本研究目的在瞭解師生進行「公平分配」概念討論教學之情形，透過自身教學的反思，探討教師在設計「公平分配概念」課程上的考量，以及教師面對「公平分配概念」課程時，該具備之教學技巧。 研究者設計一系列的公平分配課程並實際進班教學，收集資料的方式主要包括錄影、錄音、研究日誌。研究對象為研究者本身以及某大班幼兒共十五名。 研究結果發現，設計公平分配課程時，必須考量到「程序性原則」、「繼續性原則」以及「範圍」。且必須注意內容與目標之間的一致性，並考量到幼兒之特性，與日常生活經驗結合，採多元評量，並依幼兒的學習情況適時調整課程。 在教學時需注意討論位置的安排，以及討論規則之訂定，對討論時之秩序以及對話的影響。在問話內容上，有「資訊性的討論」、「問題性的討論」、「經驗感受的討論」、「想像及創造的討論」四類型，其中後三個容易引起幼兒之間有對話互動。在問題概念層次上，有「記憶性問題」、「轉譯性問題」、「聚斂性問題」、「解釋性問題」、「擴散性問題」、五類型，其中後兩個容易引起幼兒之間有對話互動。 在對話類型部份，「反問以及轉問」最能引起幼兒之間的對話互動；而「補充覆述」則能夠提供幼兒對話的一種可能性；「提示」、「深入探究」能幫助教師所回應的該名幼兒學習更加深入；至於「判斷」、「總結」能讓幼兒知曉何種答案是適當的。 最後，針對以上幾點發現以及在研究過程中所遇見的困難與限制提出幾點對幼稚園教師以及未來研究者的一些建議。 / The purpose of this study is to explore the situation of teacher and students use discussion method on distributive-Justice concept. Through reflection on oneself, focuses on how to design distributive-Justice concept curriculum and the teaching skill that the teachers must have. The writer designs a series of distributive-Justice concept curriculum and teaches myself. The collecting methods included video recording, taping and journal. The study samples are I and 15 children between 5-year-old and 6-year-old. The main conclusions were drawn as follows: Designing distributive-Justice concept curriculum must to think about ‘sequence’、‘continuity’ and ‘scope’. Then must to note the contents accord with the objective, and think about the character of child to match activities of daily livings, and use multiple evaluations, and regulate curriculum by children’s learning. When teaching must to think about arrange of seat and discussion order. On ‘question contents’ , there are four types：‘material discussion’、‘ question discussion’、‘experience discussion’ and ‘creative discussion’, among these, the last two easy to cause conversation among children. On ‘question concept’ , there are five types：‘memory question’、‘translate question’、‘gathered question’、 ‘explanation question’ and ‘extended question’ , among these, the last two easy to cause conversation among children. On ‘conversation type’, ‘reask’ easy to cause conversation among children；‘supplement’ provide the chance of the conversation among children ; ‘cue’ and ‘explore’ can accelerate child learning in depth ; ‘estimate’ and ‘summarize’ can make child know which answer is adequately. According to the conclusions, some suggestions to kindergarten teacher and the future research.

This thesis defends John Rawls’s constructivist theory of justice against three distinct challenges. Part one addresses G.A. Cohen’s claim that Rawls’s constructivism is committed to a mistaken thesis about the relationship between facts and principles. It argues that Rawls’s constructivist procedure embodies substantial moral commitments, and offers an intra-normative reduction rather than a metaethical account. Rawls’s claims about the role of facts in moral theorizing in A Theory of Justice should be interpreted as suggesting that some of our moral beliefs, which we are inclined to hold without reference to facts, are, in fact, true, because certain facts obtain. This thesis and the acknowledgement of the moral assumptions of Rawls’s constructivism help to show that Rawls does not, and does not need to, deny Cohen’s thesis. Part two defends the characterization of the decision problem in Rawls’s original position as a decision problem under uncertainty. Rawls stipulates that the denizens of the original position lack information that they could use to arrive at estimates of the likelihood of ending up in any given social position. It has been argued that Rawls does not have good grounds for this stipulation. I argue that given the nature of the value function we should attribute to the denizens of the original position and our cognitive limitations, which also apply to the denizens of the original position, their decision problem can be characterized as one under uncertainty even if we stipulate that they know that they have an equal chance of being in any individual’s place. Part three assesses the claim that a true commitment to Rawls’s difference principle requires a further commitment to an egalitarian ethos. This egalitarian ethos is offered as a means to bring about equality and Pareto-optimality. Accordingly, I try to undermine the case for an egalitarian ethos by challenging the desirability of the ends it is supposed to further or by showing that it is redundant. I argue that if primary goods are the metric of justice, then Pareto optimality in the space of the metric of justice is undesirable. I then argue that if the metric of justice is welfare, depending on the theory of welfare we adopt, an egalitarian ethos will either be redundant or will have objectionably paternalistic consequences.

