This thesis is a history of American and British efforts to halt or retard the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. It assesses US and UK non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan from the Indian nuclear test of May 1974 to the decline of anti-proliferation activity in 1979 and 1980. A broadly chronological analysis of key government and media sources from American and British archives highlights the development of non-proliferation policy and the factors that influenced anti-proliferation activity. Scrutiny of British-and not just American-involvement in Pakistan's nuclear programme permits an assessment of the existence of a 'non-proliferation special relationship' between Washington and London. This study demonstrates that successive British governments played a significant role in creating, shaping, and at times adversely affecting, non-proliferation activity on the sub-continent. Additionally, this thesis demonstrates that the UK frequently deprioritised non-proliferation concerns in favour of economic considerations, creating tension between London and Washington. Thus, it is shown that there was a close working relationship between the US and UK governments, but the relationship was riven with fissures. Alongside this examination of British policy, this study also examines American policy and attitudes, demonstrating that infighting and conflicts between strategic priorities impaired the effectiveness of American non-proliferation policy. Furthermore, this study offers a detailed examination of the cultural underpinnings of UK-US non-proliferation policy directed against Pakistan. It demonstrates that-contrary to popular and long-lasting media representations-the paradigm of an 'Islamic bomb' played no part in the creation and application of non-proliferation policy. This thesis makes it clear that in UK-US efforts to halt or retard Pakistani nuclear attainment, issues of credibility and global standing were far more significant than religious factors. Overall, this study examines a key moment in non-proliferation history and offers new findings on the Anglo-American relationship and the role of cultural factors in shaping foreign policy.

La crise des euromissiles trouve son origine en octobre 1977, lorsque le chancelier allemand Helmut Schmidt exprime son inquiétude face à l’aggravation du déséquilibre militaire en Europe, consécutive au déploiement des missiles soviétiques de moyenne portée SS-20. Plus précis que les systèmes qu’ils remplacent et dotés de têtes nucléaires multiples, les SS-20 pourraient neutraliser la mise en œuvre de l’escalade nucléaire de l’OTAN. Qui plus est, les armes de moyenne portée de l’organisation militaire intégrée versent dans un état d’obsolescence. La question qui se pose est de ce fait celle de savoir quelles sont les garanties sécuritaires que les Américains offrent à l’Europe, alors que la parité stratégique, bientôt consacrée par le traité SALT II, rend improbable l’engagement de la dissuasion centrale américaine en faveur du Vieux Continent. La montée de la menace soviétique et la méfiance européenne vis-à-vis de la protection militaire américaine sont alors les deux éléments au centre du débat atlantique qui caractérise la décennie 1977-1987 et qui se conclut par le traité de Washington, sanctionnant l’élimination de toutes les armes nucléaires soviétiques et américaines de moyenne portée d’Europe.Cette situation risque d’affecter la France pour deux raisons. Tout d’abord, l’aggravation du déséquilibre militaire engendré par les SS-20 confèrerait à Moscou un droit de véto sur toute évolution politique future du continent, que cela ait trait à la construction européenne ou à la résolution de la question allemande. Deux dossiers sur lesquels Paris n’accepte pas d’être marginalisé. Ensuite, la manifestation d’une méfiance européenne vis-à-vis de l’engagement américain en Europe semble amener certains alliés, la RFA au premier chef, à chercher un équilibre militaire propre au continent européen. Or, loin de garantir plus de sécurité, un équilibre « eurostratégique » n’aurait pour conséquence que d’éloigner la dissuasion américaine d’Europe ; en outre, il finirait par imposer des limitations aux forces nucléaires des puissances nucléaires tierces comme la France. Dès lors, la crise des euromissiles concerne la France dans la mesure où sa politique d’indépendance et sa politique de défense risquent d’être mises à mal par les évolutions du débat atlantique à propos de la sécurité de l’Europe, qui constitue l’environnement stratégique dans lequel Paris inscrit sa propre sécurité. / The origins of the Euromissile crisis date back to October 1977, when Helmut Schmidt publicly expressed his anxieties about the nuclear imbalance in Europe, following the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles. The new Soviet system was more accurate than its predecessors and equipped with three nuclear warheads. NATO’s aging nuclear medium-range missiles could not match the Soviet technology and NATO’s nuclear escalation strategy proved weakened. At a time when SALT II fixed a rough strategic nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, Europe wondered whether the American extended deterrence was still reliable. The increasing Soviet threat and the deepening European defiance vis-à-vis the American military protection were the two central elements of the Euromissile crisis, which lasted until 1987, when the Washington treaty sanctioned the elimination of all Soviet and American medium-range nuclear forces in Europe.The French concern about the Euromissile crisis was twofold. Firstly, Moscow might profit from its military superiority in Europe in order to extend its influence over the Western part of the continent. As a consequence, the Soviet Union might acquire a veto over any European political development, for example as regards the European integration process or the resolution of the German question, issues on which France was eager to play a major role. Secondly, the European distrust towards the American military protection could lead to the establishment of a “eurostrategic” balance, or a balance between the Soviet and the American nuclear weapons in Europe. This would definitely have weakened the value of the American extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, but also in due course included third country nuclear forces into the military European balance as a part of the Western military effort. In this case, France would be deprived of a major element of her defense policy. As a consequence, France got involved in the Euromissiles crisis to preserve her strategic environment from any Soviet European ambition and to defend her policy of national independence from any attempt to diminish her military force at a time of increased East-West confrontation.

