Thesis (M.S.)--Northern Illinois University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [82]-85). Also available online (PDF file) by a subscription to the set or by purchasing the individual file.

This study investigated the relationship between gender, self-esteem, self-consciousness, social self-efficacy and shyness among 9th, 10th, and 11th grade school students. Participants of the study were 424 high school students (250 female and 174 male) from four high schools in Bursa. Demographic information form, Revised Cheek and Buss Shyness Scale (RCBS) (Cheek &amp / Buss, 1981), Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) (Rosenberg, 1965), Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) (Feningstein, Scheier, &amp / Buss, 1975), and Social Self-Efficacy Scale (Matsushima &amp / Shiomi, 2002) were used as data collection instruments. The results of multiple regression analysis indicated that self-esteem, self-consciousness, and social self-efficacy were significant predictors of high school students

Thesis (PH.D.)--Michigan State University. Social Work, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Aug. 11, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-173). Also issued in print.

It is essential for individuals’ well-being and relationships that they have the ability to consciously experience, express and respond to their own and others’ affects. The validity of a new conception of affect consciousness (AC), incorporating consciousness of both own and others’ affects, was investigated in this thesis. The clinical usefulness of the new conception was explored and an interview (affect consciousness interview – self/other; ACI-S/O) intended to capture this new definition was validated. In study I the interrater reliability and the concurrent validity of the ACI-S/O were assessed and found to be acceptable. There were significant differences in all variables of ACI-S/O between the four groups that participated in the study. Joy and interest had the highest ratings in all groups and guilt and shame had the lowest. By means of a factor analysis, two factors, labeled “general affect consciousness” and “consciousness about shame and guilt,” were obtained. General affect consciousness was related to different aspects of relational and emotional problems and possibly protection against them. In study II the clinical implications of AC were further explored in relation to eating disorders (ED). The level of AC in the ED group was compared with a comparable non-clinical group. The relation between AC and aspects of ED pathology were explored, as well as whether AC should be seen as a state or trait in patients diagnosed with ED. ACI-S/O was not significantly related to ED pathology or general psychological distress. There were no significant differences in AC between the different sub-diagnoses of ED but there were between the ED group and the non-clinical group. Significant pre-post correlations for both factors of ACI-S/O were found, indicating that AC could be seen as a stable dimension that might be important for ED pathology but is unrelated to ED symptoms. In study III the relationship between AC and self-reported attachment style (ASQ) was explored in a non-clinical group and three patient groups. There were significant correlations between all scores on ACI- S/O and the ASQ, with the exception of consciousness about guilt. Multiple regression analyses showed that AC, and especially others’ affects, contributed significantly to the ASQ subscales. AC and in particular own joy and others’ guilt and anger seem to be of importance for attachment style. In study IV the importance of AC for the treatment process was explored. Patients’ AC before therapy was significantly correlated with patients’ positive feelings towards their therapists but not with their alliance ratings. Patients’ warm and positive feelings were related to pre-therapy AC, whereas negative feelings were related to low alliance ratings in the previous sessions. / Det är viktigt för människans relationer och välbefinnande att ha en förmåga att medvetet uppleva, uttrycka egna samt svara på andras affekter. I denna avhandling studerades användbarheten av en ny definition av Affektmedvetenhet (AM), omfattande medvetande om egna och andras affekter samt validiteten i en intervju (affektmedvetenhetsintervjun-själv/andra; AMI-S/A) som avser att fånga den nya definitionen. I studie I undersöktes interbedömarreliabilitet och den samtidiga validiteten hos AMI-S/A. De befanns vara godtagbara. Det fanns signifikanta skillnader på alla delsskalor i AMI-S/A mellan de fyra grupper som deltog i studien. Affekterna glädje och intresse hade de högsta skattningarna i alla grupper och skuld och skam hade de lägsta. En faktoranalys genomfördes där två faktorer föll ut. De beskrevs som "Generell affektmedvetenhet" och "Medvetenhet om skam och skuld". Generell affektmedvetenhet visade sig vara relaterad till olika aspekter av relationella och känslomässiga problem och antogs skydda mot dessa. I studie II genomfördes vidare undersökning av den kliniska betydelsen av AM för ätstörningar. Nivån av AM hos patienter med ätstörningar jämfördes med en demografiskt jämförbar icke-klinisk grupp. Förhållandet mellan AM och ätstörningspatologi undersöktes. Någon signifikant relation mellan AMI-S/A och ätstörningssymtom eller allmän psykisk ohälsa hos ätstörningspatienterna hittades inte. Det fanns heller inga signifikanta skillnader i AM mellan olika undergrupper av ätstörning men däremot mellan hela ätstörningsgruppen och den icke-kliniska gruppen. Frågan om AM kan betraktas mer som ett drag eller tillstånd hos patienter med ätstörning utforskades. Det fanns signifikanta korrelationer mellan före och eftermätning på båda faktorerna på AMI-S/A. Resultaten tyder på att AM kan ses som en stabil dimension i sig själv som tycks vara viktig för ätstörningar, men som inte har samband med ätstörningssymtom. I studie III undersöktes förhållandet mellan AM och självrapporterad anknytningsstil (ASQ) i en icke-klinisk grupp och tre patientgrupper. Det fanns signifikanta korrelationer mellan alla skattningar på AMI-S/A och ASQ, med undantag av medvetenhet om skuld. Regressionsanalyser visade att AM, och speciellt medvetenhet om andras affekter, bidrog signifikant till anknytningsstilen. AM och i synnerhet egen glädje och andras skuld och ilska verkar vara av betydelse för anknytningsstil. I studie IV undersöktes betydelse av AM för behandlingsprocessen i olika former av samtalsbehandling. Patienternas AM före behandlingen var signifikant korrelerad med deras positiva känslor gentemot sina terapeuter vid det tredje samtalet, men inte med deras alliansskattning vid detta samtal. Patienternas negativa känslor var inte relaterade till deras AM före behandlingen men däremot till låg alliansskattning vid de tidigare samtalen.

