The recent financial crisis which has beset the United States has made itself felt in a number of ways, not the least of which has been its adverse effect on the housing market. As foreclosure percentages accelerated, increasing numbers of properties across the country became empty and abandoned, leaving a visible imprint of deterioration in neighborhoods that were significantly affected. Initial GIS analysis of both foreclosed and non-foreclosed residential land in Broward County Florida was conducted, showing that there is a discernible spectral difference in the lawn space of these two types of properties, with foreclosed properties exhibiting more brownness, or loss of green space. In order to evaluate whether or not this visible deterioration has had an effect on residents left behind in areas of foreclosure and their own habits, 950 mail-in surveys were distributed throughout 19 different census tracts in Broward County, inquiring about demographics, surrounding foreclosures, degrees of concern for home value and appearance, and changes in lawn maintenance since the foreclosure crisis along with reasons for such change if such exists. Data received from respondents was then analyzed in order to identify any attributes or correlations which might contribute to further neighborhood change, and how any of these factors might be affecting attitudes or perceptions of those left behind, as well as their lawn maintenance habits. / by Cindy M. Shaw. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2013. / Includes bibliography. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / System requirements: Adobe Reader.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:48:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_WGLucas.pdf: 757519 bytes, checksum: 47335cf960121877cadc10b474ac8413 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-05-16 / Fundação Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnológico / Leaving of the hypothesis of the financial cycle of Minsky of that a financial crisis if becomes each most likely time the measure that three disequilibria grow: a disaligning of the growth of the product and the prices of the actions; a disequilibrium of the market of action and the prices of production of the capital (being the first greater that as) and a growth in the relation debt/income, the agreement of the propagation of the financial crisis is seen, in this in case that, as condition necessary and enough to understand the Necessity of International the Financial Reform. Ahead of this scene, it is placed as question for this paper: How financial volatileness became evident? What it took the countries (Mexico, East Asian and Brazil) to the occured financial crises in the decade of 1990? What he is being considered for the international agencies to structuralize system financial e, thus, to contain volatileness that become the vulnerable countries the crises? Amongst the proposals suggested for the international agencies, the inquiry will be delimited to the application of the Tobin Tax that will be analyzed having as experience to the measures adopted for the governments of Chile and Malaysia to contain the capital of short term. / Partindo da hipótese do ciclo financeiro de Minsky de que uma crise financeira se torna cada vez mais provável à medida que três desequilíbrios crescem: um desalinhamento do crescimento do produto e dos preços das ações; um desequilíbrio do mercado de ações e dos preços de produção do capital (sendo o primeiro maior que o segundo) e um crescimento na relação dívida/renda, o entendimento da propagação da crise financeira é visto, nesse caso, como condição necessária e suficiente para compreender a Necessidade de Reforma Financeira Internacional. Diante desse cenário, coloca-se como questão para esta dissertação: Como a volatilidade financeira tornou-se evidente? O que levou os países (México, Leste Asiático e Brasil) às crises financeiras ocorridas na década de 1990? O que está sendo proposto pelos órgãos internacionais para estruturar o sistema financeiro e, assim, conter a volatilidade que tornam os países vulneráveis às crises? Dentre as propostas sugeridas pelos órgãos internacionais, a investigação será delimitada à aplicação do Imposto Tobin que será analisada tendo como experiência às medidas adotadas pelos governos do Chile e da Malásia para conter o capital de curto prazo.

