliance of normative acts with the Constitution. This control function causes the function of interpretation of constitutional provisions. The administrative judge exercising similar functions: it supervises the compliance of administrative acts with the Constitution and is interpreter of the Constitution. The Council of State cannot control all administrative acts, as some of them violate the Constitution merely because they apply an unconstitutional law. But according to the theory of legislative screen, the law shields between the Constitution and the controlled act. The mission of the State Council is she to question the application of this law unconstitutional. This mission can only be achieved if the Council of State acts as the constitutional court, that is to say, if it is required to review the constitutionality of administrative acts In France, the system of constitutional review introduced by the 1958 Constitution limited the constitutionality of laws to control a priori. Any judge could not apply the law, even unconstitutional. This problem was solved in France in 2008 by the constitutional reform made by the Constitutional Act No. 2008-724 of 23 July 2008 which adds Article 61-1 of the Constitution.

Denna kvalitativa studie syftar till att undersöka hur anställda inom Nato upplever att maktdistans påverkar beslutsfattandet. För att svara på min frågeställning har jag använt mig av en kvalitativ metod med inkäter, där sex deltagare från fyra olika länder svarade. Resultatet analyserades med en tematisk analys där fem teman framträdde, beslutsfattande, hierarki, kultur, maktdistans och språk. Resultatet är att maktdistans i viss utsträckning påverkar beslutsfattande inom Nato beroende på vilket land som representanterna kommer ifrån. Länders indirekta makt varierar beroende på storlek, befolkningsmängd och hur länge de varit medlemmar av Nato. Studien visar på att maktdistans existerar och påverkar beslut i viss utsträckning men att frågan är komplex då de tillfrågade inte alltid vet vad begreppet maktdistans är även om svaren tyder på det. Sammanfattningsvis påverkas maktdistans av hur länge ett land varit medlemmar i alliansen, hur många personer med hög grad landet har i alliansen och hur bra dessa personer är på språk, att tolka orden i rum och tid och vikta orden rätt. Kunskap i engelska och förhandlingsvana har här betydelse. / This qualitative study aims to investigate how NATO employees experience the impact of power distance on decision-making. To answer that question, I have relied on a qualitative method consisting of a hybrid of questionnaires and interviews that were sent out. Six participants from four countries participated. When the results were examined through thematic analysis, five different themes emerged: decision-making, hierarchy, culture, power distance and language. The results indicate that power distance does affect decision-making within NATO to some extent; depending on which country the representatives come from. The indirect power wielded by the member states varies according to their respective geographical size, the size of their population and their annuity as a member of NATO. The study shows that power distance exists and to some extent affects decision-making within the organization. It also shows that the issue is complex, as not all participants are aware of the concept of power distance, although their responses indicate that they are aware of its existence within the organization. In conclusion, power distance is influenced by how long the nation has been a member of the Alliance, how many high-ranking people the nation has in the various offices of the Alliance, and how well these representatives are able to master language skills, to interpret what is said in a spatial and temporal context, and to weight words accurately; here English and negotiation skills are of great importance.