Historiquement, les États-Unis ont, dans l’ensemble, accordé assez peu d’importance au Maghreb, les dirigeants américains considérant que celui-ci faisait partie de la zone d’influence de l’Europe, notamment de la France. La Seconde Guerre mondiale, la décolonisation dans les années 1950 et 1960 et, enfin, le conflit du Sahara occidental jusqu’aux années 1980 sont les périodes au cours desquelles la présence américaine dans cette région a été la plus active. Le Maghreb n’a pas été tenu à l’écart des enjeux et défis du monde dans les années 1990. Comment les Administrations Bush et Clinton se sont-elles comportées face à des régimes autoritaires, socialement fragilisés par un endettement endémique et incapables de construire un projet alternatif au plébiscite populaire dont jouissent les partis islamistes ? Parmi les déterminants internes de la politique étrangère américaine, quels sont les principaux acteurs liés au Maghreb ? Quels ont été les rôles du Congrès, des partis politiques, des diplomates, de la presse dans les positionnements américains face à la montée en puissance de l’islam en tant que force dans la région ? Existe-t-il des intérêts liés à des camps politiques et économiques américains au Maghreb ? Existe-t-il des courants antagonistes au sein du Congrès et de l’exécutif américains au sujet de la politique à mener dans cette région ? / In history, United States did not focus on North African issues. American leaders consider that this part of the world is under European influence, especially under French influence. The Second World War, decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s and the Western Sahara dispute in the 1980s are the periods during which American presence has been the most active. Yet, the Maghreb was not kept out the stakes and challenges facing the world in the 1990s. How did the Bush and Clinton Administrations consider the North African authoritarian regimes, socially weakened by endemic debts and unable to provide an alternative response to the popular call for Islamist parties ? In the making of American foreign policy, which actors are bound to the Maghreb region ? Which roles played the Congress, the media, the political parties as the Maghreb faced the booming of Islam as a political force ? Are there any interests of American parties or American political and economic clans in the Maghreb ? Are there any antagonist positions inside the Congress and the executive branch about the policy to conduct in the region ?