Ces dernières décennies, le monde a vécu des épisodes de forte instabilité financière globale, allantde pair avec un mouvement important de capitaux internationaux. Ce paradoxe remet en question lebien-fondé d’une politique de libéralisation financière internationale et soulève de nombreusescontroverses dont l’issue est à ce jour ambigu. L'objectif de cette thèse est d’apporter une contributionà ce débat actuel. Notre démarche s'articule autour de trois grandes parties. D'abord, nous analysonsl'impact de la globalisation financière sur la croissance économique dans les pays en développement(PED). Ensuite, dans la deuxième partie, nous étudions le rôle que pourrait jouer la libre circulationdes capitaux internationaux comme un déterminant du déclenchement des crises bancaires dans lesPED. Ceci nous amène dans la troisième partie à analyser les réformes réglementaires proposéespour pallier à ce risque de crises bancaires et tirer profit de la globalisation financière (GF).Les principaux résultats de la thèse peuvent être résumés comme suit : (1) La GF agit positivementsur la croissance économique et la stabilité du secteur bancaire, ces effets étant conditionnés par lanature des flux de capitaux échangés. (2) Les pays en développement peuvent bénéficier de lalibéralisation des mouvements de capitaux s’ils ont atteint un certain seuil de développementinstitutionnel. (3) Le contrôle des capitaux permet aux pays en développement d’assurer un niveau destabilité financière soutenu. Les implications de politiques économiques sont : (a) Les PED ont intérêtà améliorer leurs cadres institutionnels pour tirer profit de la globalisation financière. (b) Les pays endéveloppement doivent renforcer leur cadre règlementaire et mettre en place une politique de contrôledes capitaux qui ciblerait ceux à l’origine de l’instabilité économique et financière. (c) Un tel contrôlene doit pas se faire seulement sur les engagements envers l’étranger mais aussi sur les avoirs. / Over the last few decades, the world has experienced episodes of global financial instability combinedwith significant shifts of international capital movements. This paradox questions the merits of theinternational financial liberalization and raises many controversies whose outcome is inconclusive todate. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to this current debate. The approach is structured aroundthree main parts. First, the impact of the financial globalization (FG) on the economic growth isanalyzed for developing countries. Then, in the second part, we examine the potential role of freemovement of international capital as a major factor responsible for the onset of banking crisis indeveloping countries. This analysis leads us to the third part in which we analyze the regulatoryreforms, proposed to mitigate the risk of banking crisis and to benefit from financial globalization.The main outcomes are summarized as follows: (1)The financial globalization acts positively oneconomic growth and the stability of the banking sector. Furthermore, these effects are conditioned bythe nature of capital flows. (2) The developing countries can benefit from the liberalization ofinternational capital flows, if they have reached a certain threshold level of institutional development.(3) The capital controls allow the developing countries to ensure a sustainable level of financialstability. The economic policy implications are: (a) The developing countries may find it beneficial todevelop their institutional framework to benefit from financial liberalization. (b) the developing countriesmust strengthen their regulatory framework and set up a capital control policy that will target theorigins of economic and financial instability. (c) Such a control should not only be exercised on foreignliabilities but also on domestic assets.

This diploma work is about the Great depression in 1930s and the World financial crisis. The aim of this work is to find both identical and different aspects which led to the crises and which could be observed in the course of the crises. Based on word description and analysis of macroeconomic indicators, in the diploma work is compared the pre-crisis situation and development in selected economies during the crises. Special attention is paid to the economic development in Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic).

The neo-liberal policies of liberalization and deregulation, as utilized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its dealings with countries of the developing world, tend to facilitate the conditions for financial crisis. This can be traced by examining the economic crises of Mexico in 1982 and 1994/95, Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998 and looking at the main causes and triggers of these crises. It is evident that the financial vulnerability that these countries suffered from existed due to, and not in spite of, these policy prescriptions. The IMF continues to present these policies as proven successes - a view that this dissertation contests. Further to this, the policies that the Fund uses are formulated for use in semi-peripheral economies and have little relationship to the actual economic environments of peripheral countries such as those of sub-Saharan Africa or Papua New Guinea. The ideology of free-markets and globalization is seen as unassailable by the IMF. By encouraging countries to remain part of the global financial system through debt rescheduling and open-markets policies, the IMF holds an increasingly fragile economic environment together. This dissertation formulates and tests four hypotheses in relation to Mexico, Asia, Russia and Papua New Guinea and the periphery. These are - (1) If there are periods of 'irrational exuberance' among investors in Third World debt, these are likely to contribute to debt crises. (2) If IMF policies are implemented in the Third World as dictated, then their primary benefits will accrue to the elites in those countries and in the developed world. (3) If Third World countries open their economies to foreign capital, then they are more likely to experience debt crises. (4) If IMF policies are implemented in peripheral countries, then they are even less likely to be successful than in semi-peripheral countries.

