Recusal, or judicial disqualification, occurs when a judge abstains from a particular legal proceeding because of a personal conflict of interest. All levels of the judicial system and some administrative agencies in the United States apply the concept of recusal, but this study focuses on the United States Supreme Court. Title 28 of the United States Code provides standards (not obligatory by legal means) on when Supreme Court Justices should recuse themselves. But Supreme Court Justices are themselves the arbiters of their own recusal and often these substantive standards are not met. The method of study applied is theoretical, using both quantitative and qualitative data from past Supreme Court cases.

Recusal, or judicial disqualification, occurs when a judge abstains from a particular legal proceeding because of a personal conflict of interest. All levels of the judicial system and some administrative agencies in the United States apply the concept of recusal, but this study focuses on the United States Supreme Court. Title 28 of the United States Code provides standards (not obligatory by legal means) on when Supreme Court Justices should recuse themselves. But Supreme Court Justices are themselves the arbiters of their own recusal and often these substantive standards are not met. The method of study applied is theoretical, using both quantitative and qualitative data from past Supreme Court cases.

El objetivo del presente artículo es evidenciar el poco interés de las organizaciones para con la ética y la moral de las personas, así como la poca valoración de la ética empresarial al interior de las organizaciones con tal de cumplir sus objetivos empresariales. Está orientado a explorar las ideas principales de las teorías de la agencia, comparando las distintas teorías según su periodo, a través de conceptos y posturas de los diversos autores, que desde sus inicios ya empezaron a cuestionarse unos a otros porque no llegaron a tener una postura clara sobre las empresas. La teoría de la agencia se inicia con el pensamiento clásico, donde sus principales exponentes son: Frederick W. Taylor y Henry Fayol, este pensamiento da inicio a las otras teorías de la agencia. Por consiguiente, lo que buscamos es analizar las distintas posturas de los autores clásicos y autores modernos con la finalidad de evidenciar el gran cambio que tuvo las teorías desde su primer planteamiento. Asimismo, detallamos como en la actualidad surgen nuevas teorías enfocadas en mejorar la gestión de las empresas, y atender las necesidades de todas sus partes interesadas, no solo en la parte económica, si no también en lo ambiental, social y personal. / The objective of this article is to show the little interest of the organizations towards the ethics and morals of people, as well as the low value of business ethics within organizations in order to meet their business objectives. It is oriented to explore the main ideas of the theories of the agency, comparing the different theories according to their period, through the concepts and positions of the different authors, who from their beginnings already began to question each other because they did not have a Clear stance on companies. The theory of the agency begins with the classic thought, where its main exponents are: Frederick W. Taylor and Henry Fayol, this thought gives beginning to the other theories of the agency. Therefore, what we seek is to analyze the different positions of classical authors and modern authors in order to show the great change that had theories from its first approach. Likewise, we detail how new theories are currently emerging focused on improving the management of companies, and addressing the needs of all its stakeholders, not only in the economic part, but also in the environmental, social and personal aspects. / Trabajo de Suficiencia Profesional

In dieser Dissertation werden Strategien untersucht, mit denen sich Schimpansen, Bonobos und Kinder in Konfliktsituationen koordinieren. Sozial komplexe Tiere wie Menschen und Große Menschenaffen müssen ihr Verhalten regelmäßig untereinander koordinieren, um kooperative Ziele zu verwirklichen, die sie alleine nicht erreichen würden. Kollaboration, das heißt zusammenarbeiten für gemeinsame Ziele, stellt eine Lösung dar, wenn die Interessen der Individuen nicht im Widerspruch zueinander stehen. In manchen Situationen gehen allerdings Gelegenheiten zu kooperieren mit Gelegenheiten zu defektieren einher. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es wahrscheinlich, dass sowohl Große Menschenaffen als auch Menschen mit Interessenkonflikten konfrontiert sind, wenn sie entscheiden müssen, ob sie mit anderen Gruppenmitgliedern kooperieren. Wenn zum Beispiel eine Gruppe von Schimpansen eine Jagd beginnt, könnte es sein, dass manche Gruppenmitglieder es bevorzugen, zurückzubleiben und darauf zu warten, dass andere Schimpansen die Kosten der Jagd tragen. Indem wir Schimpansen, Bonobos und fünfjährige Kinder jeweils paarweise mit Interessenkonflikten konfrontieren, können wir die Strategien untersuchen, die diese Arten benutzen, um ihr Verhalten in Konfliktsituationen miteinander zu koordinieren und den Konflikt zu überwinden. Durch diesen Artvergleich gewinnen wir Einblicke in die Evolution der menschlichen Kooperation. Im ersten Kapitel der Dissertation präsentiere ich eine Studie, in der ich Schimpansen paarweise mit einer Konfliktsituation konfrontiert habe, die dem so genannten “Snowdrift Game“ entspricht (Studie 1). Dieses Modell aus der Spieltheorie wird dazu benutzt, zu untersuchen, ob Individuen miteinander kooperieren, wenn ihre Interessen miteinander im Konflikt stehen. In diesem Spiel können die zwei Spieler entweder kooperieren oder von der Arbeit des anderen profitieren, ohne selbst etwas beizutragen. Beiderseitige Kooperation wird höher belohnt als beiderseitiges Defektieren. Jedoch ist ein Kernelement dieses Spiels, dass es besser ist zu defektieren, wenn der Partner kooperiert, und zu kooperieren, wenn der Partner defektiert. Mit anderen Worten, es ist besser, das Gegenteil von dem zu tun, was der Partner macht. Um auf das Beispiel der Jagd bei den Schimpansen zurückzukommen: Wenn ein Gruppenmitglied die Jagd startet, können die anderen davon