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11	O conflito de interesses como ato de improbidade administrativa Pereira, Felipe Dudienas Domingues 16 March 2018 (has links) Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-04-23T12:33:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Felipe Dudienas Domingues Pereira.pdf: 1091567 bytes, checksum: a508c6be86ee1c47666999bb89640f70 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-23T12:33:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Felipe Dudienas Domingues Pereira.pdf: 1091567 bytes, checksum: a508c6be86ee1c47666999bb89640f70 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-16 / The present thesis aims at analyzing the regulatory treatment of the conflict of interests as an act of administrative improbity, for the specific purpose of Article 37, Paragraph 4, of the 1988’s Brazilian Constitution. The requirement for a systematic discipline on conflict of interests within the sphere of corruption prevention and enforcement actions emerges with the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (Decree No. 4,410 of 7 October 2002), which emphasizes the duty of each State to create, maintain and strengthen codes of conduct for the correct, honorable, and proper performance of public functions to prevent conflicts of interests, so as to maintain confidence in the integrity of employees in both direct and indirect Public Administration as well as in the public management. The International Convention Against Corruption (Decree No. 5,687 of 31 January 2016), in its turn, also highlights the legal discipline of the conflicts of interests, which sets forth that each State Party, according to the principles of its internal legislation, shall adopt systems capable of promoting transparency, as well as preventing conflicts of interests, or capable of maintaining and strengthening such systems. The Brazilian Federal Union’s legislative and institutional response to these international commitments was formalized under the Conflict of Interests Law (Federal Law No. 12,813 of 16 May 2013). This thesis, therefore, provides an analysis of the aforementioned legal order underneath the aegis of the constitutional systematization of the liability of public officers under Brazilian Law, with the main purpose of contributing to the interpretation and application of legal arrangements as relevant supervisory instruments of the administrative probity / Este trabalho tem por escopo analisar a Lei no 12.813/2013 (Lei de Conflito de Interesses – LCI), instrumento de relevante utilidade à Administração Pública no combate e prevenção à corrupção. Para tanto, enfoca especialmente os conceitos de moralidade e de improbidade, bem como apresenta o cenário em que se desenvolveu o arcabouço jurídico nacional, pautado pelas ideias concebidas em Tratados Internacionais dos quais o Brasil é signatário. A LCI é um exemplo. Adveio de compromissos firmados pelo Brasil em tratados internacionais à colaboração e combate à corrupção e ampliou o rol de atos tipificados como ilícitos funcionais na Lei no 8.429/1992, a Lei de Improbidade Administrativa (LIA), inserindo condutas caracterizadoras como conflitantes entre os interesses privados do agente público e aqueles da Administração Pública, em específico, o órgão a que ele integra, como atos de improbidade administrativa. O estudo demonstra que a prevenção e a repressão ao conflito de interesses são formas de o direito objetivar as exigências de moralidade modeladas na Constituição Federal, na vertente fundamental de impor lealdade no exercício da função pública, valor que somente se viabiliza quando essa função é movimentada exclusivamente pelo exercício da atividade de agentes públicos norteados e comprometidos com a realização exclusiva dos interesses públicos, cuja guarda e tutela o Direito lhes assinala Conflito de Interesses Improbidade administrativa - Brasil Moralidade (Direito) Conflicts of Interests Administrative improbity - Brazil Morality