Chaque année, plus de 400 catastrophes naturelles frappent le monde. Pour aider les populations touchées, les organisations humanitaires stockent par avance de l’aide d’urgence dans des entrepôts. Cette thèse propose des outils d’aide à la décision pour les aider à localiser et dimensionner ces entrepôts. Notre approche repose sur la construction de scénarios représentatifs. Un scénario représente la survenue d’une catastrophe dont on connaît l’épicentre, la gravité et la probabilité d’occurrence. Cette étape repose sur l’exploitation et l’analyse de bases de données des catastrophes passées. La seconde étape porte sur la propagation géographique de la catastrophe et détermine son impact sur la population des territoires touchés. Cet impact est fonction de la vulnérabilité et de la résilience du territoire. La vulnérabilité mesure la valeur attendue des dégâts alors que la résilience estime la capacité à résister au choc et à se rétablir rapidement. Les deux sont largement déterminées par des facteurs économiques et sociaux, soit structurels (géographie, PIB…) ou politiques (existence d’infrastructure d’aide, normes de construction…). Nous proposons par le biais d’analyses en composantes principales (ACP) d’identifier les facteurs influents de résilience et de vulnérabilité, puis d’estimer le nombre de victimes touchées à partir de ces facteurs. Souvent, les infrastructures (eau, télécommunication, électricité, voies de communication) sont détruits ou endommagés par la catastrophe (ex : Haïti en 2010). La dernière étape a pour objectif d’évaluer les impacts logistiques en ce qui concerne : les restrictions des capacités de transport existant et la destruction de tout ou partie des stocks d’urgence. La suite de l’étude porte sur la localisation et le dimensionnement du réseau d’entrepôt. Nos modèles présentent l’originalité de tenir compte de la dégradation des ressources et infrastructures suite due à la catastrophe (dimension résilience) et de chercher à optimiser le rapport entre les coûts engagés et le résultat obtenu (dimension efficience). Nous considérons d’abord un scénario unique. Le problème est une extension d’un problème de location classique. Puis, nous considérons un ensemble de scénarios probabilisés. Cette approche est indispensable à la considération du caractère très incertain des catastrophes humanitaires. L’ensemble de ces contributions a été confronté à la réalité des faits dans le cadre d’une application au cas des crises récurrentes du Pérou. Ces crises, essentiellement dues aux tremblements de terre et aux inondations (El Niño), imposent la constitution d’un réseau logistique de premiers secours qui soit résilient et efficient. / Every year, more than 400 natural disasters hit the world. To assist those affected populations, humanitarian organizations store in advance emergency aid in warehouses. This PhD thesis provides tools for support decisions on localization and sizing of humanitarian warehouses. Our approach is based on the design of representative and realistic scenarios. A scenario expresses some disasters’ occurrences for which epicenters are known, as well as their gravity and frequency. This step is based on the exploitation and analysis of databases of past disasters. The second step tackles about possible disaster’s propagation. The objective consists in determining their impact on population on each affected area. This impact depends on vulnerability and resilience of the territory. Vulnerability measures expected damage values meanwhile resilience estimates the ability to withstand some shock and recover quickly. Both are largely determined by social and economic factors, being structural (geography, GDP, etc.) or political (establishment or not relief infrastructure, presence and strict enforcement of construction standards, etc.). We propose through Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to identify, for each territory, influential factors of resilience and vulnerability and then estimate the number of victims concerned using these factors. Often, infrastructure (water, telecommunications, electricity, communication channels) are destroyed or damaged by the disaster (e.g. Haiti in 2010). The last step aims to assess the disaster logistics impact, specifically those related to with: transportation flows capacity limitations and destruction of all or part of emergency relief inventories. The following of our study focuses on location and allocation of a warehouses’ network. The proposed models have the originality to consider potential resources and infrastructure degradation after a disaster (resilience dimension) and seek optimizing the equilibrium between costs and results (effectiveness dimension). Initially we consider a single scenario. The problem is an extension of classical location studies. Then we consider a set of probable scenarios. This approach is essential due to the highly uncertain character of humanitarian disasters. All of these contributions have been tested and validated through a real application case: Peruvian recurrent disasters. These crises, mainly due to earthquakes and floods (El Niño), require establishment of a first aid logistics network that should be resilient and efficient.

