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Duas possíveis perspectivas do sujeito kantianoLima, Luís Aurélio Spósito 30 October 2008 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2008-10-30 / The present work will study two possible perspectives regarding the Kantian
view. We will analyze the possible approximation of the humanist Kantian
view and the relativist individualism present in this society. Then we will
analyze the appropriation made by Hannah Arendt of the Kantian aesthetic
judgment, considering such judgment from the point of view of the whole
mankind. We shall study the Introduction and the first half of Immanuel Kant s
Critique of Judgment . Then, we will analyze the appropriation by Hannah
Arendt of said judgment by studying her Lectures on Kant's Political
Philosophy ; in this book, Arendt uses the reflective judgment to lay the basis
for a judgment in which the corner stone is the observation of a particular
event from the point of view of the whole of humanity. Such judgment is only
possible when employed the broaden thought / O presente trabalho estudará duas possíveis perspectivas do sujeito
kantiano. Analisaremos a possível aproximação entre o sujeito kantiano
humanista e o individualismo relativista presente em nossa sociedade. Depois
analisaremos a apropriação realizada por Hannah Arendt do juízo estético
kantiano, tendo em vista um julgamento do ponto de vista de toda a
humanidade. Trata-se de uma perspectiva humanista do sujeito kantiano, que
entende possível o seu resgate para a pós-modernidade. Estudaremos a
introdução e a primeira metade da Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo de
Immanuel Kant. Depois analisaremos a apropriação realizada por Hannah
Arendt do juízo reflexivo, a partir de um estudo de suas Lições sobre a
Filosofia Política de Kant . Nesta obra, Arendt aproveitará do juízo reflexivo
para lançar bases a um julgamento que tenha como ponto central a
observação de um acontecimento particular do ponto de vista de toda a
humanidade. Tal julgamento é possível apenas a partir do pensamento
alargado
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A felicidade pública no enfrentamento ao homo felix: ou a busca do sensus communisBrito, Antonio José Rollas de 18 June 2010 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2010-06-18 / Based on Hannah Arendt s thoughts, this thesis aims to reflect about how the idea of
public happiness an expression that is used in the author s main works may contribute for
the contemporary debates involving the theme of happiness. In the present days, happiness is
often thought only in terms of biological life or man s vital process. The obligation of being
happy is the culmination of the modern Project and the consolidation of production, labor
force s reproduction and consumption of goods under the sign of private property, wealth
accumulation, individualism and hyperconsumption. Our problem is not to examine actual
policies of happiness but to take public happiness as an analytical perspective, for its ability to
empower the critics of these policies of happiness in contemporary societies. With this work
we intend to contribute with the present Social Psychology studies of happiness, especially
for the opening of a new field of studies and research, articulated within the concept of public
happiness / A partir do pensamento de Hannah Arendt, essa tese objetiva refletir sobre como a
felicidade pública, expressão presente nos principais trabalhos da autora, pode contribuir para
os debates contemporâneos que envolvem o tema da felicidade, que têm privilegiado uma
única dimensão da felicidade, relacionada à vida biológica ou ao processo vital do homem. O
dever de sermos felizes se apresenta como ponto de chegada do projeto inaugurado na era
Moderna, em que a produção, a reprodução da força do trabalho e o consumo de bens
voltados para a satisfação e o bem estar pessoal se consolidaram na sociedade contemporânea
sob a forma da propriedade privada, do acúmulo da riqueza, do individualismo e do
hiperconsumo. Nosso problema não é examinar as políticas da felicidade na atualidade, mas
tomar a perspectiva da felicidade pública como lugar analítico, que torna fecundas as críticas
às políticas da felicidade nas sociedades contemporâneas. Com este trabalho pretendemos
contribuir para os estudos da felicidade na Psicologia Social Contemporânea, particularmente
para a abertura de um novo campo de estudos e pesquisas em torno do conceito de felicidade
pública
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Assembling the Plebeian Republic. Popular Institutions against Systemic Corruption and Oligarchic DominationVergara Gonzalez, Camila January 2019 (has links)
Democracy seems to be in crisis and scholars have started to consider the possibility that “the only game in town” might be rigged. This book theorizes the crisis of democracy from a structural point of view, arguing that liberal representative governments suffer from systemic corruption, a form of political decay that should be understood as the oligarchization of society, and proposes an anti-oligarchic institutional solution based on a radical interpretation of republican constitutional thought.
