Thesis (DPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / The purpose of this thesis twofold: first, to develop an account of modernity as a “loss of the world” which also entails the “death” of the human as a meaningful philosophical, political or moral category, and second, to explore the possibility of recovering a sense of the world in us and with it, a sense of what it means to be human. This argument is developed by way of a sustained engagement with the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt, whose analogous critiques of modernity centre on the problem of the connection between humanity and worldliness. My argument consists of three parts, each of which spans two chapters. Part one of the thesis sets out the most important aspects of Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s respective critiques of modernity. Chapter one focuses on modernity as a rupture of a philosophical, political and religious tradition within which existence in the world could be experienced as unquestionably meaningful. Following arguments developed by Nietzsche and Arendt, chapter two establishes that the loss of this tradition results in a general crisis of meaning, evaluation and authority that can be designated as “modern nihilism”. The second part of the thesis deals with what may be called the “anthropological grounds” of the critique of modernity developed in part one. To this end, chapter three focuses on Nietzsche’s portrayal of the human as “the as-yet undetermined animal” who is neither the manifestation of a subjective essence nor the product of his own hands, but who only exists in the unresolved tension between indeterminacy and determination. This is followed in chapter four by an inquiry into Arendt’s conception of “the human condition”, which in turn points to the conditionality of being human. What is clearly demonstrated in both cases is that, in so far as the predicament of modernity is incarnate in modern human beings themselves, any attempt at overcoming this predicament would somehow have to involve re-thinking or transcending our present-day humanity. The third part of the thesis examines the way in which the reconceptualisation of the human as advocated by Nietzsche and Arendt transforms our understanding of “world”. The more specific aim here is to demonstrate that both thinkers conceive of a reconciliation between self and world as a form of redemption. In chapter five I explore their respective attempts to resurrect the capacity for judgement in the aftermath of the death of God as the first step in this redemptive project, before turning to a more in-depth inquiry into the “soteriology” at work in Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s thinking in chapter six. This inquiry ultimately makes clear that there is a conflict between the Nietzschean conception of redemption as amor fati (love of fate) and Arendt’s notion of redemption as amor mundi (love of the world). I conclude the thesis by arguing that what is at stake here are two conflicting notions of reconciliation: a worldly – or political – notion of reconciliation (Arendt), and a much more radical, philosophical notion of reconciliation (Nietzsche), which ultimately does away with any boundary between self and world. However, my final conclusion is not that we face an inevitable choice between these two alternatives, but rather that the struggle between these two dispositions is necessary for an understanding of what it means to be human as well as for the world in which our humanity is formed.

閱聽人抗拒主流意識形態的批判能力﹐一直是閱聽人研究領域的重要議題。但是﹐現存閱聽人研究典範卻無法提出適切的討論框架﹐接收分析典範因時代變遷而使其概念模式難以適用﹐新典範如觀展／表演典範卻不關心閱聽人的抗拒問題。因此﹐本研究以閱聽人的思辨能力指稱閱聽人藉由與媒介影像互動、進而返回自我主體思考的能動性﹐試圖建構適合當代複雜媒介景象之閱聽人思辨能力的理論框架。 為了強調思考過程重於思考結果﹐本研究引入政治哲學家鄂蘭的哲學體系﹐視閱聽人的思辨能力為流動變化的過程﹐並以其提出之想像操作機制、普遍可溝通性、想像式巡訪與無家感思考狀態作為研究觀察的參考框架。於實際經驗資料蒐集分析方面﹐本研究持續觀察四年（1998年至2002年）閱聽人於《村上春樹的網路森林》發表循環文本共1,815篇﹐並從鄂蘭的哲學體系出發﹐試圖描繪閱聽人思辨進行的歷程。 研究首先發現﹐閱聽人研究應當將「閱聽人」的概念回歸到「人」的本質基礎﹐承認閱聽人並非單一、純粹、高同質性的群體﹐並重視其多元、混雜、糾結、交錯的身分認同。再者﹐閱聽人進行思辨時﹐其抗拒解構的對象不只是媒介文本蘊藏的意識形態﹐尚且包括長期自我人生經驗形成的默識與價值體系﹐因此﹐閱聽人思辨能力的呈現是綿延不斷的自我摧毀過程﹐是無所依傍與無家感心靈狀態的保持﹐唯有藉由闡述自我思考結果、與他人辯駁溝通的過程等持續的自我鍛鍊﹐才得以培育養成。