Submitted by Murilo Resende Ferreira (muriloresende82@gmail.com) on 2014-10-28T15:22:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tesedoutoradomuriloresende.PDF: 806113 bytes, checksum: e6d9cfcc660128de80d20f44f9c5213e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2014-11-10T11:34:49Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tesedoutoradomuriloresende.PDF: 806113 bytes, checksum: e6d9cfcc660128de80d20f44f9c5213e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2014-11-13T13:40:01Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tesedoutoradomuriloresende.PDF: 806113 bytes, checksum: e6d9cfcc660128de80d20f44f9c5213e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-11-13T13:40:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tesedoutoradomuriloresende.PDF: 806113 bytes, checksum: e6d9cfcc660128de80d20f44f9c5213e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-27 / This thesis contains two chapters, each one dealing with banking theory and the history of financiai arrangements. In Chapter 1, we extend a Diamond and Dybvig economy with imperfect monitoring of early withdrawals and make a welfare comparison between all possible allocations, as proposed by Prescott and Weinberg(2003) [37]. This imperfect monitoring is introduced by establishing indirect communication( trough a mean of payment) between the agents and the machine that is an aggregate of the financiai and the productive sector. The extension consists in studying allocations where a fraction of the agents can exploit imperfect monitoring and defraud the contracted arrangement by consuming more in the early period trough multiple means of payment. With limited punishment in the period of late consumption, this new allocation is called a separating allocation in contrast with pooling allocations where the agent with the ability of fraud is blocked from it by a costly mean of payment or by receiving enough future consumption to make fraud unattractive. The welfare comparison in the chosen range of parameters show that separating allocations are optimal for poor economies and pooling allocations for intermediary and rich ones. We end with a possible historical context for this kind of model, which connects with the historical narrative in chapter 2. In Chapter 2 we explore the quantitative properties of an early warning system for financiai crises based on the boom and bust framework described in more detail in appendix 1. The main variables are: real growth in equity and housing prices, the yield spread between the 10-year government bond and the 3-month interbank rate and the growth in total banking system assets. These variables display a higher degree of correct signals for recent crises (1984-2008) than comparable early warning systerns. Taking into account an increasing base-line risk ( due to increasing rates of credit expansion , lower interest rates and the accumulation of distortions) also proves to be informative and to help signaling crises in countries that did not go trough a great boom in previous years. / Esta tese contém dois capítulos, cada um lidando com a teoria e a história dos bancos e arranjos financeiros. No capítulo 1, busca-se extender uma economia Diamond-Dybvig com monitoramento imperfeito dos saques antecipados e realizar uma comparação do bem estar social em cada uma das alocações possíveis, como proposto em Presscott and Weinberg(2003). Esse monitoramento imperfeito é implementado a partir da comunicação indireta ( através de um meio de pagamento) entre os agentes e a máquina de depósitos e saques que é um agregado do setor produtivo e financeiro. A extensão consiste em estudar alocações onde uma fração dos agentes pode explorar o monitoramento imperfeito e fraudar a alocação contratada ao consumirem mais cedo além do limite, usando múltiplos meios de pagamento. Com a punição limitada no período de consumo tardio, essa nova alocação pode ser chamada de uma alocação separadora em contraste com as alocações agregadoras onde o agente com habilidade de fraudar é bloqueado por um meio de pagamento imune a fraude, mas custoso, ou por receber consumo futuro suficiente para tornar a fraude desinteressante. A comparação de bem estar na gama de parâmetros escolhida mostra que as alocações separadoras são ótimas para as economias com menor dotação e as agregadoras para as de nível intermediário e as ricas. O capítulo termina com um possível contexto histórico para o modelo, o qual se conecta com a narrativa histórica encontrada no capítulo 2. No capítulo 2 são exploradas as propriedade quantitativas de um sistema de previsão antecedente para crises financeiras, com as váriaveis sendo escolhidas a partir de um arcabouço de ``boom and bust'' descrito mais detalhadamente no apêndice 1. As principais variáveis são: o crescimento real nos preços de imóveis e ações, o diferencial entre os juros dos títulos governamentais de 10 anos e a taxa de 3 meses no mercado inter-bancário e o crescimento nos ativos totais do setor bancário. Essas variáveis produzem uma taxa mais elevada de sinais corretos para as crises bancárias recentes (1984-2008) do que os sistemas de indicadores antecedentes comparáveis. Levar em conta um risco de base crescente ( devido à tendência de acumulação de distorções no sistema de preços relativos em expansões anteriores) também provê informação e eleva o número de sinais corretos em países que não passaram por uma expansão creditícia e nos preços de ativos tão vigorosa.