No description available.

The Issue of the Just Distribution of Limited Resources in the Health Sector The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the current state and development of the principal legal institutes concerning health care financing and to define their relationship to the main principles of distributive justice. Health care financing is a specific issue, from both the economic as well as legal point of view, especially because human life is dealt with in this domain. The first chapter therefore deals with distributive justice in health care as a potentially leading principle for elaborating legislation. The history of philosophy has provided legislators with some useful tools which can help them to decide whether a norm can be labelled as "just". The following part of the text consists of three chapters which deal with different levels of redistribution. In the first chapter, the national level is focused on, the key issues being the evolution of health care systems, their typology according to the financial sources (taxes, insurance or private financing) and main advantages and disadvantages of each of the options. Furthermore, this part of the text discusses the total amount of money provided for health care by the state, extra financial resources and the question of the right to health. A characteristic...

Les élections politiques dans la République de Venise provoquaient des tensions entre normes républicaines, légales, sociales et religieuses. En conséquence, les patriciens développèrent une culture informelle constituée de diverses pratiques appelée “broglio” pour concilier ces normes. Cette culture se déroulait en parallèle aux élections et pouvait à la fois les dévier de leur objectif principal que les rendre plus fluide. Cette étude a pour objectif de mettre en lumière comment une culture pré-électorale de la campagne politique a réussi à s’imposer alors qu’elle était interdite.1500 patriciens prenaient place dans le Grand Conseil chaque dimanche et pendant les jours fériés pour élire les candidats. Le système électoral était strict : à travers une procédure complexe, seul le meilleur, le plus compétent et le plus loyal envers la patrie devait être élu sans prendre en considération les liens familiaux et clientélaires. Les patriciens appelaient ce principe “justice distributive” en référence au concept d’Aristote. Or, les patriciens devaient également soutenir les intérêts de leur famille. De plus, ils étaient intégrés dans un réseau clientélaire où les obligations mutuelles devaient être respectées. Si un patricien ne les honorait pas, il était exclu de la vie politique. Afin de réconcilier les normes républicaines avec les enjeux familiaux ou les intérêts de leurs amis et clients, les patriciens ont développé une culture informelle parallèle aux élections : le broglio. Certaines pratiques étaient illégales mais elles étaient tolérées de fait. D’autres, telle la corruption par l’argent, n’étaient ni légales ni légitimes. / Political elections in the early modern Republic of Venice used to generate tension between republican, legal, social and religious behavioral norms. As a result, Venetians developed a culture of informal practices called broglio to harmonize these norms. This culture ran parallel to elections and could both thwart and smooth them. The analysis aims to highlight how a pre-election culture of political campaign managed to establish itself though it was forbidden. 1500 Patricians sat in the Great Council every Sunday and even on public holidays to elect candidates. The electoral system was strict: through a complex procedure, only the best, the most competent, and those most loyal to the motherland were to be elected, without any consideration of familial and friendship ties. Patricians called it distributive justice, a concept dating back to Aristotle. Patricians had to favour the interests of the family. Besides, they were integrated in clientele networks, where mutual obligations had to be honoured. Whoever did not respect his social duties was excluded from political life. To reconcile republican norms with familial and friendship’s issues, they established an informal culture that existed in parallel with the elections: the broglio. Some practices were legally not permitted, yet tolerated to a certain extent. Others, such as monetary bribery were inacceptable at all levels.

No description available.

The purpose of this thesis is to present a conception of commutative justice. Commutative justice is defined as that part of justice in transfer (as opposed to justice in acquisition as well as distributive or rectificatory justice), which deals with transferring goods via market exchanges. Thus, this thesis examines which conditions a market exchange has to fulfil in order to be called just. Whereas traditionally speaking conditions like non-coercion or non-deception have received most attention – i.e. conditions focusing on the act of exchanging itself – the thesis' focus is a different one. It argues that we necessarily also have to take into account the consequences of a certain market exchange in order to judge whether it is just. Therefore, the thesis proceeds to analyze how problematic market outcomes like externalities, the formation of monopolies, violations of the Lockean proviso, inequality, and commodification affect the justice of the market exchanges which gave rise to them. The thesis finds that we need to broaden our conception of commutative justice – but only a little. Whereas the issues of externalities, violations of the Lockean proviso, and inequalities do not affect whether a certain market exchange is just, monopolization and commodification do. In order to be commutatively just, a market exchange must not only fulfil the traditional conditions of non-coercion, non-deception, etc., but it also must not bring about certain forms of monopoly nor further certain kinds of commodification. This conclusion leaves open the idea that, say, inequality or externalities could be relevant to distributive justice if not commutative justice.