12	Conflito de interesse na administração pública: Estudo de caso na Prefeitura Municipal de Cachoeirinha-RS Branco, Alex Sandro Corrêa 18 August 2011 (has links) Submitted by Fabricia Fialho Reginato (fabriciar) on 2015-07-22T23:14:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 AlexBranco.pdf: 825457 bytes, checksum: ac236cd385f191eb1f6cf870fac8daa8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-22T23:14:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AlexBranco.pdf: 825457 bytes, checksum: ac236cd385f191eb1f6cf870fac8daa8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-18 / Nenhuma / Este estudo tem por objetivo identificar os conflitos de interesse na administração pública, além de averiguar a percepção dos mesmos por seus protagonistas. Utilizou-se como fundamentação para a análise a Teoria da Agência. Na esfera pública, são incipientes os estudos voltados ao tema proposto. Através de entrevista (apêndice A) aplicada ao Prefeito, Vice-Prefeito, Secretários e Subsecretários, verificou-se que a Secretaria da Saúde apresenta maior complexidade, sendo, portanto, o órgão mais apropriado para o desenvolvimento da pesquisa. Desenvolveu-se o estudo de caso no Município de Cachoeirinha, adotando a análise multivariada para obtenção dos resultados dos questionários aplicados. Através de pesquisa qualitativa, observou-se as diversidades comportamentais dos servidores públicos municipais, e demonstrou-se que os interesses particulares, por diversas vezes, sobressaem aos interesses públicos, tornando visível o conflito de interesse entre o administrador público e o servidor. / The main purpose of this study is to identify the conflicts of interest in the Public Administration, as well as to recognize the awareness of these conflicts by theirs characters. We recurred to the Agency Theory as the basis of our analysis. In the public area, the studies turned to this theme are limited. Through an interview (Annex A) done with the Mayor, vice-mayor, Secretaries and Subsecretaries, we could see that the Secretary of Health presents more complexity, because of that, it is the best place to develop our research. We developed a case study in the city of Cachoeirinha RS, adopting the multivariate analysis in order to obtain the results of the applied questionnaires. From a qualitative research, we observed the different behaviors of the public employees of that city, we could also show that the personal interests, for many times, exceed the public ones, becoming visible the conflict of interest between the public manager and the employee. Administração pública Conflito de interesses Teoria dos incentivos Teoria da agência Public employees Conflicts of interests Theory of incentives Agency theory
13	Hedgefonds, Governance und Interessenskonflikte Hürth, Georg 06 May 2013 (has links) In dieser Dissertation wird die Hedgefonds-Industrie erstmals aus einer umfassenden Governanceperspektive betrachtet. Das Anreizgeflecht zwischen Hedgefonds und ihren wichtigsten Stakeholdern wird analysiert, um darzustellen, welche Interessenskonflikte zwischen Hedgefonds und ihren Stakeholdern, aber auch innerhalb der Stakeholdern-Society der Industrie existieren. Einige dieser Konflikte können das operative Risiko und somit die Kreditrisiken einzelner Fonds erhöhen und strahlen durch die verbreitete Intransparenz und die zunehmenden Ansteckungsgefahren innerhalb der Hedgefonds-Industrie auf weite Teile der Industrie ab. Diese Arbeit ergänzt die wissenschaftliche Literatur, indem erstmals die grundlegenden Interessenskonflikte der Hedgefonds-Industrie gegenüber ihren wichtigsten Stakeholdern (Investoren, Gläubigern & Gesellschaft) identifiziert, umfassend dargestellt und Lösungsansätze diskutiert werden. Zur Identifizierung und Analyse dieser grundlegenden Anreizprobleme und der daraus resultierenden Interessenskonflikte wird sich eines Datensatzes bedient, der bisher noch keine Behandlung in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur über Hedgefonds gefunden hat: Den Hedgefonds-Anklagen der U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) zwischen den Jahren 2000 und 2011. Der Blick aus der Stakeholderperspektive ermöglicht es, die Anreize, denen ein Fondsmanager oder verschiedene Stakeholder ausgesetzt sein können, besser zu verstehen, zentrale Anreizprobleme der Industrie zu identifizieren und potenzielle Lösungsansätze vor dem Hintergrund der Governancetheorie zu diskutieren. Zudem wird der Zusammenhang zwischen den Governanceproblemen und den systemischen Risiken der Hedgefonds-Industrie hergestellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass verbesserte Governancestrukturen, die transparenzerhöhend und anreizangleichend wirken, nicht ausschließlich Investoren und Gläubigern, sondern auch der Gesellschaft als zentraler Stakeholder