Submitted by Caio Machado (caiohm@gmail.com) on 2017-05-18T18:01:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Machado2017.pdf: 1442885 bytes, checksum: 6de78cd6ea7228909465f19bc20ae0ce (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2017-05-18T19:16:58Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Machado2017.pdf: 1442885 bytes, checksum: 6de78cd6ea7228909465f19bc20ae0ce (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-18T20:24:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Machado2017.pdf: 1442885 bytes, checksum: 6de78cd6ea7228909465f19bc20ae0ce (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-11 / Coordination failures are often said to play an important role in business cycles. If agents’ incentives of taking a given action depend on the amount of other agents expected to take the same action, coordination failures can often arise. Firms may not invest because they do not expect others to invest, confirming their initial expectations. Similarly, banks may not lend because they do not expect others to lend. This dissertation analyzes different environments in which crises arise as a result of coordination failures. The first chapter analyzes an economy that is subject to a dynamic coordination problem. Because of aggregate demand externalities, firms’ incentives to increase their production depend on expected demand, which in turn depends on the amount produced by other firms. The problem is dynamic since firms do not take investment decisions at the same time, implying that a firm deciding today is trying to forecast what other firms will decide in the future. This opens the possibility of dynamic coordination traps: firms do not invest today because they do not believe others will invest tomorrow, generating lower incentives for firms to invest at future dates. This chapter focuses on the following questions: In economies subject to dynamic coordination traps, what is the optimal stimulus policies? Should policy makers provide higher incentives to production in times of low economic activity? The answer is that a constant subsidy implements the first-best in an economy where beliefs are endogenously determined. The reason is that, although it is harder to coordinate in times of low economic activity, agents are naturally more optimistic about the future in times of poor economic activity and reasonably good fundamentals. This optimism arise from the fact that in bad times negative shocks do not change the level of economic activity, while positive shocks may end a recession. The second chapter proposes a model to study unusually deep financial crises. Previous empirical work has found that financial crises are very deep and persistent on average, but there is a lot of heterogeneity across different episodes. Some financial crises feature a very distressed financial sector, but little distress on the real sector, while others are real macroeconomic disasters. In light of this evidence, I propose a model in which there is a highly non-linear feedback between the real and the financial sector. Disaster episodes arise from the dynamic interaction of two frictions: coordination frictions and financial frictions. When banks have weak balance sheets they do not intermediate much capital. This causes firms to get trapped in a self-reinforcing regime with low aggregate demand, which ends up provoking further damage to banks’ balance sheets. I use the model as a laboratory to study unusually deep financial crises and the effects of some policies. It is shown that the effects of disasters go far beyond what we observe during those episodes: they imply very low asset prices, economic growth and welfare, even in good times and when their probability is very small. Policies that protect the financial sector from those episodes can be very beneficial. Moreover, higher risk-taking in bad times may improve economic growth, welfare and financial stability. The third chapter studies the policy trade-off of a regulator that wants to avoid coordination failures, but at the same time does not want to generate distortions arising from moral hazard. Banks have investment opportunities with an expected return that depends positively on the amount of other banks undertaking similar investments, opening room for coordination failures. At the same time, banks may risk-shift to projects with smaller expected return but higher volatility. By providing guarantees in case of failures, a regulator can enhance coordination, but that leads banks to switch to worse projects. It is shown that in some states a regulator will