Law and development mainstream conceptions of labour market policies, while still marked by long-dominant views of contract law as economically superior to any labour regulation, have recently incorporated certain specific labour (human) rights. Core labour rights are thus accepted by global policy-makers, on the basis of their radical distinction from non-core labour standards and their rationalization according to certain foundational principles. This thesis criticizes the prevailing dichotomies between core labour rights and non-core standards, on the one hand, and contract law and regulation, on the other, bringing to bear the post-legal realist idea of legal indeterminacy. It argues that the organizing legal concepts that justify these dichotomies contain gaps and ambiguities that often lead to contradictory and indeterminate outcomes. It thus suggests that the core/non-core labour standards and contract/regulation distinctions are unproductive and should be rejected if a better conception of labour governance is to come to fruition.

This thesis examines gender violence in Argentina in the context of the historic continuum of gender inequality, with a more in-depth analysis of gender violence during the 1976-1983 dictatorship. I argue that gender violence is perpetuated and normalized by its lack of recognition as a political issue with ramifications extending to daily life. I use the construction of a collective memory of the Dictatorship as a framework for making the intricacies of gender violence more visible and provide a detailed analysis of two laws against gender violence to demonstrate its systematic nature. Ultimately, laws are not sufficient to address such a widespread issue, and society is responsible for creating a dialogue that presents gender violence in a context that adequately addresses its complexities. Esta tesis examina la violencia de género en Argentina en el contexto del continuo histórico de la desigualdad entre los géneros, y en particular analiza la violencia de género de la Dictadura de 1976-1983 y de la actualidad. Propongo que la carencia de reconocer la violencia de género en un contexto político la perpetúa y la normaliza. Utilizo la construcción de la memoria colectiva de la Dictadura como un ejemplo de estrategias para visibilizar las complejidades de la violencia de género y analizo dos leyes contra tal violencia para demonstrar cuán sistemática es. Al fin, las leyes no son suficientes para abordar un problema tan generalizado y normalizado y la sociedad es responsable de desarrollar un diálogo sobre la violencia de género y sus complejidades.

The purpose of this thesis was to analyze four of the most commonly applied theories in jurisprudence by means of using the philosophical framework of in-tegral theory. Natural law, legal positivism, legal realism and critical legal theory were analyzed to find out how they relate to each other and to see what their strengths and weaknesses are in an integral perspective. The integral theory was created by the American philosopher Ken Wilber (1949-). Two of the main com-ponents of the theory are the four quadrants and the levels of development. The quadrants describe dimensions and perspectives of reality, and consists of the inner individual (subjective) quadrant, the outer individual (objective) quadrant, the inner collective (intersubjective) quadrant and the outer collective (interob-jective) quadrant. Individual values develop through different levels in a specific order, as is described in the second component of the integral theory. Different adult individuals can therefore be on different levels of development. This devel-opment is not only seen in individuals, but is also seen in historical and collective development. The levels that both individuals and societies develop through in-cludes (but are not limited to): the absolutistic (traditional) level, the rational (modern) level and the relativistic (postmodern) level.When using the integral theory to analyze the four theories in jurisprudence it became apparent that they can be mapped onto the integral framework. Natural law, which focuses on morality, can be placed in the intersubjective quadrant, and is mostly associated with the traditional level of development. Legal positiv-ism stems mostly from the interobjective quadrant where law is first and fore-most a system of rules that are enforced by different societal institutions. Legal positivism is typically associated with the modern level of development. Legal realism is also typically associated with the modern level of development and focuses a lot on the objective quadrant: on empiricism and on what judges actu-ally do. Critical legal theory is strongly associated with the postmodern level of development. It emphasizes different kinds of oppression in the intersubjective and in the interobjective quadrant. This thesis presents further examples of how the integral theory can be applied in legal theory and practice.

Certain Small Island Developing States (hereinafter the "SIDS") such as Kiribati or Tuvalu are often incorrectly called "sinking islands" because their highest points are located just a few meters above the sea level. Sea level rise may turn their territories to uninhabitable land gradually disappearing beneath the tide. Worsening of the environmental conditions causes internal displacement, migration and other problems. SIDS repeatedly brought their plight to the United Nations Security Council (the "UNSC") during its meetings in 2007, 2011, 2015, 2018 and 2019. They demanded that the UNSC should deal with their situation as a potential security issue and safeguard more equal distribution of environmental security risks and costs. During the UNSC negotiations, various states attempted to interpret and re-interpreted the UNSC mandate in order to suit their interests. The representatives of SIDS suggested that the UNSC should be a body based on the principles of distributive justice decision-making and thus safeguard fairer sharing of threats and burdens, including those of environmental character. The rapidly developing states strongly opposed; they implicitly claimed that the UNSC should be based rather on the principles of commutative justice, i.e. decide in strictly given situations of violations of...