If one agrees that the minimal normative expectation of liberal democracies is that governments should advance the welfare of the majority within constitutional safeguards, increasing income inequality and the relative immiseration of the majority of citizens would be in itself a deviation from good rule, a sign of corruption. As a way to understand how we could revert the current patterns of political corruption, the book provides an in-depth analysis of the institutional, procedural, and normative innovations to protect political liberty proposed by Niccolò Machiavelli, Nicolas de Condorcet, Rosa Luxemburg, and Hannah Arendt. Because their ideas to institutionalize popular power have consistently been misunderstood, instrumentalized, demonized, or neglected, part of what this project wants to accomplish is to offer a serious engagement with their proposals through a plebeian interpretative lens that renders them as part of the same intellectual tradition. In this way, the book assembles a “B side” of constitutional thought composed of the apparent misfits in a tradition that has been dominated by the impulse to suppress conflict instead of harnessing its liberty-producing properties.
As a way to effectively deal with systemic corruption and oligarchic domination, the book proposes to follow this plebeian constitutionalism and instituionalize popular collective power. A proposed plebeian branch would be autonomous and aimed not at achieving self-government or direct democracy, but rather at an effort to both judge and censor elites who rule. The plebeian branch would consist of two institutions: a decentralized network of radically inclusive local assemblies, empowered to initiate and veto legislation as well as to exercise periodic constituent power, and a delegate, surveillance office able to enforce decisions and impeach public officials. The establishment of primary assemblies at the local level would not only allow ordinary people to push back against oligarchic domination through the political system but also inaugurate an institutional conception of the people as the many assembled locally: a political collective agent operating as a network of political judgment in permanent flow. The people as network would be a political subject with as many brains as assemblies, in which collective learning, reaction against domination, and social change would occur organically and independently from representative government and political parties.
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Moral Performance, Shared Humanness, and the Interrelatedness of Self and Other: A Study of Hannah Arendt's Post-Eichmann WorkShlozberg, Reuven 05 December 2012 (has links)
This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible.
In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.
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Moral Performance, Shared Humanness, and the Interrelatedness of Self and Other: A Study of Hannah Arendt's Post-Eichmann WorkShlozberg, Reuven 05 December 2012 (has links)
This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible.
In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.
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Rundbrief / Lehrstuhl für Religionsphilosophie und Vergleichende Religionswissenschaft19 October 2011 (has links) (PDF)
No description available.
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Juízo político em Hannah ArendtHelfenstein, Mara Juliane Woiciechoski January 2008 (has links)
Esta dissertação apresenta a concepção de juízo político de Hannah Arendt. Afastando-se de uma leitura ortodoxa dos textos kantianos, Arendt vislumbra no juízo reflexionante estético de Kant a estrutura do juízo político. Em um constante diálogo com a obra kantiana a autora se apropria de vários conceitos, tanto conceitos constantes na Crítica da faculdade do juízo, que é a obra que ela afirma conter a verdadeira filosofia política de Kant, como conceitos de outras importantes obras kantianas. No decorrer deste texto, quando entendemos que ocorre uma apropriação conceitual buscamos situar minimamente o conceito no contexto da obra kantiana para compreendermos a concepção e o gesto interpretativo de Arendt. Através da análise de seus escritos mostramos como ela compreende o modo de funcionamento da faculdade humana de julgar os eventos políticos, por meio da exposição e discussão dos principais conceitos envolvidos em sua teoria. Assim, apresentamos as condições de possibilidade do juízo representadas pelas faculdades da imaginação e do senso comum, bem como as duas perspectivas pelas quais essa faculdade se manifesta no mundo público, o juízo do ator e o juízo do espectador. Depois, analisamos a conexão entre as faculdades de pensamento e juízo para extrair as implicações éticas da faculdade humana de julgar. Estas reflexões são uma tentativa de compreender como, para Arendt, opera a faculdade de julgar; por que ela considera esta faculdade a mais política das habilidades espirituais do homem, e qual é a relevância política desta atividade do espírito. / This dissertation presents the conception of Hannah Arendt’s political judgment. Moving away from an orthodox reading of Kantian texts, Arendt glimpses in the aesthetic reflective judgment of Kant, the structure of the political judgment. In one constant dialogue with Kantian Work the author appropriates several concepts, as concepts constant in the Critique of judgment, which is the Work that she affirms that contains the true Kant’s political philosophy, as concepts of other important Kantian Works. In elapsing of this text, when we understand that a conceptual appropriation occurs, we try to situate the concept in the context of the Kantian Work to understand Arendt’s conception and the interpretation gesture. Through the analysis of her writings we show as she understands the way of functioning of the human faculty to judge the political events, by the exposition and debate of the main involved concepts in her theory. So, we present the conditions of judgment possibility represented by the faculties of the imagination and the common sense, as well as the two perspectives for which manifests this faculty in the public world, the judgment of the actor and the judgment of the spectator. After that, we analyze the connection between the faculties of thought and judgment to extract the ethical implications of the human faculty to judge. These reflections are an attempt to understand how does the faculty of judge operate for Arendt; why does she consider this faculty the most political of men’s mental abilities, and what is the politic relevance of this spirit’s activity.