profitieren, ohne selbst aktiv teilzunehmen und die Kosten zu tragen. Wenn jedoch niemand die Jagd startet, hat niemand eine Chance an die Beute zu kommen. Das Dilemma in dieser Situation besteht für die Individuen darin, ob sie die Jagd starten sollen oder nicht, angenommen, dass alle verlieren, wenn niemand die Jagd einleitet. Um die Anreizstruktur dieses Spiels nachzubilden, habe ich Schimpansen paarweise mit einer beschwerten Plattform konfrontiert, auf der sich Belohnungen für beide Individuen befanden. Die Schimpansen mussten entscheiden, ob sie kollaborieren (das heißt, die Plattform zusammen heranziehen und die Kosten teilen) oder alleine ziehen und die Kosten für die Kooperation alleine tragen. Die Schimpansen hatten eine begrenzte Zeit zur Verfügung, um ihre Entscheidungen zu treffen, bevor ihre Belohnungen verschwanden. Wenn die Kosten für die Kooperation hoch waren, war es die beste Strategie für ein Individuum zu warten, bis der Partner zog und dann die Belohnung zu erhalten, was eine Maximierung der Vorteile bei einer gleichzeitigen Minimierung der Kosten darstellte. Die Leistung der Schimpansen bei hohen Kooperationskosten wurde mit ihrer Leistung in einer Bedingung mit wenig Gewicht verglichen, in der die Kooperationskosten minimal waren. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass Schimpansen erfolgreich ihr Verhalten miteinander koordinierten, um den Konflikt zu beseitigen, und dabei in den meisten Fällen die Belohnungen erhielten. Überraschenderweise kollaborierten Schimpansen häufiger, wenn die Kosten hoch waren, obwohl sie defektieren hätten können. Sie haben allerdings nicht nur kollaboriert, um die Belohnungen zu erhalten, sondern sie zeigten auch klare Anzeichen von strategischen Entscheidungen zur Kostenreduktion. Bei hohen Kosten warteten die Schimpansen länger, bevor sie am Seil zogen, was die Wahrscheinlichkeit reduzierte, alle Kosten alleine zu tragen. Bei einer genaueren Betrachtung der Kollaboration innerhalb der Paare zeigte sich, dass die Individuen ungleich viel Arbeit zum Ergebnis beitrugen. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass sie versucht haben, die Kosten zu reduzieren. Alles in allem weisen diese Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass Schimpansen dazu fähig sind, zwischen erfolgreicher Koordination (innerhalb eines Zeitlimits) und einer Beschränkung der eigenen Kosten auf ein Minimum abzuwägen. Im zweiten Kapitel der Dissertation präsentiere ich eine Studie, in der ich Bonobos und Schimpansen (Studie 2a) und Kinder (Studie 2b) jeweils paarweise mit einer zweiten Version des „Snowdrift Game“ konfrontiert habe. Im Gegensatz zu der vorherigen Version konnten die Individuen in dieser Version des Spiels nicht innerhalb der einzelnen Durchgänge kollaborieren. Jedoch konnten sie andere Strategien anwenden, um den Konflikt im Verlauf der Studie aufzulösen (zum Beispiel sich abwechseln über die Durchgänge hinweg). Ich habe die drei Arten mit einer rotierenden Plattform konfrontiert, die mit einer ungleichmäßigen Belohnungsstruktur versehen war. Zwei lösbare Seile waren an den beiden inneren Enden der Plattform befestigt. Die Seile verliefen gegenläufig zueinander und jeweils eins führte in die Räume der zwei Testteilnehmer. Jedes Individuum konnte an seinem Seil ziehen, um das innere Ende der Plattform in seine Richtung zu drehen, während gleichzeitig das äußere Ende der Plattform sich zum Partner bewegte. Wenn hingegen beide Individuen zur gleichen Zeit zogen, konnten sich die Seile von der Plattform lösen, so dass keiner einen Zugang zu den Belohnungen erhielt. In der „Snowdrift“-Bedingung war die bevorzugte Belohnung auf dem äußeren Ende positioniert. Sie konnte nur erreicht werden, wenn man darauf wartete, dass der Partner vor einem am Seil zog. Im Gegensatz dazu war die bevorzugte Belohnung in der kompetitiven Bedingung auf dem inneren Ende gelegen. In dieser zweiten Bedingung war es besser, vor dem Partner zu ziehen. Wie in der vorangegangenen Studie gab es für die Affen und Kinder ein Zeitlimit, in dem sie eine Entscheidung treffen mussten. Das Hauptziel dieser Studie war es, zu untersuchen, ob sich die Individuen in dieser Version des Spiels strategisch verhalten würden, das heißt, ob sie in der „Snowdrift“-Bedingung länger warten würden als in der kompetitiven Bedingung. Ein weiteres Ziel dieser Studie lag darin, die Strategien zu vergleichen, die die drei Arten zur Konfliktbewältigung anwendeten, und zu untersuchen, inwieweit Kommunikation eine bedeutsame Rolle in ihrem Vorgehen spielte. Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigten, dass die drei Arten sich jeweils erfolgreich koordinierten und die Belohnungen in den meisten Fällen erhielten. In der kritischen Bedingung haben alle drei Arten länger mit dem Ziehen gewartet, was auf generelles Verständnis der Aufgabe hinweist. Eine Analyse ihrer Zieh-Strategien zeigt, dass Kinder über die Sitzungen hinweg gelernt haben länger zu warten, obwohl sie in den meisten Durchgängen letztlich gezogen haben. Im Gegensatz dazu neigten die Großen Menschenaffen dazu, eine Strategie anzuwenden, bei der nur ein Individuum die meiste Zeit über zog, sowohl bei der „Snowdrift“-Bedingung als auch bei der kompetitiven Bedingung. Jedoch wendeten nicht alle Menschenaffen diese Strategie an; einige Individuen verhielten sich klar strategisch und zogen signifikant häufiger in der kompetitiven als in der „Snowdrift“-Bedingung. Bei der Untersuchung der Frage, ob Affen und Kinder kommunikative Akte verwendeten, um die Koordination zu erleichtern, zeigte sich, dass nur die Kinder während der Aufgabe kommunizierten. Sie benutzten spezifische Arten verbaler Kommunikation, um die Entscheidung des Partners zu ihren eigenen Gunsten zu beeinflussen. Aufgrund der Strategien, die einige Große Menschenaffen im ersten Teil der Studie zeigten, habe ich einen Folgetest entwickelt, um die Entscheidungsstrategien von Schimpansen und Bonobos detaillierter zu untersuchen (Studie 3). Zu diesem Zweck habe ich die Tiere mit derselben rotierenden Plattform konfrontiert, die im ersten Teil der Studie verwendet wurde (die soziale Option), mit dem Zusatz einer sicheren Belohnung für die beiden Tiere (die nicht-soziale Option). Individuen konnten in diesem neuen Zusammenhang