This thesis is an account of the poet and critic W.H. Auden's relations with Germany and Germans over the course of his life (1907-1973), presented through a selection of influences that have received little critical attention in the corpus of secondary literature to date. While these connections and influences are manifold and sometimes disparate, they can serve as a prism to tell Auden's life-story from a particular, relatively unexplored angle and to illuminate his work. The thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter One discusses Auden’s engagement with German literature before 1928, his reasons for spending nine months in Weimar Berlin 1928-29, and the formative influence of this experience on his life and work. Chapter Two explores Auden's relationship with his 'in-laws', the famous family of Nobel Prize winning author Thomas Mann, and Auden's choice of an international life-style. Chapter Three discusses various other, later German influences on Auden: his visit to Germany with the US Army and its traces in The Age of Anxiety; issues concerning the German translation of this text; his Ford Foundation residence in isolated West Berlin; and his intellectual friendship with Hannah Arendt. Introduction and Conclusion embed these three specific chapters, deliberating the topic more abstractly. A number of appendices bring together a wide range of unpublished sources – and their translations into English, if the original is composed in German. Translations of all German appendix material can be found in the appendix itself.

Cette étude, qui s'intéresse aux appropriations de l'Antiquité grecque au XXe siècle, se propose d'analyser les impacts de la lecture de Platon sur le développement de la pensée politique et éthique de Hannah Arendt. Notre approche du sujet est historique et philosophique. Premièrement, nous considérerons la toile de fond biographique, intellectuelle et historique de cette lecture. La relation intellectuelle entre Hannah Arendt et Martin Heidegger reçoit une attention particulière, puisque le Platon arendtien présente parfois des similarités avec celui de Heidegger. Nous considérerons également la réception de Platon en Allemagne entre la période de Weimar et l'après-guerre : les lectures idéologiques de l'époque nazie, et le débat autour du statut de Platon en tant qu'ancêtre du totalitarisme, clamé par Karl Popper, ont assombri la réputation philosophique de Platon jusqu'à la fin du XXe siècle. Nous trouvons des échos de ce climat intellectuel particulier dans le traitement de Platon chez Arendt. Dans un deuxième temps, nous examinerons les thèmes et les motifs de la lecture arendtienne en observant minutieusement une sélection d'ouvrages, d'essais, d'ébauches d'Arendt, en plus des notes du Journal de pensée (Denktagebuch) et des extraits de dialogues de Platon sur lesquels s'appuient sa lecture. Arendt déconstruit, transforme, altère et utilise ces textes afin de démontrer que notre tradition de pensée politique s'est édifiée sur un mépris de la politique qui trouve sa source dans la pensée platonicienne. Ce mépris culmine dans la pensée de Marx et le totalitarisme. Mais les réflexions d'Arendt sur la pensée, le jugement et la conscience, et son traitement du cas Eichmann suggère qu'elle s'approprie par moments la pensée de Platon. Des comparaisons avec d'autres penseurs émigrés allemands, qui s'inspirent aussi de Platon et des Grecs pour édifier leur pensée politique, Leo Strauss et Eric Voegelin, vont nous permettre d'affiner notre compréhension du Platon d'Arendt. / This study, which concerns the appropriations of Greek Antiquity in the 20th century, proposes to analyze the impacts of the reading of Plato on the development of Hannah Arendt's political and ethical thought. Our approach of this subject is historical and philosophical. First, we will consider the biographical, intellectual and historical background of this reading. The intellectual relationship between Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger receive a special attention, since Arendt's Plato is sometimes similar to the heiddeggerian one. We also consider Platonic reception in Germany between the Weimar period and the postwar era : the ideological readings of the Nazi era, and the debate surrounding Plato's status as the forebearer of totalitarianism, as claimed by Karl Popper, darkened Plato's philosophical reputation until the end of 20th century. We find some echoes of this particular intellectual climax in Arendt's treatment of Plato. Second, we will examine the themes and motives of arendtian reading by scrutinizing a selection of Arendt's books, essays, drafts, and notes from the Denktagebuch, and excerpts from the Platonic dialogues that informs her reading. Arendt deconstructs, transforms, distorts and uses these texts in order to show that our tradition of political thought was founded on a contempt for politics that finds its source in Platonic thought. This contempt culminates in Marx's thought and totalitarianism. But Arendt's reflections on thinking, judgment and conscience, and her treatment of Eichmann's case suggests that she sometimes appropriates Plato. Some comparisons with other German Émigrés thinkers who also reads Plato and the Greeks to inform their political thought, Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, will enhance our understanding of Arendt's Plato.

