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Expérience néo-cyniques de la ville. Sur la dimension esthétique et narrative de la possibilité d'habiter l'espace urbain. / Neo-cynical experiences of the city. On the aesthetic dimension and narrative of the possibility of inhabiting urban space. / Esperienze neociniche della città. Sulla dimensione estetica e la narrazione della possibilità di abitare lo spazio urbano.Cornia, Ugo 19 April 2018 (has links)
Dans cette thèse on a essayé d’enquêter sur la spécificité de l’ancien cynisme à partir des recherches de quelques philosophes tels que Hadot, Agamben, Foucault, Fabbrichesi, Goulet-Cazé et Sloterdijk. Le cynisme représenterait une forme de vie très particulière dont le style a encore peut être quelque chose à nous dire.Pourtant on a essayé de reconstruire un cadre d’ensemble qui pourrait recomposer cette particulière forme de vie cynique, très autarcique et polémique, en relation aux principales expériences de la vie : l’origine et la citoyenneté, le rapport avec l’économie et le pouvoir, avec les conventions sociales, avec le savoir et la religion.En outre on a essayé de contextualiser la forme de vie cynique en relation au contexte urbain, car le cynisme s’est développé à l’époque de la civilisation gréco-romaine à l’intérieur des villes. Les provocations et le style de vie typiquement cynique se manifestaient dans les lieux typiques des villes comme les temples ou les places. À travers des comportements effrontés et impudents la manière habituelle de s’habiller ou d’habiter était contestée, et le rôle des usages ordinaires et des lois était peu considéré. Ensuite on a essayé de sonder l’existence d’une sorte de courant souterrain du cynisme, et ses incessantes remontées en surface, au cours du développement de la culture occidentale, dans la longue période de temps qui va de la fin du monde gréco-romain jusqu’au dix-neuvième siècle. Des fragments concernant Diogène se trouvent dans la culture arabe et dans certains recueils du Moyen Âge. Au cours de la Renaissance le cynisme est cité par Erasme de Rotterdam, par Michel de Montaigne et par Rabelais, et le thème de l’extravagance de la vie de l’artiste apparaît par exemple dans l’œuvre de Pietro da Cosimo. Diogène est cité à nouveau au siècle des Lumières. Enfin on a analysé les tentatives d’autarcie chez Thoreau, le style de vie de Marx à Londres, et la grande récupération du cynisme faite par Nietzche. Pour ce qui concerne le dix-neuvième siècle on a analysé quelques thèmes cyniques dans la prose de différents auteurs tels que Tolstoï, Bernhard, Beckett, Hasek et Kristof. Il ne s’agit pas d’un cynisme déclaré, mais de certaines questions et de certaines solutions qui remontent en surface. Pour ce qui concerne la philosophie on a essayé d’approfondir ce que Foucault et Sloterdijk ont récupéré du cynisme et comment. Dans le domaine socio-économique, on a essayé de mettre en évidence les connections entre l’autarcie cynique et les propositions de la pensée liée à la décroissance et à celles d’ Ivan Illich. / This PhD dissertation investigates, starting from the stimuli offered by Hadot, Agamben, Foucault, Fabbrichesi, Goulet-Cazé and Sloterdijk, the specificity of the ancient cynicism. Cynicism is a very particular form of life that today perhaps has something to say.We tried to reconstruct a framework that recomposes this form of cynical life, very autarchic and controversial, in relation to the main experiences of life: the origin and citizenship, the relationship with the economy, with the power, with the social conventions, with knowledge and with religion.This research tries to contextualize the cynical life form in relation to the urban context because cynicism developed within the cities. Cynical provocations were shown in temples or squares; through shameless and shameless behavior, the way of dressing or living was disputed, and customs and laws were transgressed.A kind of subterranean current of cynicism was then reconstructed in the development of western culture from the end of the Greek-Roman world to the nineteenth century. Diogenes appears in Arab culture and medieval novels; cynicism is cited by Erasmus, Montaigne, Rabelais and the theme of the extravagance of the artist's life appears. The illuminists quote Diogene. Thoreau's attempts at autarky have been analyzed, Marx's lifestyle in London, and Nietzsche's great recovery of cynicism.In the twentieth century, some cynical motifs in the narrative of Tolstoy, Bernhard, Beckett, Hasek and Kristof were also analyzed. It is not a declared cynicism, but the re-emergence of certain problems and certain solutions. We then tried to investigate how and what Foucault and Sloterdijk have recovered from cynicism. In the socio-economic sphere, the links between cynical autarky and the ideas of de-growth thought and Ivan Illich were highlighted.