entscheiden, ob sie an dem sozialen Dilemma teilnehmen wollen oder ob sie die nicht-soziale Option wählen. Es war nun nicht mehr möglich, inaktiv zu bleiben. Ein wichtiger Punkt ist, dass die Menge der Belohnungen in der nicht-sozialen Option über die Sitzungen hinweg variierte. Meiner Hypothese nach würde das Hinzufügen der nicht-sozialen Option den Tieren erlauben, die Risiken besser einzuschätzen und strategisch zu wählen, nämlich abhängig von der Verteilung der Belohnungen und der voraussichtlichen Wahl des Partners. Durch meinen direkten Vergleich von Schimpansen und Bonobos konnte ich untersuchen, wie empfindsam die beiden Arten gegenüber einem sozialen Risiko sind in einer Situation, in der dieses Risiko durch das Wählen der nicht-sozialen Option umgangen werden konnte. Schließlich habe ich erforscht, ob Individuen das vorangegangene Verhalten ihres Partners zu ihrem eigenen Vorteil nutzen würden, um ihre Belohnungen zu maximieren. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie zeigten, dass beide Menschenaffenarten sich koordiniert haben, um in den meisten Durchgängen an die Belohnungen zu kommen, und dass sie sich strategisch verhalten haben. Die Latenzzeiten, um an die Belohnungen zu kommen, verringerten sich, wenn die Menge der Belohnungen in der nicht-sozialen Option erhöht wurde. Bei der Wahl der sozialen Option warteten die Affen in der kritischen Bedingung immer noch länger, denn die bevorzugte Belohnung konnte nur erlangt werden, wenn der Partner vor einem zog. Beide Menschenaffenarten wählten die nicht-soziale Option häufiger, wenn sich das Verhältnis der Belohnungen in der nicht-sozialen und der sozialen Option zu Gunsten der nicht-sozialen Option erhöhte. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass Schimpansen und Bonobos keinen signifikanten Unterschied bezüglich ihrer Empfindsamkeit für soziales Risiko aufweisen. Abschließend habe ich herausgefunden, dass Große Menschenaffen ihre Entscheidungen so anpassen, dass sie die Belohnungen maximieren, indem sie kompetitiven Situationen ausweichen und mögliche Entscheidungen des Partners vorhersehen. Im letzten Kapitel der Dissertation präsentiere ich eine Studie, in der ich Schimpansen (Studie 4a) und Kinder (Studie 4b) jeweils paarweise mit einer Situation konfrontiert habe, die einem Gefangenen-Dilemma („Prisoners‘ Dilemma“) entspricht. Im Gegensatz zum „Snowdrift Game“ gelangt der Kooperierende beim Gefangenen-Dilemma bei einseitiger Kooperation zum schlechtesten Ergebnis; Individuen profitieren nicht von ihrem einseitigen Handeln. Um das Gefangenen-Dilemma abzubilden, habe ich die Paare mit einer vertikal beweglichen Plattform konfrontiert, die an den Enden mit Belohnungen versehen wurde. Jeder Teilnehmer konnte an einem Seil ziehen, das mit einer Seite der Plattform verbunden war. In der Gefangenen-Dilemma-Bedingung mussten die Teilnehmer warten, bis der Partner kooperiert (das heißt, an dem Seil zieht), um an die bevorzugte Belohnung zu kommen. Im Gegensatz dazu konnten die Belohnungen in der kompetitiven Bedingung nur erreicht werden, wenn man vor seinem Partner zog. Diese Bedingung diente als Kontrolle. Zudem konnten die beiden Individuen in beiden Bedingungen kollaborieren (das heißt, an den beiden Seilen zur gleichen Zeit ziehen) und ihre Belohnungen teilen. Wie bereits in den vorangegangenen Studien hatten die Individuen ein Zeitlimit, um an die Belohnungen auf der Plattform zu gelangen. Das Hauptziel dieser vergleichenden Studie war es, zu untersuchen, ob Schimpansen und Kinder sich strategisch verhalten würden, um den präsentierten Konflikt zu überwinden. Meiner Hypothese nach würden sich Individuen in diesem Kontext strategischer verhalten als in einer „Snowdrift“-Situation, weil einseitige Kooperation in diesem Fall zu keiner Belohnung für den Kooperierenden führte. Ein zweites Ziel der Studie war es, die Strategien zu erforschen, die Individuen zur Konfliktüberwindung benutzen, wenn eine Kollaboration möglich ist. Bei den Kindern war ich zudem an der Rolle interessiert, die Kommunikation bei der Aufrechterhaltung einer erfolgreichen Koordination in diesem Gefangenen-Dilemma-Szenario einnimmt. Die Befunde dieser vergleichenden Studie wiesen darauf hin, dass sich beide Arten substanziell voneinander darin unterschieden, welche Strategien sie zur Lösung der Aufgabe wählten. Schimpansen lernten sich über den Verlauf der Studie strategischer zu verhalten; in der kompetitiven Bedingung zogen sie sehr schnell im Vergleich zu der Gefangenen-Dilemma-Bedingung, in der ihre Latenzzeiten sich erhöhten. Doch letztlich zogen die Schimpansen auch in dieser Bedingung. Eine mögliche Erklärung für dieses hohe Maß an Kooperation könnte sein, dass die Schimpansen versucht haben, ihren Partner zum Ziehen zu verleiten. Dies verwandelte die Gefangenen-Dilemma-Durchgänge in kompetitive Durchgänge, wodurch die Wahrscheinlichkeit für die Schimpansen erhöht wurde, an die Belohnungen zu kommen. Kinder entwickelten eine effizientere Strategie, die darin bestand, sich abzuwechseln, um die Belohnungen alternierend zu erhalten. Interessanterweise haben sie diese Strategie in beiden Bedingungen angewandt. Diesem Befund entsprechend wurden sie schneller im Verlauf der Studie; sobald die Strategie sich abzuwechseln einmal etabliert war, haben sie weniger lange auf die Entscheidung des Partners gewartet. Schließlich habe ich herausgefunden, dass Kinder spezifische Kommunikationsarten benutzt haben, um sich mit ihren Partnern zu koordinieren. Durch diese strategische Kommunikation konnten sie ein hohes Maß an Kooperation in beiden Bedingungen aufrechterhalten. Durch die Verwendung des “Snowdrift”- und des Gefangenen-Dilemma-Modells konnten wir unser Verständnis bezüglich der Fähigkeiten von Schimpansen, Bonobos und Kindern vertiefen, sich in Situationen zu koordinieren, in denen Interessenkonflikte bestehen. Die Ergebnisse meiner Studien haben gezeigt, dass diese drei Arten verschiedene Konfliktsituationen erfolgreich lösen konnten, besonders, wenn ihr eigenes Handeln zu einem direkten Vorteil für sie führte. Zudem unterstützen die Ergebnisse die Annahme, dass Kinder einzigartige kognitive Fähigkeiten zur Koordination besitzen, was es ihnen erlaubt, effizientere Strategien zu entwickeln, um