der Industrie einen Mehrwert bringen können. Denn die Governanceprobleme, die noch immer Teile der Hedgefonds-Industrie prägen, wie immer neue und größere Betrugsskandale andeuten, zeigen auch, dass sie aus einer Governance- beziehungsweise operativen Perspektive für ihre wachsende Rolle im Finanzsystem noch nicht gerüstet zu sein scheint. Diese operativen Risiken können die Kreditrisiken vieler Fonds erhöhen und negative Auswirkungen auf systemrelevante Gläubiger haben, die im Brokerage/Depotgeschäft den Risiken einer Vielzahl von Hedgefonds ausgesetzt sein können. Im Lauf der vergangenen Dekade hat zusätzlich noch die Vernetzung innerhalb der Hedgefonds-Industrie und mit systemrelevanten Institutionen zugenommen. Daher sind nicht mehr nur die Kreditrisiken großer Fonds, sondern durch potenzielle Ansteckungsgefahren innerhalb der Industrie werden auch die Kreditrisiken kleinerer Fonds relevant, wenn diese korreliert ausfallen. So können Governanceprobleme in der Hedgefonds-Industrie durch die Erhöhung des operativen und des Kreditrisikos die systemischen Risiken der Industrie beeinflussen. Daher können durch geeignete Governancemechanismen den einzelnen Stakeholdern, der Wissenschaft sowie der Politik grundlegende Informationen und Steuerungsinstrumente zugänglich gemacht werden, die die Mess- und Steuerbarkeit von operativen Risiken erhöhen, potenzieller Überregulierung besser vorbeugen und Kredit- und systemische Risiken abschwächen. info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/330 ddc:330
14	Réflexion sur l'abus en droit des sociétés dans l'espace Ohada : contribution du droit français / Reflection on the abuse in corporate law : contribution of French law Aguemon, Khaled 07 September 2013 (has links) Depuis des lustres, les sociétés commerciales n’ont cessé d’être l’accessoire juridique favori des entrepreneurs dans l’exercice de leur activité. La société commerciale est créée par deux ou plusieurs personnes qui conviennent, par un contrat, d’affecter à une activité des biens en numéraire ou en nature, dans le but de partager le bénéfice ou de profiter de l’économie qui pourra en résulter. Cette définition découle de l’article 4 de l’AUSCGIE qui constitue une transposition de l’article 1832 du Code civil. L’AUSCGIE rassemble toutes les normes juridiques qui ont pour objectif de gouverner la constitution, l’activité et la fin de la société. Une des prérogatives les plus importantes des associés est de prendre part à la vie sociale, ils peuvent participer à cette vie sociale en dirigeant la société ou de façon plus réservée, en votant dans les différentes assemblées. Toutefois ce droit, comme tout droit est susceptible d’abus ; l’abus étant un usage injustifié ou excessif de quelque chose ou d’un pouvoir par son titulaire. D’un point de vue impartial avec les autres associés, l’AUSCGIE a codifié dans ses dispositions des sanctions contre les abus commis à l’occasion de l’exercice du droit de vote. Toutefois, l’abus ne se révèle pas uniquement lors de l’exercice du droit de vote. De multiples abus se révèlent aussi dans la direction et la gestion d’une société. Là encore, l’AUSCGIE a prévu des dispositions et laissé le soin aux Etats-parties d’instaurer dans leur législation des lois pour sanctionner ces abus. Le concept d’abus nous pousse donc à étudier les sources de sanction de ce dernier dans l’espace Ohada. / For decades, corporations have ceased to be legal accessory favorite of contractors in the exercise of their activity. The corporation is created by two or more persons who agree, by contract, to assign an activity assets in cash or in kind, to share in the profit or advantage of the savings that may result. This definition follows from Article 4 of the AUSCGIE which is transposition of Article 1832 of the Civil Code. AUSCGIE gathers all the legal standards that are intended to govern the establishment, activity and the end of the company. One of the most important partners prerogatives is to take part in social life, they can participate in the social life by directing the company or more reserved, by voting in the various assemblies. However, this law, like any law is open to abuse; abuse is unjustified or excessive use of something or power by its owner. From an impartial point of view with the other partners AUSCGIE codified in his texts sanctions against abuses in connection with the exercise of voting