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Les conditions d'impossibilité de la société sadienneDesbiens, Justine 12 1900 (has links)
Cette étude vise à démontrer que les propos des protagonistes libertins de Sade tendent toujours vers une démarche autarcique, qu’on peut associer à une volonté exacerbée d’autonomie. Pour faire état de ce postulat, nous examinerons les convictions naturalistes et matérialistes de Sade, qui le poussent à critiquer si fortement le système religieux, qu’il considère comme une antinomique au geste de libération entamé par les philosophes. C’est que Sade est radical par son matérialisme et par son athéisme. Lorsqu’il se prononce quant au mouvement prioritaire de la nature, en faisant d’elle une force destructrice et meurtrière, Sade annihile toute possibilité d’un objet absolu et, par le fait même, de la possibilité du bonheur dans un cadre moral. Nous montrerons que c’est ce qui le force à fonder les conditions de possibilités du bonheur sur l’individualité, en ce que le plus grand plaisir est un choc issu de l’acte criminel. Influencé par le libertinage, Sade examine les conditions de possibilités du plaisir absolu, de la jouissance, comme une dernière tentative d’adéquation avec le monde. La démarche est donc complexe, ardue et interminable. Devant la difficulté de faire état d’un monde qui se conforme à ses préceptes, Sade est forcé de recourir à la communauté close, qu’on associera à l’autarcie. Cette société ne respecte pourtant pas le formalisme immoral dont on l’accuse, bien qu’elle soit souvent associée à un prosélytisme pour le despotisme. / This study aims to demonstrate that Sade’s libertine protagonists tend towards an autarchic approach, which can be associated with an exacerbated desire for autonomy. To demonstrate this premise, we will examine Sade's naturalistic and materialistic convictions, which lead him to so strongly criticize the religious system. To demonstrate this postulate, we will examine Sade's naturalistic and materialist convictions, which lead him to so strongly criticize the religious system, which he sees as an antithesis to the gesture of liberation initiated by philosophers. When he speaks out about the movement of nature, making it a primarily destructive and murderous force, Sade annihilates all possibility of an absolute object and, therefore, of the possibility of happiness in a moral framework. We will show that this is what forces him to base the conditions of happiness on individuality, in that the greatest pleasures come from a shock resulting from criminal acts. Patently influenced by libertinism, Sade is brought to examine the conditions of possibility of absolute pleasure as a last attempt at equilibrium with the world. The process is therefore complex, arduous and unending. Faced with the difficulty of describing a world that conforms to its precepts, Sade is forced to resort to the closed community, to autarky, that however does not respect the immoral formalism of which he is accused, although it is sometimes akin to proselytize for despotism.
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Modeling frameworks to evaluate energy autarky of wastewater treatment systemsSarpong, Gideon 01 May 2020 (has links)
This research demonstrates the use of two novel methodologies to evaluate energy autarky status of wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) in two steps. Step I (analysis 1 and 2) focuses on overall energy performance evaluation of a conventional activated sludge process (CAS) using a quantitative mass balance model. Step II involves development of a dynamic model that simulates a future wastewater resource recovery facility (WRRF). The step I (analysis 1) focused on small WWTPs with treatment capacities less than 5 MGD. The results revealed that a CAS process can achieve energy autarky or energy-positive status when old technology equipment is replaced with new, high efficiency equipment to save 10-12% energy; aeration energy is reduced by installing nitritation/anammox nitrogen removal process; and energy production is enhanced with the addition of FOG for co-digestion. Analysis 2 of step I focusing on large plant capacities (i.e., > 20 MGD) evaluated the effect of influent wastewater strength (IWWS), primary treatment COD removal efficiency (PT-COD), and proper design of combined heat and power (CHP) systems on the overall energy performance. The results showed that energy autarky is feasible when PT-COD is 60% for low IWWS, 40% or greater for medium IWWS, and 30% or greater for high IWWS. In step II analysis, a new and dynamic model was developed by integrating high rate algal pond (HRAP) and anaerobic digester (AD) systems. The model was calibrated using the experimental data from recent studies. The results showed that this system can achieve energy autarky when advanced solids separation and co-digestion systems are included. Solids separation efficiency was increased from 75 to 90% to reduce the winter effluent COD concentrations from HRAP (by 20%). Similarly, nitrogen effluent concentrations were reduced by increasing the solids retention time. Future studies should focus on techno-economic and environmental life cycle impact analysis of these novel process configurations.