Konfliktsituationen zu bewältigen.:TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Theoretical background 2 Unilateral cooperation 3 Mutualistic collaboration 5 Conflicts of interest 6 1.2 Human cooperation in conflict situations 8 1.3 Great apes coordination in conflict situations 11 Field experiments 11 Experimental research 14 1.4 Models of cooperation and conflict 17 The Snowdrift game 19 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 21 1.5 Focus of the dissertation 23 Chapter 1 23 Chapter 2 23 Chapter 3 24 2 CHIMPANZEES COORDINATE IN A SNOWDRIFT TASK 27 2.1 Introduction 27 2.2 Material and Methods 30 Subjects 30 Material 30 Procedure 31 2.3 Results 34 2.4 General Discussion 37 3 CHIMPANZEES, BONOBOS AND CHILDREN SUCCESFULLY COORDINATE IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS 43 3.1 Introduction 43 3.2 Material and Methods: Study 2a 45 Subjects 45 Materials 45 Procedure 46 3.3 Results 49 Discussion 50 3.4 Material and Methods: Study 2b 50 Subjects 50 Materials 51 Procedure 52 3.5 Results 54 Discussion 56 3.6 Material and Methods: Study 3 57 Subjects 57 Materials 57 Procedure 58 3.7 Results 63 Discussion 66 3.8 General Discussion 67 4 CHIMPANZEES AND CHILDREN COOPERATE IN A PRISONER’S DILEMMA 71 4.1 Introduction 71 4.2 Material and Methods: Study 4a 74 Subjects 74 Materials 74 Procedure 76 4.3 Results 79 Discussion 82 4.4 Material and Methods: Study 4b 82 Subjects 82 Materials 82 Procedure 83 4.5 Results 86 Discussion 89 4.6 General Discussion 90 5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 95 5.1 Great ape coordination under conflict 95 Discussion of the findings 96 Findings in the context of apes’ experimental studies 99 Findings in the context of apes’ field observations 101 Findings in the context of animal cooperation 102 Methodological considerations 103 5.2 Children’s coordination under conflict 104 Discussion of the findings 105 Findings in the context of human cooperation 107 Insights into the evolution of human cooperation 108 5.3 Conclusion 109 REFERENCES 111 APPENDICES 125 Chapter 1 Study 1 126 Chapter 2 Studies 2a and 2b 134 Chapter 2 Study 3 141 Chapter 3 Studies 4a and 4b 149 BIBLIOGRAPHISCHE DARSTELLUNG 158 SUMMARY 159 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 163 CURRICULUM VITAE 168 SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 169 ERKLÄRUNG GEMÄß §8(2) DER PROMOTIONSORDNUNG 171 / This dissertation investigates the strategies that chimpanzees, bonobos and children use to coordinate in situations of conflict. Socially complex animals such as humans and great apes regularly need to coordinate their actions to achieve cooperative goals not attainable individually. Collaboration, acting together for mutual goals, is a solution when individuals’ interests do not compete. However, in some situations, opportunities to cooperate come together with opportunities to defect. In that context, great apes and humans are likely to face conflicts of interest when they need to decide whether or not to cooperate with other group members. For instance, when chimpanzees initiate hunts in groups, some members may prefer to lag behind and wait for other chimpanzees to pay the costs related to the hunt. By presenting pairs of chimpanzees, bonobos and 5-year old children with situations of conflicting interests we can explore the strategies that these species use to coordinate their actions to overcome those conflicts in an attempt to shed light on the evolution of human cooperation. In the first chapter of this thesis, I present pairs of chimpanzees with a conflict situation in the form of a Snowdrift game, a game theoretical model used to explore whether individuals cooperate when their interests compete (Study 1). In this game, both players can either cooperate or free-ride. Mutual cooperation results in a better reward than mutual defection. However, the key feature of this game is that it is better to defect if your partner cooperates, but better to cooperate if your partner defects; in other words, it is better to do the opposite of your partner. Returning to the example of chimpanzee hunting, if a group member starts a hunt, others can benefit without actively participating and incurring the costs. However, if no one starts the hunt, they all lose the chance to get the prey. The dilemma faced by individuals in such situations is thus whether to initiate the action or not, given that if no one initiates, everyone loses out. To recreate the payoff structure of this game I presented pairs of chimpanzees with a weighted tray containing rewards for both individuals. Subjects needed to decide whether to collaborate (i.e. pull the tray together and share the costs) or pull alone and unilaterally pay the burden of cooperation. Chimpanzees had a limited amount of time to make their decisions before the rewards disappeared. The best strategy for an individual was to wait for a partner to pull and obtain the rewards when cooperative costs were high; maximizing benefits while reducing costs. Chimpanzees’ performance when cooperative costs were high was compared to their performance in a low weight condition in which the costs to cooperate were minimum. The findings showed that chimpanzees successfully coordinated their actions to overcome the conflict, obtaining the rewards the majority of times. Surprisingly, chimpanzees collaborated more often when the costs were high even though they had the opportunity to defect. However, they did not just collaborate to obtain the rewards; they showed clear signs of strategic decision-making to reduce costs. When costs were high, chimpanzees waited longer to pull, reducing the likelihood of incurring all the costs unilaterally. Moreover, when I investigated in more detail how they collaborated, I found that pairs of chimpanzees contributed unequal efforts, suggesting that they tried to minimize costs. In all, these results suggest that chimpanzees were able to manage the trade-off between successful coordination (within the time limits) and minimizing costs. In the second chapter of the dissertation I presented pairs of bonobos and chimpanzees (Study 2a), and children (Study 2b) with a second version of the Snowdrift game. In this version of the game, in contrast to the previous