provide no guarantees, even if it that means allowing a coordination failure to happen. Moreover, the possibility of risk-shifting reduces the amount of guarantees needed to avoid a coordination failure. / Com frequência argumenta-se que falhas de coordenação têm um papel importante no ciclo de negócios. Se os incentivos dos agentes a realizar determinada ação depende da quantidade esperada de outros agentes que tomarão a mesma ação, falhas de coordenação podem acontecer. Empresas podem não investir porque não esperam que outras empresas irão investir, confirmando suas expectativas iniciais. De maneira similar, bancos podem não conceder empréstimos porque eles não esperam que outros bancos irão fazer o mesmo. Esta tese analisa diferentes ambientes onde crises surgem como o resultado de falhas de coordenação. O primeiro capítulo analisa uma economia que está sujeita a falhas de coordenação dinâmicas. Por causa de externalidades de demanda agregada, os incentivos para uma dada firma aumentar sua produção dependem da demanda esperada, que por sua vez depende da quantidade produzida por outras firmas. O problema é dinâmico porque as firmas não tomam decisões de investimento ao mesmo tempo, implicando que uma firma tomando decisões hoje está tentando prever o que outras firmas decidirão no futuro. Isso abre a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação dinâmicas: firmas não investem hoje porque elas não acreditam que outras firmas investirão amanhã, gerando incentivos menores para outras firmas investirem no futuro. Este capítulo foca nas seguintes questões: Em economias sujeitas a este problema de coordenação dinâmico, qual a política de estímulo ótima? O governo deveria prover mais estímulos em épocas de baixa atividade econômica? A resposta é que um subsídio constante implementa o ótimo nesta economia. O motivo é que, embora seja mais difícil coordenar em tempos de baixa atividade, os agentes estão naturalmente mais otimistas sobre o futuro em tempos de baixa atividade e fundamentos razoavelmente bons. Este otimismo surge do fato que em tempos ruins choques negativos não alteram o nível de atividade econômica, mas choques positivos podem acabar com uma recessão. O segundo capítulo desta tese propõe um modelo para estudar crises financeiras mais severas que o usual. Trabalhos empíricos prévios mostram que, em geral, crises financeiras são muito profundas e persistentes, mas também que há muita heterogeneidade entre diferentes episódios. Algumas crises financeiras causam enormes danos no sistema financeiro, mas pouco dano no setor real, enquanto outras são verdadeiros desastres macroeconômicos. À luz desta evidência, esta tese propõe um modelo onde há um feedback extremamente não linear entre o setor financeiro e o setor real. Desastres surgem através da interação dinâmica de duas fricções: fricções de coordenação e fricções financeiras. Quando os bancos estão com problemas em seus balanços, eles optam por intermediar menos capital. Isso leva as firmas a entrar em um regime com baixa demanda agregada, que causa ainda mais dano ao capital dos bancos. Este modelo é utilizado como um laboratório para estudar crises financeiras muito severas e o efeito de algumas políticas. É mostrado que os efeitos de desastres econômicos vão muito além do que observamos durante estes episódios. Eles levam à queda dos preços de ativos, baixo crescimento e perdas de bem-estar, mesmo que a probabilidade destes eventos seja muito pequena. Finalmente, quando os bancos tomam mais risco em tempos ruins, podemos ter um aumento de crescimento, bem-estar e estabilidade financeira. O terceiro capítulo estuda o trade-off enfrentado por um regulador que quer evitar falhas de coordenação, mas ao mesmo tempo não quer gerar distorções que surgem por conta de risco moral. Os bancos possuem oportunidades de investimento cujo retorno esperado depende positivamente da quantidade de outros bancos investindo em projetos similares, abrindo espaço para a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação. Ao mesmo tempo, bancos podem escolher investir em projetos com menor retorno esperado e maior volatilidade. Ao prover garantias em caso de falha de um banco, um regulador pode melhorar a habilidade que estes têm de coordenar, mas ao mesmo isto pode levar os bancos a tomarem risco excessivo. É mostrado que em alguns estados o regulador não proverá garantias, mesmo que isso implique permitir que uma falha de coordenação aconteça. Ainda, a possibilidade dos bancos tomarem risco excessivo reduz a quantidade de garantias necessárias para evitar uma falha de coordenação.