A presente tese trata da teoria da justiça de Adam Smith, especialmente das operações de linguagem realizadas por ela no conceito de justiça distributiva, contribuindo para o processo histórico de deslizamento deste conceito, a resultar na inexigibilidade jurídica dos temas distributivos e sua confusão com o conceito de caridade. Para isso, valemo-nos da metodologia proposta por Quentin Skinner e J.G.A. Pocock, de acordo com a qual é necessária a contextualização do texto, para se identificarem as linguagens da teoria política com as quais o autor teve que dialogar. Assim, a tese é divida em duas partes. Na primeira, buscando se tal contextualização, foram estudados autores que antecederam ou conviveram com Adam Smith, para se identificarem os problemas filosóficos por ele enfrentados e a maneira como buscaram resolvê-los. No primeiro capítulo foram vistas as instituições tradicionais escocesas, especialmente a jurisprudênciade Lord Stair (1619-1695). No seguinte, examinou-se o movimento de transição dos filósofos escoceses, buscando reformular tais instituições, a fim de adaptá-las à sociedade comercial inglesa, tendo em vista o Ato de União de 1707. Assim, trata-se da teoria da justiça de Gershom Carmichael (1672-1729), Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) e Lord Kames (1696-1782). Desta primeira parte, notou-se que, na transição filosófica moral escocesa, foi dedicada especial atenção à concepção de virtude. Na segunda parte, no terceiro capítulo se fez uma contextualização histórica e notou-se que o conceito de virtude desempenhou um papel fundamental nos debates políticos ingleses dos séculos. XVII e XVIII. No quarto, tratou-se do papel da imaginação na teoria do conhecimento de Smith, falando-se sobre a imaginação simpatética (da filosofia moral), mas especialmente da imaginação teorética (das ciências naturais). Constatando-se a pretensão de Smith em aplicar o método da ciência especulativa a todas as áreas do conhecimento, conclui-se por sua necessidade de naturalizar as instituições sociais, a fim de que houvesse um objeto a ser espelhado (speculum) pelas ciências especulativas. Assim, no quinto, se viu como Smith procurou naturalizar a instituição social da linguagem. No sexto, como, através de sua história conjectural, buscou naturalizar a própria sociedade. No sétimo, como, apropriando-se de diversas tradições filosóficas, e operando deslizes em seus conceitos de virtude, Smith naturaliza sua concepção geral de virtude, decorrente da naturalização de suas quatro virtudes particulares (prudência, benevolência, justiça e autodomínio), fazendo com que ela não mais dependa de uma perspectiva de racionalidade prática. No oitavo, como a virtude particular da justiça foi restrita ao campo da justiça comutativa, que seria a única exigível, e como a justiça distributiva se tornou objeto da benevolência (caridade). No nono, como os temas distributivos foram relegados à política econômica. Ao final, concluiu-se que, com a naturalização da virtude e a restrição da exigibilidade da justiça ao campo comutativo, a possibilidade de distribuição deixou de ser matéria deontológica e passou a depender ontologicamente da eficiência produtiva, deixando a lógica distributiva a se referir a um critério racional deontológico de igualdade, passando sua causa a se submeter à lógica econômica de eficiência, e a maneira da distribuição, ao sentimentalismo moral da caridade. / The present thesis concerns Adam Smiths theory of justice, in particular the operations of language realized by it in the concept of distributive justice, contributing to the historical process of erosion of this concept and resulting in the judicial uncoerciveness of the distributive themes and their confusion with the concept of charity. For that, we make use of the methodology proposed by Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, according to which the text must be contenxtualized, in order that the political theory language with which the author had to hold a dialogue with can be identified. In that manner, the thesis is split into two parts. In the first, aiming for such a contextualization, we study the authors that either preceded Adam Smith or were his contemporaries, so that the philosophical problems by him faced and the manners in which resolutions were attempted can be identified. In the first chapter the traditional Scottish institutions are seen, in particular the jurisprudence of Lord Stair (1619 -1695). In the following, we examined the movement of transition of the Scottish philosophers, which aimed to reformulate such institutions with the goal of adapting them to the commercial English society, in the light of the Union Act of 1707. Thus, the treatment is of the theories of justice of Gershom Carmichael (1672 -1729), Francis Hutcheson (1694 -1746) and Lord Kames (1696 -1782). From this first part, it was noted that in the transition of the Scottish moral philosophy special attention was given to the concept of virtue. In the second part, in the third chapter, after performing a historical contextualization, it is noted that the concept of virtue played a fundamental role in the English political debates of the XVII e XVIII centuries. In the fourth, the role of imagination in Smith\'s theory of knowledge is treated, discussing sympathetic imagination (of moral philosophy), but particularly the theoretical imagination (of the natural sciences). Having established Smith\'s intention in applying the speculative science method to all areas of knowledge, his necessity in naturalizing the social institutions in ascertained, in order that there is an object to be mirrored by (speculum) the speculative sciences. Hence, in the fifth, it is seen how Smith aimed to naturalize the social institution of language. In the sixth, how, through his conjectural history, he aimed to naturalize society itself. In the seventh, appropriating himself of various philosophical traditions and operating shifts in his concepts of virtue, Smith naturalizes his general conception of virtue, itself derived from the naturalization of his four particular virtues (prudence, benevolence, justice and self-command), so that it no longer depends on a practical rationality perspective. In the eighth, it is seen how the particular virtue of justice was restricted to the field of commutative justice, which would be the only claimable one, one, and how distributive justice became the object of benevolence (charity). In the ninth, we see how distributives themes were relegated to economic policy. Finally, it is concluded that with the naturalization of virtue and the restriction of the liability of justice to the commutative field, the possibility of distribution ceased to be a deontological matter and became ontologically dependent on productivec efficiency, leaving distributional logic to refer to a criterium of deontological equality, its cause submitted to economic\'s logic of efficiency, and the manner of distribution, to the moral moral sentimentalism of charity.