one, subjects could not collaborate within trials but they could use other strategies to overcome the conflict over the course of the study (e.g. taking-turns over trials). I presented the three species with a rotatory tray baited with an unequal reward distribution. Two detachable ropes were connected to the interior end of the tray. The ropes were oriented in opposite directions and each fed into one subjects’ room. Each individual could pull from their rope and move the interior end of the tray towards him while the exterior end moved towards the partner. Yet, if both individuals pulled at the same time, the ropes could detach from the tray, preventing individuals from accessing the rewards. In the Snowdrift condition, the preferred reward distribution was baited on the interior end and it could only be obtained by waiting for the partner to pull. In contrast, in a competitive condition, the reward distribution was changed (the best rewards were baited on the interior). In this second condition, the best strategy was to pull before the partner. As in the previous task, apes and children had a limited amount of time to decide on their actions. The main aim of this study was to explore whether individuals would behave strategically in this version of the game; waiting longer in the Snowdrift condition compared to the competitive one. Moreover, another aim of the study was to compare the strategies that each of the three species used to solve the conflict situation and to explore whether communication played a significant role in their performance. The results of the study showed that the three species successfully coordinated to obtain the rewards most of times. In the critical condition, all three species waited longer to pull, showing a general understanding of the task. An analysis of their pulling strategies revealed that children learned to wait longer to pull across sessions, although they ended up pulling in most trials. In contrast, great apes were more likely to employ a strategy that consisted of only one individual pulling the majority of times in both the Snowdrift and the competitive condition. Yet, not all great apes employed this strategy: some individuals behaved clearly strategically, pulling significantly more often during competitive than Snowdrift trials. With regard to whether apes and children used communicative acts to facilitate their coordination, I found that children but not apes communicated during the task. They used specific types of verbal communication to influence their partners’ decisions for their own benefit. Due to the strategies shown by some great apes in the first part of the study, I developed a follow-up to test chimpanzees’ and bonobos’ decision-making strategies in more detail (Study 3). For this purpose, I presented the same rotating tray that was used in the first part of the study (the social option) with the addition of an alternative secure reward for each subject (the non-social option). In this new context, individuals could decide whether to participate in the social dilemma or access the non-social option; inaction was no longer possible. Importantly, the quantity of the rewards presented in the non-social option varied between sessions. I hypothesized that the addition of the non-social option would allow subjects to better manage the risks and chose strategically depending on the reward distribution presented and the partners’ likely decisions. Moreover, by comparing chimpanzees and bonobos, I explored species’ sensitivity to social risk in a context in which those risks could be avoided by accessing the non-social option. Finally, I investigated whether individuals would take advantage of their partners’ previous actions to maximize their rewards. The results of this study showed that both great ape species coordinated to obtain the rewards in the majority of trials and behaved strategically during the task. Apes’ latencies to retrieve the rewards decreased as the quantity in the non-social option increased. Moreover, once they had chosen the social option, apes still waited longer in the critical condition, when the preferred reward could only be obtained if the partner had previously acted. Both ape species increased their choices towards the non-social option as the proportion of the rewards in the non-social option increased compared to the social option. This finding suggests that there were no significant differences between chimpanzees and bonobos in their sensitivity towards social risks. Finally, I found that great apes adjusted their choices to maximize their rewards while avoiding competitive situations and anticipating partners’ likely decisions. In the last chapter of the dissertation I presented pairs of chimpanzees (Study 4a) and children (Study 4b) with a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. In contrast to the Snowdrift game, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma unilateral cooperation is the worst outcome for cooperators; individuals do not benefit from their unilateral actions. To recreate the Prisoner’s Dilemma I presented pairs of chimpanzees and children with a rectangular elevator baited with rewards at its ends. Each subject could pull from a rope connected to one side of the apparatus. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma condition subjects had to wait for their partners to cooperate (i.e. pull from the rope) in order to obtain the best rewards. In contrast, in a competitive condition that served as a control all the rewards could only be accessed by pulling before the partner. Moreover, in both conditions individuals could collaborate (i.e. pulling their ropes at the same time) and divide the rewards. As in previous studies, individuals had a limited amount of time to operate the apparatus and obtain the rewards. The main aim of this comparative study was to explore whether chimpanzees and children would behave strategically in their attempts to overcome the conflict presented. I hypothesized that, because unilateral cooperation yielded no rewards for cooperators, individuals would behave more strategically in this context compared to a Snowdrift in which cooperation was always rewarded. A secondary aim of the study was to