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The effects of globalization on state control of civil society: the Catholic Church in Vietnam during autarky and interdependenceLunt, Eric N. 03 1900 (has links)
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis examines how globalization has affected Vietnam's view and treatment of religious institutions. In a larger context, it argues that the conditions of globalization foster increased liberalism and the latent development of civil society. The implications of globalization on religion in Vietnam are explored through a case study of the Catholic Church in Vietnam from 1975 to 2004. The Catholic Church is examined during two different periods: during autarky from 1975 to the Doi Moi reforms in 1986, and during international interdependence from 1987 to 2004. Isolated from international norms and pressures during its period of autarky, Vietnam suppressed, rigidly controlled, and severely restricted the Catholic Church. As Vietnam entered its present period of global integration and interdependency, Vietnam's view and treatment of the Catholic Church improved: suppression lessened, controls eased, and many restrictions lifted. The thesis concludes that in order to foster religious freedom and build civil society, policy makers should implement policies that engage rather than isolate. Engagement policies tend to increase a country's degree of global interdependency and integration with the world economy and community. As the level of interdependency increases, countries tend to become more subject to international norms and standards. / Captain, United States Air Force
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Hodnocení finanční situace školy a návrhy na její zlepšení / Evaluation of the Financial Situation in the School and Proposals to its ImprovementNavrátil, Pavel January 2009 (has links)
This Master‘s thesis deals with the financial analysis of the current situation in the school Střední zdravotnická škola a Vyšší odborná škola zdravotnická Jihlava. The work includes proposals for improvement and evaluation of the contributions of these proposals for the school.
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Ill fares the Land? The concept of national food self sufficiency in political discourse 1880-1939.Hargreaves, David William January 2012 (has links)
After the repeal of the Corn Laws ended the policy of protectionism
which had enabled Britain to feed herself from within her own
resources, free trade resulted in domestic food production constituting
only 30% of the British diet. This study looks at the political discourse
from 1880 to 1939 when the ¿empty countryside¿ became a symbol of
agricultural decline. Emerging radical and socialist narratives put
forward approaches for rural regeneration and increased food
production. Other narratives suggested that agricultural decline was one
manifestation of national decline whereby a self sufficient and proud
nation was being betrayed by Capitalism. Both Left and Right offered up
the prospect of different solutions predicated upon shared perceptions
of ¿Englishness.¿ The experience of Irish famine failed to inform political
action or policy making.
The study notes the importance of War upon the development of food
policy. Increasingly, the State joined forces with the NFU in a corporate
endeavour which sought to manage, rather than increase, food production and created structures which became increasingly important in the context of rearmament. Increased food production was rejected upon defence grounds in that free trade and a navy were seen as appropriate safeguards. Those countries which sought to follow self sufficiency ¿ or autarky ¿ are portrayed as warlike in their intentions; by 1939 all mainstream political parties rejected the notion of artificially increased food production.
Those who continued to press for increased food production concentrated either upon earlier pre Capitalist societies or were attracted by Fascism and strong leadership. After such searches became increasingly problematic there was emphasis upon the soil, with the adoption of an approach which was both practical and mystical.
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A imergência da pessoa humana na história: ensaio sobre a filosofia radicalizante (protestante) e o cristianismo ateu de Pierre Thévenaz / The immergence of human person in the history Essay about the radicalizing (protestant) philosophy and the atheistic Christianity of Pierre ThévenazCosta, Daniel da 29 April 2014 (has links)
Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo / The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world
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A imergência da pessoa humana na história: ensaio sobre a filosofia radicalizante (protestante) e o cristianismo ateu de Pierre Thévenaz / The immergence of human person in the history Essay about the radicalizing (protestant) philosophy and the atheistic Christianity of Pierre ThévenazDaniel da Costa 29 April 2014 (has links)
Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo / The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world
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