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Hannah Arendt : a estética e a política (do juízo estético ao juízo político)Schio, Sônia Maria January 2008 (has links)
Resumo não disponível
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Juízo político em Hannah ArendtHelfenstein, Mara Juliane Woiciechoski January 2008 (has links)
Esta dissertação apresenta a concepção de juízo político de Hannah Arendt. Afastando-se de uma leitura ortodoxa dos textos kantianos, Arendt vislumbra no juízo reflexionante estético de Kant a estrutura do juízo político. Em um constante diálogo com a obra kantiana a autora se apropria de vários conceitos, tanto conceitos constantes na Crítica da faculdade do juízo, que é a obra que ela afirma conter a verdadeira filosofia política de Kant, como conceitos de outras importantes obras kantianas. No decorrer deste texto, quando entendemos que ocorre uma apropriação conceitual buscamos situar minimamente o conceito no contexto da obra kantiana para compreendermos a concepção e o gesto interpretativo de Arendt. Através da análise de seus escritos mostramos como ela compreende o modo de funcionamento da faculdade humana de julgar os eventos políticos, por meio da exposição e discussão dos principais conceitos envolvidos em sua teoria. Assim, apresentamos as condições de possibilidade do juízo representadas pelas faculdades da imaginação e do senso comum, bem como as duas perspectivas pelas quais essa faculdade se manifesta no mundo público, o juízo do ator e o juízo do espectador. Depois, analisamos a conexão entre as faculdades de pensamento e juízo para extrair as implicações éticas da faculdade humana de julgar. Estas reflexões são uma tentativa de compreender como, para Arendt, opera a faculdade de julgar; por que ela considera esta faculdade a mais política das habilidades espirituais do homem, e qual é a relevância política desta atividade do espírito. / This dissertation presents the conception of Hannah Arendt’s political judgment. Moving away from an orthodox reading of Kantian texts, Arendt glimpses in the aesthetic reflective judgment of Kant, the structure of the political judgment. In one constant dialogue with Kantian Work the author appropriates several concepts, as concepts constant in the Critique of judgment, which is the Work that she affirms that contains the true Kant’s political philosophy, as concepts of other important Kantian Works. In elapsing of this text, when we understand that a conceptual appropriation occurs, we try to situate the concept in the context of the Kantian Work to understand Arendt’s conception and the interpretation gesture. Through the analysis of her writings we show as she understands the way of functioning of the human faculty to judge the political events, by the exposition and debate of the main involved concepts in her theory. So, we present the conditions of judgment possibility represented by the faculties of the imagination and the common sense, as well as the two perspectives for which manifests this faculty in the public world, the judgment of the actor and the judgment of the spectator. After that, we analyze the connection between the faculties of thought and judgment to extract the ethical implications of the human faculty to judge. These reflections are an attempt to understand how does the faculty of judge operate for Arendt; why does she consider this faculty the most political of men’s mental abilities, and what is the politic relevance of this spirit’s activity.
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Hannah Arendt : a estética e a política (do juízo estético ao juízo político)Schio, Sônia Maria January 2008 (has links)
Resumo não disponível
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