explore the strategies that individuals would use to overcome the conflict when collaboration was possible. Finally, in the case of children I was interested in the role of communication to maintain successful coordination in a Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario. The findings of this comparative work indicate that both species substantially differed in their strategies to solve the task. Chimpanzees learned to behave more strategically over the study period; in the competitive condition they pulled very quickly compared to the Prisoner´s Dilemma condition in which they increased their latencies. However, chimpanzees ultimately pulled in that condition. One possible explanation for these high levels of cooperation could be that chimpanzees tried to entice their partners to pull. This transformed Prisoner’s Dilemma trials into competitive trials, thereby increasing their likelihood to obtain the rewards. Children developed a more efficient strategy that consisted of taking turns to reciprocate their rewards. Interestingly, they used this strategy in both conditions. In line with this finding, they became faster across the study period; once the turn-taking strategy was established, they waited less for their partner’s decisions. Finally, I found that children used specific types of communication to coordinate with their partners and maintain high levels of cooperation in both conditions, a reflection of their turn-taking strategy. By adapting the Snowdrift and the Prisoner’s Dilemma models, we have advanced our understanding of chimpanzees’, bonobos’ and children’s capacities to coordinate in situations of conflicting interests. The results of my studies have demonstrated that the three species were successful at solving different situations of conflict, showing some similarities in the ways they coordinated their actions, especially when their own actions resulted in direct benefits. At the same time, the findings support the idea that children possess uniquely cognitive abilities to coordinate, allowing them to develop more efficient strategies to overcome situations of conflict.:TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Theoretical background 2 Unilateral cooperation 3 Mutualistic collaboration 5 Conflicts of interest 6 1.2 Human cooperation in conflict situations 8 1.3 Great apes coordination in conflict situations 11 Field experiments 11 Experimental research 14 1.4 Models of cooperation and conflict 17 The Snowdrift game 19 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 21 1.5 Focus of the dissertation 23 Chapter 1 23 Chapter 2 23 Chapter 3 24 2 CHIMPANZEES COORDINATE IN A SNOWDRIFT TASK 27 2.1 Introduction 27 2.2 Material and Methods 30 Subjects 30 Material 30 Procedure 31 2.3 Results 34 2.4 General Discussion 37 3 CHIMPANZEES, BONOBOS AND CHILDREN SUCCESFULLY COORDINATE IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS 43 3.1 Introduction 43 3.2 Material and Methods: Study 2a 45 Subjects 45 Materials 45 Procedure 46 3.3 Results 49 Discussion 50 3.4 Material and Methods: Study 2b 50 Subjects 50 Materials 51 Procedure 52 3.5 Results 54 Discussion 56 3.6 Material and Methods: Study 3 57 Subjects 57 Materials 57 Procedure 58 3.7 Results 63 Discussion 66 3.8 General Discussion 67 4 CHIMPANZEES AND CHILDREN COOPERATE IN A PRISONER’S DILEMMA 71 4.1 Introduction 71 4.2 Material and Methods: Study 4a 74 Subjects 74 Materials 74 Procedure 76 4.3 Results 79 Discussion 82 4.4 Material and Methods: Study 4b 82 Subjects 82 Materials 82 Procedure 83 4.5 Results 86 Discussion 89 4.6 General Discussion 90 5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 95 5.1 Great ape coordination under conflict 95 Discussion of the findings 96 Findings in the context of apes’ experimental studies 99 Findings in the context of apes’ field observations 101 Findings in the context of animal cooperation 102 Methodological considerations 103 5.2 Children’s coordination under conflict 104 Discussion of the findings 105 Findings in the context of human cooperation 107 Insights into the evolution of human cooperation 108 5.3 Conclusion 109 REFERENCES 111 APPENDICES 125 Chapter 1 Study 1 126 Chapter 2 Studies 2a and 2b 134 Chapter 2 Study 3 141 Chapter 3 Studies 4a and 4b 149 BIBLIOGRAPHISCHE DARSTELLUNG 158 SUMMARY 159 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 163 CURRICULUM VITAE 168 SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 169 ERKLÄRUNG GEMÄß §8(2) DER PROMOTIONSORDNUNG 171

The Swedish sport movement is built on voluntary engagement and strong autonomy, and is Sweden's largest popular movement. To help finance sports, the government annually provides state financial support. The idea of the support is to promote sport for the entire swedish population, trusting the Swedish sport movement to manage the course of action. The financial support is important to enable Swedish sport to maintain its independence. Research has shown that the government and otherexternal financiers lately has grown an increased interest to involve and affect Swedish sport, using financial means to do so. Researchers fear that this will challenge the autonomy of the Swedish sportmovement. Leading to the purpose of this study, to see on a grassroot level how sport organisations witness this conflict of interest between external financiers and thus the effect on the Swedish sport movements autonomy. To answer this, the study is based on (qualitative) interviews made with 7 sportclubs within the municipality of Umeå. Results show that all interviewed sport clubs experience positive use of using external financiation. However these sport clubs do not seem to characterize the effects just as problematic as former research suggests. On the contrary, the sport clubs declare themselves as free to structure their activities without disturbing involvement from external financiers. Where the organizational governance is stronger than the systemic. A final conclusion is that smaller sport clubs in Umeå do not experience this conflict of interest between external financiers and their own activities. They feel free to plan their activities based on the clubs internal driving forces, where external finances rather creates opportunities for the clubs to grow.