Dès janvier 1957, après la crise de Suez, Macmillan donna toute priorité à la refondation de la « relation spéciale » anglo-américaine ; en juin 1958, de Gaulle revint au pouvoir, avec l’ambition de pratiquer une politique étrangère fondée sur l’indépendance nationale vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis. La volonté gaullienne de faire émerger une autonomie européenne entra en opposition avec la politique de la Grande-Bretagne, visant à maximiser son influence globale au sein de l’Alliance atlantique. Le heurt entre ces deux orientations fondamentales, d’abord latent, déboucha sur un schisme politico-stratégique entre Paris et Londres, que de Gaulle choisit de proclamer publiquement le 14 janvier 1963 en refusant l’entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans la Communauté Economique Européenne et l’offre anglo-américaine de partenariat nucléaire. A la lumière des archives diplomatiques françaises et britanniques, cette thèse se concentre sur une question essentielle, mais jusqu’ici insuffisamment étudiée : le rôle qu’aura joué la relation franco-britannique et en particulier sa dimension politico-stratégique à une époque cruciale pour la constitution de l’architecture de sécurité euro-atlantique dans un monde dominé par la guerre froide. En croisant les perspectives européenne et transatlantique, cette étude montre le lien entre la construction politico-stratégique de l’Europe et les évolutions de l’OTAN et permet ainsi de mieux comprendre certaines tendances fondamentales de la politique étrangère de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne dans la longue durée, ces deux pays représentant depuis lors des positions extrêmes dans le débat opposant atlantistes et partisans de l’« Europe européenne ». / From January 1957 onwards, following the Suez crisis, Macmillan prioritised the rebuilding of the Anglo-American “Special Relationship”; in June 1958, de Gaulle returned to power, with the ambition to deliver a foreign policy grounded in the principle of French national independence from the United States. De Gaulle’s desire to promote a strategic European autonomy came into conflict with a British foreign policy designed to maximise British influence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. The fundamental clash between these two directions of travel, latent at first, resulted in a politico-strategic schism between Paris and London, which de Gaulle chose to expose publicly on January 14, 1963, by vetoing the British entry into the European Economic Community and turning down the Anglo-American offer of a nuclear partnership.Drawing on the French and British diplomatic archives, this thesis will examine a crucial question which, until now, has been insufficiently analysed: the role that Anglo-French relations played, especially their politico-strategic dimension, during a period which proved crucial for building the architecture of Euro-Atlantic security, in a world dominated by the Cold War. By bringing together European and transatlantic perspectives, this study demonstrates the links between the politico-strategic dimension of the European project and the development of NATO, and thus improves our understanding of fundamental long-term trends in British and French foreign policies, namely how, from that point on, Britain and France came to represent two antagonistic positions within the debate between Atlanticists and supporters of “European Europe”.

Drawing on methodologies from Performance Studies and Transnational American Studies, this dissertation is an historical analysis of the transatlantic relations of the American Indian radical sovereignty movement of the late Cold War. First the study recovers the transnational dimension of Native Americans as historical actors, and demonstrates that the American Indian radical sovereignty movement of the early 1970s posed a transnational challenge to the U.S. nation state. Next, arguing against the scholarly consensus, it shows that by the mid-1970s the American Indian radical sovereignty movement transformed itself into a transnational struggle with a transatlantic wing. Surveying the older transatlantic cultural representations of American Indians, this study finds that they both enabled and constrained an alliance between Native radical sovereignty activists and European solidarity groups in the 1970s and 1980s. This dissertation traces the history of American Indian access and participation in the United Nations, documents the transformation of Native concepts of Indian sovereignty, and analyzes the resulting alliances in the UN between American Indian organizations, Third World countries, national liberation movements, and Marxist régimes. Finally, this study documents how national governments such as the United States and the German Democratic Republic responded to the transatlantic sovereignty alliance from the middle of the 1970s through the end of the Cold War.

Despite historians describing the 1970s as a time of détente, both National Security Advisors that dominated America’s foreign policy pursued harsh stances against the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski sabotaged peace talks in order help the United States keep its edge against the other world superpower. Most historians point to the similarities between these two men, but what is most often left out of the narrative is that both men witnessed persecution at the hands of totalitarian governments: Kissinger by the Nazis and Brzezinski by both the Nazis and the Soviets. This influence is strong in their first works written at Harvard University, where they met Dr. Carl J. Friedrich and Hannah Arendt, both German émigrés. This paper will explore how European intellectuals, as well as their own European heritage, predisposed both Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski in their hawkish stances against the Soviet Union.