The thesis focuses on the irreducibility of the concept of a person to scientific view of the world. The main inspiration for thematising this specific aspect of folk dualism comes from Donald Davidson (two realms) and Wilfrid Sellars (two images). The theoretical sections are complemented by reflexion on results of empirical studies provided mostly by experimental philosophy in order to demonstrate how this approach benefits attempts to reach complex view of philosophical questions that have close connection to moral dimension of human life. The first chapter addresses a wider concept of self and introduces the idea of the necessity to bring the two conceptual realms on the scene: there is a specific conceptual realm (irreducible to physical realm or scientific image) enabling proper grasp of the concept of a person. The subsequent chapters address particular sub-concepts of the concept of self. The second chapter focuses on the concept of free will, and by referring to different views it points to the necessity to bring folk concepts into consideration. It concludes that the folk concept of free agent is transcendent with regard to scientific accounts and bears certain "supernatural" characteristics connected to the concept of conscious will. The third (and central) chapter brings focus on the...

This thesis presents an argument for the use of dialogic halaqah to develop the personal autonomy of young Muslims in twenty-first century Britain. It begins by developing a theoretical grounding for Islamic conceptualisations of personal autonomy and dialogic pedagogy. In doing so, it aims to generate dialogue between Islamic and ‘western’ educational traditions, and to clarify the theoretical foundation of halaqah, a traditional Islamic oral pedagogy, that has been adapted to meet the educational needs of Muslim children in contemporary Britain. Dialogic halaqah is daily practice in two independent British Muslim faith-schools, providing a safe space for young Muslims to cumulatively explore challenging issues, in order to facilitate the development of selfhood, hybrid identity and personal autonomy, theorised as shakhsiyah Islamiyah. This thesis examines the relationship between thought, language, and the development of personal autonomy in neo-Ghazalian, Vygotskian and Bakhtinian traditions, and suggests the possibility of understanding shakhsiyah Islamiyah as a dialogical Muslim-self. This theoretical work underpins an empirical study of data generated through dialogic halaqah held with groups of schoolchildren and young people. Using established analytic schemes, data from these sessions are subjected to both thematic and dialogue analyses. Emergent themes relating to autonomy and choice, independent and critical thinking, navigating authority, peer pressure, and choosing to be Muslim are explored. Themes related to halaqah as dialogic pedagogy, whether and how it supports the development of agency, resilience and independent thinking, and teacher and learner roles in halaqah, are examined. Moreover, findings from dialogue analysis, which evaluates the quality of educational dialogue generated within halaqah, that is, participants’ capacity to engage in dialogue with each other, as well as with an imagined secular other, are presented. The quality of the dialogic interactions is evaluated, as is evidence of individual participant’s autonomy in their communicative actions.

Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo / The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world

Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo / The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world