Les arguments du mouvement Critical Legal Studies sur l’indétermination du droit ne sont doublés d’aucune théorie sur la légitimité des interprétations qu’offrent les juges et donc d’aucun critère juridique pour critiquer une décision. La théorie pluraliste critique du droit, qui prend acte de la pluralité du droit officiel pour redéfinir le phénomène juridique plutôt que de nier qu’il puisse exister, pourrait toutefois fournir un tel critère. En effet, elle présente plusieurs correspondances avec les travaux de Dworkin, qui défend que les citoyens sont en droit d’obtenir les fruits d’une attitude interprétative en germe dans le concept même de droit. Ces deux théories maintiennent que le droit sert à reconnaître la valeur de l’histoire d’un groupe dans sa conception de lui-même tout en soutenant qu’il doit trouver une pertinence contemporaine pour être effectif et légitime. Les pluralistes priorisent toutefois la résonance actuelle des règles de droit et croient que toute communauté est divisée entre diverses définitions du bien. Selon eux, le droit est avant tout un procédé pour penser la conduite humaine et lui conférer un sens, qui dépend des capacités créatrices des citoyens. Chaque règle est alors la cause d’une pluralité d’ordres juridiques concurrents. Suivant ce portrait, seule l’acceptation d’une interprétation par un groupe, sa capacité à lui reconnaître un sens, pourrait rendre cette interprétation légitime. Ce critère nous mène vers un modèle de justice négociée où deux personnes s’adressent à un juge pour développer une lecture en commun du droit, pour identifier une interprétation légitime dans leurs univers juridiques respectifs. / No theory of the legitimacy of judges accompanies the Critical Legal Studies’ arguments on the indeterminacy of law, which entails there are no criteria to identify a legitimate interpretation. Critical legal pluralism, which redefines law to take account of its inherent plurality rather than denying its very possibility on these grounds, could however provide such criteria. Indeed, it presents many resemblances with Dworkin’s theory of law which argues that citizens are entitled to reap the benefits of the interpretative nature of law. Both theories defend that law allows to bridge a group’s past, which is essential to its self-understanding, with the present, and both insist that law must be made to appear relevant in the present. Pluralists however prioritize the current significance of law and stress that communities are split by a variety of definitions of the good. According to them, law is mainly a process to think about human conduct and grant it meaning, and it depends as such on citizens’ creative capacities. Accordingly, only an interpretation that is accepted by a group and seen as meaningful can be considered legitimate. This criterion forces us to consider a form of negotiated justice, where two persons consult a judge to develop a common reading of a rule which would be legitimate in each person’s legal universe.

Les conceptions jusnaturalistes peuvent paraître mineures dans la philosophie etla théorie du droit françaises à la différence de leur présence massive dans un enseignementdu droit à l’étranger mais elles n’en ressortent pas moins directement ou indirectement dudroit privé en France si l’on en analyse de près certains aspects de la doctrine, de la loi et dela jurisprudence notamment dans le domaine patrimonial des biens et des contrats. Lesdialogues de nature philosophique éclairent la polysémie qui s’attache au « jusnaturalisme »,au mot « nature » ou à ses équivalents, dénonçant une sorte de structure commune(d’invariant), dans des débats juridiques impliquant les situations les plus pratiques àcommencer par le droit de propriété. Il s’agit de montrer dans ce travail qu’il existe donc unargument de type jusnaturaliste sous-jacent à un droit qui n’en a pas toujours conscience.Cette thèse entend par là ne pas séparer l’étude de la doctrine et du droit positif, ensélectionnant les aspects les plus représentatifs et l’ensemble le plus pluraliste desconceptions jusnaturalistes et de leurs antithèses positivistes contemporaines qui serventhabituellement à discréditer toute référence à la notion de « nature », comme à sessubstituts. Il existe différents modes d’émergence des arguments jusnaturalistes. Unenouvelle lecture du droit positif peut être proposée si l’on veut assumer toutes les exigences,dans leurs dimensions critiques, qui conduisent parfois à des reclassements et qui éclairentsur des relations insoupçonnées à propos d’éléments éloignés. / The concept of “natural law” may seem minor in French philosophy and Frenchtheory of law, unlike their massive presence in legal studies abroad, but they do not standdirectly or indirectly under private law in France if analysed in certain aspects of the doctrineof the law and jurisprudence, in particular in the field of heritage property and contracts. Inlight of the philosophical dialogues which have illuminated the polisemy attached to the term“natural law” or the word “nature” in legal proceedings involving the most practical situationsstarting with the right to property, it is shown in this work that there is a natural law argumentof this type underlying a right that is not always conscious. This thesis does not separate thestudy of the theory of positive law taken in its most representative aspects and the morepluralistic theories of natural law and the rival views of contemporary positivists which usuallytend to reject any reference to or notion of natural law. There are different forms of apparitionof natural law arguments. By means of arguments, jurists look at law studies in a new light.