This thesis analyzes how Eisenhower defined war and its utility in his New Look defense policy and the ramifications for America’s interactions with the world through its foreign policy. It argues that Eisenhower redefined the relationship between war and society as he executed his grand strategy, further removing society from the decision for war. To avoid what he believed to be the inevitable global destruction of a general war turned nuclear, Eisenhower broadened the scope of ‘war” to balance domestic opinion for containing communism while also avoiding the devastating consequences of war in American society. By authorizing coups in Iran and Guatemala, Eisenhower blurred the line between coercive diplomacy and violent political warfare. President Eisenhower’s reliance on covert action to achieve political outcomes prevented general or nuclear war but it strengthened an emerging model for society’s relationship with war. Political warfare and covert action increased the gap between society and the commitment of American power during the Cold War. In his effort to prevent war, Eisenhower expanded presidential power and set a precedent that continues today.

Este trabalho analisa os relatos de viagem (publicados em forma de livro) de brasileiros que visitaram a União Soviética no momento da Guerra Fria. Enquanto que o pico de publicação de relatos de viagem de europeus e norte-americanos para a URSS é percebido no período entreguerras (1920-1930), o Brasil diferencia-se por apresentar um pico de publicações no período pós-2ª Guerra Mundial: entre os anos de 1951 a 1963, foram publicados 33 relatos de viagem escritos por 54 viajantes, sendo eles homens e mulheres dos mais diversos meios: políticos, operários, escritores, jornalistas, sindicalistas, médicos, juízes, professores, jovens militantes e até mesmo esposas descritas apenas como acompanhantes de seus maridos. Esse movimento de viagens é bastante peculiar, considerando que o Brasil esteve com as relações diplomáticas rompidas com a URSS entre 1947 e 1961. Para se trabalhar com um montante de relatos tão distinto e amplo, foi proposta uma tipologia que se sustenta no caráter político e ideológico das narrativas. Os autores foram divididos em quatro grupos: comunistas, simpatizantes, anticomunistas e de ideologia não definida. Os principais objetivos dessa pesquisa configuram-se em perceber os relatos de viagem como fontes/objetos de estudo complexos, que contribuem para a investigação de elementos materiais da viagem, mas devem ser também analisados como possibilidades de representações das sociedades soviética e brasileira, de acordo com o contexto ideológico e visão de mundo dos autores. Este trabalho contribui para um melhor entendimento dos movimentos internacionais de viagens à URSS, e visa inserir o fenômeno das viagens brasileiras no período da Guerra Fria em estudos que abordam os relatos de viagem políticos do século XX. / This paper analyzes Brazilians travel writings who visited the Soviet Union during the Cold War. While the peak of North-Americans and Europeans travel writings to the USSR was published in the late 1920s and 1930s, the peak of Brazilians travel writings was in the 1950s: between the years of 1951 and 1963, it was published 33 travel writings written by 54 travelers. Among them, there were men and women from diverse backgrounds: politicians, factory workers, journalists, writers, physicians, judges, educators, young people and even wives described only as companions of their husbands. This travel movement is quite peculiar, considering that there had been no diplomatic relations between Brazil and USSR since 1947. In order to work with a distinct amount of narratives, a typology based on the political and ideological character of the narratives is proposed. The authors and their narratives were divided in four groups: communists, sympathizers to the USSR, anticommunists and the non-defined ones. The main objectives of this work are to perceive travel writings as complex sources/objects of research, which can contribute to the investigation of the material elements of the travel, and also can be analyzed as possibilities of representations of Soviet and Brazilian societies, that can change according to the social and ideological context of their authors. This work is part of an international study movement about the travels to USSR, and aims to insert the phenomenon of Brazilians travels to the USSR in studies about political travel writings of the twentieth century.