rights. However, abuse is not revealed only when the right to vote. Many abuses also reveal the direction and management of a company. Again, AUSCGIE provided texts and left it to the States Parties to introduce in their legislation laws against such abuses. The concept of abuse leads us to study the sources of sanction it in OHADA space. Abus de biens sociaux Abus de majorité Abus de minorité ou d’égalité Administration provisoire Alerte Arbitrage Conflits d’intérêts Conventions réglementées Conventions de vote Expertise de gestion Intérêt social Prévention des abus Sanctions des abus Transparence Misuse of corporate assets Abuse of majority Abuse of minority or equality Temporary administration Alert Arbitration refereeing Refereeing Conflicts of interests Regulated agreements Agreement of vote Expertise of management Prevention of the abuses Sanction of the abuses Transparency 340
15	La liberté contractuelle du banquier : réflexions sur la sécurité du système financier / The contractual freedom of the banker : reflections on the safety of financial system Maymont, Anthony 17 December 2013 (has links) La liberté contractuelle du banquier est une liberté parmi d’autres. Cependant, elle est la plus sensible dans lamesure où elle peut avoir des répercussions sur son activité. A priori sans limites aujourd’hui, cette liberté auraitmême des conséquences indéniables sur la sécurité du système financier en facilitant le phénomène des« bulles ». Le contrat, situé au coeur de l’activité bancaire et financière, serait ainsi la cause de cette réalité. Leschocs récents, telles les crises financières, imposent l´examen détaillé des opérations bancaires nationales maisaussi internationales, notamment celles les plus dangereuses. Encore méconnue, la mesure de la libertécontractuelle du banquier s’avère nécessaire pour en proposer une relecture. L’objectif n’est donc pas d’excluretoute liberté au banquier mais de définir le degré de liberté contractuelle à lui accorder pour chaque opération.L´idée étant de lui octroyer un niveau satisfaisant de liberté tout en assurant la sécurité du système financier.L’enjeu repose finalement sur la conciliation de l’impératif contractuel, résultant de la liberté contractuelle dubanquier, avec l’impératif de sécurité du système financier, nécessaire à la pérennité des banques et del’économie mondiale. / The contractual freedom of the banker is a freedom among the others. However, it is the most sensitive in so faras it can affect on his activity. Apparently unlimited today, this freedom would have even undeniableconsequences on the safety of the financial system by facilitating the phenomenon of “speculative bubbles”. Thecontract, situated in the heart of the banking and financial activity, would be thus the cause of this reality. Therecent shocks, such as financial crises, require the detailed examination of the national but also internationalbank transactions, especially the most dangerous. Still ignored, the measurement of the contractual freedom ofthe banker proves to be necessary to propose a review. The aim is not thus to rule any banker’s freedom out butto define the degree of contractual freedom to grant to him for each transaction. The idea being to grant him asatisfactory level of freedom while ensuring the safety of financial system. The stake rests finally on theconciliation of the contractual requirement, resulting from the contractual freedom of the banker, with the safetyrequirement of the financial system, necessary for the sustainability of banks and worldwide economy. Liberté contractuelle Droit commun Ordre public Banque Droit bancaire Droit financier Instruments financiers Contrats financiers à terme Risques financiers Système financier Stabilité Sécurité Marchés financiers Crises financières Réglementation prudentielle Crédits Titrisation Garanties Dérivés de crédit Transparence Secret professionnel Conflits d’intérêts Codes de bonne conduite Participations bancaires Compensation Contractual freedom Common law Law and order Bank Banking law Financial law Financial instruments Financial futures Financial risks Financial system Stability Safety Financial markets Financial crisis Prudential regulation Bank credits Securitization Guarantees Credit derivatives Transparency Professional secrecy Conflicts of interests Code of conduct Banking holdings Compensation 346

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