Submitted by Diego de Sousa Rodrigues (diego-2607@hotmail.com) on 2018-05-21T19:09:48Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Liquidity_constraints_and_collateral_crises.pdf: 724079 bytes, checksum: 3ad8ea76a1e94e45b794f4a0daa1ee3e (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Bom dia Diego, Para que possamos dar andamento ao seu processo será necessário fazer apenas alguns ajustes. SÃO PAULO 2018 = DEVE SER LETRA MAIÚSCULA NAS CAPAS. A ficha catalográfica, deve ser inserida conforme lhe foi enviado pela biblioteca - Mudando apenas a quantidade de paginas. ( colocar ate mesmo o quadrado/ retângulo ) Apos as modificações excluir o arquivo ja postado e fazer novamente toda submissão. Qualquer duvida estamos a disposição. att, Pâmela Tonsa 3799-7852 on 2018-05-22T13:29:44Z (GMT) / Submitted by Diego de Sousa Rodrigues (diego-2607@hotmail.com) on 2018-05-22T16:41:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Liquidity_constraints_and_collateral_crises.pdf: 742240 bytes, checksum: 7566b1884a3945cd0b1e24a245dcae9b (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Boa tarde Diego, Conforme falamos , estou rejeitando seu trabalho para a nova alteração. Att. Pâmela Tonsa 3799-7852 on 2018-05-22T16:48:17Z (GMT) / Submitted by Diego de Sousa Rodrigues (diego-2607@hotmail.com) on 2018-05-22T16:54:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Liquidity_constraints_and_collateral_crises.pdf: 761100 bytes, checksum: 7c985eac9766620ac562288a5c15f07d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2018-05-22T16:56:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Liquidity_constraints_and_collateral_crises.pdf: 761100 bytes, checksum: 7c985eac9766620ac562288a5c15f07d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-05-22T17:50:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Liquidity_constraints_and_collateral_crises.pdf: 761100 bytes, checksum: 7c985eac9766620ac562288a5c15f07d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-22T17:50:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Liquidity_constraints_and_collateral_crises.pdf: 761100 bytes, checksum: 7c985eac9766620ac562288a5c15f07d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-16 / Asset-backed securities were widely traded. Arguably, this happened because they were complicated claims, in the sense that it was very costly to assess their fundamental value. Here, we show that if this is the case, then the emergence of alternative ways to address liquidity needs, by undermining the liquidity role of these assets and reinforcing the relevance of their fundamental value, may increase the incentives to acquire information about them, and negatively impact the credit market. Hence, our results suggest that it is easier for these assets to accomplish the role of private money when there are fewer alternative ways to address liquidity needs. / Os títulos lastreados em ativos eram amplamente negociados. Provavelmente, isso aconteceu porque eram títulos complicadas, no sentido de que era muito custoso avaliar seu valor fundamental. Aqui, mostramos que, se este é o caso, então o surgimento de formas alternativas de atender às necessidades de liquidez, ao enfraquecer o papel de liquidez desses ativos e reforçar a relevância de seu valor fundamental, pode aumentar os incentivos para obter informações sobre eles e impactar negativamente o mercado de crédito. Portanto, nossos resultados sugerem que é mais fácil para esses ativos desempenharem o papel do dinheiro privado quando há menos formas alternativas de atender às necessidades de liquidez.