Privata kreditvärderingsinstitut publicerar, i egenskap av en oberoende tredje part, kreditbetyg som är ämnade att motarbeta informationsasymmetrier mellan investerare och emittent. På grund av issuer-pays modellen, den oligopolistiska strukturen av kreditvärderingsmarknaden samt kreditvärderingsinstitutens vinstdrivande affärsmodell hotas värderarens oberoende ställning och kapacitet att utföra och publicera de mest högkvalitativa, träffsäkra analyser. Detta arbete sammanställer befintliga studier kring ämnet samtidigt som den bidrar genom att utforska eventuella förslag att åtgärda de befintliga problemen i dagens system genom att antingen endast låta kreditvärdering att utföras av offentliga sektorn eller att tillgodose en övervakande myndighet uppdrag att betygsätta kreditvärderingsinstitutens kvalité. Betygsättning av kreditvärderingsinstitutens insatser kan komma att motverka förekomsten av rating catering, medan ett förbud mot privata kreditvärderingsinstitut skulle eliminera konkurrens som bidragande faktor till intressekonflikter och ratinginflation. Däremot medför båda förbättringsförslag egna risker och genomförbarheten av förslagen är ett stort frågetecken som måste studeras i större omfattning. / Credit rating agencies, operating as an independent third-party, publish credit ratings with the objective of counteracting information asymmetry between investor and investee. Due to the issuer-pays model, the oligopolistic structure of the credit rating market and the credit rating agencies’ profit-seeking business strategy, the independent nature of the credit rating agency is threatened. This paper deems to compile current theory on this topic while also furthering the discussion by proposing the examination of two alternative solutions: only allowing for credit rating to be carried out by the public sector, or giving a overseeing entity the assignment of publishing grades which distinguish between different agencies by way of credit rating quality. Grading credit rating agencies could likely hinder the presence of rating catering, meanwhile banning private credit rating agencies completely in favor of public sector alternatives eliminates the conflict of interest and rating inflation that originates from the presence of competition in this market. Both suggested solutions bear with them risks of their own, while also requiring further studies into the feasibility of the aforementioned suggestions in the current market.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente tese tem por objetivo tratar do conflito de interesses na sociedade de economia mista. Referida sociedade tem na sua base constitutiva o conflito como elemento inerente. Por possuir capital público e privado, não é fácil solucionar facilmente os problemas que se apresentam no decorrer de sua existência frente à possibilidade de que o detentor do poder de controle pode decidir em prol do interesse público. E é visando limitar a má utilização do interesse público como resposta à tomada de decisões por parte do acionista controlador que se propõe uma mudança de paradigma. Para tanto, propõe-se analisar o papel do Estado empresário na atual conjuntura de limitação de intervenção do Estado na economia. Também é abordada a forma com que o poder Executivo vem intervindo no mercado, de forma a limitar a livre iniciativa e, por vezes, até mesmo eivada de certa inconstitucionalidade. No entanto, para evitar que haja afronta à Constituição no que diz respeito à exploração de atividade econômica por parte do Estado sem que sejam observados os limites constitucionais impostos, apresenta-se o meta-interesse como meio de solução. Sendo o meta-interesse o interesse da própria companhia, e considerando que o interesse público que fundamenta a autorização para a criação da sociedade de economia mista se extingue com a criação da referida companhia, tem-se que as normas que devem reger as sociedades de economia mista são as normas de direito privado. Com o meta-interesse o Estado passa a intervir na seara privada em igualdade de condições com as demais companhias, não podendo mais se valer de sua posição de acionista majoritário para tomar decisões que conflitem com o interesse da companhia e que privilegiem o interesse público secundário ou até mesmo o interesse político do Estado em detrimento do interesse social e dos acionistas minoritários. Dessa forma, o meta-interesse tem por finalidade colocar fim aos conflitos em relação à aplicação das normas jurídicas e as indefinições da própria natureza da sociedade de economia mista. / The nodal question of this thesis represents eventuals conflicts insurged on mixed capital companies. That typeof society have a particular constitutive element: conflits, sedimented in yourtwo nature constitutive capital public and private. It is not become easilier overcome hodiernal issues when the main controlling shareholder have to decide in public interest favor. It is proposed to change paradigms, in order to limit the misuse of public interest. Therefore, this work analyzes the role of Government as the main shareholder in the current situation of state intervention in the economy. Also covered is the way the executive branch hás intervened in the market, so as to limit free enterprise. Nevertheless to avoid that affront to Constitution with regard to the exploitation of economic activity by the state without being observed the constitutional limits imposed, we present the meta-interest as a means of solution. Being this concept the interest of the company itself, and considering that the public interest that justifies the authorization for creation of mixed capital company is extinguished with creation of this company, we have that the norms that should govern societies mixed are the rules of private law. On the logic of the meta-interesse, the state shall intervene in the private sphere on equal terms with other companies. However, his position as majority shareholder to make decisions that conflict with the interests of the company can no longer be used. Besides the public and political interest can not violate the social interest of minority shareholders. Therefore, the meta-interesse is intended to put na end to conflicts related to the application of legal standards and the uncertainties in the nature of company of mixed economy.

Recently published scientific articles have led to mixed nutritional advice on dietary saturated fatty acids. Lesser et. al (2007) identified that mixed conclusions in scientific articles on sweetened beverages might be attributed industry funding, as articles funded by the beverage industry are four to eight times more likely to report conclusions in favor of the sponsor’s products. This thesis applies Lesser’s methods to determine whether industry funding influences the inconsistent conclusions on saturated fatty acids. This thesis analyzes 100 articles on foods high in dietary saturated fatty acids. While studies with food industry funding are more likely to produce favorable conclusions, this trend is not significant (p= 0.205). On the other hand, the odds ratio of a favorable versus an unfavorable conclusion in articles where investigators disclosed a food industry related conflict of interest is 2.67 (95% CI, 1.03 to 6.88). The prevalence of both industry funding and conflict of interest have increased over time, yet the percent of articles reporting favorable conclusions has not changed over time. This suggests that while industry funding and conflict of interest might skew nutrition research, the mixed conclusions in articles on saturated fatty acids are largely influenced by other factors. Therefore, all nutrition-related scientific articles on saturated fatty acids should be critically evaluated before informing dietary recommendations.