A presente dissertação busca realizar uma discussão pormenorizada de dois grandes teóricos da justiça distributiva: John Rawls e Ronald Dworkin. O objetivo é verificar como a meritocracia e a responsabilidade individual são acomodadas, de forma normativamente apropriada, nessas diferentes interpretações do igualitarismo, ressaltando suas justificativas para a existência de desigualdades socioeconômicas, isto é, sob que condições estas poderiam ser consideradas legítimas. Além disso, verificar-se-á que tipo de políticas públicas o Estado estaria autorizado a adotar, se levar em consideração as implicações de cada uma dessas concepções de justiça. / This dissertation seeks to accomplish a detailed discussion of two major theorists of distributive justice: John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. The aim is to check how meritocracy and individual responsibility are accommodated, in normatively appropriate way, in these different interpretations of egalitarianism, highlighting the justifications for the existence of socioeconomic inequalities, that is, under what conditions these could be considered legitimate. Furthermore, this study will verify what kind of policies the state would be authorized to adopt, taking into account the implications of each of these conceptions of justice.

Need is a concept that carries intuitive appeal in moral decision-making. As it stands, need is relatively under-theorised, given its currency not just in philosophical argumentation but in news coverage, charitable appeals, and political practice. Need claims carry compelling normative force, and they are amenable to widespread support as our most basic needs are some of the things we most transparently share with our fellow human beings. However, how should we understand that normative force? Is need best understood to compel us as a matter of justice? I begin my account by considering the kind of need relevant to the project. I build from an understanding of need as a three-place relation, which is by its nature needing for a purpose. I suggest that morally important needs are those which aim at the objective interests that all people have in virtue of what is good for each of us qua human beings ('non-arbitrary needs'). Further, I distinguish the existentially urgent subset of those non-arbitrary needs as 'basic needs.' Given this understanding, I consider how basic needs theory relates to its conceptual neighbours. I focus on capabilities as the nearest neighbours, but also comment on wants, interests, and rights. I judge that the theories developed by Martha Nussbaum (capabilities) and Len Doyal and Ian Gough (needs) benefit from a complementary reading, with each supplementing the other. I then draw from Amartya Sen's early writings on capabilities to ultimately see capabilities and needs as two sides of the same coin. This helps to situate needs theory in relation to a mainstream branch of political theory more generally, and indicates that we can recognise the special significance of needs without eschewing other morally important categories. I then move to establish a scope of justice that allows us to distinguish between duties of justice and other moral duties. If we think that duties of beneficence are weak and optional, whereas duties of justice are binding and enforceable, a great deal rides on how we characterise our duties to the global poor. I offer a 'moral enforceability' account, claiming that duties of justice are those which are, in principle, morally enforceable. It is the in-principle enforceability of justice duties which gives them teeth. Returning to need, I then ask how another's need comes to give me a moral reason for action. I canvas a range of existing accounts, many of which furnish important insights. I then propose that it is the morally relevant capacities of the being in need which gives them moral status such that their needing is morally significant. We are morally required to answer this need with responsiveness, as a demonstration of appropriate respect for the sort of being that the human in need is. If this is right, we are morally required to be responsive to need, even if we are not always required to reduce it. Finally, I bring the diverse strands of the foregoing argument together to return to the relationship between need and justice. I consider what a duty of responsiveness might amount to in practice, and suggest that our duties of responsiveness are best thought of as collective duties, grounded in the capacity of the global well-off to contribute. Further, I argue that duties of responsiveness are a matter of justice, as they are the sort of duties that are, in principle, morally enforceable. A wide range of threats to the necessary conditions for human flourishing, and even human life, are on the horizon, and many of these are uniquely collective challenges. The seriousness of those challenges, and the extent to which we have treated our responsibilities to those in need as discretionary in the past, means collective action and problem solving are called for when there are no easy answers.