Submitted by Jaqueline Silva (jtas29@gmail.com) on 2016-10-18T18:57:37Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Hallhane Machado - 2016.pdf: 2209756 bytes, checksum: 8608379a53ecf24d5256ec218b0c4fae (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Jaqueline Silva (jtas29@gmail.com) on 2016-10-18T18:57:54Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Hallhane Machado - 2016.pdf: 2209756 bytes, checksum: 8608379a53ecf24d5256ec218b0c4fae (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-18T18:57:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Hallhane Machado - 2016.pdf: 2209756 bytes, checksum: 8608379a53ecf24d5256ec218b0c4fae (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-07-01 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Dans les années 1930, tant les institutions que les auteurs dominants du contexte intellectuel français se sont interessés à un mouvement philosophique dont de nombreux concepts se distinguaient fortement de ceux admis par le milieu philosophique français: le Cercle de Vienne. Cet intérêt a donné lieu à des colloques ainsi qu’à des publications des traductions, des compte-rendus et présentations des théses de ce Mouvement autrichien. A la même période, émergeaient grâce à Gaston Bachelard et Alexandre Koyré une épistemologie historique et une histoire philosophique des sciences. Notre hypothése de travail dans cette étude est que de tels événements ne sont pas isolés. Le passage du Cercle de Vienne en France et les positions philosophiques bachelardiennes et koyréenne peuvent être conçues comme le résultat d’une même préoccupation : les crises des fondements de différents savoirs, les crises de la raison. Le milieu philosophique français a vu dans le Mouvement Viennois une possible solution, d’ailleurs écartée aprés examen et analyse d’auteurs comme Émile Meyerson, Jean Cavaillès, Albert Lautman, Gaston Bachelard, Alexandre Koyré et Federigo Enriques, au probléme des crises. Pour eux, la thése d’une raison catégorique et absolue était inadmissible. C’est donc au moment même où ils ont connu la proposition viennoise que Koyré e Bachelard ont élaboré une histoire philosophique et une épistémologie historique fondées sur une conception de la raison intégrant l’idée de crise. La raison n’est pas absolue, éternelle. Elle passe par des mutations, des révolutions. Les crises sont des périodes de transformations des fondements, aprés lesquelles la raison n’est pas détruite mais rénovée, transformée en un nouveau genre de raison. Koyré e Bachelard ont ainsi donné une nouvelle réponse aux crises, où les problémes de la thése autrichienne sont absents. / Nos anos 1930, instituições e autores proeminentes do contexto intelectual francês direcionaram sua atenção para um movimento filosófico que trazia em seu interior concepções muito distintas daquelas admitidas pelo meio filosófico da França: o Círculo de Viena. Realizaram congressos, publicaram traduções, resenhas e exposições das teses do Movimento austríaco. Nesse mesmo período, Gaston Bachelard e Alexandre Koyré traziam à luz uma epistemologia histórica e uma história filosófica das ciências. A hipótese sobre a qual nos debruçamos neste trabalho é a de que tais acontecimentos não estão isolados. A passagem do Círculo de Viena na França e as posturas filosóficas bachelardiana e koyreniana podem ser concebidas como frutos de uma mesma preocupação: as crises dos fundamentos de diversos saberes, as crises da razão. O meio filosófico francês viu no Movimento vienense uma possível solução ao problema das crises, que, logo após ser conhecida e analisada por autores como Émile Meyerson, Jean Cavaillès, Albert Lautman, Gaston Bachelard, Alexandre Koyré e Federigo Enriques, foi descartada. Para eles, era inadmissível uma proposta que delineasse uma concepção de razão categórica e absoluta. É nesse mesmo momento, em que se puseram a conhecer a proposta vienense, que Koyré e Bachelard elaboraram uma história filosófica e uma epistemologia histórica fundamentadas em uma concepção de razão que abarcava a ideia de crise. A razão não é absoluta, eterna, mas passa por mutações, revoluções. As crises são períodos de transformação de fundamentos, depois dos quais a razão não é destruída, mas renovada, tornando-se um novo tipo de razão. Assim, Koyré e Bachelard davam uma nova resposta às crises, onde não mais se faziam presentes os problemas da proposta austríaca.