O presente trabalho se propôs três tarefas: (i) responder algumas perguntas teóricas a respeito da transparência como estratégia regulatória no mercado de valores mobiliários; para tanto, revisitou a literatura jurídica e econômica sobre o papel da informação nos processos de tomada de decisão econômica; (ii) mapear o regime jurídico aplicável a transações com partes relacionadas no Brasil, analisando se as estratégias regulatórias adotadas são aquelas que seriam mais recomendáveis; para tanto, sistematizou as regras legais, regulamentares e os precedentes da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, comparando-os ao desenho regulatório mais adequado sob o ponto de vista teórico; e (iii) conduzir um teste empírico para averiguar em que medida as reformas realizadas em 2009 no regime de prestação compulsória de informações periódicas foram capazes de mudar o comportamento dos emissores de valores mobiliários e, consequentemente, contribuir para o aperfeiçoamento de sua governança corporativa. O teste empírico demonstrou que, em um período de apenas 3 anos, o número de companhias no mercado brasileiro que adotou conduta mais estrita que a prevista em lei para lidar com transações com partes relacionadas praticamente dobrou (de 16% para 31,5%). Esse número é ainda mais expressivo nos segmentos especiais de listagem, que são os que mais cresceram nos últimos 10 anos. No Novo Mercado esse número passou de 19,5% para 46% e, no Nível 2, de 37% para 62,5%. No entanto, regras de transparência não parecem ser suficientes para lidar com transações com partes relacionadas porque, apesar da mudança de conduta percebida, as políticas adotadas pelas companhias ficaram muito aquém daquilo que seria recomendável sob o ponto de vista teórico. / This study intends to accomplish three tasks: (i) answering some theoretical questions regarding transparency as a regulatory strategy for the securities market; in this regard, it has reviewed the legal and economic literature on the role of information in the process of making economic decisions; (ii) mapping the Brazilian legal framework for related-party transactions, analyzing whether the regulatory strategies currently adopted mach what would be recommended from a theoretical stand point; in this regard, it has systematized the statutory rules, regulations, as well as the precedents set by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários), and has compared them to the most appropriate regulatory framework from a theoretical standpoint; and (iii) conducting an empirical test in order to assess the extent to which reforms carried in 2009 regarding periodic reporting were capable of changing the way public companies behave and, therefore, improving their corporate governance. The empirical test showed that, within only 3 years, the number of Brazilian public companies approaching related-party transactions more rigorously than required by law has virtually doubled (from 16% to 31.5%). The result is more significant among the special listing segments the ones which grew the most during the last ten years. In Novo Mercado, this number jumped from 19.5% to 46%, while in Nível 2 it went from 37% to 62.5%. However, transparency rules do not seem to be enough when addressing related-party transactions issues because, despite such change in behavior, the policies adopted by the companies have lagged well behind what would be appropriate from the theoretical point of view.

Conflict of interest allegations became a prominent part of the political and public sector in the 1980s and 1990s in Australia and elsewhere. The arena of policing was not immune, and in Victoria, the Ombudsman drew particular attention to the problem and expressed concern about the rise in public complaints relating to alleged conflicts of interest on the part of police officers. Against this background, permission was granted by Victoria Police for a major study of conflict of interest complaints against police officers within their jurisdiction. Access was granted to all public complaint case files where conflict of interest was the focus of the allegations, from the period 1988???1998. A total of 377 usable complaints files were examined, involving 539 police officers. Through extensive examination and analysis of these complaint case files, a comprehensive map of the particular kinds of interest involved, the nature of the conflicts with official police duties, and the particular contexts within which conflicts of interest emerged, was developed. Analysis of the case files identified 25 different types of problems related to conflict of interest. These were spread across the private and public realms of police officers??? involvements. Previous studies of conflict of interest have focused largely on the opportunities for misconduct arising in the public realm of police work and police duty, largely neglecting attention to the private realm of the relationships and involvements of a police officer that give rise to conflicts of interest. In this study, the specific private interests that gave rise to problems were able to be identified in 35 percent of all cases. Three broad problem areas were identified: (i) outside employment, private business interests, political, social, and sporting interests and involvements; (ii) family-based involvements, especially those involving family law problems; and (iii) problematic personal relationships, including relationships with criminals, informers, and persons of ill repute. These conflicts of interest were related to a range of breaches of official police duty, including the misuse of police authority for personal or family benefit, the use of police position to facilitate personal relationships, and inappropriate disclosure of confidential police information. When the conflict of interest identified related specifically to a police officer???s official or public role as a member of the police force, the main types of misconduct identified included three broad areas: (i) the use and abuse of police powers and authority; (ii) the use and abuse of police resources, including information; and (iii) the receipt of gratuities and breaches of the law. These problems were shown to play out in a range of ways, encompassing such behaviours as misuse of the police identity, inappropriate accessing of police information, involvement in investigations where the police officer concerned has a personal interest in the matter, failing to take appropriate police action against friends, family, or associates, the exercise of improper influence in civil matters, and engagement in harassment and discrimination. This study offers some important conceptual developments in relation to the notion of conflict of interest, focusing on the importance of the distinction between a conflict of interest and an associated breach of duty. The study noted that it is often erroneously assumed by police that if there is no breach of duty evidenced, then there is no problem of conflict of interest. The study also offers an important insight into the oversight and accountability processes involved in Victoria Police, emphasising the importance and effectiveness of the oversight role of the office of the Victorian Ombudsman. Evidence also suggests that the internal review processes within Victoria Police are by-and-large stringent, and that senior police management are genuinely interested in making police officers more accountable for their actions. However, it is concluded that both front-line operational police officer and police management often have a limited understanding of conflict of interest, and problems attendant to conflicts of interest. The study???s insights into the problem of conflict of interest are significant insofar as this problem is related to police misconduct???ranging from minor to serious???of various kinds. Attention to the problem of conflict of interest may be an important element in preventing ???upstream??? police misconduct and corruption.