This thesis explores alternative ways of staging music in preschool. The ‘preschool subject of music’ is approached as a social and cultural construct that is embedded in discursive negotiations. Participants in the study are 1-3 year-old children and their music pedagogues, working in the preschool on a daily basis. In three studies, the negotiation of a local music ‘didactic identity’ is examined by answering research questions related to three different discursive levels: (i) the micro-level of face-to-face interaction; (ii) the level of pedagogue’s conceptions; and (iii) the political/societal level. Study I examines the participants’ use of semiotic resources in their co-construction of musicking events. By means of micro-analyses of video-recordings it is shown that mobility in the room is essential for the children’s access to instruments and other artefacts, and for their possibility to influence music activities. Other crucial conditions concern the pedagogues’ responsive uptake and improvisatory approach, and that the activities are open to other forms of expression. Study II explores conceptions of the ‘child’ and conceptions of ‘music’ in four music pedagogues’ talk in a group interview. Different conceptions of the ‘child’ are seen to interrelate with certain ontological and functional conceptions of ‘music’ that involve diverse opportunities for children’s (bodily) agency. This analysis is made by means of discursive psychology. Study III examines the music practices from a political and philosophical perspective, using Hannah Arendt’s concept of the ‘public sphere’. This third perspective shows how this preschool’s music practices create a public sphere by seriously putting into practice equality and plurality as values and principles that increase the equality between children and adults. Age power structures are thereby challenged, and the children can be seen as citizens in the ‘here and now’, and not in some distant future when they are grown-ups. Also, the ‘preschool subject of music’ itself becomes a negotiated issue. Implications for preschool practice and preschool teacher education are discussed, and further research is suggested within other educational areas regarding how pedagogues’ interpretations of the concept of ‘children’s participation’ and ‘influence’ impact on specific preschool subjects, such as music. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following paper was unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: In press.</p>

The thesis inquires into the theme of political judgement and aims to rethink it from the perspective of twentieth-century philosophies of existence. It seeks to take up the contemporary challenge of political judgement that remains inadequately addressed within recent theorizing: how, given the modern breakdown of metaphysical absolutes, to reinvigorate the human capacity for political judgement as a practical activity able to confront the ambiguous, plural and complex character of our postfoundational world. Against this background, the thesis aspires to reclaim the distinctly historical orientation of twentieth-century existentialism, in particular the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus and Hannah Arendt. It draws on their aesthetic sensibility to resuscitate the human judging ability in its worldly ambiguity and point towards an account of political judgement capable of facing up to the challenges of our plural and uncertain political reality. Retrieving their vigilant assumption of the situated, worldly condition of human political existence and the attendant perplexity of judging politically, the aim of the thesis is to suggest how the existentialists' insights can be brought to bear on contemporary problematics of political judgement that seem to elude the grasp of abstract standards and predetermined yardsticks.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:28:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Aurelio Sposito Lima.pdf: 1157908 bytes, checksum: ff037a1601342b5a06004c85f7eb2b6b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-10-30 / The present work will study two possible perspectives regarding the Kantian view. We will analyze the possible approximation of the humanist Kantian view and the relativist individualism present in this society. Then we will analyze the appropriation made by Hannah Arendt of the Kantian aesthetic judgment, considering such judgment from the point of view of the whole mankind. We shall study the Introduction and the first half of Immanuel Kant s Critique of Judgment . Then, we will analyze the appropriation by Hannah Arendt of said judgment by studying her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy ; in this book, Arendt uses the reflective judgment to lay the basis for a judgment in which the corner stone is the observation of a particular event from the point of view of the whole of humanity. Such judgment is only possible when employed the broaden thought / O presente trabalho estudará duas possíveis perspectivas do sujeito kantiano. Analisaremos a possível aproximação entre o sujeito kantiano humanista e o individualismo relativista presente em nossa sociedade. Depois analisaremos a apropriação realizada por Hannah Arendt do juízo estético kantiano, tendo em vista um julgamento do ponto de vista de toda a humanidade. Trata-se de uma perspectiva humanista do sujeito kantiano, que entende possível o seu resgate para a pós-modernidade. Estudaremos a introdução e a primeira metade da Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo de Immanuel Kant. Depois analisaremos a apropriação realizada por Hannah Arendt do juízo reflexivo, a partir de um estudo de suas Lições sobre a Filosofia Política de Kant . Nesta obra, Arendt aproveitará do juízo reflexivo para lançar bases a um julgamento que tenha como ponto central a observação de um acontecimento particular do ponto de vista de toda a humanidade. Tal julgamento é possível apenas a partir do pensamento alargado