<p>Adopting a socio-cultural approach to the study of cold war historiography, this master’s degree essay is a comparative study of the two main disciplinary fields of cold war scholarship, diplomatic history and international relations theory (IR). The study applies the theory of scientific development formulated by Thomas Kuhn and the concept of paradigm on the field of cold war research.</p><p>Diplomatic history and IR shows many similarities in their development, and in the importance different schools has had in scholarly debate. These different schools are analysed as paradigms, a concept that has been more willingly adopted within IR than in diplomatic history. The transition from what historian John Lewis Gaddis has termed Old Cold War History to New Cold War History is discussed in terms of paradigms and paradigm shift. What this shift has meant for historical cold war research is also addressed. With the starting point in conclusions by historian Anders Stephanson, the study also suggests that the predominating view of the cold war during the cold war can be analysed as a paradigm, effecting interpretations and theories about the conflict. As IR scholar Ted Hopf has suggested, the normal science during the cold war prevented IR research from correctly predicting the end of the cold war.</p><p>From a Kuhnian perspective, an interpretation of the difficulties in communication and scholarly interchange between diplomatic history and IR is offered. The study emphasizes the importance of political and social factors in the development of the different paradigms within the field, and concludes that the goal to become a paradigmatic science might not be attainable, or even desirable, for disciplines such as diplomatic history and IR.</p>

<p>Sverige befann sig i en tid där andra världskriget fortfarande var i färskt minne. Geografiskt ligger landet centralt placerad mellan två supermakter, och det råder en spänd stämning i det internationella säkerhetspolitiska läget. Det svenska luftrummet har en stor strategisk betydelse i en internationell kontext. Med förtroendeskapande löften om alliansfrihet och ett avskräckande initiativ i form en av världens starkaste flygvapen försöker Sverige hålla sig utanför eventuella väpnade konflikter. Alliansfrihet syftande till neutralitet i krig är den officiella säkerhetspolitiska ställning Sverige har haft i nästan 200 år, och inte minst under två världskrig. Detta arv försökte Sveriges politiker föra vidare för att skona svenska liv. Paradoxalt nog har Sverige som suveränt land gjort analysen att förstärkningar måste tillföras utifrån ifall landet blir invaderad av en motståndare. Det uppstår ett dilemma mellan att bibehålla alliansfrihet och ett beroende av väst. Denna uppsats är en komparativ litteraturstudie som tar sin utgångspunkt i en statlig utredning och oberoende forskare för att skapa ett underlag för att belysa den balansgång mellan alliansfrihet och de västorienterade flygoperativa förberedelserna. Uppsatsens frågeställningar är; Vad finns det för likheter och skillnader mellan forskarna och SOU 1994:11 i fråga om synsätt och slutsatser? Hur kan man uppfatta och tolka gränsområdet mellan flygoperativa förberedelser och alliansfrihet? Med hjälp av de teoretiska modellerna ”avskräckning och förtroendeskapande” samt ”integration och avskärmning” åskådliggörs den balansgång som Sverige använde sig av för att hålla vårt land utanför krig och väpnade konflikter.</p> / <p>Sweden found itself in an era when World War II was still fresh in memory. Geographically the country is centrally located between two superpowers, and there is a tense atmosphere in the international community. The Swedish air space has a high strategic importance. By using Neutrality and one of the world's strongest air force Sweden is trying to stay out of armed conflicts. To be neutral has been Sweden official political statement for almost 200 years, not least during two world wars. At the same time Sweden has made the analysis that reinforcements has to be acquired if the country finds itself being invaded. Sweden struggle with the dilemma between maintaining neutrality and a dependence on the West. This paper is a comparative literature study based on a government inquiry and independent researchers. This paper aims to illustrate how the gray area in this very complex security dilemma can be interpreted. The main questions are these: What are the similarities and differences between scientists and SOU 1994:11 in terms of their approach and conclusions? How can one understand and interpret the border area between the flight preparation and non-alignment? With the help of the theoretical models "deterrence and confidence-building measurements" and "integration and independent" this papers illustrates the balancing act that Sweden had to accomplish in order to stay out of conflicts in the Cold War.</p>