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:32:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Antonio Jose Rollas de Brito.pdf: 428891 bytes, checksum: d03fad27f0bbe80f0b1353cbab7c00d3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-06-18 / Based on Hannah Arendt s thoughts, this thesis aims to reflect about how the idea of public happiness an expression that is used in the author s main works may contribute for the contemporary debates involving the theme of happiness. In the present days, happiness is often thought only in terms of biological life or man s vital process. The obligation of being happy is the culmination of the modern Project and the consolidation of production, labor force s reproduction and consumption of goods under the sign of private property, wealth accumulation, individualism and hyperconsumption. Our problem is not to examine actual policies of happiness but to take public happiness as an analytical perspective, for its ability to empower the critics of these policies of happiness in contemporary societies. With this work we intend to contribute with the present Social Psychology studies of happiness, especially for the opening of a new field of studies and research, articulated within the concept of public happiness / A partir do pensamento de Hannah Arendt, essa tese objetiva refletir sobre como a felicidade pública, expressão presente nos principais trabalhos da autora, pode contribuir para os debates contemporâneos que envolvem o tema da felicidade, que têm privilegiado uma única dimensão da felicidade, relacionada à vida biológica ou ao processo vital do homem. O dever de sermos felizes se apresenta como ponto de chegada do projeto inaugurado na era Moderna, em que a produção, a reprodução da força do trabalho e o consumo de bens voltados para a satisfação e o bem estar pessoal se consolidaram na sociedade contemporânea sob a forma da propriedade privada, do acúmulo da riqueza, do individualismo e do hiperconsumo. Nosso problema não é examinar as políticas da felicidade na atualidade, mas tomar a perspectiva da felicidade pública como lugar analítico, que torna fecundas as críticas às políticas da felicidade nas sociedades contemporâneas. Com este trabalho pretendemos contribuir para os estudos da felicidade na Psicologia Social Contemporânea, particularmente para a abertura de um novo campo de estudos e pesquisas em torno do conceito de felicidade pública

Democracy seems to be in crisis and scholars have started to consider the possibility that “the only game in town” might be rigged. This book theorizes the crisis of democracy from a structural point of view, arguing that liberal representative governments suffer from systemic corruption, a form of political decay that should be understood as the oligarchization of society, and proposes an anti-oligarchic institutional solution based on a radical interpretation of republican constitutional thought. If one agrees that the minimal normative expectation of liberal democracies is that governments should advance the welfare of the majority within constitutional safeguards, increasing income inequality and the relative immiseration of the majority of citizens would be in itself a deviation from good rule, a sign of corruption. As a way to understand how we could revert the current patterns of political corruption, the book provides an in-depth analysis of the institutional, procedural, and normative innovations to protect political liberty proposed by Niccolò Machiavelli, Nicolas de Condorcet, Rosa Luxemburg, and Hannah Arendt. Because their ideas to institutionalize popular power have consistently been misunderstood, instrumentalized, demonized, or neglected, part of what this project wants to accomplish is to offer a serious engagement with their proposals through a plebeian interpretative lens that renders them as part of the same intellectual tradition. In this way, the book assembles a “B side” of constitutional thought composed of the apparent misfits in a tradition that has been dominated by the impulse to suppress conflict instead of harnessing its liberty-producing properties. As a way to effectively deal with systemic corruption and oligarchic domination, the book proposes to follow this plebeian constitutionalism and instituionalize popular collective power. A proposed plebeian branch would be autonomous and aimed not at achieving self-government or direct democracy, but rather at an effort to both judge and censor elites who rule. The plebeian branch would consist of two institutions: a decentralized network of radically inclusive local assemblies, empowered to initiate and veto legislation as well as to exercise periodic constituent power, and a delegate, surveillance office able to enforce decisions and impeach public officials. The establishment of primary assemblies at the local level would not only allow ordinary people to push back against oligarchic domination through the political system but also inaugurate an institutional conception of the people as the many assembled locally: a political collective agent operating as a network of political judgment in permanent flow. The people as network would be a political subject with as many brains as assemblies, in which collective learning, reaction against domination, and social change would occur organically and independently from representative government and political parties.

This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible. In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.